

THE
CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW.

N^o LXXXV. OCTOBER 1896.

ART. I.—MR. GLADSTONE'S STUDIES ON
BUTLER.

Studies Subsidiary to the Works of Bishop Butler. By the
Right Hon. W. E. GLADSTONE. (Oxford, at the Clarendon Press.)

THE publication of the *Studies Subsidiary* to Bishop Butler's Works, which completes the new edition of Bishop Butler by Mr. Gladstone, awakens a double interest—the one centring around the great Bishop, whose works are now presented to us in an admirable form ; and the other around the eminent statesman who edits them. So far as Mr. Gladstone is concerned, the present work possesses a deep interest for the present generation ; but we think it will possess even a greater interest for the historian of the future. No doubt the future historian will have ample materials for the life of the great statesman in the political history of the period, the great contests of parties, and the splendid outbursts of oratory. But there is a point in the career of Mr. Gladstone, over and above his merits as a statesman, which is perfectly unique. We mean the vast, the almost unbounded, influence which for a long time he has exercised over the mind of the nation—an influence extending far beyond the party which he led. The great Midlothian campaign was an example of this influence ; but, as a manifestation of it, was perhaps not so striking as the many outbursts of popular sympathy. Judging of these from the outside, one can easily see that there was in them a feeling far deeper than the homage which the nation is ever ready to pay to a great statesman. Mr. Gladstone dominated the minds, and attracted the love, the trust, and the devotion of the people. Such a feature in his career

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can only be explained by going deep into his personality and character. Those who have long known him intimately will have the means of doing this, but after he has passed away it will be different. The historian of the future who wishes to sound this depth will naturally turn to utterances such as the Studies we are considering; and there he will find much to his purpose. He will be able to see what were the deepest feelings, the most abiding convictions, and the highest aims of a long and busy life.

In his declining years Mr. Gladstone has undertaken and carried out the editing and illustration of the great work which during a lifetime has been his favourite study and guide; and possibly this may have given rise to doubts and questionings. It may be asked, Why should he undertake this task? Why should one who does not profess to have studied the philosophical movements of the last three hundred years expound and recommend to the public a great philosophical work, and undertake the elucidation of many of the burning problems connected with it? The question is appropriate, and it suggests an answer of a negative character. But there is another aspect of the matter, which the wary reader would do well to weigh. Philosophy, no doubt, is a great thing, but it is not everything; and, unhappily, just at the present day philosophy is in a bad way. The philosophy of the present day, the issue of the contests of centuries, is concentrated in two opposing camps. On the one hand we have the Transcendentalists or modern Kantians, and on the other the Evolutionists, the Positivists, the Agnostics—or, as they are all neatly summed up by Mr. Balfour in one term—the Naturalists. Now, on the burning questions which bear on Bishop Butler's great work we know exactly what the Transcendentalists would say; we know also, with equal precision, what the Naturalists would say; but, unhappily, our distrust of the solutions tendered to us from both the opposing sides is equal to our knowledge of what they would be. The real truth is, that the philosophy of the present day has landed itself in a *cul de sac*, from which, apparently, there can be no issue, until some great creative philosophical genius shall arise, who will furnish a starting point, from which the human mind may again launch forth on a new philosophical career.

Under these circumstances the best thing, in our opinion, is to ignore philosophy and to treat the great problems from the point of view of common sense. In this way we might reasonably hope, from an able author, to obtain fresh light.

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And, indeed, only those who are ignorant of the all-important function played by common sense in the philosophical sphere could object to this procedure. It is true that common sense is not philosophy, as Dr. Reid and his successors in the Scottish school wrongly supposed. But common sense is the tribunal at whose bar every philosophical system must ultimately be tried. The truth is that philosophy is nothing else but the scientific analysis of the elements which go to make up the common sense of mankind; and the test of the success or failure of a philosophical system is simply whether this analysis has been rightly performed. Common sense asks, and imperatively demands an answer to, such questions as these: Does the system in question contradict the common understanding? Does it cover the *whole* ground of common sense? Or is it a system erected on one or more elements ignoring the rest? No system of philosophy, whether it will or no, can ultimately evade these questions. And the crumbling ruins of exploded systems scattered over the ages is proof of the efficiency and power of the tribunal we have indicated.

Yet the careful and intelligent reader will soon perceive that there is little fault to find with Mr. Gladstone's philosophical knowledge. His treatment of the great problems shows that he has a firm and comprehensive grasp of the points in dispute, and that he has brought to bear, in the rendering he has given of them, all the resources of a powerful intellect, remarkable for penetration and subtlety. But in truth the purely philosophical questions connected with Butler are the least important of all. The grand central point is that new moral and spiritual world, that scheme of things imperfectly comprehended, which he has delineated so artistically, and yet with such restrained and cautious pen. It is a world into which no one can enter by a cursory or even careful reading. It can only be entered by thinking it out step by step; when gradually it will rise before the mind of the student in all its beauty and awe. In this respect the qualifications of Mr. Gladstone as editor are pre-eminent. He has been a life-long student of Butler. Even as early as 1830 he wrote a paper, which we are glad to have reproduced; and, in some of his published letters, written to intimate friends, we see how all through life Butler has held the very highest place amongst his favourite guides. He has now given forth to the world the results of his study and meditation. To us there is something very touching in the fact that he has devoted the declining years of his life to the editing of this

favourite work, as also in the motto in which he expresses the attitude of his mind towards the great Bishop :

'Cujus sacra fero ingenti percussus amore.'

But there is another point which we think of great importance. If, as we believe, the study of Butler would be of especial advantage in the present age, surely it is a matter of no slight moment that an interest in it should be created by one who can throw a halo around it, by the attraction of a great name. And we do think that there is that in Butler which would tend much to still the doubts and dispel the scepticism of many of the educated laity, if only we could get the thoughts and the reasoning of Butler brought home to their minds. Then, for the clergy engaged in the active work of teaching, a revival of the study of Butler would be of vast moment. There is widely prevalent at the present day a spirit of optimism, a disposition to dwell exclusively on the love of God, unmindful of the solemn and even awful facts of our present life. A study of Butler would correct this tendency ; and without leading to an exclusive dwelling on 'the terrors of the Lord,' would yet tend to solemnize the mind, and would arm the teacher with a multitude of grave thoughts, which would be very effective when given forth to the people.

Turning now to Butler, it is matter of deep regret that our information as to his life and personality is so scanty. He was born at Wantage in 1692. His father, who was a substantial citizen of the place and a Presbyterian, destined him for the ministry of the Presbyterian Church. For this end he was sent, first, to the Grammar School at Wantage, and subsequently to a Dissenting academy at Gloucester—an institution which was afterwards removed to Tewkesbury. Here he had as his friend and fellow-pupil Mr. Secker. It appears that he made great progress in the study of theology ; and it was while still at Tewkesbury that he had his famous correspondence with Dr. Samuel Clarke, which ended in his being admitted to the warm friendship of that distinguished philosopher. But the most important event during his residence at Tewkesbury was his resolve, after a close examination of the Presbyterian tenets, to break with that religious body, and to join the Church of England. The student of Butler can easily see how the intellect of Butler, so cautious and tentative, must have recoiled from the over-dogmatism of the Calvinistic system—a system, too, erected on a foundation extremely narrow. At that early period, it is true, his intel-

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lectual tendencies would not be completely developed ; but the germs of them must have existed from the beginning, and probably in this early struggle the path which he was afterwards to tread so steadily was marked out.

It was natural that his father should be disappointed at this result, but he had the good sense to accept it ; and, as a consequence, Butler was sent to Oriel College, Oxford. While here he again added to his friends Mr. William Talbot, second son of Dr. William Talbot, successively Bishop of Oxford, Salisbury, and Durham. There must have been something singularly winning in the personality of Butler, as well as deep and solid, to attract to himself and to keep for a lifetime so many friends. It was to the friendship of Mr. Talbot, as also of Dr. Clarke, that Butler owed his appointment, in 1718, as Preacher at the Rolls. Here it was that the famous Fifteen Sermons were preached, which were subsequently given to the world in 1726. In the meantime Butler had been appointed, by Bishop Talbot, to the living of Houghton in the diocese of Durham ; and as that living was found to be unsuitable, he was subsequently removed in 1725 to the living of Stanhope in the same diocese. While he continued Preacher at the Rolls, Butler's time was divided between London and his country living. But after quitting the Rolls he resided during seven years in the country, devoting himself to the duties of his parish. This retirement of Butler was matter of great concern to his friends. It is said that when Queen Caroline asked Archbishop Blackburn whether Dr. Butler was not dead, his reply was : ' No, Madam ; but he is buried ! ' His absence from the world was deeply felt and regretted by his friends. Yet it may be doubted whether, in the Providence of God, this solitude may not have been a blessing, and in truth have contributed much to the great work of Butler's life. For, however engrossing the work of his parish may have been, it is clear that his great intellect must have remained in solitude ; and probably during this period from out of its depths the great work took shape.

At the end of seven years Dr. Butler again appeared in the great world. He was appointed chaplain to the Lord Chancellor and Prebendary of Rochester. Other promotions followed soon after. In 1736 he was appointed Clerk of the Closet to Queen Caroline ; and it was to her that he presented in the same year the famous *Analogy*. On her death in 1737 he was nominated to the see of Bristol, and consecrated December 3, 1738. Subsequently, he was appointed to the Deanery of St. Paul's, when he resigned the living of Stan-

hope. It was in 1750 that he was translated to the see of Durham, and in 1751 he delivered to the clergy his first and only charge. The subject of it was 'External Religion,' and it gave rise to considerable misapprehension. From a theological point of view, however, it is a document of great importance, and closely connected with his general system. It used to be very rare, but Mr. Gladstone has brought it to light, and given it an honoured place in his edition. Dr. Butler did not long enjoy the high dignity to which he had attained. After a short time his health began to decline; and on June 15, 1752, he entered on his rest, and was buried in Bristol Cathedral.

We thus see that the principal works of Bishop Butler are *Fifteen Sermons*, published in 1726, and the *Analogy*, with the *Dissertations*, published in 1736. Let us now look at the reception they met with from the public. Mr. Gladstone has shown that Butler never, to any extent, influenced the general opinion of Europe. We find that three German editions of the *Analogy* were published, one at Leipzig in 1756, another at Tübingen in 1779, and a third at Leipzig in 1787. Since then it does not appear that another edition has been called for, though the work has received commendation from various German writers, and quite recently from Lotze. Butler has been even more unsuccessful in France. It is true that a French edition was published, but it was the work of an Englishman, or executed under English influence, and it fell still-born from the press. This failure to influence the European mind is very remarkable; nor do we see well how it is to be accounted for. Certainly it forms a striking contrast to the reception his works have met with amongst ourselves. From the very first Butler's works took a hold of the Anglo-Saxon intellect which was quite phenomenal. Mr. Gladstone has collected much curious information bearing on this fact; and we are glad to present it in a condensed form to the reader.

A mere record of the editions printed is a remarkable testimony to the fact. As we have seen, the *Analogy* was first published in 1736. It was printed in quarto, and before the end of the year it was followed by another edition in octavo. Another edition, with some account of the author, was issued in 1738. As to subsequent editions issued in England during the eighteenth century we have no detailed information; but we know that they were many. Nor was it only in England that Butler's fame was witnessed to by editions of his works. The same was also true of Ireland and Scotland. An edition of the *Analogy* was published at

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Aberdeen in 1775, which bore the title of the seventh edition. Mr. Gladstone supposes that it was printed more especially for the use of the students at the University. But not for them only. There appears to have been also in Scotland an extensive popular demand. Mr. Gladstone has presented to us a picture of the seceders of Logie Almond in Perthshire, which is very characteristic of Scottish life during the last century. These hard-headed and horny-handed sons of toil, not absorbed in their daily work, but intent on the mysteries of God, of Providence, and human destiny, are presented to us as studying and discussing in the long winter evenings the deep things of the *Analogy*.

At length, in the beginning of the present century, an edition of the collected works was published in Edinburgh, in 1804; and this was rapidly followed in 1807 by an edition of the same at the Clarendon Press, Oxford. This fact would seem to imply the high, and even commanding, position which Butler had by this time attained both in England and in Scotland. Nor was his fame confined to these countries. As we have seen, he was not less studied and appreciated in Ireland, though we are not able to supply the details. When we come down to the present century, the high position of Butler is evidenced by the numerous popular editions that have issued from the press. Almost every publisher who has catered for the multitude during the present century has included in his list the famous *Analogy*. We happen to have before us at the present moment two of these editions, one by Bohn and the other by Tegg. Another evidence of continued popularity, perhaps even more striking, is furnished by the contents of bookstalls in our great towns. During the present century, and even at the present moment, one could not glance over the contents of these bookstalls without meeting with a copy, possibly several copies, of the *Analogy*. Nor has this devotion to Butler been confined to the three kingdoms. It has been not less remarkable in the Colonies and in the United States. Mr. Gladstone informs us that in the United States no less than nine editions of the *Analogy*, and scarcely fewer of the *Sermons*, have been published. And this bibliographical notice may well be completed by signaling the splendid edition of the works which we are now considering. The editor is one of England's greatest statesmen, and a lifelong student and admirer of Butler.

But the multiplicity of editions is only one of the elements we have to take into consideration in determining the place of Butler. There have been many notices and comments on

his works, mostly favourable, but others of an opposite character. Mr. Gladstone has given us the picture of the seceders of Logie Almond deep in the study of the *Analogy*. And not only they, but men of much higher standing. In fact, during the last century, there is hardly a name renowned in the literary world from which there has not emanated some notice or comment on Butler. Mr. Gladstone mentions the notice and criticisms of Lord Kames on the *Analogy*; and Dr. Hanna, in his prefatory notice, published with Chalmers's *Prælections on the Analogy*, mentions seven works of animadversion or comment dated between 1737 and 1794. All this shows the high place which Butler had attained in the general estimation before the end of the last century. Then during the present century a seal was, as it were, set to this estimate when, between sixty and seventy years back, Butler took his place by the side of Aristotle among the standard books for the final examinations in the University of Oxford. It is true that subsequently, mainly through the influence of Mr. Mark Pattison, Butler was removed from this place of honour. But this step is much to be regretted. The student of Butler is well aware that, not only from the point of view of religious faith, but quite as much from the point of view of success in the great professions, the imbibing of the spirit of Butler by young men is of great moment. One would hope, that as a consequence of the work of Mr. Gladstone, the question may be reconsidered, and that Butler may be restored to his former place. At any rate the admirer of Butler has the satisfaction of knowing that his works were prominently introduced and recommended in Cambridge by Dr. Whewell—a name famous not only in science, but much more in philosophy. Nor were the admirers of Butler confined to great names of the last and beginning of the present century. All through the present century, and especially in recent times, men of high standing in the literary and scientific world have no less recognized his position and estimated his work. It is true that while unanimously recognizing his great ability and high standing as a moral and religious writer, they have passed criticisms on his work; and some have even given out the idea that Butler, however suitable in the past century, is not adapted to meet the wants of the present age. Mr. Gladstone has replied to some of the most prominent of these critics, viz. Mr. Bagehot, Miss Hennell, Mr. Leslie Stephen; and Mr. Matthew Arnold; and in doing so has brought out the fact that Butler in their hands has been largely misapprehended; or, at least, that they have not

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penetrated into the inner sanctuary of his thought. There is nothing to be wondered at in this; for Butler is a man that cannot properly be understood till after deep study and meditation.

Such being the high position which Butler at once took and has ever since kept, it becomes of great interest to trace out and, if it may be, discover the causes which have led to it. Mr. Gladstone has pointed out that the attraction has not been on account of literary style, or fine writing. There is nothing answering to that description to be found in Butler. Indeed some of his critics have gone so far as to disparage his style; as, for instance, Mr. Bagehot, who says, 'in some places the mode of statement is even stupid.' This is really too much. In regard to Butler's style, while allowing that it is neither florid nor to the ordinary reader attractive, yet we would wish to point out that it has other qualities of a solid character. If we take his sentences one by one, we find that they are constructed with infinite care, so as to express the thought intended to be expressed, neither more nor less. Then, in Butler, there is a grandeur of progression in his thought which appeals to the serious student. Sentence follows sentence in regular order, each bringing its contribution to the train of thought which is being pursued. Surely this is a high excellence as regards style, and it can only be properly appreciated when put in comparison with others. We know of writers of acknowledged weight and excellence, whose sentences, so far from being consecutive, have all the appearance of being thrown out at random, so that the student has infinite labour in arriving at the general drift. This is never the case with Butler; sentence after sentence comes forth in orderly progression; and all that is required is to imbibe them successively and reflect upon the facts.

It may be allowed, however, that the attraction has not been style. Let us next see whether it may not be found in his method. Mr. Gladstone has laid great stress, and we think rightly, on the method of Butler as contributing to his general acceptance and popularity. It is a purely inductive method; he sets himself to collect facts and to reason on them. This was an entirely new departure on the part of Butler. Up to his time, in philosophy generally, and more especially in morals, questions were argued, not inductively, but on general principles of reason. The effect of this was that they were, thereby, removed from the cognizance of the general public; for without a considerable mental training

the abstract terms and ideas of reason cannot be apprehended. When Butler based his treatise upon facts, the effect of this was that he brought his subject within the sphere of the ordinary understanding. We have here, no doubt, a leading cause of his general acceptance, viz. that he made himself intelligible. But to be intelligible is not everything. If we would understand the attraction which Butler exercised over the popular mind, we must consider further the nature of his facts and his mode of handling them. The facts were not remote or recondite, but those which are familiar to all, those which form the staple of our ordinary life. They are such as these. We have been placed here in this sublunary state of things gifted with an understanding and a moral nature. We are placed in circumstances in which we are compelled to act ; our actions draw after them consequences which we can foresee ; some of these consequences bring joy and happiness, others suffering and misery. Those which our moral nature pronounces good bring the happiness, those which the same nature pronounces evil bring the misery. Then other consequences attach to our actions. They alter our environment sometimes for weal, sometimes for woe. They change our character, sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse. The effect of action upon character may, in truth, be summed up in this way. At the end of our sublunary career we are pretty much what in the course of our lives we have made ourselves.

These, and facts like these, are the staple with which Butler deals. They are, no doubt, serious enough if reflected on, but they are familiar, and familiarity, if it does not always breed contempt, yet takes off the edge from things. With most people they are taken as a matter of course and regarded without emotion. But now look at the magic of Butler's pen. By broad statements and delicate touches he throws around them an air of mystery and awe. He connects them with the Higher Power which has given us our being, and with a probable future life. This Higher Power to which we owe our being has given us our understanding and moral nature. It has placed us here, compelled us to act, and to foresee the consequences. We are, therefore, under its government, and this government is a moral government ; it punishes vice and rewards virtue. It is true the moral vindication of conduct is in this life not complete, but it is begun, visibly begun ; and if, as is probable, there is a future life, there is a presumption that it will be made complete. Then there is the fact, sufficiently awful if well weighed, that the moral

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vindication of conduct is worked out in this life by natural law ; it is, hence, probable that in the life to come it will be worked out in the same way. The prospect thus opened out to all is very solemn, and to those who have led a life of sin and wickedness fearful—too fearful if there were no counter-element to come into play. But it is at this point that the system of revealed religion comes in. It is a system of pure loving kindness and mercy to save mankind from the evils which, in many cases, they have unwittingly, or from weakness, incurred ; a system by which men are lifted up out of a state of nature and natural law into a new sphere where, by means of God's grace and the training of the spiritual life, they may be brought back to God.

There is much in all this which is mysterious, much which is dark and impenetrable. It were easy, with weapons of human reason to attack it. But, let it be observed, it is in all its main elements not theory, but fact, hard undeniable fact which cannot be got rid of. It is, in truth, from this point of view that Butler finds a basis for the main point of his system, viz. the position that the scheme of things of which man in this world forms a part is a scheme which is imperfectly comprehended by us. There is much behind and beyond which we do not and cannot know. But our inability to comprehend it as a whole must not lead us to shut our eyes to that part which we can see. That part, small no doubt, stands out before us clear and unmistakable, and imparts to our life all its solemnity.

We thus see how Butler, out of the plainest and simplest facts of ordinary life, has constructed, by induction, for those who cannot or will not hear the Gospel, a system which forms the basis of all religion and imparts to our present life an air of mystery and awe. If it is borne in mind that this system was put before the public in the face of the optimism and the *insouciance* of the Deistic teaching which then passed current with the world, we see how it must at once have arrested the attention of thinking men. That it did so attract attention, and took a wonderful hold on the minds of men, is clear from the numerous editions of Butler's works which were issued during the century. The effect of this must undoubtedly have been very great. Mr. Gladstone has pointed out that Butler probably played a main part in bringing about the great religious revival that was soon to take place ; and we think that it must have been so. Indeed, considering what Butler's system really was, it must, if it laid hold on the minds of men, have had this effect. But there were other things

which drew the hearts of men to Butler—peculiarities of his life and character. Foremost among these we may mention the entire suppression of self. Mr. Gladstone has noted that he rarely uses the first person singular; and then, only as a grammatical vehicle, never as the introduction of himself to the reader's notice. Then, along with this, his works are pervaded by a deep feeling of religion. In the striking language of Mr. Gladstone, 'his pen moves under the very eye of God.' This gives to all his works an air of solemnity, and insensibly conveys the same feeling to the reader's mind. Then there was his deep conscientiousness in regard to the truth, the infinite care he took to avoid overstatement, and the large abatements he made from his arguments, which often surprise the reader. These and many other like points may help to account for the high place which Butler at once took, which he has continued to hold, and which we venture to think he will always hold among the great teachers of the Anglo-Saxon race.

The question has been raised whether Butler's works, valuable as they may have been to meet the doubts and difficulties of the age for which they were written, are not quite unsuited to meet the difficulties of the present time; and this may be the place to make some observations on that issue. We do not think that the serious student of Butler will have any doubt as to this point. He knows the immense strength which accrues both to the understanding and the moral nature from a deep, earnest, and conscientious study of Butler. And knowing this, his opinion will be, that not only for the past age and the present, but for every age, the study of Butler will be of great advantage. More especially we think it is needed in the present age. The great quality which has given its superiority to the Anglo-Saxon race has not been so much intellectual as moral. It has been the high sense of moral responsibility which has given great aims to the mind, and might to the arm, and has led to those deeds of daring, and no less of justice and beneficence, which have built up and sustained our great empire. Indeed, not only in our own case, but everywhere, and at all times, it is moral qualities which in the end prevail. And hence anything which could break down or destroy this high moral standard amongst us would be a disaster, not only to individual souls, but to the race. If we could for a moment suppose that this high standard could be broken down, then inevitably our great empire would crumble to pieces, and we should sink down to the level of the worn-out races of the world. But is there not great danger of this at the present time? We must not dis-

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guise from ourselves that in the Naturalistic philosophy, now so widely prevalent, we have an enemy to morality in comparison with which the Freethinking of the last century was but child's play. The Naturalistic philosophy destroys not only faith, but it corrodes and kills all the lofty ideals and aspirations of mankind. And what is most piteous of all, it saps and destroys the very foundations of morality. Its baleful influence may be seen in the higher walks of life, and now, alas! as every clergyman can bear witness, it is descending further and further amongst the lower strata of society. Butler met and drove back a similar influence in the last century, and we think no writer is better calculated to meet the moral deterioration of the present. For, setting aside for a moment the question as to whether he meets our intellectual doubts and difficulties, there can be no doubt as to his great power in the moral sphere. Those who follow him through the moral sphere, even if they cannot rise with him to the high elevation of faith, will yet be morally strengthened and sustained. They will learn from meditation upon his facts lessons of awe, which cannot be put aside. They will perceive that conduct is to us human beings all in all, that it draws after it consequences of piercing import in this life, and that it may, and probably will, seal our fate in a life to come.

But is it really the case that from an intellectual point of view the works of Butler are antiquated? Do they quite fail to meet the doubts and difficulties of the present day? There is, no doubt, a widespread opinion to this effect. But if we consider the matter fairly we shall see that it is far from being well grounded. The ground on which it rests appears to be this. Butler, in controversy with the Deists, assumes, what they were ready to grant, the existence of an intelligent and moral Author of the Universe. But, it is urged, the existence of such a Being is precisely the difficulty which besets our path in the present day. Hence a work which proceeds on the assumption of His existence does not meet our wants. The argument as stated in general terms appears to carry with it much weight. But it quite loses its force in the eyes of the serious student of Butler. And for this reason—namely, that the assumption does not touch or affect the great moral and spiritual system under which man exists in the present world, which it was Butler's aim to bring to light. That system stands on its own basis quite independent of any assumption. And, moreover, the student of Butler can easily see that he need not have made the assumption at all. For

the effect of Butler's work is, not only to place the existence of an intelligent and moral Author of the Universe on a new and very striking basis, but what is more, to still the doubts and meet the objections and difficulties which surround the question of His existence.

In order to show this let us approach the works of Butler, not with the assumption which the Deists were ready to grant, but from the point of view of modern Agnosticism. Here, however, there is an initial difficulty. It is hard to find an intelligible statement of the position of Agnosticism. Of course, on the question whether God exists it is very easy to say 'I don't know,' or 'it is impossible for us to say.' But that is not an intelligible statement of the Agnostic position. What we want to know is how far, exactly, the Divine idea ought to be modified, and what ought to be our attitude towards it. And this we can nowhere find stated in an intelligible way. In fact, so deep does the Divine idea lie in the human intelligence, that an intelligible statement of the Agnostic position can hardly be made without compromising the very thing it is intended to define. Certainly this is the case with the statement of Mr. Herbert Spencer, who may be considered the most distinguished representative of the school. He defines his position in these words, which are the outcome of a long argumentation—'The Power which the Universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable.' Let us look somewhat closely at this definition. The criticism of it will open up the questions which will serve to determine the position which Butler is calculated to hold in view of present difficulties.

The statement declares that something is utterly inscrutable, and in the same breath it declares that this something is a Power, and that it is manifested to us by the Universe. But if it is a Power, surely we do know a considerable deal about it. It is the Supreme Power, and as a Power it is thought of (what is no slight amount of knowledge) as a Unity, and as belonging to the causative side of things. Then it is said to be manifested to us by the Universe. But how manifested? Is the Power the Universe itself? Or the sum total of the forces of the Universe? Or is it a Power which lies behind the Universe and its forces? This we are not told. All that we are told is that it is in some way so connected with the Universe that the Universe manifests it. But here surely we are landed in a flat contradiction. For if the Universe manifests it, the Power cannot be 'utterly inscrutable.' It is, in fact, open to our

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knowledge; yes, open, *in exactly the same way* as the Universe itself and its forces are open. This is quite clear. For if it should be urged that the Power is *in itself* inscrutable, it may be replied that this is the case also with the Universe and its forces. *In themselves* they are 'utterly inscrutable.' No one, for instance, knows what the force of gravity is, *in itself*. From that point of view, it is utterly inscrutable. But science does know a considerable deal *about* the force of gravity. In fact, as we know, the science of astronomy is built up mainly out of our knowledge of that force.

We thus see that in the above sentence Mr. Spencer has raised a false issue. He meant to draw a distinction between the Supreme Power and the Universe which manifests it. He meant it to be understood that, whereas the former is utterly inscrutable, the latter is open to our knowledge. But no such distinction exists; both stand upon precisely the same footing. We know and can know neither the Supreme Power nor the Universe *in themselves*; but we can, by diligent study, come to know a great deal *about* both. Science is witness how much we can know about the Universe. And so, in regard to the Supreme Power, though we cannot know it in itself, yet by studying the Universe which manifests it, we may come to know a great deal about it.

The point is so important that we may add a few words more. No competent theologian, in affirming God to be a Personal Being, would say that He is so in exactly the same sense as man is a personal being. So neither would any competent theologian, least of all Butler, say that we have a perfect knowledge of the Infinite Power, or, in other words, that we know It in Itself. All he would say is, that we know some things about It. And the principal points which it most concerns us to know, and which indeed form the bone of contention between the Agnostic and the Christian, are, whether or not the Supreme Power possesses, as attributes, intelligence and a moral nature. The great aim of the teleological argument as wielded by the Christian theologian is to come to some conclusion on these points. The Universe, as a whole, and in the relation of its parts, is studied to see whether it manifests not only wisdom and power but goodness and beneficence. But in seeking to determine these points the Christian theologian is far from aiming at a perfect knowledge of God. This he knows is beyond the reach of the human mind. The intelligence of God may be, nay, certainly is, infinitely higher than that of man, and God's moral nature is perfect. There may be also, or rather there

are, depths in the Divine Being of which we have not the remotest conception. God as He is in Himself is far above, out of our ken. And yet if we see, for certain, in His Universe marks of intelligence in the human sense and tokens of goodness as we understand it, we have gained a considerable knowledge *about* God—a knowledge also which concerns us all very deeply.

The position therefore is this. The Agnostic would deny and the Christian theologian would affirm that intelligence and a moral nature are known by us to be attributes of the Supreme Power. And both parties would proceed to argue the matter. We cannot follow them in the argument; for this is not the place to discuss the great teleological question. Nevertheless it is necessary, in order to clear up the position which Butler holds in reference to modern difficulties, to signalize the main points in it.

Both parties would in the first instance go to external nature. And the Christian would point to the marvellous order of the Cosmos as manifesting intelligence. He would point not only to the relations of the Cosmos as it now exists, but to what is perhaps a stronger manifestation of intelligence in the Supreme Power, the order of its history—the history, for instance, of the organic world, culminating in man, the crown and glory of the visible world. To this the Agnostic Evolutionist of the ordinary stamp would reply: The order to which you point is not a *real* order; it is only something which assumes to our minds the *appearance* of order. At all events, it is not the result of intelligence. That it has not been brought about by intelligence is proved by the simple fact that it is all the work of the unintelligent forces of nature. Evolutionists, however, of a higher stamp would probably demur to this simple treatment of the question, and they would concur with the Christian in replying: The order of the Universe is a fact—a marvellous fact, and it cannot be dissolved into nothingness and conjured away by simply pointing out that it has been brought about by the unintelligent forces of nature. It must have a cause, and if the unintelligent forces of nature cannot have caused it, we must go back from them in order to find the cause. This retrogressive process has for its first step the question: On what do the forces of nature depend? What has given them their character and constitution? The answer is: They are what they are in virtue of the Laws by which the Universe is governed. But we cannot rest in Laws. We must go still further back, and ask again: On what do the laws by

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which the Universe is governed depend? The answer to this is clear and unmistakable. The Laws of Nature are dependent on and grow out of the nature and constitution of the ultimate elements—the matter and the energy—of which the Universe is composed. We thus arrive at the ultimate fact, at least the fact beyond which we cannot go, which may be stated in this way. The ultimate elements of which the Universe is composed have been *so* constituted, and *so* distributed as to lead to, or, to speak more accurately, make possible,¹ the marvellous Cosmos we see around us. But is it conceivable they could have received this constitution and distribution from a Power or Cause which was unintelligent? If we think over the matter, we shall see that in whatever way we may suppose the ultimate elements of the Universe to have been brought into being, it must have been by a Power or Cause possessed of intelligence. For clearly they were shaped and fashioned with a view to all that was to follow. No doubt the teleological argument has been dislocated by the theory of Evolution, but that dislocation, so far from weakening, has, in our opinion, immensely strengthened it.

So far as intelligence, viewed as an Attribute of the Supreme Power, is concerned, there is, and can be little doubt, we should imagine, amongst the more thoughtful minds. It is different, however, when we seek for traces of the moral attribute. No doubt the arrangements of the Cosmos, in the main, manifest beneficence; and reverent minds will ever love to contemplate the Supreme Power as a beneficent and moral Being. Yet there is much in the constitution of the Cosmos of a character to cloud this deep feeling. The forces of nature are neither intelligent nor moral. Nay, they have a character of insensibility, of fierce-

¹ Most Evolutionists suppose that the Cosmos has been evolved by an iron chain of cause and effect reaching from the present moment backwards to the beginning of things. But this is simply impossible. There is no such thing as a chain of cause and effect going back *in time*. The sequence of events in time is not a chain of cause and effect, but a *free history*. Let any one consider the history of the organic world as explained by the Darwinian theory of Natural Selection. It is quite clear that as a succession of living beings in time, it is not a chain of cause and effect. There are, in fact, only two explanatory ideas under which it could by any possibility be brought: viz. first, Chance, which is in reality no explanation at all; or, secondly, Intelligent Purpose or Providence. From this point of view we see that the Supreme Power is brought into a direct and immediate relation with the Cosmos. He must not only have brought the Universe into being, but He must have guided it in its onward course by His Providence.

ness, and brutality which stands in sheer opposition to the deep feelings of the human soul. No doubt man can, to a certain extent, tame them. He can dominate them and compel them to fulfil his behests. But he cannot alter their nature. The suspicion is near, to the doubting soul, that the character of the forces may be the character of the Supreme Power. Then the arrangements of the Cosmos involve a vast amount of suffering to living beings. The thoughtful soul asks itself—Why is this? Could this have been the work of a beneficent Being? Or if we must believe in His beneficence, must we not begin to doubt His power? Then there is the dark tale of sin and misery in the human race. Looking on this scene of misery St. Paul cried out, 'The creature groaneth and travaileth,' and Butler pronounced man to be in a state of 'apostacy and ruin.' All this, and much more, serves to perplex and cloud the understanding. And it has also this sad effect: it reacts upon conclusions already drawn of a clearer and better character. Men say, if we are in the dark as to whether the Supreme Power is morally good, may there not be a flaw in the argument for His intelligence? And so souls worn out with doubt and despair lapse into Agnosticism. The problem of the Universe they find too great for them.

There are Agnostics who are such merely because they find that creed a convenient medicine to still the qualms of a conscience ill at ease. There are others who are Agnostics simply from lack of intelligence. They follow the crowd and shout with the crowd without well understanding what it is all about. But there are other Agnostics who command our deepest sympathy. They are noble souls with high aims. They would believe if they could; they would be glad to believe. But they are perplexed and weary and worn out by doubts and questionings. What can be done for such? In our opinion the very best thing they can do is to go to Butler. They will find in him much to still their doubts and to reassure them. Without meeting directly the present doubts and difficulties, which he could hardly do, seeing they were not formulized in his day, yet he effectually meets them indirectly. He shows us this most pregnant fact—viz. that if nature fails to reveal clearly the moral character of the Supreme Being, there is a revelation of a wholly different character within the sphere of human life which establishes it clearly. This Butler brings out with wonderful convincing power. He presents us with a teleology revealing the Supreme Power in His relation to man—a teleology of a far more

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intimate and personal character than that found in nature. This teleology lies in the nature and constitution of man—that is to say, in his intelligence and conscience. It lies also in his surroundings, in the facts of his everyday life, in his actions and their consequences, and in the destiny these are gradually shaping for him. He shows, too, that the highest idea of our present state is that it is a state of probation, and that there is every probability of its issuing in a future state.

All this is striking enough in the way in which Butler has put it before us. But, it will be said, it does not meet the doubts and difficulties of the present day. That is quite true; but we have not yet exhausted Butler. It will be found that all these difficulties are effectually met in the only way in which they could be met, by Butler's great principle—that the scheme of things of which man forms a part is a scheme imperfectly comprehended by us. It is a principle which deserves to be much meditated; and if it is meditated, it will be seen that it is not a mere makeshift of theology fallen into distress, but a principle established on a most solid basis. It is a principle, too, which the progress of science has wonderfully confirmed; for if that progress has added immensely to our knowledge, it has at the same time revealed the immensity of our necessary ignorance. And might we not also add that the very existence of Agnosticism is a striking proof of its truth? What, then, does this great principle mean? It means that while a part of this great scheme is clearly revealed to us—that part which covers the domain of human life and conduct, and which is illuminated by human intelligence and conscience—the rest of the great scheme is hidden from us. For just as the Supreme Power, as He is in Himself, is far above out of our ken, so His Universe is dark to us. We know not, and cannot know, its ultimate end and purpose. We know not the reasons why He has made it so. Butler has a poor opinion, almost a scorn, of all *a priori* speculations as to what God should have done. He will deal with nothing but hard fact, and, going upon hard fact, we must confess our ignorance.

We see how this great principle meets the doubts of the present day. The principle of Agnosticism is that we ought not to believe or to worship till we have solved the problem of the Universe. Butler will teach them that they are striving after the unattainable. To read the riddle of the Universe is quite beyond the power of the human mind. But Butler will also teach them a thing which it is of the utmost importance we all should learn—viz. that the darkness which is all

around us is no reason why we should not follow the light when it shines clearly. It does shine clear within the human sphere. That part at least of the great scheme we do know ; for we are gifted with intelligence and conscience to light our path. What a marvellous thing this possession of intelligence and conscience really is if we begin to reflect upon it ! These great gifts come from the Author of our being, and they are given as a light to illuminate our path. For in whatever way we may suppose man to have been introduced into this sublunary state of things—whether by Darwinian processes or directly by the Supreme Power—we know this much, that the two gifts, intelligence and conscience, *being what they are*, could not have come to us from a non-intelligent and non-moral Power ; and that being so, they contain within them a whole world of teleology. They were given for a purpose, that is certain ; nor is that purpose difficult to decipher. Being the twin foundations of morality and religion, they were given to lead us to morality and religion.

What a responsibility will be incurred by us if we do not follow the light whither it leads us ! A greater than Butler has taught us that talents given us from on high are not to be hidden away, but to be used. He has shown us how little it will avail us if we do not use them to put in pleas and excuses, as, for instance, 'I knew that thou wert an austere man,' or 'I knew that Thou wert far above out of my knowledge, and that Thy universe was very dark.' The great fact remains : the gifts were given, and they have not been used for the only purpose for which they were given.

Our conclusion, then, is that Butler's works are not antiquated. There are deep things in him which are suited not only for the past and present age, but for every age ; and we would fain hope that Mr. Gladstone's labour of love may be rewarded by sending many doubting souls to his pages.

If we turn now to Mr. Gladstone's Studies we find that, in the volume before us, they are divided into two parts. The first part deals with Butler and his works directly ; the second part deals with certain themes which arise out of Butler, and which, having been largely debated in modern times, need elucidation. Taking, in the first place, the first part, we find it composed of eleven chapters. In the first chapter, which is a beautiful one, he deals with the method of Butler, pointing out its inductive character and philosophical import, and then bringing out other peculiarities regarding it. He points out how a mind trained in Butler's

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method is strengthened and equipped in the best possible way for dealing with the affairs and problems of everyday life. More especially he points out the bearing of Butler's method on the difficult problems with which the statesman has to deal. The sphere of politics is, indeed, closely allied with that moral and spiritual sphere in which Butler moves. In both spheres the only guide to a just decision is that probability which Butler declares to be the guide of life. Mr. Gladstone shows how the best way for arriving at a just decision in the difficult questions of statecraft is to approach them in the spirit and method of Butler; and, as a consequence, he recommends the study of Butler to the young aspirant in the sphere of politics. The advice here given has at least the recommendation of a large experience; for it is the advice of one who has been a lifelong student and admirer of Butler.

After, in the second chapter, considering how far the method of Butler may be applicable to Scripture, Mr. Gladstone in the third comes to consider the criticisms that have been passed upon Butler in recent times. As we have already indicated, he passes in review Mr. Bagehot, Miss Hennell, Mr. Leslie Stephen, and Mr. Matthew Arnold. He finds that all these authors have mingled with their criticism a high appreciation of the greatness of Butler. As for the criticisms themselves, it is remarkable that they rest in a great measure upon misunderstanding. Mr. Gladstone, as a lifelong student of Butler, has no difficulty in pointing out the misconceptions; and when these are taken into account, very often the objections taken fall to the ground. This point gives rise to some reflection. It cannot be doubted that these authors, so distinguished in the literary world, have read carefully the works of Butler, at least with so much care as to be able to follow generally his arguments. But the serious student of Butler can easily see that such a perusal is by no means sufficient. It is clear that Butler himself had for a long time pondered over the facts and the arguments which he brings forward. The very care and caution of his statements, and the abatements he constantly makes, show how deeply the whole had been meditated. What Butler did in the first instance the reader must do also: he must *think out* the whole step by step. Unless he does this he cannot take in the real meaning and depth of Butler. It is only when each position is pondered, and looked at in a variety of ways, that its weight and purpose can be measured, and its place in the argument determined.

In chapter iv., on the comparison of Butler with the ancients, we have a very striking picture drawn of the immense effect which the Incarnation had upon the human race. The chapter appears to have been suggested by a remark of one of Butler's critics, that Plato sees the truth while Butler gropes for it. Mr. Gladstone admits that Butler, after bringing forward his arguments—which are often difficult of comprehension—lands his readers in conclusions which are limited and reserved; nay, which sometimes may appear clouded and indefinite. He admits that he abounds in reserves which we rarely meet with in the ancient authors and schools of philosophy. He points to the fact that the only reward that Butler offers for the close attention and mental effort of his readers is that what he has adduced goes a part of the way towards a solution of the question. All this, no doubt, forms a contrast with the procedure of Plato and the ancients. But Mr. Gladstone accounts for this difference by the fact that Butler had really to deal with a different human nature. In the following striking passage he states the point—

‘Man at large has in the last three thousand years travelled far from the early simplicity of his nature. Nor is it only that that nature has become less simple; it has also become more profound. Christianity has penetrated more deeply into the essence of man than any agency previously offered to his mind; has opened up in him new depths; has added to him a new intensity. Those who believe in a Divine Incarnation will readily believe that a nature which has once had such an inhabitant as the Saviour, and has even been subjected to all the resulting influences, cannot in its facts, and still more in its capabilities, remain just what it was before. It must, as the character of man unfolds under continued, varied, and ever-enlarging experience, undergo searching modifications, the aggregate of which it is impossible to measure, but of which some characteristics may be observed. The whole world, both of duty and of love, has been opened out to a far wider horizon. The action of man is brought into more close and constant relation with the Divine dispensations. God is ever nearer us in the still small voice. The thought of man, too, has become habituated to the clearer and nearer contemplation of Deity, and a new relation, mental as well as spiritual, and highly fertile in results, has been established between the Creator and the creature’ (p. 78).

He then proceeds to draw out the contrast in the following way:—

‘And if we compare the developments of character in practice, as known in the ancient pre-Christian world, and that which Christianity has so inefficiently but yet marvellously permeated, we shall be

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astonished at the difference. Every vice and every virtue has altered in its character, is a larger and a deeper thing. The ancients lived more on the surface; we have dug deep into the subsoil. The cruelty of Christians is more cruel. Of this fact, at first sight so startling, we have recently had a very striking illustration in the singular elaboration of those horrible instruments of torture of which there was a remarkable exhibition in London a few years ago. To the ancients the arts of torture were little known; and the legend of Regulus holds a solitary place in their popular literature. The lust of Christians is more lustful, and carries with it, as to acts which may be the same, the consciousness of a much deeper sinfulness; for, as Butler is careful to instruct us, moral acts can only be estimated aright when taken in conjunction with the nature and capacity of the agent. Antiquity has displayed for us in its records all the worst it had to say of itself in this painful chapter of the experience of the race, and has done it with a certain *naïveté*. It has been of a surety entirely outstripped in the performances of the Satanic schools, under the earlier and later conditions respectively. The animal greed of Christians is tenfold more greedy, and the pre-Christian times afford us no panorama of Mammon worship to compare for a moment with our own. The systematic, or, if the expression may be used, the scientific use of the apparatus of life to build up a godless existence, an atheism of act, which by the mere extinction of all thought avoids the name, has so developed as to seem different, not in degree only, but in kind. The luxury and the worldliness of old were but child's play in relation to those of modern times.

There is another subject the further mention of which is odious, but it cannot be avoided. The lust of Christians is more intense, and on that, as well as other grounds, far more wicked than was the lust of the heathen. It is indeed the fact that they practised largely the worship of obscene symbols; and it is certain that this worship cannot possibly revive in conjunction with that social standard of idea and common judgment which has been established (but, be it observed, as a social rule only) by the Christian tradition. It is also clear from the plays of Aristophanes, the Roman spectacles indicated by Martial, and such ideas as those proclaimed by Heliogabalus, that the sense of shame as a public sense, which had been at the epoch of Homer at once delicate and strong, had well-nigh ceased to exist. All this is of the past, and a real, and even perhaps a rigorous, standard of public decency has been established. And the private sense of shame given to us, as Butler truly says, to prevent shameful actions, is doubtless of a far greater average power than in those heathen days. But when the question is as to what is done and contrived to be done, far from the public eye, and when that barrier of personal shame has once been over-leapt, I fear the verdict upon any such comparison as may conjecturally be made must be that, while the acts may continue to be in great part the same, their intensity and the pestilent devices and contrivances associated with them have been enhanced and multiplied; and that we have here a new and crying confirmation of the

profound observation of an ancient philosophy that, if the worst is sought for it is to be found in the corruption of the best' (p. 80).

Mr. Gladstone finds the explanation of this in the words of the Apostle, 'if they had not had the law they had not had sin.' He points to the fact that the idea of sin, except in Judæa, had been almost obliterated in the ancient world. By a gradual and mental process the sanctity of the moral law among the heathen had been destroyed. The practice of sensual sin had become a matter of course. It had become universal; but for that very reason it had in it less of obliquity and less of demoralization.

He next proceeds to show that as guilt in the Christian has become guiltier, so virtue and the higher energies of our nature have attained a higher development. He instances the power of endurance which in Christian times has been wonderfully deepened. The resolution of Regulus in heathen times was sublime, but it stood solitary. Not so the power of endurance in Christian times. Innumerable examples illustrate it. First and foremost, the endurance of the martyrs, which first shot up as a strange and brilliant light amid the surrounding heathen darkness and heralded what was to come. Then there have been the like sufferings heroically endured in the persecutions of Christians, inflicted, alas! by Christian powers. Nor is it only in these higher spheres that the power of endurance has been manifested. It has appeared also in the ordinary affairs of the worldly life. Mr. Gladstone contrasts the exploits of the Phœnician mariners in ancient times, who mainly crept along the shore, with the bravery, the hardihood and power of endurance of the moderns, as exemplified in the Polar expeditions. An instance of this is found in the wonderful account of General Greely of the sufferings entailed by his expedition, and of the heroic courage with which they were borne by an assemblage of men not greatly differing in physical or moral force from the average of their countrymen. In the same vein he instances, also as an example of collective endurance, the heroic resistance of the Montenegrins to the terrible Turkish power. When the awful curse of Turkish invasion spread in the fifteenth century like a deluge of flame over Eastern Europe, to save their religion and their freedom they abandoned their lands and homes and made for themselves a Noah's ark of the Black Mountain. Here for four hundred years they offered a heroic and successful resistance to the barbarous power which everywhere else overwhelmed the East. Mr. Gladstone adds, 'All the brightest examples of courage

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animated in olden times by the enthusiasm of freedom grow pale by the side of this unequalled experience.'

To this we might add, as illustrating the great change worked by the Incarnation, the brightness of the Christian life. It shines especially in the lives of the Saints, but in these latter days it has spread over and deeply leavened the whole Christian world. Justice, mercy, benevolence, sympathy with and care of the oppressed and suffering, are part of the ordinary stock of Christian ideas, and from Christians they have flowed over and become part of the life of our modern world. This has changed the life of the world from what it was in heathen times. It has become a tradition, and that tradition influences largely the life and thought of those who are not Christians. An instance of this is given by Mr. Gladstone in the appalling sufferings heroically borne by Damiens, who attempted the life of Louis XV. of France. Mr. Gladstone sums up his position in the following words. Speaking of Butler, his work and his method, he says :—

'My position is that he had a different human nature to deal with, and a different relation between that human nature and the Almighty Maker ; that they [the Ancients] speculated freely and at will, while he moved with a nobleness of object indeed that was unknown to them, but with a burden of responsibility upon him at every step, which almost bore him to the ground. Even of common duty, what seems to some men light, to others is a sense almost oppressive : how much greater was the pressure on a quickened conscience labouring under the belief of being charged with that argument, on which the whole ultimate welfare of the world depends !' (p. 83).

We wish we could dwell upon the remaining chapters of the first part ; for there is much in them that is interesting, and as bearing upon Butler of great importance. But in addition to what we have already culled from them and used in this article, we can do little more than indicate their contents. Chapter v. is devoted to the mental qualities of Butler, and as a piece of expository criticism is very able and very interesting. Butler is dealt with under the headings : his quality and measure, his strength of tissue, his courage, his questionable theses, his supposed defect in imagination, and his originality. Under the head of his courage, Mr. Gladstone indicates several remarkable speculations of Butler's. He who, as a rule, was so cautious, so moderate, so unwilling to make any statement not based upon actual fact, yet at times exhibited a boldness which almost excites our surprise. Among the things which come under this head, Mr. Gladstone

mentions, first, his speculation as to the possible development of the brute creation and its elevation to a higher state of existence. We think there is a great deal in it. But the subject is a difficult one, and ought not to be carried beyond the point at which Butler left it; for it would be especially dangerous to let loose the imagination on it. Nevertheless, as an anticipation it is most remarkable; for it was uttered long before the progress of Biology had shown the close relation in which man stands to the beings below him. It is indeed one of the many indications of the comprehensiveness of Butler's intellect, and it shows how deeply he had pondered many problems in advance of his age. The second instance of Butler's boldness which Mr. Gladstone gives is in his principle of the scheme of things of which man forms a part being imperfectly comprehended by us. This great principle, as bearing on the doubts and difficulties of the present age, was likewise an anticipation. But as we have already considered it in relation to Agnosticism, we need say no more about it. The other instances of Butler's boldness, adduced by Mr. Gladstone, are his views on Christian eschatology, his conception of the relation between reason and faith, his treatment of the word 'natural,' his retaliation on the objectors to the scheme of God's Providential government, and lastly, his remarkable suggestions in regard to the nature of future bliss. On this last point he thinks that future bliss may include the opening up of kinds of vision altogether strange to us in our present state. Now we see God indirectly in His works, but then we may come to see Him, and His glorious attributes, as they are in themselves.

But to pass on. We have in chapter vi. a discussion of Butler's positive teaching, as exemplified in his elevated view of human nature; his doctrine of habits, and his view of human ignorance. Then we have in chapter vii. a consideration of the theology of Butler, and in chapter viii. a consideration of some points of metaphysics, raised by the text of Butler. This is followed by chapter ix. on the Butler-Clarke correspondence. Chapter x., which we have already largely used, has for its subject the celebrity of Butler; and chapter xi. forms the conclusion. All these subjects are discussed in a masterly way; and the student of Butler will find in them immense help to the right understanding of the great author.

The second part of these *Studies* deals with questions subsidiary to Butler. There are no less than five of these chapters devoted to the question of a future life. Then we

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have a chapter on Necessity or Determinism, a chapter on Teleology, one on Miracle, one on the Mediation of Christ, and the concluding one on Probability as the Guide of Life. All these are the burning questions of the present day, and the characteristic of their treatment is, that it is from the point of view of Christian common sense. The reader who is tired out and wearied with the platitudes of the philosophers, and the still more pretentious, but equally questionable, solutions of the Evolutionists, will find it very refreshing to look at these subjects from this point of view. A freshness and interest are thrown around them which they had not before.

We would only, in conclusion, direct the special attention of the clergy to the five chapters on the future life. They are exceedingly valuable, and contain an instruction very necessary for these times. Dr. Döllinger said of Mr. Gladstone, that he was the greatest living theologian of the Anglican Communion, and these chapters, with their carefully balanced teaching, fully bear out that judgment. None but an accomplished theologian could have penned these chapters. And, as we have said, their teaching is especially needed in the present day. At a previous period in the Church's history there was an over-dogmatism on the future life; and this over-dogmatism chiefly manifested itself in harrowing pictures of the flames of hell, and of poor souls tormented for ever and ever. Against this there has been a strong reaction in our day, which has landed people in a baseless optimism. Almost nothing is heard of now except pictures of the love of God. We would not for one moment discourage the drawing of such pictures. They form an essential part of the Gospel. But if they are dwelt upon alone, our whole teaching becomes one-sided and ineffective. It becomes untrue to the dread realities all around and before us. After all, life is a serious thing—a very serious thing—and its issues are awful. There is such a thing as the 'terrors of the Lord.' And one will be powerless to bring souls to Christ without exhibiting these terrors, relieved indeed by the love of God. In these chapters, in measured positions, Mr. Gladstone has brought out this more serious side of the future life; and we would commend the view he has given of it especially to the clergy, and those engaged in Christian teaching.

ART. II.—OTTLEY'S 'DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION.'

The Doctrine of the Incarnation. By ROBERT L. OTTLEY, M.A., Fellow of S. M. Magdalen College and Principal of the Pusey House, Oxford. Vol. I. to the Council of Nicæa. Vol. II. to the present time. (London, 1896.)

It would be matter for surprise if this book should not be received with much eager interest. Mr. Ottley's brilliant University career, the promise of literary powers afforded by his essay on 'Christian Ethics' in *Lux Mundi*, and his work *Lancelot Andrewes*, and his high reputation, of themselves naturally claim attention. And when the subject upon which he writes is the doctrine of the Incarnation, it must be expected that all who have followed theological controversies in the Church of England in the last few years will be desirous to know what position the present Principal of Pusey House takes up, and in what ways he states and defends it.

There is much in these two volumes which is highly attractive, and which we can heartily commend to the notice of our readers. It will be convenient that we should mention some of the features which it has been a pleasure to observe before we comment upon what in our judgment is less satisfactory, and endeavour to estimate the general attitude of the author on the subject of the Incarnation.

We have read with great satisfaction the parts of the book which deal with the Atonement. Mr. Ottley's treatment of this great doctrine is free from the crudities and misconceptions which have characterized much which has been written in recent years. In describing the 'Christology of St. Paul,' he speaks of the 'Divine Sacrifice' as

'a vicarious self-oblation: a representative offering, a submission to the law of Divine justice made on behalf of men by One who suffered in their stead' (i. 101).

Of St. Athanasius it is said that he

'regards Christ's work mainly as *expiatory*, as the payment of man's debt and the destruction of death. He also recognizes the element of *substitution*; Christ suffers in the stead of those who are united to Him as their mystical head and representative' (ii. 185).

And in the course of the admirable section in which Mr. Ottley explains the doctrine at some length (ii. 310-28) he emphasizes valuable truths:

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'The Deity of the Son is a sufficient pledge of the validity and the efficacy of the atoning work. . . . His Divine Person imparts immeasurable grace and power to the actions and sufferings of His humanity' (ii. 314-15).

'If Christ is *very man*, in the truth of our nature, His sacrifice necessarily wears the character of a representative act. It is the head of the human race who is sinless, who is perfectly well-pleasing to God, who makes a supreme act of reparation and satisfaction to the Divine holiness. He suffers *for many*, not only as a substitute who, from pure love to man, takes his burden upon Himself, pays his debt, and suffers in his stead; but also as representative, offering the sacrifice which man was too sin-stained to present, discharging the obligations which we were too weak to fulfil. Thus Christ was our substitute, not through some arbitrary arrangement by which the innocent was compelled to suffer for the guilty, but in virtue of His representative character as the head and flower of our race, in whom humanity is "summed up," and in whom, consequently, man not only makes an act of acceptable submission to the Father's righteousness, but is exalted to the very throne of God' (ii. 315-16).

'God is unchanging; and when we ascribe to Him the affection of "anger," we express in human fashion the fact of His necessary resentment against sin. God cannot welcome the impenitent sinner; He cannot treat sin as something other than it is' (ii. 317).

'The death of Christ is also "vicarious" in the sense that He suffered not only as our representative, but in our stead. He suffered something which we were too weak to endure, yet which had to be endured if atonement was to be achieved. . . . The substitution of Christ for the guilty race depended upon, and corresponded to, the actual relation in which He stood to men as the result of His Incarnation. His representative character enabled Him to be the natural substitute for sinners' (ii. 318).

'The word "reconciliation," like "propitiation," is a description, in the terms of a human analogy, of the objective change in the relation between God and sinful man which was brought about by our Lord's death' (ii. 319).

'Christ's sacrifice is of universal validity. He died for all, but men do not always actually appropriate the virtue of the Passion, which becomes effectual for those only who by an act of faith identify themselves with the submission made on their behalf by Christ, and who are by Baptism really incorporated into Him, becoming thereby living members of the Second Adam. The righteousness of Jesus Christ, and the virtue of His death, are really imparted to Christians in the sacrament of the new birth. They are accounted righteous, as being actual living members of a righteous person' (ii. 319-20).

'His blood is a real means of cleansing (*καθαρισμός*), of actual deliverance from the stain of guilt and from the power of sin. It is not merely the means of atonement as the symbol of man's submission to the penalties of sin, but also the source of healing and renewed strength. The communication of the blood of Christ,

whether in the gift of Absolution or in the grace of Holy Communion, is in fact the communication of a Divine life annihilating the stains and reinforcing the frailty of nature' (ii. 326).

When the Scriptural and Patristic teaching suggested by the terms 'satisfaction,' 'vicarious,' 'substitution,' 'in our stead' is often denied or minimized, it is a matter for great thankfulness that it should be clearly affirmed by a writer who takes pains to show that he does not hold the false ideas which have sometimes been associated with these words.

The treatment of the preparation for the Incarnation, though in some respects scanty, is of distinct value. We have observed the useful phrases, suggestive of contrast, 'the searchings of the Gentile world after God,' 'the prolonged discipline of the Jewish people' (i. 8); and we are able to commend, with some qualifications to which we intend to return, the part entitled 'Witness of the Old Testament' (i. 39-61).

A useful element is the brief summary of the 'evidence for the Incarnation' 'under four main heads'—'the fact of Apostolic belief,' 'cogent' 'because of the character of the witnesses,' and because of 'the striking change which' 'the Resurrection produced in them'; 'the rise and progress,' 'permanent continuance,' 'world-wide expansion,' and 'peculiar institutions of the Christian Church'; 'the spiritual experience of Christians'; and 'the literary products of the second half of the first century' (i. 29-35). With this we may class a valuable statement (i. 27-9) on 'the nature of the appeal made by revelation,' in which the 'point of view' from which the 'historic evidence of the Incarnation' is to be approached is explained and the conclusion reached:

'The testimony is not of such a character as will compel belief. Revelation is addressed to man as rational and free; it presents itself authoritatively indeed, but not with an absolute or peremptory authority. The evidence is cogent, but not absolutely demonstrative, and it therefore leaves room for the play of character and individuality. The evidence of the Incarnation is weighty, but falls short of carrying absolute conviction, unless the idea of Divine condescension is antecedently credible. Historic testimony is of no avail when it is approached with a negative bias which prejudices the case' (i. 29).

Admirable, too, is the treatment of our Lord's miracles (i. 77-82), and especially of their 'character' as 'not meaningless portents' or a 'mere exhibition of abnormal power,' but 'subordinated to righteous and beneficent ends' and 'a revelation of grace' (i. 79); and there is a useful discus-

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sion of 'the relation of the physical universe to the moral' (i. 14-17).¹

Passing by the skill and accuracy of several historical accounts, notably that of Monophysitism (ii. 114-18), and the utility of a number of definitions (ii. 252-9, 266-8), we may notice valuable passages on the 'perfection of Christ's Human Nature' (ii. 280-3), the reality of the temptation of the impeccable Christ² (ii. 292-8), the force of Christ's example (ii. 307-9), and the 're-creation of human nature through grace' (ii. 328-32). On the last subject Mr. Ottley says:

'In accordance with the principle involved in the Divine Incarnation, the mode of the Spirit's operation is sacramental; the Incarnation was itself the supreme illustration of the sacramental method, *i.e.* the conveyance of spiritual and Divine gifts through visible and material channels. Matter was for ever consecrated to be the veil and vehicle of spirit; and it is important to bear in mind the mysterious closeness of connexion between the work of the Holy Ghost and the sacraments ordained by Christ. They convey an actual communication of the life of the risen Christ to the soul; and, being moral instruments of grace, their saving operation necessarily depends on the moral condition of the recipient. But the point to be insisted upon here is the perpetual co-operation between the Son and Holy Spirit in the work of man's salvation; so that while the grace of the sacraments flows from the Passion of Christ, their actual operation in the soul depends upon the presence of the Holy Spirit, whose office it is to accomplish the saving union of man's nature with the human nature of the Son. The Spirit is, in a word, the agent through whom the exalted humanity of the Divine Son is applied to our sinful nature for its healing and restoration' (ii. 331-2).

The whole work is marked by reverence and high tone. Of these valuable characteristics there is a good instance in the 'Conclusion' (ii. 335-51).

It would be pleasant if we might complete our review by expanding our comments on the points we have already noticed. To do so would be to fail in our duty as critics. For, besides much that is admirable, the book also contains

¹ We regret to notice that on a connected subject Mr. Ottley quotes with approval from Mr. Romanes's *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 125: 'On any logical theory of theism there can be no such distinction between "natural" and "supernatural" as is usually drawn, since on that theory all causation is but the action of Divine will.' The distinction between 'natural' and 'supernatural' does not rest upon a denial that 'all causation' is 'the action of Divine will,' but on the assertion that the Divine will acts in different methods and with differing degrees of intermediate agency.

² We shall have occasion later to refer to the injustice of a scoff at St. Thomas Aquinas (ii. 297).

many unsatisfactory features. It is of small importance, speaking comparatively, that in several places the phraseology and literary finish are not such as we might expect from a scholar of Mr. Ottley's attainments. We are constrained to take exception to matters of history, of interpretation, and of doctrine.

An imperfect view of the deposit of the Faith underlies the whole work. Mr. Ottley, indeed, mentions 'the tradition' 'whether of doctrine or of the Christian facts' to which 'St. Paul and St. Jude allude' and 'the early Fathers refer' 'as orally delivered in the different Churches,' which 'served to guard the essential elements of Christian belief before a scientific theology had developed itself' (i. 148). He alludes elsewhere to the 'brief baptismal confession, rehearsing the main facts of the Christian tradition' which 'probably every Church already possessed' in 'the latter half of the second century' (i. 182), to the fact that 'the school of St. John in Asia Minor' 'viewed the faith in the light of a deposit to be secured and guarded from corruption by faithful transmission' (i. 184), to 'the fixed baptismal creed publicly and universally taught by the successors of the Apostles' on which 'Irenæus and Tertullian' 'fall back' (i. 208), and admits that the Council of Nicæa (i. 313) and St. Athanasius (ii. 40) regarded the truth which they taught as a tradition handed down by continuous teaching from the Apostles. But the value of this deposit is continually minimized or ignored. At the time of the growth of Gnosticism 'an authoritative standard of doctrine was as yet lacking' (i. 176); 'the latter half of the second century' was 'marked by the rise and development of a rule of faith' (i. 182); the idea of the 'school of St. John in Asia Minor' was transplanted 'to the West' by Irenæus (i. 184); 'the one truth' 'accepted' in 'the early Greek theology' 'as part of the constant Christian tradition' was 'the pre-existence of the Logos who was manifested in the Incarnation' (i. 205-6); the 'rule of faith' which the third century received was 'mainly historic, not dogmatic,' and 'was of little avail in the Christological controversies' (i. 294, note 2). This line of thought marks the whole treatment of Christian writers, and while it is to be observed that Mr. Ottley repudiates 'the theory that the theology of the Church is merely a product of Greek metaphysics,' his statement that

'there is ample room for the conclusion that a far more considerable element in the development of dogma than "Hellenism" has been the influence of Scripture and the religious experience of Christians' (vol. i. Preface, p. vi.)

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is apparently intentionally silent as to the existence of a traditional belief. It is in harmony with this that Mr. Gwatkin's unfortunate description of the work of the Nicene Council as a 'revolution'¹ should be quoted with evident approval (i. 318). The view of tradition which ought to underlie the excellent description of the work of Councils (i. 322) is not maintained in the greater part of the book.

The opinion which Mr. Ottley thus generally follows is directly opposed to the natural inference from the judgment which the Catholic Church passed upon heresies of different kinds. If, to take a single crucial instance, 'the one truth' 'accepted as part of the constant Christian tradition' was 'the pre-existence of the Logos who was manifested in the Incarnation' (i. 206), the attitude of St. Athanasius towards Arianism, which affirmed 'the pre-existence of the Logos,' was altogether ignorant and unjust; and that attitude was adopted by the Council of Nicæa and has been commended by the general judgment of orthodox Christians in all subsequent centuries. For it is the assertion of Athanasius, again and again repeated, that the Arian theories are novelties; that the fault of the Arians is not a failure to follow the logical development of Christian thought, but a departure from the existing Faith; that the truth most prominently associated with his name was, in the luminous and accurate words of a great living theologian,² 'attested by the immemorial consciousness of the Church.'³

The general standpoint of Mr. Ottley's work would necessitate a contention that St. Athanasius and the Nicene Fathers were mistaken, and, like many other persons, imagined that what they themselves thought had always been believed by orthodox Christians. In considering such a position, we pass by the uncomfortable feeling it suggests with regard to the competence of the First Œcumenical Council of the Catholic Church and ask how far it is true to the facts of history.

It is the natural inference from the New Testament that our Lord committed to His Apostles a definite system of belief, so that they were able and were intended by Him to hand on authoritative doctrine in the same way that they were to transmit the succession of the Christian Ministry.⁴

¹ Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*, p. 50.

² Bright in Smith and Wace's *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, i. 182.

³ See, e.g., St. Ath. *De decr. Nic. syn.*, 27, *Orat. c. Ar.* i. 8, ii. 40, *De syn.* 3, 7.

⁴ See, e.g., St. John xvi. 13; Acts i. 3, xviii. 26; 1 Cor. xv. 3; 2 Tim. i. 13, 14, iv. 7.

The Epistle of St. Clement of Rome,¹ as well as the Fathers of the 'school of St. John in Asia Minor,'² bears witness to the existence of such a deposit. To Irenæus³ and Tertullian⁴ it supplies the refutation of heresy. However Origen may speculate, he yet knows a traditional doctrine which is to be believed as certain truth.⁵ The context of these passages and a fair recognition of the service of which the tradition was thought capable by these writers are not favourable to any view which limits it to a small number of historical facts.

A fuller acknowledgment of the existence and authority of the deposit of the Faith might have saved Mr. Ottley some mistakes, as we cannot but regard them, in his interpretations of early Christian writers. It can only be a distorted way of estimating their testimony which makes it possible for him to say that in the Epistle to Diognetus 'the death of the Son is not stated to be an atoning sacrifice for sin' (i. 188), while himself calling attention to part of the emphatic language in which the writer of the letter teaches a doctrine which is certainly that of atonement and sacrifice;⁶ or to do less than justice to the theology of Justin⁷ and of Ter-

¹ St. Clem. Rom. i. 42.

² St. Ignat. *Eph.* 3, 4, *Magn.* 13, *Trall.* 6, 7, *Philad.* 1-3; St. Polyc. 7.

³ Iren. *C. Hær.* I. ix. 4-5, x. 1-2.

⁴ Tert. *De præf. hær.* 36.

⁵ Orig. *De princ.* præf.

⁶ *Eph. ad Diog.* ix. 2-5, αὐτὸς τὸν ἴδιον υἱὸν ἀπέδοτο λύτρον ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, τὸν ἅγιον ὑπὲρ ἀνόμων, τὸν ἄκακον ὑπὲρ τῶν κακῶν, τὸν δίκαιον ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδίκων, τὸν ἀφθαρτον ὑπὲρ τῶν φθαρτῶν, τὸν ἀθάνατον ὑπὲρ τῶν θνητῶν. Τί γὰρ ἄλλο τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν ἡδυνήθη καλύψαι ἢ ἐκέλευον δικαιοσύνη; ἐν τίνι δικαιοθῆναι δυνατόν τοὺς ἀνόμους ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀσεβεῖς ἢ ἐν μόνῳ τῷ υἱῷ τοῦ θεοῦ; ὃ τῆς γλυκείας ἀπαλλαγῆς, ὃ τῆς ἀνεξιχνίαστου δημιουργίας, ὃ τῶν ἀπροσδοκήτων εὐεργεσιῶν ἵνα ἀνομία μὲν πολλῶν ἐν δικαίῳ ἐνὶ κρυβῇ, δικαιοσύνη δὲ ἐνὸς πολλοὺς ἀνόμους δικαιώσῃ. Mr. Ottley also says that 'the deeper sense of the necessity of satisfaction for sin' (as distinguished from 'the idea of vicarious suffering') 'hardly makes its appearance' in 'the primitive Church' (ii. 184-5). Not to go later than the middle of the third century, our Lord's death appears to us to be regarded as a 'satisfaction for sin' in the passage just quoted and in St. Clem. Ro. i. 7, 12, 21, 49; St. Ignat. *Smyrn.* 2, 6; St. Polyc. i. 9; *Eph. Barn.* 7; St. Just. M. *Dial. c. Tryp.* 95, 111; Iren. *C. hær.* III. xvi. 9; Clem. Alex. *Pad.* i. 5, ii. 2, *Quis dives salvetur*, 37; Tert. *Adv. Judæos*, 10, 13, 14, *De fuga in persecutione*, 12; St. Cyp. *Ad Demet.* 26; Orig. *In Mat.* xvi. 8, *In Joan.* xxviii. 14. It is not a question of words but of thoughts.

⁷ Mr. Ottley quotes some sentences from Canon H. S. Holland's brilliant article on Justin in the *Dictionary of Christian Biography*. In his statement that 'Justin's language is in fact of an Arian cast' (i. 201), and in some other expressions he appears to forget what is stated with great power by Canon Holland, 'It will not easily be doubted—by any one who has observed how he develops the full divinity of the Son . . . what answer he would have given if the final issue of the position had

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tullian;¹ or to take so low a view of the teaching of Novatian on the Holy Trinity;² or to regard Origen as the great teacher who brought order out of chaos in Christian thought.³ And to this distorted view of tradition we must also ascribe some of the startling passages which apologize for heresy, as where the author writes:

'The "Modalists" would point to the Old Testament Theophanies and the Apostolic Epistles, and would be supported by the universal consciousness of Christians that in the Incarnation a Divine Being really appeared on earth.⁴ The "Adoptionist" school might claim that their view was in accord with the *prima facie* impression

once presented itself definitely to him'; 'Justin' 'certainly held both the divinity and the subordination'; 'Justin's temper of mind is the complete reverse of that of Arius,' Smith and Wace's *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, iii. 574-5.

¹ In the estimate of Tertullian as having 'but little idea apparently of an immanent or essential Trinity of persons,' identifying 'forthcoming' with 'generation,' teaching a 'Sonship' which 'had its origin in time' so that 'there was a time when the Son was not,' and when the Father 'could not be properly called "Father,"' and that 'the Word' 'had no proper *personal* subsistence before the *prolatio*' (i. 255-63), Mr. Ottley does not seem to allow sufficient weight to passages which ought to be compared with those upon which he relies: see *Ad Prax.* 2, 'Et nihilominus custodiatur *οικονομίας* sacramentum, quæ unitatem in trinitatem disponit, tres dirigens, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, tres autem, non statu, sed gradu; nec substantia, sed forma; nec potestate, sed specie; unius autem substantiæ et unius status et unius potestatis, quia unus Deus'; *ib.* 8, 'Sermo ergo et in Patre semper, sicut dicit, Ego in Patre, et apud Deum semper, sicut scriptum est, Et Sermo erat apud Deum, et nunquam separatus a Patre, aut alius a Patre quia, Ego et Pater unum sumus. Hæc erat *προβολή* veritatis, custos unitatis, qua prolatum dicimus Filium a Patre, sed non separatum.'

² It is said that Novatian reduced 'the unity of the Divine Persons to a kind of ethical relationship' (i. 268). Did he mean more than to assert strongly that the unity was not a unity of Person?

³ This view of Origen occurs in i. 263, 273, 277, 314. It is significant that while the worst is made of the teaching of Tertullian, the two most unfavourable points with regard to Origen's doctrine of God the Son, his recognition of no kind of prayer which can be lawfully addressed to the Son which cannot be addressed also to a creature, and his theory of the eternity of creation as well as of the Son, are ignored: see *De orat.* 14, 15, *De princ.* I. ii. 10. Readers should also compare the way in which the real minimizing of our Lord's Manhood by Clement of Alexandria is sympathetically treated (i. 205) with the stress laid upon the supposed monophysite tendencies of St. Cyril of Alexandria (ii. 81-89) and others.

⁴ It is difficult to see how the 'Apostolic Epistles' could be claimed on behalf of Sabellianism, and that heresy can be regarded as finding support in the 'universal consciousness of Christians that in the Incarnation a Divine Being really appeared on earth' only by supposing that Christians generally had no idea of the doctrine of the Trinity. Here, as elsewhere, Mr. Ottley leaves out of sight the probability that heretics of various kinds introduced error.

derived from the Synoptic Gospels.¹ . . . Either school represents a feeling of right jealousy for an intrinsic element of the Christian tradition: the first for the Divine *monarchia*; the second for the historical Christ of the Gospels' (i. 227);

or where he speaks of the 'merit' of Nestorianism 'as well as its fatal defect,' and goes on to say that

'the really strong point of Nestorianism is its grasp of the necessity of attributing its due significance to the portrait of the God-man in the Gospels'² (ii. 72).

Mr. Ottley accepts the view, which the genius of Cardinal Newman³ brought into prominence, that in the perplexities which followed the Council of Nicæa 'the faithful laity' 'still adhered to the Nicene faith' (ii. 20). It is hard to see how, without a clearer tradition than he is disposed to allow, the truth affirmed at Nicæa would have had so strong a hold on the minds of Christians.

The statements of the earliest Christian Fathers, joined to the teaching of the New Testament, and the natural inferences from later writings and facts, point to a definite Christian doctrine handed down within the Church.

We do not mean that the definitions of a later age existed from the first or that questions afterwards prominent were even thought of in the earliest times. Growth, explanation, inference there certainly were. But the faith about Christ, asserting His Godhead and demanding His eternity, was not left to be puzzled out in a maze of conflicting thoughts: it was a revealed truth, committed as a trust to the Catholic Church.

Mr. Ottley does not agree with Petavius that 'almost all the ante-Nicene Fathers held the very opinions attributed to Arius, and condemned in 325' (i. 285), and more than once dissociates himself from Harnack (*e.g.* i. 104, note 1). We could wish he had given further consideration to some of

¹ We cannot allow that even 'the *prima facie* impression derived from the Synoptic Gospels' is that our Lord is merely Man.

² The historical life of Christ is not really protected by separating His Manhood from His Godhead.

³ Newman, *The Arians of the Fourth Century*, Note V. Cardinal Newman summed up his conclusion on this subject: 'the divine dogma of our Lord's Divinity was proclaimed, enforced, maintained, and (humanly speaking) preserved, far more by the "Ecclesia docta" than by the "Ecclesia docens,"' 'the body of the Episcopate was unfaithful to its commission, while the body of the laity was faithful to its Baptism,' 'it was the Christian people, who, under Providence, were the ecclesiastical strength of Athanasius, Hilary, Eusebius of Vercellæ, and other great solitary confessors, who would have failed without them' (pp. 465-6, fifth edition).

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the passages quoted by the one writer, and had emancipated himself more fully from the influence of the other.

As we have already shown, and as we shall have occasion still further to illustrate, we cannot feel confidence in Mr. Ottley as an interpreter of the Fathers. There are points in his treatment of Holy Scripture, also, which call for criticism. In the otherwise admirable discussion of 'lines of thought which make the idea of miracle antecedently credible' (i. 14), probability is claimed for the miracles of Christ on the ground that

'each higher and more advanced product of evolution exhibits new laws and fresh capacities. And what we claim for Jesus Christ is that in Him a new type of being appears, to which new effects, physical and moral, are strictly natural. The Incarnation is, in fact, "the one absolutely new thing under the sun." It is the appearance of a sinless man; a new phenomenon from which new supernatural effects may be looked for as a matter of course. Christ's person is a miracle; and miracles, whether those recorded in the Gospels, or those moral miracles which are matters of daily experience within the Christian society, are just what we should expect from Him, being what He is' (i. 17-18).

Now, with the general thought that miraculous action is 'just what we should expect from' Christ we are in entire agreement.¹ But when the acceptance of this thought is claimed on the ground of the theory of evolution and the place of our Lord as the 'climax of creation' (i. 11), there is need of great care lest, while making belief in the miracles of the New Testament easier, it should cause fresh difficulty in the way of believing the miracles of the Old Testament. No one could rightly expect any detailed discussion of this question in a book on the Incarnation; but we are of opinion that Mr. Ottley should have shown how far he thinks the use of this particular argument, in the way he states it, compatible with a belief in the Old Testament miracles. He quotes a sentence from Mr. Aubrey Moore's *Science and the Faith*. The quotation, standing where it does, inevitably suggests the question whether Mr. Ottley accepts the argument of a brilliant passage occurring a few pages earlier in the same work. Writing of Bishop Temple's *Bampton Lectures*, Mr. Moore said:

'He has shown us the Resurrection as the culmination of a series of revelations of the moral nature of God; and, though miracles

¹ Cf. Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 238, 'the real marvel would be if the Incarnate Being should work no miracles'; Trench, *Notes on the Miracles of Our Lord*, p. 8.

must hold a subordinate place as evidences, as compared with the assent of reason and the conscience, he has shown us how impossible it is to take the moral revelation as a discovery round which a kind of miraculous halo has grown. And in doing this he has "rehabilitated," to use a modern phrase, the miracles of the Old Testament. For, if the Resurrection is a fact, it does more than overthrow the *a priori* argument against miracles. It shifts the whole balance of probability. The amount of evidence requisite for proving any fact depends upon the inherent probability of the fact. And if the culmination of the spiritual evolution of man is sealed by a miracle, it is *a priori* probable that the earlier stages of that evolution should show signs of the same character. If the Old Testament Revelation points forward to the New, the Gospel throws back its supernatural light upon the Old.¹

A similar point is with regard to Old Testament prophecy. Of the 'argument from prophecy' it is said that it,

'when restated in the form rendered necessary by our present critical knowledge, is very parallel in its results to the modern shape of the argument from design. In both cases the inductive conclusion is drawn, no longer from the narrow field of special cases of correspondence (or adaptation), but from the broad area of prophecy (or nature) surveyed as a whole' (i. 57-8).

The 'broad area of prophecy' 'surveyed as a whole' does, indeed, supply valuable considerations with regard to the Messiah: is it not the case that, if, in looking at the 'broad area,' 'special cases of correspondence' are ignored or denied, we are in danger of making little of a method of argument which has the sanction, not only of the Fathers of the Church, but of the New Testament writers and even of our Lord Himself?²

Passing by detailed points in the Old Testament about which we disagree with Mr. Ottley, such as the date of Psalm xxii. (i. 54), and the interpretation of passages in the Book of Ecclesiastes (i. 40, 87-8), we come to the New Testament. And here there is occasion for emphatic protest. It is perhaps an indication of bias that attention should be called to the 'terms which point to the' 'connexion' of the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews 'with Alexandria' (i. 121-2), and that nothing should be said about features of

¹ Moore, *Science and the Faith*, pp. 98-9.

² Compare St. Luke xxiv. 25-7, 44-7, with the argument from prophecy afterwards used by the Apostles in, e.g., Acts i. 16, 20, ii. 16-21, 31, 34-5. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the interpretations of Old Testament prophecy used by the Apostles in their earliest teaching corresponded to those which our Lord had taught them after His Resurrection.

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the Epistle which may well be Palestinian;¹ but our chief complaint is with regard to the second Epistle of St. Peter and the writings of St. John. About the former of these Mr. Ottley tells us:

'the so-called second Epistle is of unknown authorship and uncertain date' (i. 93, note 3).

To support this statement he adds:

'on the question of the genuineness of 2 Peter, see Sanday, *Bampton Lectures*, vii. note B' (i. 94).

We read Dr. Sanday's *Bampton Lectures* with some care when they were first published, and have now consulted the note to which Mr. Ottley refers, as well as the lecture to which it is appended, yet we cannot find justification for Mr. Ottley's express rejection of the traditional authorship, which is, moreover, claimed by the Epistle itself. We do not profess, either in this matter or in many others, to agree with all that Dr. Sanday says; but he is, at least, very far from any statement so positive and so contemptuous as that which we have quoted from Mr. Ottley. In the lecture itself he recalls a saying of 'perhaps the greatest critic whom our Church has produced':

'I put the question to him about a year ago, what he thought of this Epistle. He replied that if he were asked he should say that the balance of argument was against the Epistle—and the moment he had done so that he should begin to think that he might be wrong.'²

And in the appended note it is said:

'While it is difficult to resist a total impression which is against the genuineness of the Epistle, every *prima facie* view is not necessarily the true one; and if the writer of this were to commit himself definitely to the negative conclusion, he would feel that he was leaving behind arguments on the other side which he had not fully answered, and combinations which he could not say were impossible.'³

More serious still is Mr. Ottley's treatment of the 'Johannine literature.' As he refers to it 'only as evidence of certain Christological beliefs—of the *interpretation* of Christ's life which prevailed in the Church during the period between St. Paul's death and the middle of the second century, and which very deeply coloured the theology of the subsequent period,'

¹ See e.g. Westcott, *Epistle to the Hebrews*, Introduction, p. lxi. We notice that Mr. Ottley speaks of the writer's 'perception of the influences actually at work among the Hebrew Christians' (i. 127-8).

² Sanday, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 347.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 384-5.

and not as 'historical testimony of Christ's life and work,' he is able to put aside questions raised by 'current literary and historical criticism' about 'the different books traditionally ascribed to St. John,' such as 'the different theories as to the date of the Apocalypse, or as to the nature, sources, and "tendency" of the Fourth Gospel' (i. 129, note 7). This treatment is not in itself very satisfactory and it paves the way for the statements a few pages later that

'as a historian with a very distinct conception of the person whom he describes, the writer may naturally be supposed to have interpreted to some extent what he records. There seems on this ground to be no reason whatever for disallowing a certain subjective element in the discourses as recorded by the evangelist' (i. 138).

'All utterances which the evangelist ascribes to our Lord, in the actual form which enshrines them, must be regarded as an integral portion of his theology. Historical criticism may properly deal with the question of the authenticity of the words ascribed to Christ; doctrinal theology is concerned with St. John's own conception of Christ's person and work' (*ibid.*)

It may, perhaps, be allowable to hold that not every word in the great discourses is given by St. John exactly as our Lord spoke it, and that there is compression and arrangement in St. John's accounts. The language used by Mr. Ottley goes beyond any such view. He speaks of the possibility of 'a certain subjective element' and appears to suggest that the 'conception of Christ's person and work,' given by the Evangelist, may possibly differ from that conveyed in the words actually used by our Lord. So far as there is approach to any view of the words of St. John's Gospel which makes them fail to convey accurately to our minds the teaching of Christ, we are within reach of theories which may easily lead to the surrender of the Christian faith as an exploded myth.¹

We have before us an extensive list of phrases and statements which, in our perusal of the work, we noted as open to

¹ Does Mr. Ottley think there may be 'a certain subjective element' in the Synoptic Gospels also? We notice that he apparently inclines to the 'view that the three Gospels existed in their present shape before the year 80 A.D.' (i. 34). Is the significance of this date that it allows the prophecies of the destruction of Jerusalem to have been shaped by the event? Dr. Sanday is of opinion that the 'common narrative which gives to our first three Gospels their strong resemblance of form' 'was composed within sight of the troubles which it describes' at the siege of Jerusalem, 'but before they had reached their climax,' *Bampton Lectures*, p. 292. We may take this opportunity of referring to i. 156 of Mr. Ottley's book where statements are made which amount to a charge against St. John of 'practical dualism.'

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objection,¹ but we must hurry on to consider the treatment of questions about the Incarnation which have of late been prominent. In connection with the famous passage in the Epistle to the Philippians (ii. 5-11), Mr. Ottley writes:

'The *κένωσις* is the process or method by which our Lord emptied Himself of the state of Deity. The voluntariness of the action is emphasized (*ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτόν*). In what this self-emptying consisted it is impossible to speculate. St. Paul, however, implies that though in the abstract difficult to conceive, it was a real act of the Divine will; he does not exclude the idea that the Son of God continued in some sense² to be what He was before. So Chrysostom insists, *μένων, φησὶν, ὃ ἦν, ἔλαβεν ὃ οὐκ ἦν*. The real point is the exhortation to imitate the mind of Christ; there is no special insistence on the mystery of the act by which He became incarnate' (i. 104).

And just before he says:

'The pre-existence of Jesus: *ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων*. This phrase implies possession of all the characteristic and essential attributes of Deity. *μορφή* is not to be confounded with *οὐσία*, but only one who was God could subsist *ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ*. The word *μορφή* in fact comprises all those qualities which convince us of the real presence of a being or object. In this state our Lord originally subsisted, i.e. before His Incarnation. *Equality in state with God* (*τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ*), with all that it implied of glory and bliss, was His own. But He did not regard this state as a *prize* or dignity to be retained. He therefore ceased for a season to be equal in state to God. He surrendered the enjoyment of privileges which He might have claimed' (i. 103-4).

A little later it is stated

'The Son of God assumes the form of a servant (*μορφὴν δούλου*), i.e. the essential attributes of a servant of God: the life of creaturely dependence and service as contrasted with the glory and sovereignty of the Son in His natural state' (i. 105).

And in a note we find the statement

'*μορφή* presupposes *οὐσία* and *φύσις*, and cannot exist without them. . . . Chrysostom, however, says *ἡ μορφὴ τοῦ θεοῦ, θεοῦ φύσις*. It would be more strict to say, perhaps, that the Son of God could part with *μορφὴ θεοῦ*, but not with *οὐσία* or *φύσις θεοῦ*' (i. 103, note 3).

On these passages several criticisms occur to us. In the first place, we have difficulty in understanding in what sense

¹ Among the more important matters we are unable to discuss are the author's views of the state of man before the Fall and of the Scotist theory of the Incarnation.

² The italics in this place, as in our other quotations, are the author's own.

Mr. Ottley interprets the word *μορφή*. In our second quotation he appears to take it to mean not 'the characteristic and essential attributes' themselves, but something which results from the possession of them. This seems to be the sense in which he interprets the word in our fourth quotation also. But in our third quotation he explains it as meaning 'essential attributes,' and then goes on to say 'the life of creaturely dependence and service.' If it means 'essential attributes' in the phrase *μορφή δούλου*, it must mean 'essential attributes' in the phrase *μορφή θεοῦ*; and if it means 'essential attributes' in the phrase *μορφή δούλου*, it differs from, though it is closely connected with, 'the life of creaturely dependence and service.' Moreover, if *μορφή θεοῦ* means the 'essential attributes' of God, it is impossible that 'the Son of God could part with *μορφή θεοῦ*,' since the distinction between the 'essential attributes' of God and the Divine essence is not such a distinction as allows of separation.¹ Mr. Ottley has failed to show that he has a clear and consistent opinion as to the meaning of *μορφή* in St. Paul's teaching.

Secondly, the phrase 'the Son of God continued in some sense to be what He was before' does not correspond to the sentence from St. Chrysostom quoted in the text and passages from St. Augustine and St. Cyril of Alexandria, referred to in a note.² These Fathers do not say and do not mean that the Son of God 'continued in some sense to be what He was before.' They say that He remained what He was or did not lose that which He was, while He took that which He previously was not. They mean, as is clear from their general way of regarding the Incarnation, that there was no loss of the Essence or of any essential attribute of God, that He continued perfectly to possess all the attributes which were His as God.

Thirdly, Mr. Ottley fails to show reason for his view that *τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ* means the 'equality in state' with its 'glory and bliss,' as distinct from the common possession of the Divine attributes or for his assumption that our Lord in the

¹ See Pearson, *Lectiones de Deo et Attributis*, lectio iv. (*Minor Works*, ed. Churton, i. 33-42).

² St. Chrys. *In Ep. ad Philip. Hom.* vii. 2, μένων, φησὶν, ὃ ἦν, ἔλαβεν ὃ οὐκ ἦν; St. Aug. *In Joh. Evang. Tract.* xvii. 16, 'Non ergo se exinanivit amittens quod erat, sed accipiens quod non erat'; St. Cyr. Alex. *Ep. ad Joan. Antioch.*, ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καταφοιτήσας ὁ Θεὸς λόγος κενόωκεν ἑαυτὸν, μορφὴν δούλου λαβὼν, καὶ κεχηρμάτικεν υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου, μετὰ τοῦ μένειν ὃ ἦν, τοῦτο ἐστὶ Θεός· ἀπρεπτος γὰρ καὶ ἀναλλοίωτος κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν (t. V β, p. 107 C D, Aubert). There is a careful and able discussion of St. Cyril's teaching on this point in Bright, *Waymarks in Church History*, pp. 384-393.

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Incarnation parted with this τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ. The particular phrase is well explained by Bishop Lightfoot as referring to the 'attributes' of God and expressing 'the Catholic doctrine of the Person of Christ';¹ the whole passage has received an accurate and orthodox exposition too commonly ignored by writers of the day in Bishop Pearson's great treatise on the Creed.²

With regard to the 'kenosis' itself, we find Mr. Ottley's language difficult to understand and not always consistent. He exhibits caution which has been markedly absent in some writers on the subject, and more than once deprecates speculation about it. From this point of view we would ask him to reconsider parts of his comment on Philippians ii. 5-11, to which we have already referred, and the language employed when he says

'We may dare to think that in some sense the "measures of humanity" were suffered to "prevail" over the Deity³ in such degree and sense that the Divine attributes themselves became modified or coloured by the union of the manhood with the Godhead' (ii. 272-3),

and when he speaks of a possibility that the nature of God may

'forego capacities of action or knowledge' (ii. 341).

That the exercise of the Divine powers may be restrained while the powers themselves are fully possessed by God the Son in His incarnate life has been commonly taught by Catholic theologians. Such a truth affords no justification for statements that 'the Divine attributes themselves' were

¹ Lightfoot, *St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians*, p. 112.

² Pearson, *Exposition of the Creed*, Article ii., 'If any man doubt how Christ emptied Himself, the text will satisfy him, by "taking the form of a servant," "His exinanition consisted in the assumption of the form of a servant, and that in the nature of man." Bishop Pearson here accepts the Patristic interpretation that the phrase *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν* does not mean that God the Son abandoned any Divine attribute, but that He acquired Manhood. Compare Bright, *Waymarks in Church History*, p. 393, 'If we take *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν* in logical connexion with what precedes and follows, we shall see that practically it means "He became inferior to the Father as touching His Manhood."'

³ Mr. Ottley (ii. 289) quotes St. Cyril as saying 'He allowed economically the limitations of humanity to prevail over Himself.' St. Cyril's words are *ἡφίει δὲ οὐν οἰκονομικῶς τοῖς τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος μέτροις ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ τὸ κρατεῖν* (*Quod unus sit Christus*, t. Va, p. 760 C, Aubert). The phrase *ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ* was similarly translated ('over Him') by Canon Gore in his *Bampton Lectures*, p. 162. Dr. Bright pointed out that it ought to be translated 'in His own case' in *Waymarks in Church History*, p. 179, and the passage was so quoted in Canon Gore's *Dissertations on Subjects connected with the Incarnation*, p. 151.

'modified,' and that God the Son could 'forego capacities'; and it is difficult to see how these statements can be deliberately made and persisted in without impairing the truth of the Divine immutability, and consequently endangering belief not only in the power and wisdom, but also in the holiness of God.¹

Mr. Ottley, we observe, using an argument with which we are already familiar, attempts to justify his language by referring to the sacrifice which is the most intelligible form of love. Thus, he says,

'The mystery of sacrifice as an essential element in God's nature and methods of action may guard us from hasty assertions in regard to the limits of that profound fact which we call the *kenosis*' (ii. 341).

It is true, as he points out, that both the Creation and the Incarnation bear marks of sacrifice; but the sacrifice needed in each case is restraint of Divine power fully possessed, not an abandonment of it. The thought, so far as it is true, affords no justification of any theory which represents the 'Divine attributes themselves' as 'modified,' or asserts that in the Incarnation the Son of God surrendered any of His Divine attributes either absolutely or in the sphere of His incarnate life. Moreover, the work accomplished by means of the Incarnation, no less than the work of Creation, requires the continued possession of these attributes. To teach as the Divine messenger of the Father, to redeem, to sanctify, are works which need the actual possession of Divine knowledge and power, however much the exercise and use of these capacities may at times be restrained.

The whole book appears to us to be pervaded by an imperfect realization of the Divine side of the work accomplished by means of the Incarnation. It is this which, in our judgment, has led Mr. Ottley to the condemnation he passes on great teachers generally hitherto regarded as champions of orthodoxy. There are symptoms of it in sentences even about those whom Mr. Ottley does not condemn, as when it is said, with whatever qualification, that

'Athanasius, indeed, approaches the Sabellian position when he says that St. John x. 30, *I and the Father are one*, demonstrates the identity (*ταὐτότητα*) of the Godhead, while St. John xiv. 10, *I am in the Father and the Father in Me*, proves the unity of the substance (*ἐνότης τῆς οὐσίας*)' (ii. 36),

or that

'Athanasius . . . shrank from giving prominence to the logical

¹ See *Church Quarterly Review*, January 1896, pp. 318-20.

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consequence that Christ, in His human nature, was possessed of real freedom of choice, and really underwent moral probation and development' (ii. 52).¹

It is more marked in the treatment of St. Cyril of Alexandria. The 'minimizing view of Christ's humanity,' towards which there is 'tendency' in St. Gregory of Nyssa, is the 'type of theology which attains a definite form in Cyril' (ii. 81). It is apparently viewed with regret that

'Cyril simply falls back on an emphatic declaration that neither nature in any wise parted with its own properties. That which was proper to each was possible for each: consequently Christ ἀπαθὴς ἐπάθευ. The Deity remained impassible, though the human nature suffered; the same person was at once exempt from human infirmity and subject to it' (ii. 84-5).

A slighting remark of Dr. Bruce² is repeated with approval (ii. 85); there is said to be more than one 'inconsistency' in Cyril's Christology (*ib.*); he is described as attempting to

'explain the mystery of a real Divine condescension without the aid of a truly ethical conception of God' (ii. 86-7);

he is condemned because

'in his view the indissolubleness of the *εὐνοίας* depends on its being a Divine act of power rather than a continuous ethical process in which the Divine and human alike took part, each according to its true law—the Divine by free appropriation of the human, the human by free moral adherence and submission to the Divine' (ii. 87).³

So, too, we are told that 'Cyril dwells too exclusively on the Incarnation as a *physical fact*' (ii. 88); that 'there is in Cyril a very strong vein of monophysitism' (*ib.*); and that 'there is, in fact, a docetic element in Cyril' (ii. 89).⁴

¹ There is a similar depreciation of St. Athanasius from an opposite point of view in ii. 187, in the sentence, 'Athanasius grasps in some measure the conception of the infinite worth of Christ's Divine Personality, as imparting merit and efficacy to His acts and sufferings'; where the words 'in some measure' are hardly needed. The accurate balance of the theology of St. Athanasius, and his strong appreciation of both the Deity and the Humanity of our Lord, may be seen in, *e.g.*, *Orat. c. Arian.* iii. 29-35.

² Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, p. 58, note 6.

³ Mr. Ottley in this passage appears to confuse the union of the Incarnation itself with the moral union with God of our Lord's Humanity.

⁴ That St. Cyril had a very strong and clear grasp on the Manhood as well as on the Godhead of our Lord may be seen in, *e.g.*, *De fest. pasch. Hom.* xvii. The 'vein of monophysitism' in Christian teaching is detected by Mr. Ottley at a very early date, for we observe that he describes the accurate theological language of St. Ignatius in, *e.g.*, *Eph.* i. 18, *Ro.* 3. 6 as almost 'theopaschite' (i. 162).

Similarly, though less completely, St. Leo falls under Mr. Ottley's condemnation: his 'understanding' was

'unversed in the subtle distinctions which occupied the Greek mind, and incapable of contributing more to the solution of the problem than a clear antithetic statement of its factors' (ii. 101);

'Leo seems to minimize the *κένωσις*, insisting, after the manner of Cyril, that the Son of God, in taking human nature, *a paterna gloria non recessit*. It may be urged, however, that other passages in his writings define his meaning more exactly: he simply means that the Divine Son did not cease to be very God. The *forma servi* did not detract from the *forma Dei*; the condescension of God did not change or impair His nature. This ethical view of the Incarnation is an important element in Leo's Christology; but it may fairly be urged that it is somewhat unduly restricted. The free course of infinite love is of course limited by other necessary perfections of Deity; but Leo, like Cyril, seems somewhat over-confident in determining *a priori* the conditions of the mystery' (ii. 103).

The 'Definition' of Chalcedon, again,

'practically involved the acceptance by the Oriental Church of a Western type of Christology, which supplied an element undeveloped in the teaching of Cyril' ¹ (ii. 107);

the Council of Chalcedon is said to have regarded 'the manner in which the human and Divine natures are united' 'almost as a physical process' (ii. 109), and 'to have failed to recognize the ethical aspect of Christ's humanity as the unique archetype of manhood' (*ib.*); and the provoking statement of Dr. Dorner ² that at the time of the Chalcedonian decree

'the image of the person of Christ in its totality must have receded very far into the background as compared with the interest in maintaining the distinctions'

is quoted with approval (ii. 110).

In connexion with St. John Damascene we are told that

'on the whole it must be admitted that the Greek Christology in this, its definitive form, while retaining the dyophysitic formulæ, which practically originated in the West (Leo's *Tome*), retained a monophysitic element' (ii. 143).

¹ It would seem to be more in accordance with the evidence to say that the teaching of St. Cyril was substantially the same as that of St. Leo, and the Definition of Chalcedon affirmed the truth which was the belief of both Fathers alike (see Bright, *Select Sermons of St. Leo the Great on the Incarnation*, pp. 230-2, second edition). Consequently there was no need of the 'reconciliation between the theology of Cyril and the language of Chalcedon' which Mr. Ottley supposes to have been effected by Leontius of Byzantium (ii. 116).

² Dorner, *History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, Div. II. vol. i. p. 118 (English translation).

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The teaching of Alcuin is described as a 'theory of the extinction of the human personality' which 'was apparently for a time the received doctrine of the Western Church' (ii. 160-1);¹ and his 'treatment of the personality of Christ' is regarded as showing 'the lingering trace of a monophysite mode of thought'; while 'Adoptionism,' as

'the close of a prolonged series of efforts to uproot monophysitism,'² 'served to show how deeply that conception of Christ's person had moulded the thought even of those who most earnestly repudiated it' (ii. 161).

So, again, in the scholastic age

'theology still adhered to a mode of contemplating Christ's person which assigned a disproportioned prominence to His Deity'; 'professed theologians like Peter Lombard were apt to ignore, or minimize, the historic humanity of our Lord';³

and

'the prevailing inclination of theologians was to regard the Incarnation as a theophany, Christ's earthly history being a non-essential phase of the Divine self-manifestation and little more' (ii. 181).

Moreover,

'The theology of Thomas Aquinas is typical as illustrating the powerful and enduring influence of Neoplatonism upon the higher thought of the Church' (ii. 206-7);

the 'tendency' of 'theologians since Cyril of Alexandria' 'to represent the human growth and development of Christ docetically'

'was carried . . . to disastrous lengths by John Damascene and Thomas Aquinas' (ii. 289);⁴

¹ It can hardly be doubted that the phrase 'persona perit hominis, non natura' (*C. Felic.* ii. 12) was used by Alcuin, as similar phrases were used by other writers of the time, in the orthodox sense explained by St. Thomas Aquinas, *S. T.* III. iv. 2 ad 3, 'persona divina sua unione impeditur ne natura humana propriam personalitatem haberet.' This passage is mentioned by Mr. Otlety (ii. 161, note 1), but he appears to consider it to represent a different view from that of Alcuin and 'the received doctrine of the Western Church.'

² Is it not more likely that Adoptionism was due to Christians in Spain being confronted with the Saracens, and desiring to make the doctrine of the Trinity as little prominent as possible in view of the Mahometan insistence on the unity of God? See Neander, *Church History*, v. 218-20; Robertson, *History of the Christian Church*, iii. 151; Schaff in Smith and Wace's *Dict. of Chr. Biog.* i. 44.

³ It was characteristic of the time to use logical methods, but there is every reason to suppose that Peter Lombard and others, in using such methods, had a very clear sense of the historical portraiture of our Lord in the Gospels: see e.g. Pet. Lomb. *Sent.* III. xv.

⁴ That the ordinary scholastic view of the 'human growth and

'thinkers so illustrious as Thomas Aquinas' are classed among those who imagine

"that since the Lord Jesus Christ was a Divine Person, He must have known all things, must have been inaccessible to temptation, could never have had occasion to pray" (ii. 297).¹

Mr. Ottley's work resembles in one respect Canon Gore's *Dissertations on Subjects connected with the Incarnation*.² In both books an attempt is made to set aside the traditional teaching of the Church in the East and in the West. Canon Gore repudiates the beliefs of the Fathers and the Schoolmen because they are inconsistent with his theory that the Son of God surrendered His Divine knowledge within the sphere of His incarnate life; Mr. Ottley describes a series of great theologians as tainted with monophysitism because their view of Christ's Humanity is not in all respects his own belief. Is it not possible that the fault is on the other side? May not the great doctors of theology and the Church's tradition be right and Mr. Ottley wrong? May it not be that instead of describing them as minimizing the Manhood we ought to look on him as failing to realize all the consequences to the Manhood of its union with God?

There is a valuable sentence on this subject in Dr. Mozley's *Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination*. Writing on the Pelagian taunt that Catholic theologians impaired the Humanity of our Lord, Dr. Mozley says:

'The doctrine of our Lord's Divinity modifies the truths connected with His Humanity in this way, that He Who was both God and development of Christ' was not 'docetic' may be illustrated from Wilberforce, *Doctrine of the Incarnation*, chap. iv.; Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 464-6.

¹ This sentence is quoted by Mr. Ottley from Dale, *Christian Doctrine*, p. 75. If it is applied to St. Thomas Aquinas, the tone of it greatly misrepresents his position with regard to our Lord's knowledge, impeccability, and necessary adhesion to the Divine will: see, e.g., *S. T. III.* xii. 1-2, xv. 1, xli. 1, 4, *Compendium Theologiæ* (*Opusc.* ix., al. ii., al. iii.), ii. 32. The statement 'Thomas Aquinas denies to our Lord, even in His human nature, the graces of faith or hope' (ii. 301) is misleading without an accurate explanation of the senses in which the words 'fides' and 'spes' are used by St. Thomas in *S. T. III.* vii. 3-4. The statement about St. John Damascene immediately preceding is also unjust without further explanation.

² Mr. Ottley does not say how far he follows Canon Gore's theory that God the Son parted from His Divine knowledge within the sphere of the Incarnation. Some of the language he uses appears to approximate to it, and while the growth in knowledge discussed in ii. 298-303 seems to be that of our Lord's humanity, we notice that he refers to Canon Gore's works 'on all this subject' (ii. 299, note 1).

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Man cannot be thought of even as Man exactly the same as if He were not God.¹

This truth will bear application to our Lord's whole human life. His temptation cannot be quite the same as if He were not God. His human knowledge is not properly considered unless it is viewed as the knowledge of One who is personally Divine. The relation of His Manhood to the ordinary infirmities of human life must be regarded in the light of the fact that He is God as well as Man.

To fail to take due account of this truth is to incur serious risk. For a time the force of habit and the influence of traditional ways of thought may maintain a belief in the Infallibility and Impeccability of our Lord as Man; in proportion as the truth referred to is ignored, the way is made clear for denials of His Human Infallibility and Impeccability, leading in their turn to a Nestorian view of the Incarnation, which, again, will open the door for the assertion that He is merely Man.

Mr. Otley's theory of the Incarnation, then, so far as it is formulated, appears to us to be faulty in two respects, connected with one another. His view of the Divine Sacrifice accomplished in the Incarnation seems to amount to an assertion of a modification in the Divine attributes themselves. Such a modification would be inconsistent with the immutability of God, and would defeat the object for which the human life of Christ was taken into personal union with the Word. His view of Christ's Humanity fails to allow for the new and higher powers received by Man when personally united with God.

On the grounds both of authority and of inferential theology we are constrained to differ from him. From the standpoint of authority, a practical consensus of Christian teachers is not to be so lightly set aside as he appears to think.² If the scholastic theology needs to be 'revised,' the patristic theology remains. Even if the schoolmen shut their eyes to the Gospels—an idea we do not for a moment accept—the Fathers, at least, had knowledge of the Bible. The historic life of our Lord itself in no way calls for this new view.

And, on the ground of inferential theology, we are obliged

¹ Mozley, *Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination*, p. 93.

² It is not contended that any individual teacher in the East or the West, whether in the Patristic or in the Mediaeval period, was free from all error. But there is a general way of regarding the Incarnation which is common to the great theologians of the Church which we do not find in the parts of Mr. Otley's book which we have criticized.

to add that there can be no error so dangerous as one that postulates the possibility of change in the Divine Nature, while the reality of Christ's Redemption is imperilled in so far as the effect on the Manhood of its union with the Divine Person is allowed to be out of sight.

On this point, then, we are content to take our stand with the traditional theology of the Church. And we may add that even from a natural point of view it may be regarded as likely that St. Cyril of Alexandria and St. Leo, St. John of Damascus and St. Thomas Aquinas, had a more accurate knowledge of the doctrine of the Incarnation than the Lutheran divines to whom a section of modern Anglicans seems to be largely indebted.¹

The Doctrine of the Incarnation contains very much that is valuable. If we have sometimes seen occasion to question whether Mr. Ottley has in all cases digested his knowledge before he has used it, his learning is undoubted. A great deal that he says is unaffected by the mistakes which, in our judgment, he makes. Yet we dread the general effect of his book. It will tend, we fear, in spite of the aims and wishes of its author, in the direction of the growth of individualism and of a disregard for Christian antiquity and tradition. Mr. Ottley's followers will be apt to ask whether, if the facts about the history of the Church's doctrine are as he represents them, heresy is quite so grievous as it has been thought to be; whether, if the great Christian teachers have been so much in error, the fundamentals of their teaching are as valuable as Catholics used to think.

The note on the *Principles of Conciliar Authority* (i. 321-324) appears to us admirable, so far as it goes. We miss in it any recognition of the work of God the Holy Ghost in the Councils of the Church. This omission seems to us significant. As the Divine Spirit speaks in an Ecumenical Council, so are there ever the effects of His working in the Church's life. The common thought of Christendom, East and West, for many centuries, bears a new aspect when this truth is borne in mind.

¹ The limits of our space make it impossible to write at any length on the panegyric of Luther in ii. 217-8. It is fair to acknowledge that Luther did good service by forcing the acknowledgment of moral evils in which the Papacy had acquiesced and that popular teaching in his time had in many cases obscured the relation of the soul to God. But we cannot accept Mr. Ottley's estimate of the reformer, and so far from agreeing that 'he recalled men's minds from a false to a true conception of faith' we think he introduced confusions into the idea of faith which have led to perplexity, and misunderstanding, and strife, and misbelief ever since.

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In adhering to the Church's tradition about the Incarnation, we do not fail to possess the true value of Christ's human life. He took all the essential parts of the bodily and spiritual nature of man. He willed that His natural faculties should pass through ordinary human processes and be under ordinary human influences. Thus, He acquired knowledge by the exercise of His mental faculties, He developed physical strength by taking food, He perfected His spiritual powers by communion with the Father, He mastered temptation by the action of His human will. In each case there was a real process, a real work. Through each He has the sympathy of experience. In each He is our Example. That the divine knowledge which he personally possessed was undiminished, and that His human actions necessarily bore the impress of His eternal Being does not lessen the value of that which He is and does as Man for those who, being united unto Him sacramentally, share in His life and receive His grace.

ART. III.—TYPES OF THE ANGLICAN EPISCOPATE.

1. *The Life and Work of Bishop Thorold.* Rochester, 1877-91. *Winchester*, 1891-95. *Prelate of the Most Noble Order of the Garter.* By C. H. SIMPKINSON, M.A., Balliol College, Oxford; Author of the *Life and Times of Archbishop Laud* &c., Rector of Farnham Examining Chaplain to the late and to the present Bishop of Winchester. (London, 1896.)
2. *Harvey Goodwin, Bishop of Carlisle.* A Biographical Memoir by H. D. RAWNSLEY, Vicar of Crosthwaite and Hon. Canon of Carlisle. With Portraits. (London, 1896.)

It is no unworthy illustration of the spiritual wealth and variety of the Anglican Communion that the opening months of the present year should have been marked by the publication of two such biographies as those of Bishops Thorold and Harvey Goodwin. Each of them in his own idiosyncrasy was essentially a typical English bishop, such as probably no other branch of the Catholic Church could have trained up in its bosom. Each of them was conspicuous for marked individual characteristics in singular contrast with those of his brother prelate, which yet equally tended in their diversity

to the building up of the material and spiritual fabric. Their home training, their cast of thought, their personal acquirement, their most cherished convictions, their earlier and later spheres of action were all remarkably distinct. Of course, they had in common certain fundamental qualities which are of the essence of Christianity, and the mainspring of action in both these devoted men was the same—namely, deep personal piety inwrought by the spirit of power and of love and of a strong mind; but the course of its development was very different. Harvey Goodwin wielded his influence mainly through the breadth of a sympathy which touched a responsive chord in the heart of men of all classes. Anthony Thorold stirred them by the intensity of a faith which in its narrower concentration yet melted all resistance. Both of them burned with eager desire to do their Master's work in every position to which they were called, and their lives afford a telling illustration, both in comparison and in contrast, of the diversities of gifts bestowed by the wisdom of the Spirit which divideth to every man severally as He will.

The two biographers whose volumes are before us have formed a widely different estimate of the scope of the task entrusted to them. Canon Simpkinson, holding that the interest of his subject is mainly centred in Bishop Thorold's episcopate, has contented himself with a brief review of the years which preceded, and has concentrated the reader's attention upon the various phases of Thorold's labours in the sees of Rochester and Winchester. Canon Rawnsley portrays with sympathetic interest Harvey Goodwin's intellectual and spiritual development from childhood, and traces the gradual progress through undergraduate days of conscientious study rewarded by well-earned honours to the faithful discharge of parochial duties, and from these to the deanery on which he conferred new lustre, and in which he acquired so wide an influence that his appointment to Carlisle was welcomed by Churchmen of every school of thought. Canon Simpkinson chronicles an able administration, admirably discharged by one who had formed a high, if somewhat imperfect, ideal of his office, to which he brought many qualifications of no mean order. Canon Rawnsley describes a very winning personality, rich with varied qualities of warm affection, large acquirement, great intellectual force, and the widest sympathies, which not only rendered their gifted possessor capable of filling worthily every position to which in God's providence he was summoned, but made him invest each with a singular charm, and stamp it with the

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impress of his own powerful individuality. But it is time to treat the works before us separately and in fuller detail, and we commence with Bishop Thorold as holding episcopal precedence.

As ever, much of the character of the man in after years may be traced to the circumstances and training of childhood. Second son and youngest child of a country clergyman of good family—the Thorolds of Syston Park, no better blood in England—Anthony was brought up in the strictest school of Evangelicism; his closest intimates two sisters some years older than himself, of devout, not to say morbid, piety. The loss of his father when he was only eleven years old, the refusal of his mother to send him to a public school, association with a home circle which idolized and spoiled him, added to his delicacy of health, all had their influence in shaping a very affectionate disposition, which was further so modified and chastened by experience of sorrow that his biographer writes: 'The story may look like a tale of pain.' Shy, sensitive, delicate, and as we read between the lines, not a little proud and pedantic, with little peculiarities of manner and thought unchecked by the wholesome discipline of public school life, Bishop Thorold's earlier years gave little promise of the remarkable energy he afterwards displayed, and he passed through Oxford without any higher distinction than an honorary fourth in mathematics and the reputation of being a good rider and one of the sincerest of friends. Regret over the neglected opportunities of Oxford, travel in the East with Mr. Charles Carus Wilson, and, more than all, the death of his favourite sister at the age of twenty-seven, reawakened and strengthened Thorold's religious convictions, and he was ordained in June 1849 to the curacy, practically the sole charge, of Whittington, in the beautiful valley of the Lune, where he found and shortly afterwards married Henrietta, daughter of Mr. Thomas Greene, M.P., the Chairman of Committees in the House of Commons.

Our most cordial admiration is earned by the wholehearted and unwearied energy with which Thorold forthwith threw himself into his work. 'Those who knew him best,' says his biographer, 'seem to be agreed that his character was remarkably complex, to a degree beyond the usual, and that his love of devotion and heroic passion for the salvation of his people did not exclude a decided strain of personal ambition, while a shrewd worldly wisdom was a very important ingredient in his nature' (p. 20). Despite all such remnants of the *φρόνημα σαρκός* he was indefatigable in his parochial minis-

trations, 'the kindest and most sacrificing of ministers' in his visitation of the sick, severe in self-examination, and addicted throughout his life to strict personal asceticism. His thoroughness was specially manifested by the care which he devoted to the thorough instruction of individuals in spiritual knowledge, and by an entry in his diary that he should never read even a newspaper with carelessness, as if it did not matter whether he remembered it, as such reading gets the mind into a careless way and weakens the power of memory. It was at least one desirable result of his ambition that he took great pains about his sermons, which he held to be the chief instrument of influence in the larger fields to which his thoughts were directed. It is difficult to abstain from a smile as we read that when yet a curate in embryo he writes to his sister: 'The grand secret of the meagreness and flimsiness of modern sermons is the indolence of men who will not take the trouble to read and acquire fresh knowledge, but are continually trading on their old stores till the well is dry' (p. 17). Yet such pedantry is forgotten in the transparent concern for souls which is manifest from the earliest years of his priesthood. His self-examination on this point was thorough and unsparing.

'I am not quite satisfied [he writes in his diary under date November 23, 1850] about my sermons. Not that they deteriorate intellectually. On the contrary, I think that they display closer reasoning, deeper thought, and more real matter, than my sermons even six months ago. . . . Rather it is in the spirit of them. They seem to me to lack earnestness and love and unction; to come more from the head than from the heart; from the well-arranged workshop of a disciplined spirit, than from the fervid, soul-loving ardour of one who loves his Lord. Constitutionally I am shy, almost morbidly so, and when one speaks earnestly and startlingly people look up at one more; and the very consciousness of this unhinges me when I am weak or tired; and often I have left out passages of this kind from feeling too timid of the consequences which would follow' (p. 28).

However deep Thorold's sense might be of his own shortcomings he was rapidly gaining repute as a painstaking and able parish priest, and after three years' apprenticeship in London work as curate of Holy Trinity, Marylebone, he was appointed to the rectory of St. Giles's-in-the-Fields, a post of almost overwhelming responsibility for a man only thirty-one years of age. Those who pass through the broad thoroughfare which now runs from the Piccadilly Circus to Holborn find it difficult to realise, under the present conditions of a district the half of whose inhabitants are still below the line

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of poverty, what were the accumulated horrors of the Seven Dials half a century ago. Within its courts and alleys there was crowded a mass of the most miserable and vicious people in London, squalid, ignorant, godless, largely criminal. How to get at the people, mostly ill-clad, improvident, living from hand to mouth, was the problem of the parish. Sisterhoods were in their infancy, and would in Thorold's eyes have been inadmissible through suspicion of Ritualism. Deaconesses were as yet unknown. One noble-hearted woman, Mrs. Ranyard, was devising a scheme to send Bible-women into the very lowest courts and alleys, and she found the warmest sympathy as well as wise counsel and teaching from the new rector.

We cannot linger over the details of Thorold's parochial work at St. Giles's. If its statistics are less imposing than those of well-organised working-class parishes of the present day, due allowance must be made for the fact that Thorold was a pioneer in the work of recovering those classes to the national Church, and that he did not allow his whole mind and time to be frittered away in outward activities. Sixteen thousand pounds were raised for new schools to accommodate 900 children, mission rooms were opened, and mission services held in the parish church, at which, in 1859 and 1860, there were for each year over 5,000 acts of Communion. 'The average varied from 40 to 30 at 9 A.M., from 95 to 110 at midday, and from 75 to 200 in the evening. The Sunday schools numbered 1,200 children, the Bible-classes contained 240, the chief mission-room had 200 worshippers' (p. 38). It was not an ideal condition, but yet one which called for much thankfulness. The weakest point in the record is that the attendance at public worship was mainly that of well-to-do people, attracted by the rector's preaching, to which Thorold, now at the zenith of his powers, devoted methodical study.

'Intellectually he was interesting; spiritually he had begun to exercise that irresistible fascination by which the true lover of God draws other souls heavenwards. Intensely devout, he impressed his hearers with his faith. The grand truths of the Gospel broke through his words living and alight from the altar of God. Faith is infectious. This man had been to the gates of heaven and knew what he told. He was really confident that God could change the life by changing the heart' (p. 39).

Undoubtedly one influential source of Thorold's success at St. Giles's may be traced to his unremitting attention to study. His reading was broader than his avowed standpoint

of staunch, we had almost written narrow, Evangelicism would have led us to anticipate. At one time he fears he is falling too much under the influence of Maurice and Stanley; at another he is attracted by Canon Carter, of Clewer. Despite his many labours he became a contributor to *Good Words*, and was thus brought into helpful contact with thoughtful and well-read fellow-labourers. It is at once suggestive of his personal devoutness and of the Church laxity which at that date was often found in combination with it, that Holy Week was little observed at St. Giles's, but its rector regularly attended the services at All Saints', Margaret Street. Yet deeper teaching still was vouchsafed through the discipline of sorrow. Hardly had Thorold been two years at St. Giles's when his wife—the stay and guide of his youth—who had long been a confirmed invalid, entered into rest. How much he lost in her was shown by his assertion that he had never known her judgment at fault. A few months later, in October 1860, his little daughter Winifred was laid by her mother's side in Whittington Churchyard, and only a son, Hayford, remained to him. Through such bitter experience he acquired his almost unrivalled pre-eminence in consoling those who were cast down. *Pectus facit theologum*. Meanwhile he magnified his office.

'When the pastor of a flock like mine,' he wrote to his parishioners in 1861, 'has but bodily strength and a sufficiency of mental power, and is helped by God's grace to stir up the gift of God that is in him, then I say fearlessly no ministry on earth can surpass it, either for variety of interest, or for grandeur of opportunity, or for abundance of aid' (p. 37).

After nine years of exhaustive labour at St. Giles's Thorold's health completely broke down, and he reluctantly resigned his charge at the beginning of 1867. Two years before he had contracted a second marriage, with Miss Emily Labouchere, a lady of very pronounced Evangelical opinions, and after some months of travel and a brief occupancy of Curzon Chapel he resumed hard work as vicar of St. Pancras towards the close of 1869. The year following was marked by the passing of Mr. Forster's Education Act, and Thorold threw himself into the contest for the London School Board, 'fought on the same platform and in close association with the principal leaders of the Nonconformist bodies against the Secularists,' and shared in their triumph, which throughout London was complete. But parochial work at St. Pancras soon became absorbing, and Thorold refused to stand again.

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The development of his own National Schools, the organisation of a special parochial mission in 1872, and of the general mission throughout London in 1874, with the sustained after efforts necessary to retain those who had been touched by them, the crowded weekly Ladies' Bible-class and the Sunday schools, the latter the largest in London; as well as the training of workers, whom he imbued with 'a steadfastness which is still a feature in St. Pancras,' were but salient points in the work of a great London parish. In the insight which enabled him to select the right man for the right place Thorold was peculiarly happy, and his voice and pathos in preaching at times were singularly touching, but he was far from being a universal favourite.

'Some people,' says his biographer, 'never could understand him. Some honestly admired but did not like him. Others complained, not without reason, of his cold and reserved exterior. His friends attributed this to his constant attacks of ill-health. There was, no doubt, something peculiar and strange about him, and, like most persons of his temperament, he was subject to strong and often curious fluctuations of feeling. Full of sparkling humour at one time, with a fine sense of the ridiculous that bubbled up into racy sayings and quaint expressions, on another day he would be depressed, almost gloomy and unapproachable, showing unmistakably something was amiss, and acutely, even painfully, conscious of every little jar or wrong or quite unintentional slight' (p. 65).

Although the practice of holding a Canonry in some distant cathedral city in combination with the charge of an overwhelming town parish has, unfortunately, not yet entirely died out, it is difficult to understand how Thorold could have welcomed the offer of what is misnamed a Residentiary Canonry at York from Archbishop Thomson in 1874. His own private means were ample, his duties at St. Pancras sufficiently onerous and not inadequately paid, the standard of attendance and work he required of his curates exceptionally high and exacting; but his biographer only remarks that 'the comparative rest of his three months' residence at York was very useful to him, and St. Pancras, he felt, was so magnificently organised that it did not need such close attention' (p. 65). With his genuine enthusiasm for work, with his unquestionable eminence in personal piety, with his earnest desire to minister to all classes—the poorest as well as the richest—of his parishioners, with his constant insistence upon the blessedness of self-sacrifice, Thorold had still not risen above the average level of conviction then prevalent among the Evangelical clergy of his day, that the good

things of the Church were the legitimate prize of those to whom they might be offered, and that the duties of a canonry were fully discharged by delivering the prescribed number of sermons charged with the accepted party shibboleths. Possibly Thorold's ambition, to which allusion has already been made, led him to receive with unaffected complacency offers of promotion which men of equal or greater powers would not have accepted without much misgiving. By his episcopate, as well as by his previous labours as a parish priest, Thorold fully justified his appointment to the See of Rochester, and Canon Simpkinson frankly informs us that no one was less astonished than himself on Lord Beaconsfield's nomination, to which he forthwith assented without the faintest whisper of 'Nolo episcopari.'

The diocese of Rochester, when committed to Bishop Thorold's superintendence, was labouring under serious and exceptional disadvantages. Its boundaries had been re-adjusted so as to lighten the load hitherto laid upon the Bishops of London, Winchester, and Rochester, and the re-constituted See lacked the historical and even the industrial ties which have given a corporate life to most of the dioceses formed during the present reign. The huge and crowded populations of South London—in themselves a more than ample charge for one bishop's supervision—were combined with certain rural districts of Kent and Surrey, 'in both of which the principal clergy and laity would have greatly preferred a bishopric conterminous with the county' (p. 71). Greenwich and Deptford (Mr. Simpkinson tells us) regretted their separation from prosperous Hertfordshire, and were vexed to see the wealthiest districts of Kent still left in the diocese of Canterbury. Lambeth and Battersea found themselves separated from the rich residential districts of West Surrey; whilst Newington, with a crowded poor population, lost its former advantage of contributions from the great resources of the City and the West End of London. None were pleased at being included within the limits of what its new bishop called 'the Cinderella of the English dioceses,' whose shapeless and irregular outline might have been purposely designed to exclude all enjoyment of substantial and indispensable help.

Mr. Simpkinson would have brought out yet more vividly the onerous task imposed on Bishop Thorold if he had devoted a few more paragraphs to a description of what the term 'South London' really implies. How many there are who fail to realise the extraordinary revolution which has been silently at work during the last half-century, and which has

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transformed what were formerly the most charming of London suburbs into a densely thronged region completely monopolised by the smaller class of dwellings! Upon the erection of large masses of workmen's houses there almost invariably follows an exodus of their wealthier neighbours, who move to more spacious and airier quarters, and so there is a constant production of vast *ouvrier* parishes, inhabited by people all of one class, without any bond of cohesion and generally (at least within the metropolitan area) little better than a fortuitous combination of atoms. Only those who have had experience of its difficulties can tell at what cost of heart and brain and bodily strength the Church is introduced and built up under such conditions, and at the commencement of his episcopate Dr. Thorold deliberately and determinately held aloof from some of those who were labouring in this arduous task with most manifest success. After a brief experience the bishop modified his first determination to leave the Ritualistic clergy severely alone, but the early years of his episcopate were much disturbed with troubles about ritual. Frantic Evangelicals worried him with memorials and petitions against alleged infringements of the law on one side; fledgling curates pestered him with long letters asserting their rights 'as discreet and learned ministers' to hear confessions, on the other. At St. Paul's, Lorrimore Square, he was hooted and pelted. At St. James's, Hatcham, all his efforts at a settlement proved futile. Yet much was happily arranged through earnest entreaty and fatherly counsel, and in cases where Thorold found a disposition to abandon illegal practices he acted so impartially as to win the outspoken admiration of the *Church Times*. Strong as he was in doctrine and in practice, he refused to act as a partisan. 'It is a bishop's privilege,' he wrote to the persistent persecutors of Mr. Berkeley, of All Hallows, Southwark, 'that all his clergy belong to him; it is his duty, while they are loyal to him, to be just to them. English Churchmen of whatever school, when fairly inside the lines of English formularies and ceremonials, are entitled to claim, from their fellow Churchmen toleration, and from their bishops protection' (p. 85).

Amidst these distractions, which were not allowed to weigh unduly on his mind, Bishop Thorold steadily applied himself to organize his unwieldy diocese, to consolidate its dissevered fragments into one compact unity, and so to weld them together that the people of urban and suburban and rural districts should work together for the common welfare of the whole. School and church building, and multiplica-

tion of living agents, clerical and lay, must go hand in hand with efforts to quicken a deeper spiritual life and a great fight for temperance. Yet, urgent though the need, the bishop announced that he should not attempt to meet it by lowering the standard of theological attainment required of candidates for Holy Orders nor by the adoption of hurried measures. 'My final words,' he said, 'shall be these, Please give me time. I had rather you gave it me. Anyhow, I shall take it. I cannot be pushed into immature conclusions, or have to do things twice over because done hastily at first' (p. 93). In a telling page Canon Simpkinson unfolds the position and prospects of the diocese when Thorold had been for six months in possession of the See.

By preaching twice each Sunday (his biographer writes) in the different churches, and on weekdays continually speaking, visiting, and discussing, he rapidly became acquainted with the needs of his diocese. South London appalled him. 'It has always been the paralysed end of a vast diocese stretching from the Channel Islands to the Thames,' he said. He was troubled to see how insufficiently manned were its enormous parishes, and distressed at the condition of its crowded back streets and swarming alleys, where the people often lived as heathen, while many a huge bare desolate church stood dark through the week, and sparsely occupied by a few respectable worshippers on Sunday. Still more was he saddened by the listless and disheartened lives of several among the clergy, occupied with the discussion of small differences of ritual and constantly baffling the zealous projects of their younger and more hopeful colleagues. He marked with deep anxiety the wide divergence between the contracted sympathies of many among the teachers, and the bitter cry of those who desired to be taught. In such a condition of things varieties of opinion lost their distinctive colour. To convert, to comfort, to evangelize the people must be the all-absorbing task of a true successor of the Apostles; and whoever would help him to such an end must be the most faithful servant of God. Many of the Ritualists were attracting and inspiring the poor. How could he find it in his heart to worry them about ceremonial observances, which looked so insignificant in the fierce struggle for existence, and which men of some experience asserted were helpful to the work of Christ? In his perplexity he turned for suggestions to the Church Congress in 1877 at Croydon, and listened intently to a discussion on toleration (p. 95).

The first year of Bishop Thorold's episcopate did not pass without further discipline in the school of deep personal affliction. Towards its close Mrs. Thorold, who had always been delicate, grew rapidly worse, and on December 30 she passed away. In the loneliness of his periods of terrible sorrow he learned how to console others, and it was remark-

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able with what tenderness of sympathy he drew to him those who had been at first repelled by his cold and undemonstrative bearing. His family responsibilities weighed on him with special force at this moment as he was just moving into Selsdon Park, a large and expensive mansion, and the mother's influence was sadly wanted for the son and two daughters who were left him. But the necessities of the diocese were urgent, and he was soon in harness again. Hitherto he had been largely guided by the advice of Canons Miller and Money, men of much personal worth, but of narrow sympathies; now, two new counsellors, Rev. E. Fisher, Vicar of Kennington, and Rev. E. F. Alexander, his domestic chaplain, obtained a large share of his confidence, and their intimacy was most timely at the moment when a large scheme for evangelistic work throughout the diocese was being launched. If it did not at once modify the Bishop's policy of isolating the Ritualists it helped to promote a better mutual understanding. The Diocesan Society, the Bishop's own creation, was to be the great handmaid of the Church in providing additional living agents who should be sent into the most populous districts. For this purpose he asked the diocese to provide 10,000*l.* a year, and he soon got it. Meanwhile he signalled his second year of office by the issue of a pastoral in which he described the functions of a bishop.

‘His first great function is to continue the transmission of the Apostolic doctrine and fellowship by ordaining those who, after careful inquiry and on the report of his responsible advisers, he is satisfied will be efficient clergymen. In Confirmation he admits young people, arrived at years of discretion, into the full privileges of the Church's fellowship, and after exhortation and prayer invokes on them the gifts of grace. He preaches, as opportunity offers itself; and there are many opportunities. He consecrates churches and cemeteries, assists at meetings for all conceivable objects within the scope of the national life, and conducts, not without difficulties, an incessant and onerous correspondence. Yet all this expresses a very insignificant part indeed of that invisible but continual administration which makes no show, wins no praise, leaves no mark, but which includes plans to be originated, organisation to be sustained, judgments to be matured, discipline to be administered, misunderstandings to be arranged, claims to be adjudicated, mistakes to be corrected, enterprises to be pushed—in a word, the care of all the churches. You expect him to be a leader well in advance of his men (though not too much in front), with sufficient elasticity of nature not to shrink from initiating new schemes and agencies for the ever-changing times, yet prudent enough, while he can stir enthusiasm, not to lead his followers into a quicksand. He should be a ruler, with a firm hand on the rudder and a clear outlook on the sea; by

kindness winning co-operation, by justice inspiring confidence, by cheerfulness encouraging activity, by consistency inducing respect. A friend to all, let him never forget the younger clergy, so fast coming up behind us and the rulers of the Church's future. A pastor, too, he should try to be, to whom the faithful in the diocese can at all times resort for guidance, comfort, and prayer. Not least of all he must be a keeper of Holy Writ, a vigilant though not fretful guardian of the faith once committed to the Saints and deposited in the Scriptural formularies of our own Reformed Communion. Distinctly recognizing and honestly protecting those reasonable diversities of faith and practice which are essential to the existence of a National Church and manfully asserting his own liberty in holding and asserting the truth, he must never press his personal convictions as if they were articles of faith, or enforce his individual preferences in ritual and ceremony as if they had the weight of law. I might easily add much more, but surely enough has been said to effect the object in view ; that of inducing you continually to pray for us.¹

The publication of this address evoked widespread comment from the chief London journals as well as from such prominent Churchmen as Mr. Gladstone, Dean Church, and Canon Liddon. However greatly men might differ from some part of the Bishop's programme, it was universally recognised that he had formed no unworthy conception of his office and that he was prepared manfully to face its responsibilities. He had not yet shaken off his terror of Ritualism, which seventeen years ago excited greater apprehension than it does to-day, and the appointment of his domestic chaplain, Mr. Alexander, to a vacancy at St. Paul's, Lorrimore Square, with the express purpose of sweeping away the existing ritual and, if necessary, the congregation with it, naturally elicited much angry comment. 'Two years later he was opening a second mission-hall in the parish to provide accommodation for the ever-increasing and overflowing congregations who collected to worship God ; and now the newspapers were as loud in their praise as they had been in their blame' (p. 129).

Towards the close of the year 1881 Bishop Thorold delivered his first Charge, and amongst the numerous notices which it received the following extract from *Church Bells* gives a summary of the material work accomplished and tells a remarkable tale of indefatigable labour :—

'In these four years,' the writer states, 'the Bishop has officiated in no less than 202 of the 291 parishes of the diocese—in many of them several times. He has confirmed 32,819 young folks at 274 confirmations. He gives us a curious statistic, and it is one which

¹ *Life and Work of Bishop Thorold*, pp. 116-118.

implies no years 19,5 He has h of 1880 h different examined interviews of the fo £28,000 churches accession to need 7 chapels. and gift fo Lichfield there is pr which Dr.

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implies no little method at his desk, that he has received in these four years 19,527 letters, and has written 13,378 answers with his own hand. He has had 1,489 formal interviews in the same period. In the winter of 1880 he met about 10,000 Church-workers of the diocese at twenty different centres. Preparatory to his primary visitation the Bishop examined 3,000 pages of statistics and saw 290 clergy in separate interviews to discuss them. The Rochester Diocesan Society (one of the four organizations the bishop has set on foot) has received £28,000 in the four years. The Bishop has consecrated 18 new churches and sanctioned the formation of 16 new districts since his accession to the See; but he states that the diocese still seems to need 73 fresh places of worship—viz. 34 churches and 39 mission chapels. The facts thus collected prove that the Bishop has a taste and gift for organization; and we believe that, except the diocese of Lichfield (which for ten years had the experience of Bishop Selwyn) there is probably no better organized diocese in England than that of which Dr. Thorold is the ninety-eighth bishop.¹

Improved organization meant increased acquaintance with the ever-growing necessities of South London, and the publication of the Charge was a trumpet call to Churchmen to which there was a prompt and satisfactory response. The Bishop asked for ten new churches and Mr. Francis Peek offered to build one for a thousand worshippers provided funds for the other nine were forthcoming. Another friend forthwith promised 2,000*l.* and the demand for 50,000*l.*, Quixotic as it seemed, was more than justified by the completion of eleven churches, besides Mr. Peek's, within the next three years. The requisite amount was only raised through the bishop's unwearied energy in personally applying to every wealthy person who could be interested in the spiritual destitution of the poorest part of the metropolis; but the effort brought more than a pecuniary return. In the discussion of the Ten Churches Scheme, Thorold was brought into closer contact with the most earnest of the Ritualistic clergy and learned that they were amongst the staunchest of his officers in the war with vice and ignorance in its most terrible strongholds. But it was impossible to place them in the van of the battle and to hold chillingly aloof from them. The policy of isolation had to be abandoned.

It is impossible to enter in minute detail upon the machinery set up by Bishop Thorold for meeting the wants of his diocese. He used to speak of his four Diocesan Societies as the Quadrilateral and he spared no personal exertion to render them effective. Whilst every growing diocese now possesses a special organization for Church

¹ *Life and Work of Bishop Thorold*, p. 135.

extension, none was worked in a spirit of more determined aggression on densely populated regions and overgrown parishes than the Rochester Diocesan Society, of which the Bishop was the unwearied and animating spirit. The extracts given us from his correspondence with its indefatigable secretary testify to the scrupulous anxiety with which he watched over every little detail and with what infinite expenditure of patience, tact, and discretion he steered it through many a threatening storm. His eyes were all over the diocese, rebuking the sluggish, cheering the fainthearted, encouraging the diligent. Can he preach? Does he visit? Would he be a pastor? were his questions when anyone was recommended to him for a vacant living. The rapid degeneration of many newly-built districts stirred in him righteous impatience to grapple with evils before they became yet more hopeless, and dauntless pertinacity in pleading their cause. 'The work of the living Church,' he wrote to one of his most munificent supporters, '*cannot wait*, and ought not to. Do glance at the little paper I enclose.' Meanwhile a movement was commencing the limits of whose far-reaching issues are not yet assignable and from which under Bishop Thorold's eager advocacy South London was to reap its full share of blessing.

Among the many remarkable developments of Church work which have sprung forth in the latter half of the nineteenth century perhaps none strikes the imagination more powerfully than the origin and growth of College and School Missions. Their singular adaptation to pressing necessities; their dexterity in seizing upon the *esprit de corps* which is so potent in school and college and ennobling it by its employment in God's service, their happy influence in eliciting the sympathy of the well-to-do for their poorer fellow-countrymen, whilst their hearts are still keenly susceptible to generous impulses, have served to enhance the value of home missions in which the strain of work against appalling odds is relieved by association with fellow-workers who have school or college ties in common. It may be imagined with what eagerness Thorold marked the advancing tide of these missions and how he yearned to turn its fertilizing streams over the arid parts of his diocese, and in this he succeeded beyond his most sanguine expectations. One after another the Cambridge colleges, St. John's, Christ's, Clare, Corpus, Pembroke, Caius, crowned by the magnificent mission of Trinity in St. George's, Camberwell, came to the help of the Lord in South London. By what manner of personal influence the fire was kindled is

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vividly portrayed in the following description of Thorold's appeal to the undergraduates of Pembroke College:—

'Those of us who had our fingers on the pulse of the movement knew it to be neither very steady nor very strong. In fact, we had reached the critical stage when sentiment and novelty pass away, and the anxious question has to be asked: "What sort of calming down will come; will things quiet down into indifference or into steady conviction?" And we were in that condition when Bishop Thorold came to pay us a visit. Humanly speaking, everything depended upon him, what he said, and the impression he made. He was to preach in the college chapel on Sunday morning . . . and every eye was on him as he moved slowly to his place (just inside the sanctuary gates, for there is no pulpit) during the hymn. What a figure he made! He walked with the mincing step of the worst school of deportment. The impression of that walk is never to be forgotten. A figure more hopelessly out of key with its surroundings can hardly be conceived. The chapel is severe to absolute plainness. . . . Two great pillars of rare and beautiful marble are its sole and very stately ornament. And when at length he took his stand between them, and, waiting for the hymn to finish, preened his feathers, so to speak, he had jarred on every nerve one possessed, played every false note that could be played, and turned every anxiety into despair. If it had been a very ornate building it might not have seemed so bad, but in that chapel it was intolerable. It did not seem possible that he could do any worse, yet he did. He gave out his text, "I am a debtor," four times, with nods of the head to this side and that side and tricks of voice and manner, which, like his progress up the aisle aimed so pretentiously at dignity and effect that some smiled in derision, some in contempt, but no one in sympathy; no one was impressed. Then came the sermon; it lasted over half an hour. But long before the end, before, indeed, he had spoken for ten minutes, he had us all in hand, the mission in train; and ere he finished he had done all that the warmest supporter of the movement could have hoped. Yet it was not, it is not even now, obvious where the quality that thus ended the crisis exactly lay. It was not a learned sermon, neither was it eloquent, nor was the Bishop's power his style then or ever. It was thoughtful, but we were all more or less accustomed to thought. But why aim at subtle analysis? This at least was clear, that he *cared*—cared for the diocese, cared for the neglected parishes, and, above all, cared that *we* should undertake the work because of the blessing that would accrue to us in and from it. We felt that he was the leader we wanted. We had aimed at philanthropy and we had found a philanthropist in the proper, literal sense of the word; and such philanthropists have a dominating quality which speaks straight to everyone who has not lost all freshness of ideal. Perhaps the sharp contrast between what he said and the way he said it; the fresh, simple freedom of the one, the elaborate, studied mannerism of the other, only heightened the effect. But he got the effect; and to many of us the words 'I am a debtor' have

an abiding width of meaning which has affected other things besides the college mission.¹

Despite the length of this quotation we make no apology for inserting a passage on College Missions from the Bishop's Charge of 1885, which illustrates very strikingly the great expectations he had formed of them, and supplies, we think, a key to the secret of his magnetic influence over others. 'Si vis me flere' is a maxim of the widest application, and men might well be moved by one who believed so thoroughly in this new method of attacking the forces of poverty, ignorance and sin, which none could gauge more accurately than himself.

'It will bring about,' he wrote, 'happy and personal contact between the bright side of life and the shadowed, between the buoyant gladness of the young men who from time to time will come down to visit the missions, and the opaque, dull lives of countless toilers who from one year to another never gaze on the verdure of summer-time nor feel the spray of the tossing sea. It means to those who have never yet been called to bear the burdens or bow under the sorrows of actual life an opportunity of measuring the chasm that divides the extremes of English society into two alien worlds and of bridging it over with simple kindness. One of the happiest signs of times which need something to make one cheerful about them is the moral and social revolution that is secretly transforming many of the young gentlemen of the upper class in the appreciation of their personal responsibilities for the millions.

'Sociableness is the breakwater of Revolution. In most cases our young friends will get more than they give, and in a common-wealth regenerated by truth, elevated by example, softened by kindness, surprised by justice, a new England may presently be born as lofty as the England of Elizabeth, as virtuous as the England of Cromwell, as prosperous as the England of Walpole. "We are saved by hope"' (pp. 161, 162).

We have dwelt more especially on those portions of Thorold's life which cast light upon the aggressive work of the Church in South London, as it is this which gave its distinctive character to his episcopate at Rochester. For fuller account of the methods by which he strove to keep in touch with his clergy, of his splendid hospitality at Selsdon Park, which inevitably suggested at times a painful contrast with the position of the poorer clergy struggling in the thickest of the fight, of his happy audacity in dealing with the rich and well disposed and stimulating them to repeated sacrifices for the Master's sake, of his masterful personality and the failings

¹ *Life and Work of Bishop Thorold*, pp. 158-59.

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which his biographer does not attempt to conceal, and, more than all, of the deep personal piety of his spirit, chastened by severe experience of sorrow and sanctified by the Word of God and by prayer, the reader will find ample and interesting details in Canon Simpkinson's pages. With all his enthusiasm for work and his remarkable aptitude for transacting business he never allowed his whole mind and time to be absorbed or frittered away in outward things, however essential, and he perpetually warned the younger clergy against the danger of falling below the intellectual standard and of being ignorant of the current thought of their age to which the growing activities of clerical life exposed them. Perhaps he hardly practised what he preached so urgently. Perhaps he spent his strength unduly over the burdensome *minutiae* of an overpowering diocese which others might have shared, without an assistant bishop, without a domestic chaplain, and without a secretary. It is an infirmity of energetic and able minds, who have all the threads of a complicated skein under their control, to think no one else can so well handle even the smallest of them. Perhaps he erred in devoting the hours of what should have been absolute holiday to the composition of a new work or to stirring up the spirit of mutual and fraternal affection in the Churches of Australia and the United States. Yet it was a noble spirit which exclaimed with Henry Martyn 'Let me burn out for God,' and which disregarded the warnings of anxious friends that the brain cannot do without rest. And as he worked on incessantly his sympathies broadened. 'The dream of my life,' he says, under date August 6, 1886, 'is to make it plain to all that an Evangelical Churchman can love culture, practise justice, discern differences, and respect goodness anywhere and everywhere; and that a good man may preach the Gospel with wide-mindedness, be orthodox, and yet be in harmony with his time.' Thirteen years of successful administration of the Rochester diocese told heavily upon Thorold, and he accepted with little hesitation Lord Salisbury's offer to translate him to the lighter and more dignified position vacated by the resignation of Bishop Harold Browne.

We confess that, to our thinking, the interest of Bishop Thorold's life declines largely on his translation to the stately see of Winchester. There is something which jars on our sense of congruity in the late occupant of a diocese whose necessities were so overwhelming as those of South London spending large sums upon the decoration and furniture of the castle in which the successors of William of Wykeham are housed. No doubt there is much to be said in behalf of

maintaining the historic continuity of an episcopal residence associated with such glorious memories as those enshrined at Farnham Castle, and it is no mere idle sentiment that would bewail the severance of a tie which has existed through so many centuries. No doubt, too, the expenditure of his own large private means was legitimately within Bishop Thorold's own control, and it was largely prompted by an unselfish desire to put the official see-house into such sumptuous and complete repair as might enable a much poorer man to follow him without serious inconvenience. But the symmetry of a life of high and noble effort is marred by the undue appreciation in which the Bishop evidently held 'the pomp of circumstance,' and its dignity is lowered as we read of lavish outlay upon flower-beds and hanging gardens, upon Japanese wall-papers and costly tapestries. It is not for us to judge harshly infirmities which are frankly revealed, and we admit with unfeigned alacrity that in many respects Bishop Thorold's example was one which most men might be thankful in any degree to approach; but in an age wherein extravagance and luxury trench so terribly on wealth that should be devoted to higher uses, simplicity of living and disregard of outward show are the more imperative in those who bear rule in the Church.

In turning from the biography of Bishop Thorold to that of Harvey Goodwin we pass to a widely different sphere of life and thought. From their childhood upwards the careers of the two men present innumerable points of contrast. The boyhood of Harvey Goodwin was exceptionally dull and cheerless. He lost his mother at an early age, and all the pride of his father—a man of chilling and unsympathetic temper—was centred upon an elder brother, to whom his partiality attributed a capacity and powers of application in which he thought the younger was deficient. The motherless lad of seven was sent to a private school at High Wycombe with the remark that the master might do what he would with him provided only that he made him work. 'The consequence was that "tears were his meat day and night," and for several years the poor boy groaned under continual caning and continual impositions. The current theory was that he was clever and could do anything he liked; the practice was that he was caned almost every day of his life' (p. 14). With all the evils (as the Bishop afterwards expressed it) of a public school intensified, and with none of its compensating advantages, with an inferior master

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whose habit of combining jokes and strokes made him seem an unmitigated tyrant to his pupils, and whose teaching was supplemented by that of second-rate ushers, and with the home training of a pedantic father who was perpetually cramming his boys with instruction at unseasonable hours, it would have been small wonder if Harvey Goodwin had grown up ill-tempered, morose, and deceitful. But nothing could spoil his native sweetness, and we are tempted to ask for an adequate cause of a result so charming and so uncommon.

Is the true explanation to be found in the inheritance of his mother's gentleness of disposition and in the lasting influence she exerted over her child's mind and heart during the few brief years that she was spared to him? The question is one of universal interest and may help to point a lesson of unspeakable importance. In after years, and on great crises in his life, his mother's memory was ever vividly before him. 'Her share in our education (he wrote), at least in my own, was deeper and more real than that of my father.' She trained her children in habits of implicit and unquestioning obedience and in such unswerving respect for truth that, he adds:

'I do not believe any fear of consequences would have induced either my brother or myself to have told my father or my mother a lie, even of the whitest kind. . . . When I remember the evil influences I met with at school, and the manner in which my conscience ever testified for truthfulness in my darkest hour, I feel that my mother's teaching was bearing its fruit' (p. 9).

How permanent was his sense of her tenderness was brought out in his address to the working women's meeting at the Carlisle Church Congress in 1884:

'I think,' he said, 'there is nothing like the pure love of a mother. I was very little over six years of age when my mother was taken from me; but I say deliberately, and without any sense of exaggeration, that though I have since that time been at school, been under tutors, been at college, and had all the experience of life, I do not think all the lessons I have had since that time put together amount in value and importance to the lessons which I learned from my mother before I was seven years old. She taught me always to speak the truth. She taught me to say my prayers. I have as vivid a recollection now, at the distance of sixty years, as I had at the time, of the manner in which she made me kneel at her knees, and with her hand upon my head taught me the simple prayer suitable to my childish days. She taught me reverence, she enforced full obedience, she taught me to keep my temper' (pp. 239, 240).

Such testimony to the value of a mother's home training

is worthy of record in a day when such parental responsibility is sadly apt to be neglected. In Harvey Goodwin's case its results were priceless. It had, under God's blessing, the power to transmute the cheerless boyhood through which he passed to a youth of no ordinary promise. It would be hard to find a more beautiful picture than that of this merry and gifted but unbefriended lad, amidst most uncongenial surroundings, seizing upon every means of self-improvement, embracing with eagerness every new branch of knowledge, and at the same time painfully groping his way under the most unfavourable conditions to the peace of settled religious convictions. 'All things come to him that waits' is a truism which, in Harvey Goodwin's instance, proved to be a truth. After years at High Wycombe of what he considered to be 'wasting his time wholesale,' he was brought successively under tutors who gave him a deep insight into things, and gradually the consciousness awoke in him that his forte lay in the study of mathematics. His interest once aroused, his application was intense, and just before and during his undergraduate career he often worked for ten hours a day. It was well known in the University that Ellis was his one competitor for the senior wranglership, and there was some speculation that his health might break down. With that love of fair play which was so marked a characteristic of his after life Goodwin was most anxious 'that Ellis's health should hold out, and that he should do himself full justice. Few things (he said) could have been less satisfactory than to find oneself decorated with a false halo of glory in consequence of the physical weakness of an incomparably superior man' (p. 45). In the Tripos list of 1840 the two names stand Ellis first, Goodwin second, and they were in the same position for the hardly less coveted Smith's prize.

We must here retrace our steps that we may bring into due prominence the religious as well as the scholarly side of Harvey Goodwin's character. Beneath the cheery temper and the massive intellect there ever flowed a deep current of religious feeling which sanctified and gave them their special charm, and their early development is described by the Bishop's own pen in an interesting and instructive passage. He had determined to do some work for God and to give himself unreservedly to Him, and of this determination his first Communion was the sign and seal.

"It was," he writes, "an unspeakably sweet and solemn season. I had no special advantages, no friend with whom to talk over the matter, no book put into my hand for the occasion; my father,

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when I spoke of it, seemed rather to dissuade me, on the ground that, although my brother was fit, there was no reason to suppose that I was; my brother was kind but somewhat severe, and his intense religiousness of character somewhat alarmed me by bringing out my own sense of inferiority; but I thought that I saw my way and I determined to go; and the result made me feel sure that I was right. My feelings of worship and of God's presence were something quite different from anything that I had before experienced. I seemed as in an ecstasy: my whole soul was ravished with a sense of Divine love. Often has the remembrance of that first Communion come back to me with strength and refreshment in hours of spiritual darkness.

"Nor did the feelings of happiness which I experienced in my first Communion vanish away at once like a morning cloud. For weeks and months afterwards I seemed to be a new creature. I experienced such a sense of joy and happiness that life seemed in itself a delight; and yet the assurance of a better life seemed to make death itself desirable. I am now writing after an interval of more than forty years, and am likely, therefore, to be able to take a quiet, dispassionate view of my boyish experience; and I am quite certain that I cannot use language too strong to express the warmth of my feelings and the fulness of my happiness at the period to which I now refer. Whether the state of my mind was wholesome or not, I will not undertake to decide; that my religious scheme was crude and imperfect I found out to my cost afterwards; but that I enjoyed for a considerable period pure and intense happiness is certainly true, and I cannot fail to record it" (pp. 28, 29).

The religious atmosphere which surrounded Goodwin at this time was entirely Calvinistic, and the favourite books of that school, Doddridge's *Rise and Progress*, John Newton's *Letters of Omicron*, Wilberforce's *Practical View* were conscientiously gone through in small daily portions—a practice which the Bishop strongly commended—as a devotional exercise. On Doddridge's advice he wrote out a solemn self-dedication. In after years he abandoned the tenets of Calvinism, and burned the paper dedication as derogatory to his baptism and confirmation, yet in the struggle through which his mind passed before it was delivered from this form of bondage, as well as in after-experience of mental exercise over the theories of Maurice and Colenso, Goodwin recognized the Divine leading which enabled him to be of signal service to the young men of Cambridge and to men of deeper thought in later years.

"The result of my own experience," he said, "has been to impress upon me these two truths: first, that the revelation of God in Christ has difficulties which it is foolish not to see and dishonest not to acknowledge; secondly, that those difficulties do not touch

the foundation of the revelation, and that notwithstanding them the revelation of God in Christ consists with the conclusions of the highest human reason. These two truths have been for many years the mainstay of my own religious life and the key to all my teaching' (pp. 53, 54).

We wonder how many of those who listened to Harvey Goodwin's fervid exhortations to go and do, and who remembered the shrewd religious common sense with which he insisted upon the need of struggling on through practical piety to a sense of peace with God, realized that the speaker was himself no stranger to the ecstatic inner vision which they might have thought to be vouchsafed to the visionary mystic alone.

Saving the first unhappy choice of a school at High Wycombe, Harvey Goodwin had the advantage of tutors of no ordinary calibre, such as Thompson, subsequently Master of Trinity; Challis, Plumian Professor of Astronomy; and Hopkins, prince of Cambridge coaches. After his degree, when he had married and settled as a private tutor, and as curate of St. Giles's, Cambridge, the choicest spirits of the University were naturally drawn to one whose magnetic attraction was so rich and varied, and his preaching speedily became a power to townsfolk and undergraduates alike. But besides his tutorial and pastoral work any and every benevolent institution of whose principles he could approve found in him an energetic upholder. To the Cambridge Industrial School for Boys he devoted so much time and attention that he never missed a meeting of the Committee, whilst as President of the Working Men's College he gave lectures of such lucidity as, in the language of one of his hearers, made them understand. The influence thus acquired was further extended on his appointment to the incumbency of St. Edward's—a church in the heart of the town. It was then far more rare than it has since become—perhaps largely through Harvey Goodwin's example—for men of Goodwin's high gifts and acquirements to preach short and pithy sermons, distinguished alike by fervid earnestness and strong practical common sense, and the effect was almost electric. The parishioners of St. Edward's appreciated one whose teaching was so illustrated in his daily life amongst them that, despite all difference of rank and education, they regarded him as a true friend and brother. How he laid hold of the undergraduates who thronged the church aisles may be gathered from the following anecdote, related to Canon Rawnsley by one who was present on the occasion:—

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'On the Sunday Dr. Whewell had asked people from the country or the neighbourhood who he knew would enjoy Harvey Goodwin's sermon, some to luncheon, some to dine and sleep. After luncheon, one of the party, a country squire, took me aside and told me how he had come from Eton to Trinity College, that he had never worked and did not intend to work, but only wished to take his degree and to pass the time pleasantly. He came up on a Saturday, and on Sunday he had a breakfast party of his own friends in his rooms at 12 o'clock. When the eating, the smoking, and the singing were over, and his party was about to disperse, he said, "What do you fellows do on a Sunday?" Someone answered, "The correct thing is to hear Harvey Goodwin preach: he is now Select Preacher at St. Mary's." My friend answered, "Preaching is not much in my line, but if anyone will take me I will go." He went, and he could point me the exact place where he sat. From the time that the text was given out to the end of the sermon he was riveted to the preacher; his voice, his earnest manner, his sound sense and teaching—all appealed to him as no other voice ever had done. He returned to his rooms a changed man, and from that day he dated all and everything that was good in him. He had never missed an opportunity of hearing Harvey Goodwin preach: he had often gone fifty miles for that privilege. He bought all books or pamphlets that Harvey Goodwin wrote.'

When asked to explain the secret of his influence over the undergraduates, Goodwin replied: 'I altogether ignore their presence, and preach plain practical sermons to my own parishioners. This is my first duty, and the young men willingly listen to such sermons, whereas many of them might resent any direct address to themselves.'

As the days had not yet come when University distinction was disregarded in the appointments to high office in the cathedral of the University city, there was a general sense of appropriateness as well as of satisfaction at the recognition of his high deserts when Goodwin was promoted, on the death of Dr. Peacock in 1858, to the Deanery of Ely. A better selection could hardly have been made. All his energies were devoted to the real and important duties of an office which has too generally been regarded as a position of dignified and otiose leisure. Passionately fond of architecture, he worked *con amore* to restore and beautify his glorious cathedral, and it was on his suggestion that Mr. Gambier Parry was induced to complete the decoration of the roof of the nave, a work which he and his assistants accomplished lying on their backs upon the lofty scaffolding. The City Dispensary, the Cathedral School, the Ely Diocesan Musical

¹ Harvey Goodwin, pp. 120, 121.

Society, even the public roads, were in turn the objects of his helpful solicitude. His great love for music led him to dream of the encouragement which the united action of the capítular bodies might afford to the production of an English school of sacred music. Above all, his heart was set upon making the cathedral service a model of worship for the entire diocese, both in the beauty of its services and in the spirit of those by whom its exquisite strains are rendered.

'The *crux* of a Cathedral choir lies, as the Dean knew, in maintaining the interest of the lay clerks in their work, and in raising their tone and spirit to that spiritual conception of a daily sacrifice of prayer and thanksgiving unto God, which needs pure minds and pure mouths to offer it worthily. The behaviour and general conduct of the lay clerks were, in the Dean's mind, of essential importance. He held that, in the event of any scandal, no considerations of musical proficiency should be allowed the slightest weight, and in the few cases of trouble that arose during his time as Dean he acted firmly on this opinion. Yet he fully recognised the peculiar difficulties with which the position of a lay clerk is beset. "The weight of the daily office presses, I think," he once wrote, "the most heavily upon the lay clerks. Their attendance is the most continuous, their share in the office is the most laborious and the most technical, and their education does not give them advantages in appreciating the value of the work in which they are engaged, equal to those possessed by the clergy of the Cathedral. No amount of trouble and inquiry is wasted which tends to preserve really holy and religious men for the occupation of this responsible post. Voice and knowledge of music must not stand for everything. The Dean should be quite satisfied as to the previous history of every applicant, and nothing should induce him to admit a doubtful member into the choir. Every lay clerk should be a consistent and devout communicant. This last condition is necessary not merely on religious grounds, but because, unless it be satisfied, it is impossible that the Holy Communion should be celebrated in a cathedral as it ought to be. Nothing can be more melancholy than to attend the service of a cathedral on a Sunday and watch the choir disperse after the sermon, then find the most solemn part of the service celebrated without any choir at all; perhaps almost without congregation."¹

It was as Dean that Harvey Goodwin first took a share in the proceedings of Convocation, where his clear-headedness and fair-mindedness quickly made him a power, and caused him to be placed on several committees. His reputation was extending, and on one Commission after another—on the first and second on Ritual and on that on Clerical Subscription—his name was inserted, and his practical common sense and sound judgment largely influenced their Reports. So marked

¹ *Harvey Goodwin*, pp. 108, 109.

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was his capacity for conducting business that the secretaries of great Church societies welcomed his arrival in town as a sure promise that difficult and intricate affairs would be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. In these varied ways Goodwin was filling so prominent a place in the public mind as a man inevitably destined to go higher that there was some remonstrance against his banishment to so distant and barbarous a region as Carlisle, to which he was nominated by Mr. Gladstone on the death of Bishop Waldegrave in 1869. Like Thorold, Harvey Goodwin succeeded to a diocese that in its modern shape had never been welded satisfactorily together. A more serious difficulty had to be faced in the low mental and moral condition of many of the clergy, amongst whom Dr. Gunson bewailed to his friend that intemperance largely prevailed. How such a condition of things subsisted despite the exertions of Bishops Blomfield and Waldegrave is explained by Canon Rawnsley as follows:—

‘The position of the Cumberland clergy sixty years ago was in many ways peculiar to the diocese. They were in part the natural result of the impoverishment of the diocese at the time of the fall of the conventual houses, and in part the product of those old pastoral republics that peopled the valleys and hills in the good old days of the Cumberland and Westmoreland estatesmen. In those days when, for lack of settled stipend, the dalesmen taxed their tiny holdings for what was called “chapel-wage,” and, adding thereto “sark,” “whittlegate,” and “gusegate,” or right to shirting, and knife and fork, and a few geese on the common, maintained their own lay reader, to be parson, schoolmaster, and lawyer in one, it was not unnatural that the farmers should choose out of their own number the reader they wished to present to the bishop. It was not always the fool of the family by any means who was so chosen; it was rather the lad who, being too weakly to go to the fells with the sheep, had time to study and become “beuk-larned,” to be able to “dea a bit at Latten, Greek, and sec-like.” And thus the readers or priests of Cumberland and Westmoreland were drawn from the people. The poverty of the dales and their sparse populations had, when the rectorial tithe was withdrawn, failed to keep up the poor churches, as anyone may see who reads Bishop Nicholson’s visitation, made in 1614. With the disorder and squalor of poverty and ruin in their parish churches, a lower idea of the sacred office of village priest and of sacred ordinances had prevailed. There were, it is true, here and there “wonderful Walkers,” as in Donnerdale, and such pattern parsons as the Sympson of Wythburn, whose portrait Wordsworth drew in his *Excursion* within memories of living tradition; but side by side with these had been found “dale-priests”—the word priest has steadily survived since Roman Catholic times—who had to eke out their slender living by selling ale at the Church House on

Sunday, and who would break off from some well-known old rant or lilt with "I must away to preach now and will soon be back again." There were others who would come down to the public-house on Saturday night, wrestle with the toughest fellow in the taproom, and, after flinging him, would return to prepare the next day's discourse; and others who would sometimes dine not wisely but too well with their flock who had "getthered for sarvice time," get "steddit" up the aisle, and gallop through the prayers, and then rattle through a homily which they prefaced with such words as these: "Now mind, my friends, you must do as I say, and not as I do."¹

In 1869 the clergy of the dales were in a transition stage, but it needed all the new bishop's singular gifts of conciliation, authority, and organization to unite clergy and laity in harmonious efforts for the Church. It was not so much, however, by the introduction of new machinery, nor even by the perfecting and bringing into working order of Bishop Waldegrave's plans, that the regeneration of the diocese was effected: it was rather by the spirit infused into every part of it that Harvey Goodwin's influence was felt. He found Church work at places in full activity, but bound in the fetters of party, and he laboured successfully to promote union amongst men of various schools. He imparted new life to the Diocesan Societies, and made strenuous and effective efforts to sustain the Voluntary Church Schools; he established Diocesan Conferences, and so brought clergy and laity together for mutual discussion of Church questions and requirements; he raised funds to increase the miserably inadequate stipends of many of the country clergy; and he kept the portcullis of Rose Castle, as he had promised, always raised to welcome Churchmen of all ranks with unostentatious but cordial hospitality. But whilst he neglected none of his purely diocesan duties, it was in the wider spheres of Convocation and of Parliament, as a constant and indispensable speaker at Church Congresses, as a select preacher at Cambridge, in Westminster Abbey, and other prominent occasions, and above all as a staunch and competent defender of the faith against the assaults of 'science falsely so called,' that Harvey Goodwin made his mark in the Church and in the world. From the lucid explanation of some tangled scientific question he could turn with ready facility to address crowds of working men, with whom his cheery manner and his apt powers of illustration made him a special favourite. We cannot enter upon any account of his scientific works, the

¹ *Harvey Goodwin*, pp. 133, 135.

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chief of which, *The Foundations of the Creed*, has been fully reviewed in our pages; but it is hardly too much to say that through his varied forms of activity his name became a household word throughout the Church, and was held everywhere in the highest affection and esteem.

It is difficult for a biographer to escape suspicion of unduly exalting his hero, so we will present our readers with Sir Henry Acland's portrait of the Bishop when in his seventy-first year he preached to the members of the British Association in Newcastle Cathedral. The testimony is noteworthy as coming from so competent an authority.

'In the last sixty years,' he writes, 'I have heard many preachers who riveted attention from their manner, their character, their discourse—Mr. Newman, Dr. Pusey, Dr. Magee, Dr. Liddon, Dr. Salmon, Bishop Alexander, Arthur Stanley. There was something in the occasion, and in the man, and in his writings, which led one to expect a discourse of the deepest interest. The Bishop had scarce begun when this was more than realised. The effect increased with every part of the simple and luminous exposition of the simple and beautiful words (of Psalm lxxv. 9, 10). Erect, motionless, in clear, firm voice, the aged man riveted instant and deep attention. I had heard nothing like it since Newman at St. Mary's; like, yet very different. As a scholar, he first noted different translations of the simple words. Each asserts the *Providence* of God. *He* prepares the corn. *He* provides the corn. I cannot safely abridge the argument. I dare not wholly pass it by. Himself an expert, he was addressing experts. He spoke as one might speak to the most simple.'

We are constrained to omit the *résumé* of the preacher's argument, and must content ourselves with a few vivid sentences from Sir H. Acland's conclusion:—

'With the precision of a mathematical reasoner, with the imagination of a poet of nature, with the simplicity of a faithful believer, he set before his great audience his conclusions upon the evidence derived from modern knowledge as to the provision and the providence of the earth for man by a power higher than law. But he did not thus conclude. In a more pathetic strain he carried on his argument to the contemplation of the chiefest of all mysteries set before man; that of God visiting the earth in the person of His Incarnate Son—the only solution of the many difficulties of the world. His impressive, touching words, the outpouring of a trained intellect and of noblest nature, the sight of the manly preacher, as he tenderly brought his last words to a close, are often before my mind with never-diminished beauty.'¹

In adding a few concluding words to our notice of these

¹ *Harvey Goodwin* pp. 297-299.

types of the Anglican episcopate, we are reminded that we have spoken but little of the way in which Canons Simpkinson and Rawnsley have respectively performed their task; but our readers will have gathered that the two biographies are exceptionally good ones, nor can we pay the authors a higher compliment than by saying that we have been completely engrossed in the excellence of their portraiture. 'Maximæ artis est celare artem,' and the men are so portrayed as to be instinct with life. Each of them was eminently worthy of separate notice; yet we thought it might serve a useful purpose to unite them in a single review as typical examples of the identical and contrasted qualities which enable men to do signal service in our days in the Church of God. In character as in gifts they were singularly diverse. Thorold commenced his episcopate as an avowed partisan, and was never a leader in the realm of thought, nor did he shine in the councils of the Church or the Empire as either a ready debater or a successful legislator. Yet by dint of unwearied earnestness of purpose, by unflagging enthusiasm for work, and by true missionary zeal for the souls of men, he acquired and deserved a high place in the roll of distinguished names which adorn the bench of English bishops. Harvey Goodwin was distinguished for a breadth of view and width of sympathy which could appreciate the broad tolerance of the Church of England, and his first episcopal utterance that he would know no party was justified by his consistent refusal to countenance petty sectional persecution, and by his success in so governing his diocese that it was conspicuous for the harmonious action of its clergy and for its freedom from ritual excesses. His sweet reasonableness, engendered by the power of looking on both sides of a question, did not result in hesitancy or irresolution. His mind was eminently constructive, and men turned to him instinctively for the solution of a difficulty and for the definite shaping of some long-debated conclusion. Few men possessed equal power of arresting the attention alike of the most highly educated and of the masses; and the secret of this lay in such complete mastery of his subjects as enabled him to handle them with the utmost simplicity. Scholar, scientist, and saint, Goodwin won a place amongst the acknowledged apologists of the Catholic faith.

From this estimate of contrasted qualities let us turn to those which the two prelates possessed in common. Both had the inestimable, shall we say the indispensable, advantage of ample experience as parish priests. Both were born

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rulers of men, the one more lovingly, the other somewhat sternly, yet each so as to command the respect essential to the rightful occupancy of his high position. Both were exceptionally endowed with the shrewd, practical common sense which is the pride of Englishmen, with the capacity for intense and sustained labour—but shortly before his death Harvey Goodwin asserted that he did not know what ‘being tired’ meant—with the happy art of securing the confidence and cordial support of the laity, and with burning desire to recover to the Church of their fatherland the great masses of her indifferent and alienated children. And besides these qualities, in each case there was the force supplied by that personal holiness on which all lasting influence depends.

So long as the Church is permitted to breed such men and to place them at her helm, so long as the varied gifts of a complex race and civilization are freely accepted when made manifest and are consecrated to her service, so long may she go on her way with humble confidence and trust in the Divine blessing, despite the internal distractions which trouble her and those occasional defections to the Italian schism by which she is pained. In the selection of her bishops the Church is liable to the caprice of a Prime Minister, who can force a nominee whose convictions are utterly at variance with a whole diocese, lay and clerical, upon a vacant See, or to Court influence, which may thrust a valetudinarian favourite into a chair which might tax all the energies of the strongest. But these are mere passing accidents: and the Church which can present amongst her overseers such men as Benson and Temple, and Ellicott and Westcott, and Stubbs and Creighton—to name only the first half-dozen that occur to us—may calm her heart. Hers is no mean inheritance nor inglorious position, and we need to bear it constantly in mind, not for mere idle boasting, but as a stimulus to renewed exertion. Nor, with this thought in our minds, can we close our paper more fitly than with Bishop Goodwin’s paraphrase of Newman’s words at the Church Congress at Carlisle. When speaking of the Church of England he said passionately:

‘Oh, my mother! sorrows have been thine in times past and are thine now. Thou hast foes without, lukewarm hearts, divided counsels, and too much of the world within; thy face is scarred, thy garments are soiled and torn; but thine is not the curse of the miscarrying womb and the dry breasts; God hath given thee the blessing of sons and daughters, and the wide world is their possession and inheritance’ (*Life*, p. 238).

ART. IV.—UNIVERSITIES IN THE MIDDLE AGES.

The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages. By HASTINGS RASHDALL, M.A., Fellow and Lecturer of Hertford College, Oxford [now Fellow and Tutor of New College]. Two Volumes, in three parts. (Oxford, 1895.)

MR. RASHDALL'S book stands, we believe, quite alone among University Prize Essays, since it has not merely grown into a substantial book, but has also the solidity of a work of erudition as well as the maturity which we have a right to expect from a philosophical tutor at Oxford. It stands, we have said, alone; for the nearest parallel—the masterly and finely-written history of the Normans in Italy and Sicily, by the late Mr. Lewis Nettleship—though it cost the writer long and sedulous study, was never brought to completion, and has not yet been, perhaps never will be, published. To compare works like these with the typical specimen of the enlarged Prize Essay, Mr. James Bryce's *Holy Roman Empire*, is to do injustice to both. Mr. Bryce's essay was the brilliant production of a young man of the highest gifts; but in attaining the dimensions of a volume it owed a debt which is scarcely sufficiently recognized to a sterling monograph of Döllinger, and to the famous *History of the City of Rome in the Middle Ages*, by Gregorovius. When these failed him, Mr. Bryce sank in precision, and his later chapters betray rather the characteristics of the prize essay than of the ripe history. Admirable as his book is, it has become standard by virtue of its clear and striking presentment of large facts, not of scholarship or independent study.

We have dwelt upon this matter in order to point a contrast. Mr. Rashdall gained the Chancellor's Prize for an English essay so long ago as 1883, and for twelve years he devoted such time as he could spare from his duties as a college tutor to reading everything that had been written which bore in any way upon the subject of mediæval Universities. The three volumes which are the result seem, as far as we can judge, hardly to bear any possible relation to what must have been their original form. It is only on occasions—usually, we are sorry to say, in the shape of some display of animus against the clergy, especially when they happen to be 'orthodox'¹—that we seem to hear the ring of the reciter in the

¹ For example, speaking of Abailard, Mr. Rashdall thinks it 'surprising how little his treacherous crime seems to have shocked the men

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Sheldonian theatre. The work as a whole is (though the author modestly disclaims such a scope) very nearly an encyclopædia of mediæval studies, thorough and conscientious in all its details, which takes its place at once and by universal consent as the leading book (in English the only book) on its subject; and from this position it is not likely to be dethroned for many years. The treatment is clear and the style readable and straightforward, though sometimes clumsy; it is not often that it rises into brilliancy, but at the same time it is happily seldom (though a good many instances might be collected) that it is disfigured by 'slang.'¹

Readers of this Review may recognize in the account of the origin of the University of Oxford a chapter of which the first—or rather more probably the second or third—draught appeared in our pages in January 1887. In the same year another fragment on 'The Origines of the University of Paris' was published in the *English Historical Review*; and anyone who chooses to compare these articles with the corresponding parts of the finished book will gain some idea of the repeated revision and rewriting to which Mr. Rashdall has subjected his work. The same laborious painstaking reveals itself throughout. Mr. Rashdall has too clear a perception of the needs of proportion to expand his treatment of all sections out of regard to the amount of literature, or what passes for literature, bearing upon every obscure University; but still he lets us see that he has got abreast of that literature, and he supplies us with an astonishingly complete bibliography for every one of them.

who professed such a holy horror of his theological enormities' (i. 52). The treachery indeed may be disputed, but this is a large question, rather of psychology than history; and perhaps Abailard's contemporaries were just enough to consider the offence already sufficiently punished. But after all, if we are to give them credit for any sincerity of intention, they had a duty, according to their lights, in denouncing erroneous doctrine; while to rake up an old scandal would have been merely vindictive. Again, we are told by Mr. Rashdall that no influence 'could extract from the Council' of Constance, 'which exhibited in so practical a manner its zeal against heresy, any proof of its sincerity in condemnation of political assassination' (i. 523). But a careful reading of the examination of Hus before the Council will show that there was nothing the fathers desired less than his condemnation: they offered him every loophole for escape; but the terminology of Paris was different from that of Prague, and Hus was too honest to assent to phrases which he felt he did not fully understand. Of any exultation over his fate there is not a symptom.

¹ Instances of 'journalese' like the following should have been avoided: 'A nocturnal exodus by the window involves immediate expulsion' (i. 203).

The appearance in 1885 of Father Denifle's solid volume on the Mediæval Universities down to 1400, might seem to have anticipated Mr. Rashdall at an early stage of his preparations. It was, however, only the first volume out of a series planned to extend to five, and nothing more has yet been published; so that, while Mr. Rashdall has learned much (as he amply acknowledges) from that work, specially in the way of bibliographical references, he has been still left free to pursue an independent course in the greater part of his book, and is, moreover, able to state—what is a striking testimony to the soundness of his research—that some principal conclusions by which the eminent Dominican revolutionized the current doctrine on several points in the early history of the University of Paris had been already arrived at by himself before the appearance of the German work.

Mr. Rashdall opens his discourse by considering the position occupied by the Universities in the mediæval world, the meaning of the name they bear, and the mode by which their privileges were attained.

'The University, no less than the Roman Church and the feudal Hierarchy headed by the Roman Emperor, represents an attempt to realize in concrete form an ideal of life in one of its aspects. Ideals pass into great historic forces by embodying themselves in institutions. The power of embodying its ideals in institutions was the peculiar genius of the mediæval mind, as its most conspicuous defect lay in the corresponding tendency to materialize them. The institutions which the Middle Age has bequeathed to us are of greater and more imperishable value even than its Cathedrals . . . The Universities and the immediate products of their activity may be said to constitute the great achievement of the Middle Ages in the intellectual sphere. Their organization and their traditions, their studies and their exercises affected the progress and intellectual development of Europe more powerfully, or (perhaps it should be said) more exclusively, than any schools in all likelihood will ever do again' (i. 5).

As for the signification of the word, Mr. Rashdall with proper contempt brushes away the unhistorical 'notion that a University means a *Universitas Facultatum*—a School in which all the Faculties or branches of knowledge are represented'—'the word "University" means merely a number,

¹ He is not right, however, in saying that this has 'long since disappeared from the pages of professed historians'; since we find it substantially in Döllinger's lecture on *Universities Past and Present*, which has been twice translated into English and was last published (in his *Addresses on Historical and Literary Subjects*) so recently as 1894.

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a plurality, an aggregate of persons.' It gradually tends to denote a corporation or legal body of persons, but was never absolutely limited to a body of persons engaged in study. Mr. Rashdall might have cited the University of Coāchmen at Rome, founded quite late in the Middle Ages. Hence the nature of the corporation required to be, and for a long time regularly was, specified.

'In the earliest period the word is never used absolutely. The phrase is always "University of Scholars," "University of Masters and Scholars," "University of Study," or the like. It is a mere accident that the term has gradually come to be restricted to a particular kind of Guild or Corporation, just as the terms "Convent," "Corps," "Congregation," "College," have been similarly restricted to certain specific kinds of association' (i. 7).

The University thus comes to denote the body of teachers or scholars, but not the place in which they lived or the schools in which they taught. In the Middle Ages men were very careful to keep distinct the various properties, functions, and relations of the same people. A parallel suggests itself from the organization of monasticism. A monastery was the place in which monks lived; but the body of monks was a *conventus* or, when assembled for consultation, a *capitulum*, and a prelate who wrote 'to the prior and convent' on a matter of serious business was apt to meet with a rebuff because he had not addressed himself 'to the prior and chapter.' The institution of which the University formed the teachers or scholars was known as *Studium*, or more precisely, as time went on, as *Studium Generale*. But even this term did not imply that all studies were included in the curriculum of the place, but simply that students from all parts were received there. It became, however, very soon understood that a *Studium Generale* was a place of higher education—that is, not exclusively in Arts—and a place where the teaching was carried on 'by a considerable number—at least by a plurality—of Masters' (i. 9). Mr. Rashdall traces with great care the steps in the important change which limited and defined the character of the *Studium Generale*—in modern language, of the University. It was plainly inexpedient that any school should assert a right of universal recognition for its Masters. In regard to the great centres, first of all Paris, Bologna, and Salerno, the claim would be unquestioned; but there were many schools which stood on a very different footing, and some check had to be invented. In the present day we see the injury to the standard of education which arises from the unrestricted power of conferring degrees in the United States

of America. A perfectly irresponsible local college may grant the same titles as Harvard or Yale, and without special examination it is impossible to know whether these titles mean much or little. We have before us a treatise by a writer who affixes to his name the following letters, besides others, 'A.M., J.U.B., S.T.B., D.D., Ph.D.' In such a case one can only conjecture that the dignity of the degree is in inverse proportion to the importance of the University. The common sense of the Middle Ages saw almost at once the danger of allowing all high schools, of whatever quality, to stand on a like footing, and by the fourteenth century it had come to be accepted that, in order for its Masters to enjoy the *jus ubique docendi*, a University must be fortified by a Bull from Pope or Emperor. Mr. Rashdall is, in our opinion, absolutely right in maintaining this position, which is that of Father Denifle, as against Professor Kaufmann, who is not uninfluenced by 'confessional' theories. We cannot here enter into the question, but refer our readers to Mr. Rashdall's scrupulously guarded discussion of it. It is only necessary to say that the older Universities, which existed before the fourteenth century, were in some instances satisfied with the prestige they had acquired and never asked for a Papal Bull. This was, in fact, the case with Oxford, which remained content with its status as a *Studium Generale ex consuetudine* and never conferred the *licentia ubique docendi*.¹

Mr. Rashdall claims Paris and Bologna as the two archetypal Universities: 'Paris supplied the model for the Universities of Masters, Bologna for the Universities of Students' (i. 19). 'Nearly all the secondary *Studia Generalia* which arose spontaneously without Papal or Imperial charter, were established by secessions of masters or students from Paris or Bologna' (p. 18). To Englishmen it is a matter of special interest that Mr. Rashdall has included the University of Oxford among those which originated in a secession from Paris; but in this point, as we shall see, his views have not obtained universal acceptance. Before dealing with the two great model Universities, to which he devotes the greater part of his first volume, he has to give an account of the famous Medical School of Salerno, which stands by itself, and seems to have exerted no influence on the constitution of later Universities. In his second volume, which is divided into two parts, Mr. Rashdall passes in turn through the multifarious Universities of Italy, Spain, Portugal, France,

¹ An institution peculiar to the Spanish kingdoms was the *Studium Generale respectu regni* (ii. 73, 83, 97, 100, 107).

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Germany, Bohemia, the Low Countries, Poland, Hungary, Denmark, Sweden, and Scotland, reserving for Part ii. the history of the English Universities. To the whole he prefixes a chapter on the intellectual movement from which the Universities arose.

This chapter, entitled 'Abelard and the Renaissance of the Twelfth Century,' while it is one of the best written and most interesting chapters in the book, contains also some of the passages most open to misunderstanding. In the earlier portion, dealing with the time before the twelfth century, the author is treading on ground which he has not made his own.¹ It is strange, for instance, that he does not in this connexion hint at the fact that the influence of Alcuin in the Frankish dominions meant the introduction into them of the remarkable and unique tradition of learning which had been handed down in England, not without Irish help, from Hadrian of Carthage and Benedict Biscop to Bede and his disciples.² Nor among the factors in the Carolingian revival of letters

¹ We think that Mr. Rashdall stands alone in being convinced by Mr. Henry Parker's ingenious paper (*English Historical Review*, v. 438 sqq.) that the date of Martianus Capella is to be placed earlier than the building of Constantinople (i. 35, n. 1); for the mention of Byzantium, on which Mr. Parker lays stress, is taken straight from Solinus or some other geographical manual. See Teuffel's *Gesch. der röm. Liter.* (ed. Schwabe, 5th ed., Leipzig, 1890), § 452, 1. Nor, again, is Mr. Rashdall's other date, c. 470, 'as commonly supposed,' correct, since Martianus's reference to Africa being under proconsular government has been shown to involve an earlier date than Gaiseric's subjugation of the country (429-439).

² Compare Bishop Stubbs's remarks in the *Dict. of Christ. Biogr.* (i. 309 a). Mr. Rashdall alludes to the fact later on (p. 91 n. 1 and p. 274). We may notice in this connexion that, following Mr. Bass Mullinger (*The Schools of Charles the Great*, pp. 110-112, 1877), he says that Alcuin 'in later life condemned the teaching of Pagan poetry to the Christian youth' (i. 36). The main basis for this assertion is a story told by an anonymous biographer who never knew Alcuin, and of whom Professor Wattenbach says with truth, 'Revera monacho vetulo digna sunt quæ refert: multus enim est in laudanda Alchuini pietate, fabulisque et miraculis gaudet. De aliis autem magni momenti rebus, de gravi illa et fructuosa Alchuini cura, qua litterarum studium diu neglectum imprimis instauratum est, nihil fere hic reperies' (*Monumenta Alcuiniana*, pp. 1 sq., 1873). The anonymous biographer in fact is a hagiographer, to whom secular things were necessarily objects of contempt, and we may place his story on the same footing as that which Thietmar (*Chron.* ii. 10) tells of St. Bruno of Cologne, how his devotion to philosophy imperilled his acceptance at the Last Day; likewise a story told by one who belonged to a later generation. The other evidence for Alcuin's supposed hostility to classical studies is found in some passages in his letters. It would take us too long to examine them here, but we may say at once that a critical study of them has convinced us that they will not bear the interpretation which has been placed upon them.

should the reform in handwriting, the establishment of the 'Caroline minuscule,' have been omitted, a reform which modern investigation has closely connected with Alcuin's school at Tours.¹ But for this emancipation from the intricate and debased style of writing previously in use it may almost be said that the revival of education would have been well-nigh impossible. The following statement, again, may not be incorrect in its terms, but it is certainly misleading:—

'The Palace School [under Charles the Great] . . . hardly constitutes an exception to the ecclesiastical character of the system: it was primarily intended as a nursery for the future Bishops and Abbots of the Frankish Empire: it was perhaps in its origin an outgrowth of the royal chapel' (i. 28).

It should have been explained that the 'chapel' corresponded as nearly as can be to what we call the 'chancery'; the chief chaplain was what we should call the chancellor. The word *capella* designated, no doubt, primarily the special relique of the Frankish kings—the holy cope of St. Martin—but it came to mean not only the place where the relique was kept, but the staff of clergy who had its custody. These clergy became naturally the officers who conducted the king's correspondence and formed the centre of administration; and as they represented specially the lettered element at the Court it would not be surprising if the Palace School were in some sort placed under their control, though this (as Mr. Rashdall implies) is only an hypothesis. Still, the use of the English word 'chapel' is inadmissible without explanation. The *capella* and *palatium* had come to be used as synonymous, and the *capellanus* also bore the title of *custos palatii*.

Mr. Rashdall properly rejects the fable 'which connects the new birth of Europe with the passing away of the fateful millennial year, and with it of the awful dread of the coming end of all things. Yet,' he adds,

'although there was no breach of historical continuity at the year 1000, the date will serve as well as any other that could be assigned to represent the turning point of European history, separating an age of religious terror and theological pessimism from an age of hope and vigour and active enthusiasm' (i. 31).²

¹ Cf. Sir E. M. Thompson's *Manual of Palaeography*, pp. 233 sq.

² So again, in the following page, we read, 'The beginning of the eleventh century represents, as nearly as it is possible to fix it, the turning-point in the intellectual history of Europe.' And yet, by a curious contradiction, Mr. Rashdall speaks on p. 40 of the controversy excited by Berengar of Tours 'in the middle of the eleventh century—just before the period from which we have seen reason to date the intellectual new birth of Europe.'

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We venture to think that no date could be worse chosen. It is either too late or too early. Mr. Rashdall appeals to the Cluniac movement, which began in the first decade of the tenth century, and to the Cistercian reform, which he himself remembers is 'a century later.' He speaks of 'a revival of Architecture,' which belongs to the second half of the eleventh century. 'The schools of Christendom became thronged as they were never thronged before. A passion for inquiry took the place of the old routine.' Can any teacher of the first half of the eleventh century be compared for reputation and for originality with Gerbert in the tenth?¹ Mr. Rashdall goes on with a flourish about the Crusades and the introduction of Arabic learning, as though these had the remotest connexion with the year 1000. Any date that is chosen must inevitably be more or less arbitrary, but the determining cause of the intellectual revival was, in our judgment, beyond question the renewed interest in religious matters which marked the middle years of the eleventh century. The Hildebrandine movement—to use a convenient though inexact term—was closely bound up with the intellectual movement, even though the leaders of the one stood apart from the leaders of the other. Thus the first Conceptualist of note was Berengar of Tours; and it was from religious difficulties that he was led on to examine philosophical principles. The quickened interest in theology led naturally to discussion, and the wide area of theological speculation gave scope for varying points of view. The result was to produce an atmosphere of controversy, and for controversy it is necessary to be equipped with arguments. It was inevitable that the spirit of discussion should give a new importance to the method according to which it was conducted. More and more attention was, therefore, given to the study of logic, and though the purpose for which it was studied—the eliciting of theological truth—was seldom quite forgotten, nevertheless it came to occupy such a predominant place in the interest of scholars that its pursuit was very nearly regarded as an end in itself. Formal logic became not merely an instrument for carrying on argumentation, but a

¹ It should be noticed also that Gerbert's materials for logical instruction as described by Richer (*Hist.* iii. 46) consist of precisely the same books of Aristotle, Porphyry, and Boëthius as those which were at Abailard's disposal, and indicate a notable advance upon those used nearly a century earlier by St. Remigius of Auxerre, who is credited only with a knowledge of the *Dialectic* attributed to St. Augustine and the work of Martianus Capella. See the late M. Hauréau's remarks in the *Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits*, xx. pt. ii. (1862), in view of which Mr. Rashdall's statements (i. 37, ii. 744 *sq.*) seem to require revision.

highly attractive subject for investigation on its own account. It was found to involve alike metaphysics and psychology, and a definitely philosophical bent was given to the studies of the mediæval scholar. The problem of the Universals; which has been the aim of so much cheap ridicule at the hands of more 'advanced' moderns, is the mediæval form of a problem which lies at the root of all philosophical inquiry. 'Indeed,' as Mr. Rashdall truly says,

'the solution of the most momentous questions to which the human intellect can address itself is inextricably bound up with the solution of a question which "common sense" will undertake to clear up in five minutes, or which it will indignantly pronounce too trifling to be asked or answered. Yet he who has given his answer to it has implicitly constructed his theory of the Universe' (i. 38 sq.).

In the same way, in our author's statement of the origin of the scholastic dispute, we should prefer, where he lays stress on *theology* as the originating motive, to substitute *religion*, and to connect the process definitely with the religious and ecclesiastical revival of the second half of the eleventh century. Mr. Rashdall attaches paramount importance to the influence of Abailard in giving shape and spirit to the new movement; and in this he is in the main right, though we think he exaggerates some of his special services. For instance, he speaks of Abailard, though, he admits, 'less than some of his contemporaries,' as anticipating the sixteenth century 'in his enthusiasm for the study of classical literature' (i. 62). We should like some evidence of this. It is true that Abailard knew something of perhaps a dozen of the classical Latin authors, and was familiar with a few of them; but a great part of his classical references is taken at second hand from the Fathers. We are disposed to agree with Professor Deutsch that his 'acquaintance with the literature of antiquity must not be ranked too high; it was for his time extensive, but by no means unheard of, and it does not even distantly approach that which we find in his younger contemporary John of Salisbury.'¹ Indeed, during the middle period of Abailard's life it may be taken as certain that classical studies were pursued at Chartres under Bernard Sylvestris, who was possibly Abailard's senior in years, with far greater enthusiasm and wider influence than they ever were by Abailard or the circle over which he presided.

This leads us to a second point. Without in the least wishing to detract from Abailard's unsurpassed position as a

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teacher in his time, we think that the way in which this has been described, and by Mr. Rashdall among others—though here again he stops himself in time to avoid any positive misstatement—leads the unwary reader to think that he appeared as a meteor in a clear sky, whereas he is, in truth, only the most brilliant among several, if not many, luminaries. There is no need to disparage his contemporaries in order to emphasize his supremacy. Besides, we must not forget that Abailard is himself our chief witness for the unique hold which he possessed over his audience. What others say of him is only a little more emphatic than what they tell us concerning other teachers, some of whom he despised, such as William of Champeaux or Anselm of Laon. Abailard's was an age in which the personality of the teacher was, perhaps more potent than at any later period. Schools arose, as it were, of themselves where any great master taught, and the number of populous schools which can be named in Abailard's day is sufficient to prove that the attraction was not his alone. Let us agree that Abailard was the greatest teacher of his time: there were still many who, judged by the applause and the devotion of their scholars, stood not far below him.

The School of Salerno is rather an elder sister of the Universities than a University as understood elsewhere. For although it cannot be denied the title, its characteristics—indeed, its very constitution—place it quite by itself. Mr. Rashdall is plainly right in rejecting 'the theory which attributes the rise of the School of Salerno to the introduction of Arabic writings by Constantinus Africanus, towards the end of the eleventh century' (i. 78), since the physicians of Salerno were famous long before Constantine was born. We should not, however, like to deny quite so definitely the possibility of Arab strains drawn from an earlier period; for the Arabs were very much in evidence on the coast of Italy in the ninth and tenth centuries. On the other hand, the medical writers of Salerno, whose works reach back to the early part of the eleventh century, 'exhibit not the slightest trace of Arabic influence' (*ibid.*), and we are disposed rather to connect the prevailing study of the place with Constantinople, since of all the Lombard duchies Salerno was the one in which Byzantine influence was most strongly felt. But we must not linger over the School of Salerno, and will only note in passing

'one curious fact connected with its history which possesses a peculiar interest for the nineteenth-century reader. Among the medical

practitioners, teachers, and writers of its palmiest days were several women. Haeser relies upon this circumstance as proof positive of the peculiar lay character of the school; but Denifle rejoins by capping Haeser's argument with an account of one Mangold, a married theological Professor of Paris in the second half of the eleventh century, whose daughters taught Theology' (i. 86).

The far-reaching differences between the conditions of life in Italy and those beyond the Alps produced a corresponding difference between the type of education and consequently the type of school which arose in each. 'In Italy . . . Grammar and Rhetoric absorbed a large part of the attention almost monopolised in the North by Theology and Logic' (i. 94). The Rhetorical Schools, conducted to a great extent by laymen, seem to have lasted on without a break from Imperial times, and gave a peculiar cast to the whole educational system.

'In Northern France all intellectual life was confined to the cloister or to schools which were merely dependencies of the cloister, because the governing class itself was composed of but two great orders—the military and the clerical—in the latter of which alone was there any demand for learning. In Italy . . . it was in the political sphere that the new eleventh-century activity first manifested itself; while the consequent or concomitant revival of culture took a correspondingly secular turn' (i. 95).

This statement, though made a little too absolutely,¹ is in the main perfectly true, and it indicates the great line of demarcation which separates the sphere of interest in the North and in the South. Mr. Rashdall, indeed, dwells too much on the continuity of city life in Lombardy, although he admits the exaggeration of Savigny's view; but he is quite right in maintaining the persistence of Roman law among an important element in the population of Italy. We wish, however, that he had attempted to define the extent to which the body of law contained in the three collections of Justinian, as distinguished from the Theodosian Code, was in use,²

¹ For instance, education in the North was not altogether limited to the clergy. We find towards the middle of the twelfth century Geoffrey of Anjou employing the well-known grammarian, logician, and natural philosopher William of Conches as tutor to his sons, among them the future King Henry II.; and William wrote his *Dragmaticon* or *Dialogus de Substantiis Physicis*, in the form of a dialogue between himself and the Count of Anjou. Addressing him, the author speaks of his sons 'quos non, ut alii, ludo alearum sed studio literarum, tenera ætate imbuisti' (p. 3, Strassburg, 1567).

² Mr. Rashdall is not quite consistent on the point. On pp. 99-105 he dwells on the continuous study of Roman law, including that of Justinian. 'The *Breviarium* . . . by no means superseded either the

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since Signor Villari still maintains that the legend of the 'discovery' of the former towards the middle of the twelfth century contains a kernel of historical truth.¹ The study of law is attested in the eleventh century not only at Bologna; but also at Rome, Pavia, and Ravenna; but the School of Bologna was the only one which grew up into a position of European eminence. From Pepo and Irnerius onwards its record is unbroken. Yet there is evidence to show that in the earlier part of the twelfth century its fame was established not only in Law but also in Rhetoric and the Arts. Rhetoric, which in practice meant the art of composition, worked naturally with the study of Law in its earlier stages; but when the Digest, 'far the bulkiest, most elaborate, and most important section of the Corpus Juris,' became the special and overmastering pursuit of the scholars of Bologna, the Arts were rapidly ousted from the field, and a predominantly professional colour was given to the study of Law. Hence arose the peculiar characteristic of the University.

'It was from the age of Irnerius, or at least very early in the century ushered in by his teaching, that men of mature age—men of good birth and good position—beneficed and dignified ecclesiastics or sons of nobles—flocked from the remotest parts of Europe to the lecture-rooms at Bologna' (i. 126).

Side by side with this renewed and absorbing study of the Civil Law, the Law of the Church, Canon Law, thanks to the work of Gratian, quickly asserted its position. Mr. Rashdall dwells upon the fact that 'the earliest Bologna Canonists were . . . Theologians as well' (i. 137). On this point we need not linger, since readers of the *Church Quarterly Review* (xli. 145-150) were last year put in possession of the results of Father Denifle's investigations, upon which Mr. Rashdall also relies. But Canon Law was very soon differentiated from general Theology, and at Bologna practically usurped its place altogether. 'The estrangement of the Canon Law from Theology kept pace with the increasing closeness of its

use or the authority of the Institutes and the Code' (p. 100). He speaks of 'the explosion of the theory that the Pandects were unknown in North Italy till the twelfth century' (p. 99, n. 2; cf. p. 121). But further on we read that 'the Digest,' which it need hardly be explained is another name for the Pandects, 'was practically unknown before the time of Pepo' (p. 122), and that 'the evidence which Fitting produces to show that the Digest was not unknown between the time of Gregory the Great and the middle of the eleventh century is of a very slender description' (*ibid.* n. 1).

¹ *The Two First Centuries of Florentine History*, ii. 28 sq. (English transl., 1895.)

union with the Faculty of Civil Law.'¹ Mr. Rashdall points out with truth that the genius of Bologna is totally misrepresented when it is conceived, in contrast to that of Paris, as 'free, enlightened, anti-Papal, anti-clerical, revolutionary' (p. 138), though we may take exception to the combination of epithets. It was rather, he says, a lay spirit as opposed to a clerical spirit; and it was this spirit which came into play when, at least half a century after Gratian, more than half a century after Irnerius, the schools of Bologna were consolidated by the organization of a University, or, more accurately, of two or even four Universities.

Nothing can better display the strict meaning of the word University than the fact that two or four such bodies should have arisen in the same place, unless indeed it is the other fact that they were composed exclusively of persons who were not citizens of the town. They were simply organizations for the protection of those who could not claim the privileges of citizens. And the members of the Universities were not the elder or teaching class—the Masters—but the students exclusively, these students being

'older men and men of much greater wealth and social position than the boys who attended the Arts Schools of Paris. Into the Bologna lecture-rooms the idea of discipline never entered at all. The associations of the School and of the Cloister were alike absent. The Professor was not originally the officer of any public institution; he was simply a private-adventure Lecturer—like the Sophist of ancient Greece or the Rhetor of ancient Rome—whom a number of independent gentlemen of all ages between seventeen and forty had hired to instruct them' (i. 151).

Citizens of Bologna needed no such organization; they fell under the ordinary law of the place, and the Professors were given an honourable rank in the municipal constitution. It was 'foreigners' only who required to form themselves into guilds, and of these guilds or Universities of foreign students we find two in existence in the middle years of the thirteenth century, the *Universitas Citramontanorum* and the *Universitas Ultramontanorum*. There is, however, reason to believe that the *Citramontani* arose from a union of three distinct bodies,

¹ Vol. i. p. 138. The student will find some valuable remarks in the following pages on the general bearings of the study of Canon Law. We agree with Mr. Rashdall, in this case, even against the Bishop of Oxford, in holding that the Canon Law was accepted as authoritative in England, but need not here discuss the question, since Professor Maitland, who arrives at the same conclusion, has dealt with it in a learned dissertation, of which the first portion appeared in the July number of the *English Historical Review*.

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most likely Lombards, Tuscans, and Romans.¹ From these organizations the Professors were jealously excluded—at first, no doubt, for the obvious reason that they were citizens, and then all the more when they joined with the city in attempting to shut out ‘foreigners’ from the privilege of teaching. Here, by the way, we have a good illustration of the primitive distinction between the University and the authority which gave the right of teaching—call it Doctorate or Professoriate, or what we will—for the Doctors also had their Guilds, or ‘Colleges,’ in order to keep control over the exercise of this right. This right of teaching, *licentia docendi*, formed, it need not be said, the essential feature of what was afterwards called a Degree. The student acquired the right by virtue of his admission to the College of Doctors, until in 1219 Honorius III. entrusted the conferment of the licence to the Archdeacon of Bologna. Still the College of Doctors had the exclusive power of examining candidates; nor did they ever cease to maintain it, although in other respects they became entirely subject to the Students. The Professors found the Students hard taskmasters. They were fined if they omitted a chapter or postponed a difficult passage to the end of a lecture. The texts were divided into sections, and the Doctor was compelled to reach a certain point by a specified date. At the beginning of each year he had to deposit a prescribed sum of money with a banker, and whenever he was unpunctual in his lectures a fine was levied upon him, which was deducted from this fund. If he desired leave of absence for a single day he had to ask it first from his pupils and then from the Rector and Council; ‘and if he proposed to leave the town, he was required to deposit a sum of money by way of security for his return’ (i. 198).

Having their own organization, the students naturally proceeded to elect officers. It was argued against them that they had no right to act as independent guilds did: they were, strictly speaking, apprentices. But they gained their way, and chose their Rector and Council. It seems, however, that, from practical considerations, a compromise must have been arrived at in regard to the drawing up of statutes, since, while the students claimed that their statutes overrode anything prescribed by the Doctors, the town statutes enacted just the reverse. It was plainly desirable that on points where their interests touched both bodies should ordain in substance the same thing. What conflict there

¹ We accept Mr. Rashdall’s argument (i. 156 *sqq.*) in favour of the original number of four. The constituent elements are not so certain.

was arose from the migratory tendencies, first, of the Professors, and soon afterwards of the Students. The threat or the act of migrating was the most effective protest against any real or imagined injury, and the town could not afford to lose such profitable residents. For some time in the thirteenth century the Rector had to 'swear not to entertain any project for the removal of the *Studium* from Bologna' (i. 173). At length the city granted the Students the private rights of citizens, and the Podestà was directed to enforce the Rector's sentences in civil disputes between scholars.

We cannot follow Mr. Rashdall through his minute and highly interesting account of the developed constitution of the University of Bologna. He has the advantage of working from the statutes collected in the earlier part of the fourteenth century, which were discovered by Father Denifle in a manuscript at Pressburg, after he had published his work on the Mediæval Universities, and were printed by him in the *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters* in 1887. We may notice that the two oldest and most universal officers of a University are the Rector and the Bedel: 'in fact, an allusion to a *bidellus* is in general (though not invariably) a sufficiently trustworthy indication that a school is really a University or *Studium Generale*' (i. 194). The course of study is very fully described, and Mr. Rashdall concludes his exposition by a notable chapter on 'The Place of Bologna in the History of Culture,' in which he says, concerning the great Doctors of the century and a half following Innerius:—

'It was in the hands of the "Glossators"—of Innerius, of the famous "Four Doctors" . . . , of Rogerius, Placentinus, Azo, and Hugolinus—that the most real progress was made. The works of these men are, perhaps, the only productions of mediæval learning to which the modern professor of any science whatever may turn, not merely for the sake of their historical interest, not merely in the hope of finding ideas of a suggestive value, but with some possibility of finding a solution of the doubts, difficulties, and problems which still beset the modern student' (i. 255).

In passing from Bologna to Paris we exchange the schools of the Lawyers for those of the Artists and Theologians, and the Universities of Students for the University of Masters. The licence granted by some superior and external authority, which comes in only, as it were, as an after-thought at Bologna, is at Paris an essential feature of the institution from the beginning. In the French Cathedrals it had been the practice to maintain the hold of the Chapter

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upon the regular instruction of the School by making the schoolmaster a member of the Capitular body. He might either have the special dignity of Master of the Schools or *Scholasticus* created for him, or he might be made Chancellor or, to use the older title, *Primicerius* of the Church,¹ the officer whose duty it was

'to keep the Chapter seal and to draw up the letters and documents which required sealing; and as this function demanded an amount of learning which was not a matter of course in those days, it was natural enough that the supervision of the Schools, and again the care of the Library, should be entrusted to the same functionary' (i. 282).²

It appears that in course of time, as the Cathedral Schools increased the numbers of their scholars, the Chancellor appointed a deputy to take charge of at least the more elementary teaching in Grammar and Dialectic; and it is in this practice of the Chancellor's giving authority to some one else to exercise a part of his functions that the academical

¹ The statement that 'the duty of presiding over the Schools was annexed to some already existing office—often in Southern Europe to that of Primicerius or Precentor, in Northern Europe more frequently to that of Chancellor' (i. 281)—contains at least one misconception. The Primicerius has nothing whatever to do with the Precentor. He is the chief of the notaries in what we may call the Secretary of State's office under the later Empire (see H. Bresslau's *Handbuch der Urkundenlehre*, i. 154, Leipzig, 1889); and he occupies a similar position under the Papacy, until, under the influence of the Emperors of the Saxon house, the principal officer comes to bear the name of Chancellor (*ibid.* p. 185). It is clear, then, that the title of Primicerius is to be equated with that of Cancellarius, not with that of Precentor (Mr. Rashdall, indeed, seems to admit this in vol. ii. p. 172, n. 4). Again, he refers to the *Histoire Littéraire de la France*, vii. 28, as though in favour of the identification of the Primicerius with the Precentor at Metz; but all the Benedictines tell us is of a Primicerius. There is no hint of a Precentor, and they do not commit themselves to the existence of a Cathedral School there at all. The other specimens of a Primicerius in Mr. Rashdall's book do not bear closely on this particular point. At Salamanca (ii. 78) the head of the College of Doctors was called the Prior or Primicerius, just as, apparently, the Roman Primicerius was at the outset the chief of the *priores*, the seven heads of the *schola defensorum* (Bresslau, p. 168). So soon as we see that the name of Primicerius may be used as synonymous with that of Chancellor, there is no difficulty in its employment to designate the head of the University, though this occurs only at Avignon—and at Avignon just before the Popes established themselves there (Rashdall, ii. 172). It is curious that in Aix in Provence, and at Valence, the Rector, as distinguished from the Chancellor, should have been sometimes styled Primicerius (ii. 186, 201).

² Here again we may note a partial parallel with the history of the Papal chancery, where the Bibliothecarius becomes in course of time the Cancellarius.

Degree took its origin. At first, no doubt, the Chancellor appointed a deputy, because there was more teaching to do than he had time for; afterwards, in the course of the twelfth century, the usage became extended, because there were more persons who were competent and desirous to teach. And with this multiplication of licences came also a multiplication of Schools, which sprang up under this sanction outside the precincts of the Cathedral, wherever a Master could obtain authorization to open his school. The next step was taken by the Third Lateran Council of 1179, which compelled the Chancellor to grant his licence without fee to all properly qualified candidates. It seems evident that this canon did but set a seal to a custom which had been growing up for many years, but to which, no less evidently, obstacles had been placed by Chancellors reluctant to lose a source of income as well as an instrument of authority.

Side by side with the establishment of the right to the *licentia docendi* there arose the other element in the formation of the French idea of a *Studium*—namely, the organized body of Masters. No man, it was well understood, could claim the right unless he had been for some years—five or seven—himself the pupil of an authorized Master. Nor, when he had obtained the licence, could he begin teaching until he had been formally admitted into the society of Masters. The cap, or biretta, the badge of Mastership, was placed upon his head, and he forthwith proceeded to deliver a lecture or hold a disputation. This was his Inception. With these ceremonies, followed usually by a feast at which he entertained his new colleagues, he entered upon the full rights of his Degree. He had not only the licence from the Chancellor, but he was also a member of the University of Masters. So soon as these two correlative requisites have become obligatory, so soon has a *Studium*—a University in the modern sense—come into existence. Mr. Rashdall thinks (i. 288) that the custom of Inception 'in all probability' originated 'the idea of a Guild or corporation of teachers.' It may rather be argued that it presupposes some such organization; but, in any case, there can be no doubt that it hastened the consolidation of any such elementary associations as may have come into being already.

The earliest evidence for the existence of a University at Paris is contained in the statement of Matthew Paris that John de Cella, the future abbot of St. Albans and the reputed author of the Chronicle from which both Wendover and Matthew Paris drew so freely, was 'a student at Paris, and

was there at a date 1175 (i. 288) supplies, in about the makes it that time, which to 1170 there Breton,¹ until about Augustus their prop not until —statutes simplicity particular at least w at lecture of deceas permitted the Papal In 1215 c by Cardin matters c pursued (

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was there admitted into the "fellowship of the elect masters," at a date which may be roughly fixed between 1170 and 1175 (i. 293 *sq.*) The silence of John of Salisbury, who supplies, in his *Metalogicus*, large and invaluable information about the studies pursued at Paris, and who wrote in 1159, makes it unlikely that the University had yet been formed at that time, so that there remains but a short interval within which to fix its establishment. But from the years *c.* 1160-1170 there is, but for the occasional notice of William le Breton,¹ hardly any further trace of such an institution until about a generation later. The famous charter of Philip Augustus of 1200 did no more than place the scholars and their property² on a privileged footing before the law. It is not until about 1208³ that we come upon a body of Statutes—statutes which are of peculiar interest from their extreme simplicity. They enjoin upon the Masters the wearing of a particular dress—the 'round black cape reaching to the heels at least when new,' as it is afterwards explained—attendance at lectures and disputations, and attendance at the funerals of deceased Masters. About the same date Innocent III. permitted the Masters to elect a Proctor to represent them at the Papal Court, thus recognizing their corporate existence. In 1215 came the body of Statutes imposed on the University by Cardinal Robert de Courçon, which not only dealt with matters of administration but also with the studies to be pursued (i. 310 *sq.*, 433 *sq.*)

The next stage in the history of the University of Paris is distinguished by the gradual emancipation from the control of the Chancellor. Mr. Rashdall, whose illustrations are almost invariably apposite and helpful,⁴ brings out the nature of their early relations by an English analogy.

'The relation of the Chancellor to the University may . . . be compared with that of the Crown to the extinct Serjeants' Inn. The Crown alone could make a man a Serjeant-at-law just as the Chan-

¹ Quoted in vol. ii. p. 737 *sq.*

² We think Mr. Rashdall has conclusively proved (i. 297, *n.* 2) that *capitale* in this charter means the 'chattels' of the scholars, not, as has been maintained, their 'head,' whether Chancellor, Rector, or 'regent Master.'

³ Mr. Rashdall fluctuates between the dates 1208 and 1210 (i. 294, 300), and says that the Bull in which the Statutes are mentioned 'appears in the Vatican Register between the years 1210 and 1211.' Denifle, however, states (*Chartul. Univ. Paris.* i. par. i. 68) that it is found among undated letters following Innocent III.'s eleventh pontifical year, and this ended on February 21, 1209.

⁴ A good example is furnished in vol. i. p. 286, *n.* 3.

cellor alone could make a Licentiate: but, though the appointment by the Crown in the one case and the Chancellor's licence in the other was the condition of eligibility, it was by the free election of his professional brethren that the new-comer entered the professional Society. The presentation of rings by the newly admitted Serjeant to his colleagues was one of the last relics of those customary presents of hats, gloves, gowns, and the like by a new member of a Guild in which the more prosaic degree-fees of modern Universities have their origin' (i. 308).

All through the struggle the University had the steady support of the Papacy, which, 'with that unerring instinct which marks its earlier history, sided with the power of the future';¹ and in the process the four Nations of the University, with their distinct 'Rectors or Proctors,'² came into existence. That the idea of such a system was derived from Bologna seems clear, though we do not think Mr. Rashdall positively asserts it. We cannot help suspecting that it may have been introduced through Papal influence, which would naturally be affected by Italian modes of organization. This suggestion would gain in plausibility if we could follow Father Denifle in considering the Nations to have been primarily organizations of Scholars, in which Masters were only included in so far as they were also Scholars. Be this as it may, the Nations formed an internal system within the Faculty of Arts, each with its separate Proctor; and after a short time the four together are found to have a Rector as their common head, the two titles being clearly distinguished in 1245. The remarkable thing was that all this organization was limited to one Faculty. The Superior Faculties, of Divinity, Canon Law, Civil Law, and Medicine, lay entirely outside it. The study of Civil Law was indeed forbidden by Honorius III. in 1219, and the Medical School of Paris never acquired a commanding position. But Theology and Canon Law were subjects to which the University owes, perhaps, the largest portion of its fame, and it is at first sight strange that the organization of their Faculties should be so late in their formation—their Deans do not make their appearance until 1265—and still stranger that the Doctors³ should have been content to accept as their president in congregation the Rector of the Faculty of Arts, and to allow him the style of Rector of the

¹ The parallel case of the dealings of the Popes with the new Religious Orders is not less to the point in confirming this just remark.

² We agree with Mr. Rashdall's guarded opinion that the two titles were originally equivalent, as they were also at Oxford and Cambridge.

³ We use the word for convenience of distinction, but at Paris, as at Oxford, the customary title in Divinity was Master.

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University, a title which he is given as early as 1255.¹ Mr. Rashdall aptly compares the predominance of the Lower House in the English Parliament, since it was the financial control in each case which determined the result. Possibly one reason why the position of the Rector was unassailed was that, with all his dignity, he was really little more than an ornamental head, holding office 'at first only for a month or six weeks, afterwards for three months' (i. 399), with judicial and executive powers closely limited by statute, and seldom speaking in the name of the University. If the Theologians could supply the speaker on important occasions, they could afford to leave the appointment of the Rector to the Artists. Moreover the Doctors of each Superior Faculty retained their power of settling the course of study to be pursued within it; it was only in general University business that the Artists succeeded in taking and maintaining the lead. Side by side with the growth of the University, the power of the Cathedral Chancellor, who claimed at one time to be Dean of the Faculty of Theology, continuously declined. His criminal jurisdiction was taken away by Gregory IX., and by the end of the thirteenth century he had lost almost all judicial authority (i. 339, 395). Even his exclusive right to grant the licence was menaced by the rise of a rival chancellor, who also granted licences, at St. Geneviève's, in the southern suburb.

The establishment of the Mendicant Orders at Paris was the occasion of more than one fresh constitutional difficulty. In the first place they did not pass through the Arts course; and, in the second, their modesty forbade their applying for the licence in Divinity, which nevertheless they desired to possess. The latter obstacle was removed by a Papal Bull in 1250, which required the Chancellor to confer the licence upon all duly qualified Religious; but a conflict was aroused, which lasted for five years, and seemed likely to end in the victory of the Friars—and the dissolution of the University. The Masters, in fact, declared it dissolved, and renounced all their privileges; but the Nations, it was held, being a separate organization, survived; and by this technicality a way was opened for a peaceable arrangement on a new footing. The Friars remained exempt or excluded² from the Arts course;

¹ Father Denifle dates the rise of the Rector later; but Mr. Rashdall's criticism (i. 331, n. 1) has satisfied us that this view is not tenable.

² Mr. Rashdall does not make it perfectly clear how far this exclusion was in accordance with the Friars' wishes. In ii. 379 he says that they 'considered it inconsistent with their principles to allow graduation in secular branches of learning,' and to this rule they strictly adhered in

they were allowed to have their Doctors, with a seat in Congregation, but the number was limited. By degrees their Schools became in practice chiefly Schools for the members of their respective Orders. They had gained some of the points for which they had contended; but the University had gained more. It had succeeded in consolidating itself, and was strong enough early in the fourteenth century to bind the Friars by an oath of obedience to its Statutes, such as it had previously attempted in vain to impose. Moreover, 'in 1292 Nicolas IV. conferred upon the licentiates of Paris the prerogative of teaching in all other Schools and Universities throughout the world, without any additional examination' (i. 396); and with this *jus ubique docendi* the University acquired the full development of its powers. Another result arose from the fact that the Papacy had, on the whole, stood by the Friars in the struggle. The University therefore, in so far as it was bound to oppose the claims of the Friars, learned to observe something of an independent attitude towards the Papacy. 'The alliance,' says Mr. Rashdall, 'between the Holy See and the Mendicants sowed the seeds of Gallicanism in that University which was to be its stronghold' (i. 392). In close connexion with this tendency we must place the rise of the University into a recognized exponent of public opinion. Yet it is perhaps too much to say that 'the political influence of the University did not begin till the greatest Parisian Schoolmen were in their graves' (i. 519), since Ockham cannot be denied a rank among the greatest, and, though his own political work must on no account be confused with the political influence of the University as a body, still it was in his lifetime that a majority of the Faculties, claiming, as it seems, for the first time the rights of a majority, supported in 1303 the appeal of the French Prelates against Boniface VIII.'s excommunication of the king's adherents in his contest with the Papacy (i. 406). Still it is undoubtedly true that the time when the political interest of the University was keenest was also the time of its intellectual decadence. Mr. Rashdall does not attempt to trace this influence continuously, but supplies several illustrations to bring out its nature and extent. In one of these he adduces grounds for disputing the current opinion that at the beginning of the fifteenth century the University ranked as a

their dispute with the University of Oxford; but in i. 389 he hints at their 'failure to get admission to the Art Schools of the University' of Paris, and speaks of their exclusion from the Faculty as a restriction imposed on them.

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Burgundian partisan.¹ The account of its action during the critical years of the Great Schism strikes us as inadequate; but Mr. Rashdall's main purpose was to trace the history of the University as an institution, and he may fairly claim that its dealings outside its proper sphere form no proper part of his subject.

It is, indeed, this constitutional history which has seemed to us to form so much the strongest and most independent element in the book that we have been led to pass by in silence what is no less acceptable a feature in it—namely, the account of the studies pursued in the University. We can now only refer to the excellent statement of the steps by which the whole of the works of Aristotle became known to the Latin world,² and of the effects produced on philosophical study—a statement which takes note of most of the recent publications on the subject, and which is characterized by that easy familiarity with the ground which marks our author's treatment of philosophical matters—and to the elaborate description of the studies pursued in the University.³ Nor can we say anything of the chapter which deals with the Parisian Colleges, a form of institution which is now so peculiarly English that we are apt to forget that it was from Paris that Oxford, and then Cambridge, derived it. We conclude this part of our subject with a short extract which brings out the immense gulf which separates the mediæval University—with all its similarity—from the University of to-day.

'By 1426 . . . failure to "satisfy the Examiners" had become so unheard of an event that a Bachelor [of Divinity] whom the Doctors had refused to present for his License brought an action against the Faculty before the Parliament, and in his pleadings boldly claimed the degree as the right of any candidate who had complied with the proper forms. In their answer the Doctors maintain their right to exercise a discretion, but it is not alleged that any one had

¹ In the margin of i. 521, 'the University exclusively Burgundian,' the word 'not' has evidently fallen out by accident.

² When, however, Mr. Rashdall seems (p. 360, n. 1) to approve M. Charles's opinion that the *Politics* were not 'known at all until after 1292,' he seems to have forgotten the Commentary by St. Thomas Aquinas.

³ The foot notes to this chapter represent wide and careful reading; but Mr. Rashdall has missed the identity of Galfridus de Vino (i. 442, n. 1) with Geoffrey Vinsauf. He has also eluded the difficult question as to the origin of the new logical method which made its way towards the end of the thirteenth century. He cites, of course, Petrus Hispanus (p. 441) and Nicolas de Ultricuria (p. 538), but says nothing of Carl von Prantl's theory of their indebtedness to Byzantine materials, a theory which still is generally accepted, in spite of the conclusive arguments, as we regard them, of Thurot and Dr. Valentin Rose against it.

actually within the memory of man been rejected for mere incapacity. In this exceptional case, the failure "to satisfy the Examiners" was attributed by the candidate to *odium theologicum*'¹ (i. 470 sq.)

The miscellaneous collection of Universities which forms the subject of the first part of Mr. Rashdall's second volume defies treatment in a review. A few general remarks must suffice. The smaller Italian Universities were for the most part offshoots of Bologna, springing up out of the secession of discontented students from the older School. Padua is the only one which rose into a position of the highest eminence. And yet so normal were the migrations of Universities that but six years after we read of an established University there a scheme was arranged, in 1228, for its transference to Vercelli.

'Vercelli agreed to make over to the students five hundred of the best houses in the place, and more if necessary. This fact is one of the best evidences we have as to the populousness of the early Universities. Even now, when the original single University of Bologna was throwing out colonies in all directions, we find the possibility contemplated of a migration from one of them of not less—at a very low estimate of the average capacity of each house—than 2,500 or 3,000 students' (ii. 12).

For the University of Padua itself was by no means extinguished. It declined, no doubt, for some twenty years, but soon recovered its prosperity, and became a dangerous rival to Bologna. The time, however, of its chief ascendancy belongs to the centuries after Padua became subject to Venice in 1404; it is connected with the Humanist movement, the epoch which our author rightly takes as marking the boundary line of the mediæval period of Universities. Much the same thing may be said of the University of Florence, which only came into existence in 1349, and owed its transient celebrity, not to any distinction in mediæval studies, but to its situation in the home of the early Renaissance. The prosperity of the town was fatal to the University: the students could not find houses except at rents beyond their means; and in 1472 the institution was united with the University of Pisa. Other Universities, with whatever points in common, have their individual characteristics. Naples was a royal foundation, and St. Thomas Aquinas was among its scholars; but so small was its success that it had to be set on foot three times in the thirteenth century. Only with the accession of the House of

¹ Even here there is something of a parallel to the case of Mr. Macmullen and Dr. Hampden at Oxford in 1844. See Fowler's *History of Corpus Christi College*, p. 319.

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Anjou did it enjoy a continuous existence and a moderate—we had almost said a provincial—reputation. It was neither a University of Students nor a University of Masters: the corporate life was shared by both; but the authority, in great matters and small, belonged exclusively to the royal officials. The University of the Roman Court was likewise an artificial creation; it moved about as the Pope changed his residence. The Students had no voice in its government, which was exercised by the College of Doctors under the supreme authority of the Pope. These two Universities stand by themselves; the rest were modelled upon Bologna. The University of Siena was distinguished, like the modern University of Amsterdam, for the directness of its dependence upon the city government, and upon it alone.

'The attempt of the City in 1275 to erect a Studium by a distinct executive or legislative act represents the first attempt of the kind in the history of the Italian City-republics; and it remains the only instance (except the early secessions from Bologna) in which the attempt was made without any effort or apparent intention to apply for a Bull of erection' (ii. 34).

To this peculiarity was due the fitfulness of its existence and its failure to secure recognition as a *Studium Generale*. The municipal character is, indeed, normal in the Italian Universities; but the others were careful to protect themselves by a higher authority. In their choice of studies Mr. Rashdall notes as an important feature

'the prominence of legal studies, to which may be added the hardly less important fact that the second place in the University was everywhere occupied by Medicine, to which the study of Arts was completely subordinate, while Theology at first stands altogether apart from University organization, and afterwards enters into but a slight and formal connexion therewith' (ii. 60).

The Spanish Universities stand nearest to those of Italy, since it was on the model of Bologna that most of them framed their constitutions. But in arranging them all in chronological order Mr. Rashdall has rather obscured the important differences which separate the Universities of Aragon from those of Castile, and has rather understated the conformity of each to its national type. 'In the less ecclesiastical Studia—especially in Aragon—the Cities also take some part in the erection and government of the Universities' (ii. 107). Now, of the six Aragonese Universities,¹ the three

¹ We omit that of Palma, in Majorca, of which Mr. Rashdall furnishes no particulars, except that it was granted 'the privileges of Lerida' in 1483 (ii. 97).

oldest—those of Huesca, Perpignan, and Lerida—seem to be expansions of town-schools of Law, and that of Barcelona was the definite creation of the town council. So also was the Studium at Valencia, though the burghers had to stave off the resistance of the Cathedral Chapter by inviting its co-operation in the formal act. The only exception to this specifically municipal character is furnished by the University of Saragossa, which was founded so late as 1474, evidently out of the Chapter School. Yet even here the charter was obtained by the joint petition of the Chapter and the municipality. What was the exception in Aragon was the rule in Castile. Palencia and Salamanca grew up simply out of the Cathedral Schools, as we strongly suspect did Valladolid also out of its Collegiate School;¹ and the two latest of the Castilian Universities, Sigüenza and Alcalá, were distinctively founded as conventual establishments.² The Spanish Universities, however, and the single Portuguese University, which fluctuated between Lisbon and Coimbra, have this great characteristic in common, that they were all 'created by the Sovereigns of the various kingdoms' (ii. 107), whose authority was in many cases frequently or regularly exercised in their government.

The lesser Universities within the modern limits of France are sixteen in number; but of these only eleven—Montpellier, Orleans, Angers, Toulouse, Cahors, and the group of fifteenth-century Universities (Poitiers, Caen, Bordeaux, Valence, Nantes, and Bourges)—were French at the date of their foundation, and Montpellier during the time of its rise and chief prosperity, from 1204 to 1349, was independent of the kingdom. The other five arose in Provence (Avignon, Orange, and Aix), Dauphiné (Grenoble), and Franche-Comté (Dôle). Confining ourselves to the strictly French Universities, we note that all the five older ones may be classed by their associations, if not in every case by their local situation, since Orleans and Angers stand on the north bank of the

¹ We do not understand why Mr. Rashdall should suggest that this University 'seems rather to have grown out of a Town-school through the exertions of the Municipality, but with the assistance and sanction of the Crown, than out of a purely ecclesiastical Studium' (ii. 84), since he himself admits that the School which became the University 'was in very early times something more than a merely local Church School' (p. 82), and in the University the licences were confirmed by the Abbat of the Church.

² The earlier projects for the creation of a University at Alcalá are too indefinite for it to be possible to infer any connexion with pre-existing institutions.

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Loire, as belonging to and drawing most of their students from the country south of that river; whereas the very names of the Nations at Paris—French, Norman, Picard, English—indicate their primary northern connexion. The five Universities, therefore, represent the more Romanized part of France; they were little affected by the example of Paris, and their constitutions form a distinct type of independent growth; most of them were Universities of students and yet not imitations of Bologna. At Montpellier there were two separate Universities, of Medicine and Law; afterwards one of Arts; and finally one of Theology. The Chancellor and Proctors of the University of Medicine—at first by far the most important—furnish interesting parallels with the institutions of Oxford.¹ Orleans, famous in the twelfth century as a home of classical letters, emerged in the thirteenth as the leading French University of Law. That this new life was due to the prohibition of the teaching of Civil Law at Paris in 1219, and to a consequent secession of students from that city, is highly probable; and hence it is not surprising that the original Parisian model—that of a University of Masters under the control of the Cathedral officer (here the Scholasticus)—should have been combined with the system of Student-Nations familiar from the great Law University of Italy. Angers in like manner was an ancient Cathedral School reinforced at the same time as Orleans, and in all probability by a migration from Paris: so that it also became an important seat of legal study, and legal study only, its internal history following the same lines as that of Orleans. The other Universities, Toulouse and Cahors, were definitely Papal creations—the former a school of orthodox Theology to consolidate the conversion of Languedoc, which at first met with scanty success; the latter an enlarged Cathedral School erected into a University by John XXII., whose loyalty to his native town is well known. Among the Universities of the fifteenth century two may be noticed for the way in which they illustrate general history. While the English occupied Paris Charles VII. procured the foundation of a rival University at Poitiers in 1431; and before the year was out the English set up a University at Caen for the study of Law, plainly as a rival to Orleans and Angers, and afterwards, when the English had lost Paris, for the other faculties, so as to spite the capital as well. Among the distinctive features of the smaller Universities of what is now French territory we may notice, besides the

¹ See ii. 120 *seq.*

combination of the magisterial mode of government with that of the Student-Universities, the prominence of the authority of the Bishop and the restriction of the rights of Regency—that is, of the full-blown graduate—to a body of regular teachers, or what we should call a Professoriate. This last characteristic resembles the system of the German Universities, to which Mr. Rashdall next addresses himself, but which from considerations of space we are reluctantly compelled to pass over. Prague and Vienna, it may be observed, represent a mixed type of constitution, while the other Universities borrowed their system from Paris, modifying it, however, in this important point: that their teachers were from the first endowed and gradually acquired complete control over the government. The Scottish Universities likewise took France as their model, but not Paris, but Orleans or Angers. They had their Colleges, but these were 'primarily endowments for University teachers, not endowments for students like the Colleges of Oxford and Paris' (ii. 300). The 'teachers from the first, or almost from the first, were College teachers and University teachers at the same time . . . College and University were more or less completely fused into one' (ii. 311).

At length, with the second part of vol. ii., we reach the chapters on the Universities of England, which contain some of Mr. Rashdall's most interesting writing and most independent research, although, with one important exception, his results, so far as Oxford is concerned, differ but little from those set forth by Mr. Maxwell Lyte. As for the legends concerning the origin of the University of Oxford, we think he would have done better to have mentioned them in their true historical connexion, in the fourteenth century, when they were invented, than at the very outset of his discourse. But this is of little consequence. The account he published in this Review in 1887 of the beginnings of the University has received an important development in the hypothesis he has now elaborated of a migration from Paris in 1167 as the originating cause of its existence. That it could not have grown up out of Schools attached to any local conventual Church is demonstrated by the fact that when it became possessed of a Chancellor that Chancellor was elected by the Masters under the authority of the Bishop of Lincoln.

'Had the Schools at one time been connected with St. Frideswyde's or Oseney, they could only have emancipated themselves from

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the jurisdiction of the Prior or Abbot by a tremendous struggle, which could not have passed into utter oblivion without leaving a trace or a vestige of itself behind' (ii. 327).

Now, an academic migration is known to have resulted in the establishment not only of a multitude of transitory Universities, but also of many which took permanent root in their new soil. Padua and Leipzig, if not certainly Angers and Orleans, are conspicuous examples of such movements. In the present case we are definitely informed that in 1167 'alien scholars' were expelled from France; while two English ordinances of uncertain date, between 1164 and 1169, forbid clerks to cross to or from the Continent without special leave, and require all clerks having revenues in England to return to them within three months. Taken together these orders must necessarily have brought a large number of Masters and students to England, while they precluded their return abroad, unless they could obtain permission from the king's justiciar.

'Nobody who knows anything at all of the habits of the mediæval scholar will doubt that somewhere or other—in one town or in several—at least a portion of these scholars would be sure to congregate under their old Masters, and transfer to English soil their old studies, their old discipline, and—so far as altered circumstances permitted—their old organization. As a matter of fact, we hear of no such congregation of scholars except at Oxford. If the recalled Scholars did not go to Oxford, where did they go to?' (ii. 331.)

An hypothesis has to be devised, since no positive evidence is attainable; and the proposed date accords equally with the known facts as to the multiplication of teachers and students at Oxford in the last quarter of the twelfth century, and with the epoch at which we should be led on *a priori* grounds to fix the establishment there of a *Studium Generale*, ranking second and only second to Paris.¹ An interesting illustration is a deed (of which a facsimile is given) drawn up about 1180, and relating to property in Cat Street, hard by St. Mary's Church.

'Among the parties or witnesses appear the names of one book-binder, three illuminators, one writer, and two parchmenters—all

¹ Shall we be guilty of excess of scepticism if we venture to doubt whether Giraldus Cambrensis's vainglorious account of his famous reading at Oxford is to be accepted as historical fact, or whether it implies all that it is generally supposed to imply? The phrase 'doctores diversarum facultatum' antedates by some thirty-five years the first known example of the word Faculty in its technical sense (see Mr. Rashdall's note to vol. i. p. 325): it may perhaps mean, quite generally, 'doctors of various attainments.'

evidently residing in the immediate neighbourhood of St. Mary's, close to the School Street of later times' (ii. 343).

It appears to us that much of the criticism which has been directed against the theory since Mr. Rashdall first announced it in the *Academy* in 1888 has proceeded upon the misunderstanding that he contests the existence of any Schools at Oxford before the supposed migration.¹ On the contrary he admits

'that there were already, or had been at an earlier date, schools of considerable importance at Oxford. A certain scholastic reputation, or a tradition of past scholastic reputation, may well have been one of the causes which attracted the recalled Parisians to Oxford rather than to any other of the few English towns whose size and situation fitted them equally well for the sudden reception of a large body of scholars' (ii. 332).²

What he denies is that any one of these schools grew up by a constitutional process into the University; and in this we think he is right.

The mode by which the new Society organized itself is largely a matter of conjecture until the end of John's reign, when we read of a Chancellor to be appointed by the Bishop of Lincoln; but when the Chancellor actually appears, while he is distinctively the Bishop's officer, he is not the less elected by the Masters from their own number.³ The notion of having a Chancellor was, of course, borrowed from Paris; but the fact that Oxford was not then a Cathedral City enabled the office to be so modified that its holder exercised all the powers, as to jurisdiction and the granting of licences, which the Chancellor of Paris possessed,

¹ The critics, it should be observed, differ among themselves. One writer thinks the expelled scholars went 'to some part of the English possessions in what we now call France' (*Edinburgh Review*, clxxiv. 105 sq., July 1896), while Mr. A. F. Leach denies that these 'aliens' were English at all and transports them to Germany (*National Review*, xxviii. 96, September 1896). Mr. Leach, however, deserves our thanks for having collected some useful notices about the schools attached to secular collegiate churches in early times.

² Mr. Rashdall, we notice, has not repeated his former conjecture (*Academy*, June 2, 1888) that 'Oxonia, referring to Robert Pullus's teaching in 1133, is a misreading for 'Exonia.' That there was a school of some importance at Exeter at the end of the century is shown by the *Evesham Chronicle*, cited vol. ii. p. 347, n. 5. With reference to Vacarius it must be admitted that, since Mr. Rashdall's book appeared, Professor Liebermann has given some new grounds in favour of Gervase of Canterbury's statement that he taught law at Oxford. See his paper in the *English Historical Review*, xi. 308 sq., April 1896.

³ In 1368 even the confirmation of the Chancellor by the Bishop was dispensed by Urban V. (ii. 427).

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and at the same time occupied a representative position towards the body of Masters, like the Paris Rector, as the Head of the University. Yet to the present day there remain traces which point to the fact that not the Chancellor but the Proctors were the true executive officers of the Masters: so that if the Chancellor was the Head of the University as a whole, the Proctors were Heads of the Regent Masters, the body engaged in the practical teaching of the University. The influence of Paris is clearly traceable, with whatever modifications, in the forms which the constitution of Oxford assumed. Here too the organization by Nations for a time prevailed. At an early date it seems as though the Nations were, as at Paris, four in number; but soon there were but two, of Northerners and Southerners. As a basis of organization they were abolished in 1274, and the Faculty of Arts thenceforth voted as a single body: but the two Proctors, one always a Northerner, the other a Southerner, continued to testify to the old division; and no single Head of the Faculty was established, because no conflict with the Chancellor made such an officer necessary or desirable. Still the parallel with the history of Paris was preserved in the predominance of the Faculty of Arts and the pre-eminent position held by its Proctors. 'The want of independent corporate life on the part of the superior Faculties and their complete subordination to the inferior Faculty of Arts is one of the most remarkable peculiarities of the Oxford University constitution' (ii. 387 *seq.*)

Mr. Rashdall has an interesting chapter on the relations between the University and the town of Oxford, the disputes that arose between them, and the secessions to which these gave rise. In 1209 there was a migration to Cambridge, in 1238 to Northampton and Salisbury, in 1334 to Stamford. It is curious to notice how nearly these settlements succeeded in making themselves permanent. The first actually created the Sister University, which, however great in the sixteenth and following centuries, is, during the Middle Ages, but a pale copy of Oxford. The School at Northampton probably continued for many years, since in 1260 the town was chosen as their residence by the discontented students of Cambridge, and in 1263 was further populated by a wholesale migration from Oxford.¹ At Salisbury too, forty years after the seces-

¹ In connexion with Henry III.'s siege of Northampton, Mr. Rashdall should not (ii. 395, *n.* 3) have cited Knighton, and, after him, Hemingburgh, since the former is simply repeating the latter's words, and Mr. Rashdall cannot be ignorant that Hemingburgh (whom he persists in calling Hemingford) preceded Knighton by half a century.

sion of 1238, we find all the indications of a *Studium Generale*.¹ The School at Stamford, originating as it did at a time when the powers of the University of Oxford were more matured, was put down as a rival authority by the assistance of the Government; but so deep was the impression of jealousy which it left at Oxford that 'until living memory an oath not to lecture at Stamford was exacted from all candidates for the mastership at Oxford' (ii. 398).

The account of the Wycliffite movement, so far as it concerns the University, is not, we think, one of the best parts of the book. The author looks at it too much through Protestant spectacles, and the proportions become distorted. To speak in Richard II.'s time of 'the zeal of the English Court and prelates against heresy' is to misread the evidence. The great complaint made by the St. Albans chronicler² is that so late as 1389 not a Bishop, except Despenser of Norwich, could be induced to take resolute measures against it; and as for the Court, once at least Wycliffe's opinion was asked by the King's Council on a matter of Church politics. He was openly protected by the Princess of Wales, as well as by John of Gaunt, until the date of his denial of the doctrine of transubstantiation.³ An order was indeed issued in 1388 for the repression of Wycliffite teaching, 'sed executio tarda et quasi nulla affuit,' as the writer who records it comments.⁴

Another point arises in the same connexion. The University obtained in 1395 a bull from Boniface IX. exempting it 'from the jurisdiction of all Archbishops, even *legati nati*, Bishops, and Ordinaries' (ii. 430). A year later, when a copy of it was formally produced before Convocation, Archbishop Arundel refused to accept it: whereupon Mr. Rashdall characteristically exclaims, 'It is remarkable how light orthodox ecclesiastics will make of ecclesiastical authority when the supposed interests of orthodoxy are at stake' (ii. 431 *seq.*) This looks, we are sorry to say, very much like wilful perversion of facts. The Archbishop did not make light of ecclesiastical authority: he simply disputed the genuineness of a document, 'nullatenus bulla apostolica, sigillove auctentico,

¹ See the important document printed from the Salisbury *Liber Ruber* in vol. ii. pp. 795 *seq.*, in accordance with which the statement in vol. i. pp. 292, *n.* 1, requires modification.

² Walsingham, *Hist. Angl.* ii. 188 *sq.*

³ This denial was in all probability not made, as here stated, 'apparently in the summer of 1381' (ii. 428), but in 1380 or even 1379; see Mr. F. D. Matthew's paper in the *English Historical Review*, v. 328 *sqq.*, 1890.

⁴ Knighton, *Chron.* ii. 264, ed. Lumby, 1895.

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aut cuiuscunque notarii publici signo, subscriptione ve munitam' (ii. 431, n. 2). Now, the Middle Ages were very careful in demanding that a document conferring a right or privilege must be delivered in the original or else in a copy attested by a duly certificated notary. The Archbishop was bound not to admit a mere unofficial copy. We do not so much complain of the statement that 'the ecclesiastical repression which followed the collapse of the Wycliffite heresy meant the extinction of all vigorous and earnest scholastic thought' (ii. 541 *seq.*), though we think it expresses but a half-truth. Scholasticism was already far in its decline in Wycliffe's lifetime. To this fact his own writings give abundant testimony; and that he should have held an unequalled position as a Schoolman is a speaking proof of the degeneracy of the schools in his day. The vitality of the movement was past, and no external pressure could do much to hasten or retard its end. We cannot here enter into the disputed question as to how far the religious work of Wycliffe survived in England; we do not ourselves believe that its later influence was at all appreciable: but when Mr. Rashdall says—

'It can hardly be doubted that those Bible-readings of the English Reformers [Tyndale and the Cambridge group] were ultimately the outcome of a tradition of practical piety, of love for Scripture, and of discontent with the prevailing ecclesiastical system, which lingered long after the days of Wycliffe in the hearts of the English people and not least in obscure corners of the two University towns'—

we can only ask how it came to pass that there is no vestige of the use of Wycliffe's translation of the Bible in Tyndale's or in any other of the sixteenth-century versions.

We are compelled to pass over the account of the Oxford Colleges and the extremely valuable study of the philosophical work of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries (Duns Scotus and Ockham would, perhaps, have been more properly treated in connexion with Paris); the brief and somewhat jejune chapter on Cambridge, for which Mr. Rashdall is not altogether to be blamed, since materials for the mediæval period are sadly wanting; and the lively sketch of 'student life in the Middle Ages' which concludes the book. Enough has been said to show that Mr. Rashdall's work is one with which no one desirous of full and accurate information as to the development of academic institutions and studies, and, indeed, the history of learning at large, can afford to dispense.¹

¹ Mr. Rashdall's volumes are very well and correctly printed. We may add a list of a few slips which we noted during our second perusal

ART. V.—THE FATHER OF ENGLISH HISTORY.

Venerabilis Bedæ Opera Historica. Venerabilis Bedæ historiam ecclesiasticam gentis Anglorum, historiam abbatum, epistolam ad Ecgbertum una cum historia abbatum auctore anonymo ad fidem codicum manuscriptorum denuo recognovit commentario tam critico quam historico instruxit CAROLUS PLUMMER, A.M., Collegii Corporis Christi Socius et Capellanus. Tomus Prior, Prolegomena et textum, Tomus Posterior, Commentarium et indices, continens. (Oxonii e typographeo Clarendoniano. MDCCCXCVI.)

FOR some time past the ordinary working edition of Bede's *History*, printed by Mr. Moberly, has been out of print, and, as it has not been easy to obtain second-hand copies, a small but important class of theological tutors and students at the University has been put to considerable inconvenience by the lack of a text-book. Their hope has been long deferred, but now at last Mr. Plummer has given them the pleasure which is felt 'when the desire cometh,' and has placed in their hands an edition which will afford hearty satisfaction to all lovers of Bede, and which will, moreover, as we firmly believe, prove to be indispensable to all students of Bede in the future. Although it has been a little hard to wait patiently for Mr. Plummer's expected publication, it must be admitted that the delay has caused the appearance of the book to be singularly opportune. The Anglican branch of the Catholic Church is preparing, as Churchmen are reminded by the letter of the Archbishop of Canterbury,¹ to celebrate the thirteen-hundredth anniversary of the arrival of St. Augustine, and Mr. Plummer's book gives us the oppor-

of the book. Vol. i. p. 37, *n.* 3, for App. *vi.* read *xiv.* P. 51, for *Walahfrid* Strabo read *Walahfrid*. P. 116, for *Richard* of Ursperg read *Burchard*. P. 284, *n.* 1, Ermoldus Nigellus should not be spoken of as Nigellus, a mere nickname. P. 305, *n.* 1, for *Guala* read *Gualo*. Pp. 327, *n.* 1, the date 1265 should be 1264. P. 328, for 1244 read 1245 (see p. 315). P. 350, *n.* 1, for p. 33 read 37. P. 385, 'the protection of the Anti-papal Empire' could hardly avail in 1260, during the great Interregnum. Vol. ii. p. 120, *n.* 2, the reference has not been supplied. P. 181 and elsewhere, *Grenoble* is misprinted *Grénoble*. P. 335, for 1233 read 1133. P. 347, *n.* 1, the punctuation is confusing. Pp. 395, *n.* 3, and 397, *n.* 1, the historian is indifferently spelt *Knyghton* and *Knighton*; and in the former place 'c. 1652' should be 'c. 2447.' P. 428, *n.* 1, for 1830 read 1820.

¹ Dated July 30, 1896, and printed in the *Times* of August 19.

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tunity of repeating, what cannot be too much emphasized, that the full story of St. Augustine's mission is to be traced in Bede, and in Bede alone. Again there are signs around us that 1897 is to be used, on the completion of sixty years of Her Majesty's reign, to consolidate the unity of the British Empire, and it is in Bede's *History* alone that we can see what a tremendous debt all Englishmen owe to Archbishop Theodore, as the man who held 'the first of all national gatherings' ¹ in England, who provided 'a precursor of the Witenagemots and the Parliaments of the one indivisible imperial realm,' and who so may 'take no mean place among the men who helped to make England.' ² Once more, as we approach the end of the century and find ourselves face to face with 'the venerable dispute which reappears every hundred years' in the question, 'When does the next century begin?' ³ it is well that we should be reminded by Mr. Plummer that Bede 'has the enormous merit of being the first chronicler who gave the date from Christ's birth, in addition to the year of the world, and thus introduced the use of the Dionysian Era into Western Europe' (i. p. xxxviii). In the broad and comprehensive scheme of Mr. Plummer's work, in the thorough pains which he has bestowed upon its details, in his affectionate reverence for Bede's personal character, as revealed in all his writings, and in the extremely interesting comments which he has made upon particular passages, we find abundant reasons for supposing that Mr. Plummer will successfully commend Bede's historical works to English Churchmen, and, indeed, further, to many Englishmen who can appreciate the most highly educated Englishman of his day, who was as much a gentleman in piety and morals as in learning. We should be glad to think that we had done something in the *Church Quarterly Review* to commend Bede to those who are to this day benefiting by the culture which Benedict Biscop and Bede introduced to the West, to encourage the clergy to look upon the study of Bede at first hand as an unmistakable duty, and to induce the Bishops who are coming to the Lambeth Conference to make Mr. Plummer's edition of Bede known in the distant dioceses of the Church, so that our fellow-Churchmen in the colonies may look with the most entertaining and accomplished of guides unto the rock whence they were hewn.

¹ Green, *Hist. Engl. People*, p. 30.

² Bright, *Chapters of Early English Church History*, p. 258.

³ The question is discussed in a lively special article in the *Times* of August 21, in which Bede deserved to be mentioned.

No critical edition of Bede has been published since that of Smith in 1722. John Smith, Canon of Durham, died in 1715, when less than a quarter of the work was through the press. It was completed by George Smith, his son, who at the time of his father's death was but twenty-two. It might have been supposed that an edition produced under such circumstances would have been by no means all that could be desired. But so far is this from being the case that Mr. Plummer is able to speak in very high, if discriminating, terms of it. He considers that its chief imperfection is that excessive weight is attributed to one MS. in the formation of the text, though that one be the celebrated Moore MS. in the Cambridge University Library (i. Pref. p. lxxx). As Mr. Plummer shows, the editors who have intervened between Smith and himself—Stevenson (1841), Giles (1843), Hussey (1846), the editor of *Monumenta Historica Britannica* (1848), and more recently Moberly, Holder, and Mayor and Lumby—have done very little beyond reprinting Smith's text. The most unfortunate of all these efforts, on some accounts, is the edition of Mayor and Lumby. We heartily object to their 'new departure' in publishing the third and fourth books of Bede's *History* by themselves in the first place, though Mr. Plummer restrains himself and only politely hints that the proceeding was a 'new departure.' But, in the next place, it is not possible in Mr. Plummer's opinion to base a satisfactory text on the Moore MS. alone, on which Mayor and Lumby mainly depend. And, further, they do not always give the reading of the Moore MS. correctly, occasionally giving another reading without noting their divergence from the standard MS., and they appear to have omitted, as a rule, to distinguish between its original and later hands. This Mr. Plummer justly stigmatizes as one very great drawback to the value of the edition. Such partial and imperfect work will now, we trust, be superseded by the excellent labours of Mr. Plummer himself, and we need not dwell upon that which is ready to vanish away.

No editor before Mr. Plummer has exhibited in an *apparatus criticus* the various readings of the MSS. on which the text is based. He has completely collated the four oldest known MSS. for this edition of the *Historia*, namely, the Moore MS. (M), Cambridge University Library, Kk. v. 16; Cotton, Tiber. A, xiv. (B); Cotton, Tiber. C, ii. (C); Namur, 'Bibliothèque de la Ville' (N). The account of these is contained in Part II. of the Introduction (i. pp. lxxx-cxlv), where the principles on which the text has been based are

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fully explained, and where satisfactory reasons are given for the interesting supposition that two different recensions of the text of the Ecclesiastical History were issued by Bede himself. It is difficult to do justice to the extremely careful labour which Mr. Plummer has bestowed upon this important question of the manuscripts without going into too much detail. We may, however, say generally that the text and notes taken together give a complete view of the various modes of spelling Anglo-Saxon names in four eighth century MSS.; that good reasons are given to prove that M and B are sister MSS., that C is a wholly independent witness, and that N is quite worthless for the settlement of the text. This gives Mr. Plummer two types of MSS., a C type and an M type. He notices the chief points in which they differ, and groups the later MSS. which he has examined under their respective types (pp. xciv, xcvi). Although Mr. Plummer makes it quite plain, therefore, that M cannot claim to be taken as the sole basis of the text, yet he concludes (p. xcvi) that M is earlier than C. An equally careful account is given of the much smaller questions of the MSS. of the History of the Abbots by Bede himself, the Anonymous History of the Abbots, and the Epistle to Egbert (pp. cxxxii, cxl, cxli). The peculiarities and mutual relationships of some of the later MSS. are further illustrated in the additional critical notes (i. 424). Passing from the MSS. to Mr. Plummer's printed edition itself, we observe that he has printed in italic type those parts of Bede's works which are derived from previously existing materials. This is an immense service to the young student, and it gives us the opportunity of saying that the typography and the whole material form of this edition is a very fine piece of work, and vastly superior to the last edition of Bede which proceeded from the Clarendon Press. It is a pleasure to handle and to read the present volumes, and although Mr. Plummer's good wine needs for us no bush, yet he may gain some increase in the number of his readers because the Press has so happily presented his labour to the public. A good instance of this successful combination of excellence is supplied by the copious indices printed at the conclusion of each volume. They really appear to leave almost nothing to be desired, and it is evident that Mr. Plummer must have bestowed much time upon them. The same remark is true of the chronological table prefixed to the second volume. This is most useful, and will greatly assist a student in drawing up tables for himself. There is no doubt

that the best way to acquire an elementary knowledge of Bede is to begin by arranging the dioceses in the order of their formation, and then to make out the order of the bishops in each, with the facts which are recorded about them. This can be done the more easily now that Mr. Plummer's table is available. He has succinctly placed the chief facts in parallel columns under the headings of dates, foreign affairs, popes, Irish history, Kent, Essex, Wessex, East Anglia, Northumbria and Northern Britain, Mercia, and the history of Wearmouth and Jarrow. A short page of addenda and corrigenda (ii. xxxvi) contains for the most part only addenda. As for corrigenda, we have only observed some extremely trivial points for notice, such as the defective type of 'mediæval' (ii. 137, line 2), and 'appears' (ii. 153, last line but one). There will be little beyond such small corrections to make in the next edition. But there is one matter to which we trust that Mr. Plummer will give attention when he has the opportunity. He tells us, what every student of the period must also confess, that the two books to which he owes the most are Haddan and Stubbs's *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents*, and Dr. Bright's *Chapters of Early English Church History*. It is unfortunate that his references to Dr. Bright's pages are to the first edition of 1878. This does not matter to the older men who possess the first edition. But there are many students of Bede who only possess the second edition of 1888, and if they are to verify their references, they will be obliged, on all the numerous occasions on which they are referred to Dr. Bright, to calculate how far Mr. Plummer's pagination is wrong. We have been informed on the best authority that it has become necessary to take steps to print a third edition of Dr. Bright's book, and we hope that when Mr. Plummer has that edition before him he will make his paginal references conform to it, and bring his own work in this respect, as it certainly is in almost all other respects, thoroughly up to date. At the same time we should be glad if Mr. Plummer could see his way to provide a few really good maps. These would greatly assist the reader, and it is not easy to realize the extent of the various dioceses and kingdoms at different periods of their history without the aid which maps supply. When we have referred to the two appendices at the close of the second volume, we shall have completed our survey of the general scope of Mr. Plummer's work, and shall be free to consider the two chief matters, next to his critical work upon

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the MSS., upon which a proper estimate of the volumes must be formed—the range and value of Mr. Plummer's notes, and the picture which he presents to us of Bede himself and the impression produced by his writings. In the first of the appendices to which we have alluded (ii. 389-91), Mr. Plummer describes what he believes to be the oldest Life of Gregory the Great.¹ We must not go into the details, nor make any extracts from the Life in question, but we may just say that Mr. Plummer fairly convinces us that Bede had this Life before him, and some evidence is also supplied which suggests that Cuthbert, the author of the letter which cannot be too well known on the death of Bede, was also acquainted with it. Mr. Plummer's second appendix (ii. 392-4) deals with the question of Bede's Biblical quotations, which is a large subject even in the limits within which Mr. Plummer properly confines himself. For the whole question of the Scriptural quotations in Bede's works generally there are not yet sufficiently reliable texts available. We do not know who has shown himself more appropriately equipped for such an investigation than Mr. Plummer, so far as knowledge of Bede's other works is concerned.² But in the present appendix he has confined himself to the works which are printed in this edition. With the object of showing what Biblical text was used by Bede himself, he excludes quotations which occur in documents cited by Bede, making an exception in favour of the letter of Ceolfrid, because that is probably Bede's own work, and, at any rate, it is as relevant as his own writings to the question of the Biblical text then in use in Bede's own monastery. Mr. Plummer's examination shows that in passages where the Vulgate and the Itala differ from each other, Bede usually quoted from the Vulgate. But there are a few cases in which the quotation is certainly made from the Itala, and again a still smaller number in which the quotation differs from both Vulgate and Itala; in one of these cases Bede agrees with Jerome's version made from the Hebrew, and in another with a passage in St. Ambrose.

We will now proceed to Mr. Plummer's work as a commentator upon Bede's writings, and leave until last, what Mr. Plummer indeed puts first, Bede's most interesting per-

¹ Among the most recent estimates of the Life of Pope Gregory Dr. Hodgkin's 'Life' easily stands first (*Italy and her Invaders*, v. 279-453), although, as is shown in the *Church Quarterly Review*, No. 82, p. 553, Dr. Hodgkin seriously underrates the value of Bede's chapter 'de obitu beati papæ Gregorii.'

² See, for example, the excellent note in i. p. liv, note 7.

sonality. The editor's main object has been, he declares, 'to illustrate his author' (i. p. iii). By this test, then, he is content to be judged. He has brought together, as he says, what he could 'from other sources to illustrate the historical, social, and ecclesiastical bearings of Bede's text' (i. p. ii). There are two points which give an individual character to the notes. Mr. Plummer's special studies have enabled him to add some less obvious illustrations from Celtic and Scandinavian sources. The most interesting of these notes is upon the use of the Psalter in the Irish Church (ii. 137), but other instances may be traced in the index under such words as British Church, Celtic Churches, Dani, Irish Church (missionaries, pilgrims, and saints), and Scandinavia. There are also many scattered references (as on ii. 112-3). But although such illustrative matter from the by-paths of learning will certainly please the scholar, and is fitly included in the notes of such a scholar as Bede, its value is small when compared with the other point, which gives a unique character to Mr. Plummer's notes. For the illustration of Bede's historical works he has gone to an obvious but hitherto almost wholly neglected source, the other writings of Bede himself. He observes, and his own notes bear witness to the correctness of the observation, that, apart from the numerous direct illustrations of the text which these other writings supply, the whole texture of Bede's thought, the whole tone and temper of his mind, is so consistent, that we can hardly judge even his historical works aright without some knowledge of his other writings, especially of his theological works' (i. p. ii). To the end that these copious materials may be the more accurately employed, Mr. Plummer has carefully noted the evidence which they contain of the date of their composition, and the reader will find some very useful information 'on the chronology of Bede's writings' (i. pp. cxlv-lix), and in the complete references in the index under 'Baeda, Works of.' If we regret that there is a considerable number of Bede's works which cannot be more exactly dated than by saying that as they are mentioned in the *History* they must be placed before 731, we may, on the other hand, be glad that Mr. Plummer feels able, against the judgment of Haddan and Stubbs, to doubt the authenticity of the Penitential which is ascribed to Bede. It must be admitted, however, that it would be extremely natural for a man who lived in Bede's circumstances to compose a Penitential; and it must be remembered that there was then no dislike of casuistry to stamp such literature as 'a deplorable

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feature of the Mediæval Church' (p. clvii). Mr. Plummer has certainly made good use of the writings, which he has reduced to as much chronological order as possible.

We are often astonished at the wealth of strictly apposite illustration and the amount of labour which the notes display. A good instance of painstaking work is the long list which Mr. Plummer has made of the authors cited by name by Bede (i. p. l, note 3), a list which does credit to the studious care alike of Mr. Plummer and of Bede. Similar instances will be found in the exhaustive notes upon the authorities on which Bede's statements rest (*ib.* p. xlv), the application of *leges allegoriæ* in the interpretation of Holy Scripture (*ib.* p. lix), the heresies and heretics which Bede refutes (*ib.* p. lxii), and the exact year and day of his death (*ib.* pp. lxxi, note 3, and lxxii, note 1). To these should be added the comprehensive note in which Mr. Plummer places what he has collected about the fate of Bede's relics, his reputation for orthodoxy, and other persons who bore his name (*ib.* p. lxxviii, note 3). All these samples of industry are taken from the full introduction to the work. For the notes to the text of the *History* we have to go to the second volume. It is a vexed question whether it is practically better to print the notes at the foot of each page or to place them in a mass by themselves. Probably those who would read them in one place would read them and verify them in the other, and in Mr. Plummer's case he had hardly an alternative when we consider the size of his page and the fact that his critical notes upon the readings of the MSS. occupy the space at the foot of the pages of the first volume. After careful consideration, we think that we may assign the place of honour in the notes to the elaborate comments upon Wilfrid. This is as it should be; for whatever estimate we may form of certain episodes in Wilfrid's remarkable career, it is beyond question that he is as much the most brilliant character in the Anglo-Saxon Church as Bede is the most saintly scholar-priest, or Theodore the most capable administrator. What Mr. Plummer has done for Wilfrid may be inferred from the fact that the references under Uilfrid—as he is called in the index, after being called Wilfrid *passim* in the notes—occupy about five columns (ii. 538–41). By this means, and especially by the aid of the long notes in ii. 315–29, the student has within his reach all the facts on which to form his own opinion of the life of Wilfrid. We must plead for a patient hearing if we confess that Wilfrid's brilliancy seems to us to have been allowed to eclipse much which ought to be said

on the other side. Mr. Plummer, with somewhat vexatious caution, has rather abstained from giving his own judgment on Wilfrid's life as a whole. If we may make use of the facts, however, which he puts before us, we will make bold to say that Wilfrid profits very greatly by having Eddi as his biographer. Eddi had all the enthusiasm and veneration of Boswell, but he was blinder than the Scotchman, and far less honest in delineating the portrait of his hero. He is, alas! our only authority for some portions of Wilfrid's life, and those who take their view of Wilfrid from Eddi alone must remember how much the 'client' owed to his patron. It has sometimes been said, though we hardly think that the charge can be sustained after the whole facts have been examined, that Dr. Bright has himself been too much influenced by Eddi's picture. We have never met with the suggestion in formal print, and passages might be quoted from Dr. Bright's *Chapters* to show that he is quite aware of the true value of Eddi's work.¹ It may be said that Dr. Bright has a very warm admiration for Wilfrid's earnest, if somewhat superficial, missionary labours in Sussex and in Frisia, and for the immense service which he rendered to the English Church in advocating the civilising claims of Catholic usage against a narrow Celticism. But he yields to the imperious demands of historical truthfulness when he describes, as they deserve, Wilfrid's 'imperiousness and egoism' and the 'self-complacent consciousness' of his genius and work.² There were older and graver heads than Wilfrid's at the council of Whitby in 664, and if his brilliant speeches carried what we believe to be the right contention to victory, we cannot feel pleased with the picture of the young abbot holding forth to his elders, or forget that some of his words were 'rather insulting than conciliatory,' and that others contained 'unhistoric assumptions,' and showed that he was, with less excuse, 'as credulous on one side as his opponents on the other,'³ and that he 'treated the bishop of the Northumbrian Church with a dictatorial roughness which

¹ 'The enthusiastic Eddi.' Dr. Bright's *Chapters*, p. 199, note 6 (ed. 2). 'We may be sure that' Eddi 'does say too much when he imputes to Theodore the coarse guilt of taking a bribe from Egfrid' (*ib.* p. 291); we are warned how 'Eddi permits himself to describe' three Northumbrian ecclesiastics (*ib.* p. 292), and on the next page a warning is again added (not in the first edition) that Eddi was 'an enthusiastic partisan'; comp. *ib.* p. 225, note 4; 'open partisanship' (*ib.* p. 291); and, lastly, 'we know him well enough by this time to be mistrustful of his details, even when they do not assume a miraculous form' (*ib.* p. 309).

² *Ibid.* p. 201.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 204-5.

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must have been highly offensive, especially to those Lindisfarne ecclesiastics who remembered him as a precocious boy,' and that he spoke 'of the glorious saint of Hy with a superb indulgence.'¹ In fact, Mr. Plummer himself speaks of Wilfrid's 'insolence' on this occasion (ii. 191, margin). We do not object to the fact that Wilfrid shrank from Scotie consecration, or that he desired to be made a bishop in a canonical way by three consecrators, or that Gaul had some just claim upon his affectionate gratitude. But it was a pity that he was tempted to protract his enjoyment of rather too much splendour until his prolonged and unaccountable absence led those at home to speak of the injury which it caused to the Northumbrian Church.² Mr. Plummer thinks that the delay may have been caused by the employment of the very unnecessary number of twelve consecrators, and says that this 'looks like a touch of vanity on Wilfrid's part' (ii. 198, 317). When he did become Bishop of York, one of his dedication functions was accompanied by a 'public feast,' which was kept up with 'barbaric extravagance' for three days and nights, 'a strange concession,' as a native of Yorkshire has observed, 'to the coarse tastes of the Yorkshiremen.'³ It would be extremely easy to judge Wilfrid too harshly for the part which he took in placing the veil upon Queen Etheldreda. The whole proceeding was looked upon in quite a different light in those days. But, at the same time, Mr. Plummer tells us of a passage which would show that Wilfrid was 'guilty of gross dissimulation' in the matter (ii. 236). We may once more allow that Wilfrid is to be excused for the ready way in which he turned to Rome for deliverance out of his troubles, and we may even remember that he unwittingly gave contemporary kings and ecclesiastics in England several fine opportunities of ignoring Papal interference. But we cannot forget that Wilfrid's action was the real precursor of those appeals which from the time of Anselm were to vex the English Church through so many years. When he answered for the orthodoxy of his countrymen at the Council at Rome in 680 we cannot say that he really posed as their accredited delegate, and it was but misfortune that brought trouble upon his almost namesake Wynfrid in Neustria. But these incidents remind us that Wilfrid was fond of power, and did cause trouble to abound on many occasions. After all these

¹ Dr. Bright's *Chapters*, pp. 207-8.

² *Ibid.* pp. 220, 221. He quotes Raine, *Hexham*, i. 48.

³ *Ibid.* p. 243.

detractions we may conclude what we have to say of him by reflecting that in his case, as in the history of Thomas à Becket and of Wolsey, it was the very splendour of his genius which kept all those who had to do with him in a necessary condition of perpetual anxiety. Mr. Plummer's notes enhance the greatness of the man, and show us how his adversities brought out all his best qualities. But he also makes it clearer than it was before that Bede himself saw much in Wilfrid which he could not approve (see especially ii. 316), and that we must modify Eddi's words by the significance of Theodore's actions if we are to get a correct description of Wilfrid's true place in history. As we now pass from Wilfrid's truly 'splendid' name, we will refer the reader to Mr. Plummer's note on the date of Wilfrid's consecration (ii. 317), as an instance of careful examination of conflicting evidence. Mr. Plummer accepts Bede's date of 664, but he does not, we think, give sufficient weight to Dr. Bright's suggestion that Bede may have reckoned from Wilfrid's *election*.¹

Our comments on Mr. Plummer's work on Wilfrid have shown, we hope, with sufficient clearness how highly we appreciate the fulness, the fairness, and the industry of his notes. It is not necessary to consider numerous other examples which might be chosen at the same length, but the reader who wishes to test Mr. Plummer's labours more completely would do well to look in the index at the references under the names of Aidan, Biscop, Oswald, and Theodore, to see what excellent help Mr. Plummer gives for tracing the history of Mercia and Lindsey; and to examine the details of a few of the more important places, such as Iona, Ely, or Whitby.

We may lawfully spend a little more time upon the name of Augustine. Once more Mr. Plummer takes us through the story, and once more we have to insist, as he helps us to do, upon the true significance of St. Augustine's arrival. We would not for a moment ignore the earlier work of the British Church, nor yield to any in our affectionate veneration for the names which brought fresh missionary energy into England from Ireland and Scotland, nor forget the streams of holy influence which flowed round the work of Birinus and of Felix. We can also admit readily that Augustine's outlook was, from his earlier circumstances, rather a narrow one, and that he cannot, as a missionary, stand beside some greater heralds of the Gospel. But when all this has been said (and its general force is of more cumulative strength

¹ See Dr. Bright's *Chapters*, p. 210 (ed. 1). He maintains his position without change in p. 219 (ed. 2).

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than some partisans are prepared to admit), the fact remains that a unique halo of glory shines round Augustine's name. He indisputably did build upon a foundation which was no other man's; he did, first of all, bring Christianity to our Saxon forefathers, whom the British bishops had no sort of intention of evangelizing; he did begin a line in the hierarchy which for now thirteen hundred years has been an uninterrupted blessing to the Church and nation of England; he did make that beginning which placed us within the reach of the civilized organization of Western Christendom, which made the remarkable work of such men as Benedict Biscop possible, and which delivered us from the uncatholic insularity of Celtic enthusiasm. For this beneficent initiatory work Augustine's name shall live in the hearts of English Churchmen while the Church of England lasts, and our veneration for his memory is deepened as we read Mr. Plummer's annotations of his history.¹ Mr. Plummer has been a little too ready to accept so westerly a spot as Aust on the Severn for the position of S. Augustine's Oak. But he gives an interesting note which he has received from Mr. Moberly (ii. 74). He has been unable to trace two letters on the subject which Smith names as existing among Fulman's *Collectanea*.² There is often room for differences of opinion in equating Bede's localities with modern names, and of course Mr. Plummer cannot

¹ Cf. Dr. Bright's *Waymarks*. 'An Appeal to Bede,' pp. 279-322.

² We were unwilling to leave this stone unturned, and made a special journey to the University Library at Cambridge. Our efforts, aided by the courteous assistance of the Library officials, have, we hope, helped towards a solution of the difficulty. The proper reference seems to be Gale's edition of *Historia Britannica et Anglicana Scriptores xx.* 'duobus voluminibus comprehensi,' vol. i. p. 227, where we read in the fifth book (Polychronicon Ranulphi Higdeni monachi Chestrensis) 'in loco qui dicitur Augustines Oc, quod sonat Robur Augustini. Qui locus est in confinio Wictionum et occidentalium Saxonum.' (Compare Bede's text in ii. 2.) Why Gale's *Scriptores* is called Fulman's *Collectanea* is explained by a pencilled note written in the copy in the Cambridge Library in the handwriting of the late Mr. Bradshawe. He tells us that Gale's work—standing in the Library as R. 8, 37 and 38—came out as Vol. ii. (*Scriptores quinque*), Oxon. 1687, folio, and Vol. i. (*Scriptores quindecim*), Oxon. 1691, folio, and was complete in itself. But another work was edited anonymously, but not finished, by Fell and Fulman. This stands in the Library as P. 14. 8, and is entitled 'Rerum Anglicarum Scriptorum veterum tom. i., quorum Ingulfus nunc primum integer ceteri nunc primum prodeunt.' Oxon. 1684, folio. From the fact that the three volumes all came out at Oxford, they were mixed up and quoted as Gale and Fell, or, as we surmise from Smith's reference, Gale and Fulman, or simply Fulman. We have been baffled by another passage, which Mr. Plummer says is 'evidently a verse, but I do not know whence it comes' (ii. 365).

always satisfy all his readers by his choice. The problem presented by 'Tiovulgingacaestir' is a case in point. In his first edition (1878) Dr. Bright spoke of it as 'usually identified with Southwell'¹; in 1881 Mr. Moberly said perhaps it is now Torksey²; on December 16, 1887, we ourselves, in journeying from Retford, where Ethelfrid was slain (Bede, ii. 12), to Lincoln, the city of the prefect Blaecca (Bede, ii. 16), passed through Torksey with Dr. Bright, who exclaimed, 'Here is (the reputed) Tiovulgingacaestir'; in his second edition (1888) his comment on the place is much augmented, and, although mentioning Torksey, he decides for Littleborough.³ But an examination of the map will show that Paulinus had not to go far south to cross the Trent at Torksey. Mr. Plummer is 'sceptical' as to Torksey (ii. 109), and quotes a note from Mr. Moberly now supporting Littleborough. We still cling to Torksey, and are supported by an authority whose knowledge of the antiquarian lore of the neighbourhood was unique, the late Sir Charles Anderson.⁴ True, the Saxon chronicler calls Torksey Turcesig in 873, as Mr. Plummer says; but what are we to argue from the forms of names when the earliest form of Treenta, as Mr. Plummer tells us *in loc.*, is Trisanton?⁵

We will not enter into the question of St. Patrick with any detail, for that is unnecessary when we recollect that Bede is silent on Patrick's momentous work. But we cannot refrain from mourning that Mr. Plummer is inclined to agree with those who have doubted the very existence of St. Patrick (ii. 25). We may hope that he will come to a better mind, for we see (ii. 346) that he himself honestly notices a fact which weakens his own argument, and when he is so ready, as all 'Bedesmen' must be, to acknowledge his obligations to Dr. Bright, we may refer him to a passage which may win him over and increase his obligations.⁶

There is a lawful amount of freedom in the method to be applied in the spelling of the names in Bede. We do not profess to be rigorists in the matter, and prefer the absence of pedantry and believe in modernizing proper names in a

¹ *Chapters*, p. 123.

² Bede, p. 128, note 4.

³ P. 128 and note 7 there.

⁴ *A Short Guide to the County of Lincoln* (1847), p. 6; in his later and larger *Lincoln Pocket Guide* (1880), a worthy companion of the guide-books of the late Precentor Venables, he makes only a general remark about Torksey—'This place was of note in Saxon times' (p. 74).

⁵ Another double case of unhappy uncertainty of site is that of Brunanburh and the Winwaed (ii. 183).

⁶ *The Roman See in the Early Church*, p. 368 sqq.

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sensible way so as to meet the wants of the general reader. On the whole, Mr. Plummer strikes the balance between the nice requirements of scholarship and the needs of the average modern reader very satisfactorily. But he is not always consistent in his spelling; we find Higbald (ii. 196, 249) and Hygbald (ii. 70, 480); Partenay (i. p. xlv) and Partney (ii. 109). Mr. Plummer has given us so much delightful information that it is a somewhat ungracious complaint to say that there are occasions on which he might have given us with advantage a little more. For example, in the case of Hygbald, that abbot's connexion with the 'parts' of Lindsey may be further illustrated by observing that the churches of Scawby, Manton, and Hibaldstow are named after him.¹ And we should have welcomed a little more about the 'noble' (ii. 421) monastery of Bardney, over which Hygbald probably presided.² The note on 'sacerdos' (ii. 55) might have been illustrated by quoting the Latin title of Article xxxii, 'De conjugio sacerdotum,' where 'sacerdotum' evidently stands for the sacred orders of the ministry in general. In some cases Mr. Plummer has carried his illustrations a little further down in history than in others, and the result is a slight and perhaps inevitable unevenness. For example, he gives us very properly the landmarks of the history by which the see of Dunwich was divided into Dunwich and Elmham; both became extinct; the see was, as it were, revived at Elmham again, and removed first to Thetford and finally to Norwich (ii. 108). This places the reader at once in touch with modern ecclesiastical divisions. But Mr. Plummer does not pursue the history of the more important West-Saxon diocese so far. We ought to be told that in 909 the diocese of Winchester was divided into Winchester and Ramsbury, and that Ramsbury was the mother church of the diocese of Salisbury. And in the note on Abbot Sigfrid's death it would have been well to say that

¹ The short article on Hygbald in *Dict. Chr. Biog.*, by Bishop Stubbs, contains two inaccuracies—'period' should be 'parish,' and 'three others' should be 'two others.' Liebermann, in *Die Heiligen Englands* (Hanover, 1889), p. 12, gives Higbald's place as Cecesge. Was this an old name of Hibaldstow, or is Kelsey meant? Under 'Higbald' Bishop of Lindisfarne (*Dict. Chr. Biog.* iii. 51) Canon Raine quotes Jaffé as saying, 'Higbaldus idem sonat quod "spe alacer."'

² Some distant parishes in Lincolnshire bore their share in contributing to the Abbey. The contribution of Friskney, one of the parishes on the sea coast, is curious. Simon de Kime had given lands there to Bardney, and there were annual payments of salt from the Friskney salt pans made by the holders of the Abbey lands. One item runs, '7 bushels of salt, 2 hens, 1 capon.'—*Archæologia*, vol. xlviii.

we have here probably the first historical mention of phthisis.¹ Another class of notes shows how carefully Mr. Plummer has gone over the ground which has been described by distinguished predecessors. He has not taken their remarks for granted without verification, and on several occasions he is able to correct them. Thus in i. p. xii, note 1, he corrects an error of Professor Green's, and in discussing the fair memory of Oswald (ii. 116) he says: 'Here, as frequently, Mr. Green goes beyond what his texts warrant.' In other places he exhibits a healthy independence of judgment against Mayor and Lumby (i. p. lxxiii), Skene (ii. 101), Raine (ibid.), Dr. Bright (ii. 317), Stevenson (ii. 388), and even Bishop Stubbs (ii. 177). But he is no captious critic of other labourers in the Bede fields, and recognizes an instance, one out of many which might be quoted, in which we owe a debt to the care which Mr. Gidley bestowed upon his translation (ii. 199). In an exceedingly interesting note on 'building materials' (ii. 101) Mr. Plummer of course refers to the wooden church at Greenstead in Essex, but says that it 'survived to our own day.' We wonder why he speaks in the past tense. In Kelly's 'Essex Directory' it is spoken of as still standing, and the description of it deserves to be quoted. 'The nave is composed of the trunks of large oak trees, split or sawn asunder, roughly hewn on both sides and set upright close to each other, being let into a sill at the bottom and fastened with wooden pins to a plate at the top. The church is 29 $\frac{3}{4}$ feet long, 14 feet wide, and 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ feet high on the sides which support the roof.'² Essex has not much to be proud of in the sad persistency with which she resisted again and again the noble missionary efforts to win her to Christ, but this little wooden church is one of her glories, and may go to prove that when she once comprehended what the Christian treasure was, she knew how to take care of it. Mr. Plummer's note on church building leads us to allude, though we cannot do more than allude, to some of his many excellent notes on the general topics of interest which crop up at every turn in the text of Bede. Besides the full details which will be found in the notes in many places on the Paschal controversy and the tonsure (see under these words in the index), we must allude to the careful excursus on these subjects

¹ See *Church Quarterly Review*, No. 50, p. 440.

² Kelly's *Directory of Essex*, p. 172 (ed. 1894). The Church is dedicated to St. Andrew. The place, which Mr. Plummer spells 'Greenstead,' is 'Greensted-juxta-Ongar,' and is better spelt Greensted (as Dr. Bright, *Chapters*, p. 150) to distinguish it from Greenstead Green, near Halstead.

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(ii. 348-54). Mr. Plummer does well to bestow such pains upon them, for great principles lie beneath these apparently trivial and often wearisome disputes, and we have hardly improved in these matters since Bede's day. Without, in fact, being better we are somewhat, perhaps, inclined to congratulate ourselves upon our superiority. To these notes must be added others which bear upon the doctrines and practices of non-Roman parts of the Church, such as the question, by no means easy of solution, of the defect of the British Church in the matter of baptism (ii. 75-6), which Mr. Plummer is inclined to think was the omission of confirmation; and the monastic and not diocesan character of the organization of the Irish Church (ii. 133). Further samples of good general notes are those upon the pallium¹ (ii. 49), Gregorian chanting (ii. 118), the use of the Psalter (ii. 137), the existence of double monasteries (ii. 150), the poems of Caedmon, with the inquiry into the unique Junius MS. in the Bodleian (ii. 251-8), the Life of Aldhelm, and the history of Mailduf's town (ii. 308-11), the meaning of 'diocese' and 'parochia' (ii. 204, 212), and the lesser names of such men as Acca and the sturdy Penda (see references in the index). We wish that Mr. Plummer had grouped Bede's liturgical allusions together in the index. There is an enormous quantity of such material scattered throughout the *History*, and though Mr. Plummer always comments upon an allusion when it is necessary, he does not present Bede's information on the subject as a collected whole. Many years ago we began to write L in the margin of Bede's text when we encountered any liturgical detail, and it is astonishing now to notice how frequently the letter recurs upon the page.

We come at last to the most welcome branch of our whole subject, the character of Bede himself. We have been obliged, in reviewing Mr. Plummer's scholarly notes, to go at some length into several matters which can only be of interest to special students. We have shown, we trust, that even the most advanced readers of Anglo-Saxon Church History may go to Mr. Plummer and learn more than they knew before. It is, therefore, with no sort of desire to depreciate the value of the notes that we say that we like our editor's work best of all when he is dealing with the personal character of his author. There is that about Bede which wins the affection of all his readers in a peculiar way.² He

¹ To the references add Church's *S. Anselm*, p. 195; Palmer, *Of the Church*, ii. 434.

² We may say of him what Seneca said of his brother Junius Annæus

casts a charm over those who study his writings which cannot quite be paralleled by any other literary experience, and Mr. Plummer is a pleasing example of Bede's winning power. Hear his own confession on the subject:—'A somewhat prolonged study of Bede's works has produced in my mind such a personal feeling towards their author, that I am well content that some trace of my own personal feelings and circumstances should remain in what I have written about him' (i. p. iii). And he strikes a deeper note still in expressing his thanks to the delegates of the Clarendon Press for entrusting him with the execution of this edition, which has occupied his chief energies for some four years. 'It is no light privilege to have been for so long a time in constant communion with one of the saintliest characters ever produced by the Church of Christ in this island. I can but adapt the words of St. Ignatius, and say: *εὐχομαι μὴ εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτὸ κτήσωμαι* (*Philad.* c. 6)' (i. p. v). Again, he is quite able to enter into the enthusiasm of sentiment which is required to appreciate what 'Smith beautifully says' of the Epistle to Ecgberct,¹ that it may be taken to be 'Bede's swan-song' (ii. 378). We believe that this devoted feeling towards Bede has very commonly existed in his readers, and in examining what Mr. Plummer has to say about Bede which may seem to account for it, we shall fulfil our last object and bring our survey to a close. It is 'a picture of the scholar's uneventful life, spent in a round of religious service and of quiet study' (i. p. x). We know what to expect when we read the 'pathetic incident' of the little boy like the child Samuel, who alone with the abbot survived the plague at Jarrow and recited the appointed psalms (i. pp. ix, xii),² and the even better-known story of the angels asking why Bede came not with the brethren to the prescribed devotions. Mr. Plummer's fine illustration of the story from Bede's commentary on St. Luke is an excellent example of the service

Gallio: "Quem nemo non parum amat etiam qui amare plus non potest." (Quoted by Alford on Acts xviii. 12.)

¹ Mr. Plummer might have enlarged somewhat on the signal merits of this most excellent and instructive letter. Bishop Stubbs (in *Dict. Chr. Biog.*, under 'Bede') says that it 'contains lessons of wisdom, clear perception of abuses, and distinct recommendation of remedies, which in the neglect or observance of them might serve as a key for the whole later history of the Anglo-Saxon Church. And the same letter breathes the purest patriotism, and the most sincere love of the souls of men.' Comp. Haddan and Stubbs, iii. 314; Dr. Bright's *Chapters*, p. 212; Archd. Perry's *History*, i. 73; Moberly's *Bede*, pp. 218, note 2, 391, note 1.

² See *Church Quarterly Review*, No. 50, p. 440.

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which he has exacted from Bede's other works (i. pp. xii, xiii).¹ Bede is surely the finest model that can be offered to the students of a theological college. This man, who so marvellously combined the wisdom of the serpent with the harmlessness of the dove, and whose simplicity and piety were equalled, though never allowed to be prevented, by his immense intellectual range, who 'in history and in science, as well as in theology . . . is before all things the Christian thinker and student' (i. p. ii), ought continually to be quoted by those who have to train candidates for ordination, to remind them that if they are to bring out of their treasure things new and old, they must be students and thinkers to the very end of their ministry.² There is no more profitable lesson to be learned in these days by a young clergyman than this. When the young man has been to his daily service before breakfast and his Scripture lesson at the parish school afterwards, it is his bounden duty to study and to make sermons from ten to one o'clock daily. His sermons will be thin and his mind will be shallow if he supposes that any 'parochial' affairs should habitually be allowed to infringe upon this sacred time. Bede stands forth in holy rebuke of the wasted morning spent partly in reading the newspaper and partly in parochial fussing, which should be sternly postponed until after lunch and for the occupation of the afternoon. Increased parochial activity is a mark of our modern Church life for which we are profoundly thankful, but it is purchased at a ruinous cost if it means the sacrifice of all imitations of the Jarrow 'model of the saintly scholar-priest; a type in which the English Church has never, thank God, been deficient, and of which we have seen in our own day bright examples in the person of men like Richard William Church and Henry Parry Liddon' (i. p. lxxix). It is a type, we may add, of robust English divinity, as far as possible removed from the imported seminarist and from the moral tone which surrounded continental Christianity in Bede's day. Bede was a lover of old English songs (i. p. lxxiv), and hated whatever enfeebled his country or degraded the national life (i. pp. xxxii, xxxiv-v), and we have only to compare him with Gregory of Tours to be glad that it is Bede who be-

¹ Another instance is given by Mr. Plummer in an extract from the opening of the fourth book of Bede's commentary on Samuel, which speaks of Bede's sorrow at the departure of Ceolfrid (i. pp. xv, xvi). Cp., too, i. p. lxxiv, note 3.

² No one will ever give up reading who understands what Dean Church meant by 'the two-fold debt of the clergy.' See his *Human Life and its Conditions*, p. 165; cp. S. Gregory's *Past. Care*, ii. 11.

longs to us.¹ Such a man was bound to 'pass at a comparatively early age from the ranks of the taught to those of the teachers' (i. p. xxi). His great object was 'to benefit his countrymen,' and Mr. Plummer gives a happy illustration of this by quoting the beautiful prayer with which Bede concluded his exposition of Nehemiah (i. p. xxii). That he did not despise useful manual labour is shown both by passages in his writings and by a description of the monastic life at Jarrow (i. p. xxv).

That his learning did not make him, as we say, 'donnish,' nor cause him to forget the supreme need of a holy life for the exercise of the pastoral office, is clear again and again from many passages on the duty of pastors and masters in his works (i. p. xxxvi). Of his scientific, historical, and theological works, Bede 'no doubt assigned the greatest value' to those which are theological in character, principally consisting of commentaries (i. p. xlvii). But it is the *Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum* which is 'the best known of all his works; that by which almost alone he keeps a place in the thoughts of any besides professed students of history or theology' (i. p. xliii). Mr. Plummer's own passage on the central text of his edition must be quoted in full:—

'There are scenes in it which live in the hearts of every one of us; the picture of the Anglian slave boys in the Roman Forum, whose fair angelic faces first stirred in the heart of Gregory the desire to save from the wrath of God the souls that dwelt within such heavenly forms (ii. 1); the story of the Northumbrian thane who gave his voice for the introduction of Christianity, in the hope that it would throw some light on the dark problems of existence, the whence and the whither of the human soul, which seemed to him like a sparrow which flits in winter through a lighted hall, passing from darkness into darkness (ii. 13); the description of Oswald, the royal saint, acting as interpreter, while Aidan preached to his people (iii. 3); the tale of the cowherd of St. Hilda's monastery, who received his gift of song, "not of men nor by man," but through the grace of God, and who therefore ever regarded it as a sacred deposit, to be used only for the glory of God and the good of his fellow-men (iv. 24): these are things which will live as long as Englishmen have any care for their country and their Church, as long as the story of saintliness and self-sacrifice can awake an answering echo in human hearts' (i. p. xliii-iv).²

More, much more, might be said as to Bede's reverence for the Fathers, his orthodoxy, his wonderful power of describing

¹ Dr. Bright's *Chapters*, pp. 337, 447-50.

² There are some interesting remarks on Bede's *History* in Myles Davies' *Icon libellorum*, p. 187.

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the sunsets of beautiful Christian lives, his extreme caution in telling what he has heard from others, his treatment of miracles, his good sense, his continual remembrance of the Divine judgment. We must content ourselves with saying that the reader will find numerous details on these topics in Mr. Plummer's notes. We prepare to leave the subject with a great reluctance and with the increased conviction that all the praise which has ever been bestowed upon Bede is most thoroughly deserved. The whole history of the Anglo-Saxon Mission is a remarkable one, and Bede shares with Wilfrid the glory of being its most wonderful production.¹ 'Such a phenomenon as that of the Anglo-Saxon Church in the days of Bede—that is to say, within about two generations of its foundation, and in days when all travelling was on foot—is unknown in all the missionary reports of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries,' says one writer,² while a man in quite a different age is equally impressed by Bede's learning and calls him 'a man that saw as clearly as any whomsoever that lived in any part of the whole evening (of that dark time); and one who for the excellency of his endowments and piety obtained that adjunct (of Venerable).'³ We must go to Dean Church's writings for two passages in which he pierces beneath the surface of the phenomena.⁴ As we read once more the Dean's beautiful English, and as we linger over the scene of Bede's death-bed, with its inspiring Ascension-tide thoughts, we recognize the justice of the noble passage in which Mr. Plummer closes his introduction and which will, we are sure, move every lover of Bede to silent gratitude to Bede's latest editor:—

'The world has in many ways made great progress since the days of Bede. If he could come to life to-day, he would find indeed part of his beloved Church at Jarrow still standing; but the monastic buildings are almost wholly gone, and the face of the country has been utterly transformed. Instead of the small and scattered villages of Bede's time, he would find a dense mining and manufacturing population; the then quiet reaches of the lower Tyne resound with the din of shipbuilding, and the roar of factories; and her once wooded banks are bare and black with the smoke of colliery and furnace. How far all these things have really added to the happiness

¹ For other cases of national conversions see Dr. Bright's *History of the Church*, p. 32.

² Ffoulkes, *Eucharistic Oblation*, p. 480.

³ Heylin, *Life of S. George*, part ii. c. iii. § 2.

⁴ *Gifts of Civilization*, p. 343; *Beginnings of the Middle Ages*, p. 67 (quoted at the close of Dr. Bright's *Chapters*).

of the world may, I think, be doubted. But even rating them at the very highest value that has ever been put upon them by the most zealous votary of material progress, we have not, it seems to me, amid all our discoveries, invented as yet¹ anything better than the Christian life which Bede lived, and the Christian death which he died'² (i. p. lxxix).

ART. VI.—LECKY'S 'DEMOCRACY AND LIBERTY.'

Democracy and Liberty. By WILLIAM EDWARD HARTPOLE LECKY. 2 vols. (London, New York, and Bombay, 1896.)

It is now nearly twelve years since the coping-stone was added to the fabric of democracy in England. The Reform Bills of 1832, of 1867, and of 1885 have been the chief stages in the process. Mr. Lecky considers that the world has never seen a better Constitution than that which England enjoyed between the first and second of these epochs. By the Act of 1885, giving the suffrage to the agricultural labourers, a great stride has been made in a dangerous direction—that of placing government under the control of the least enlightened classes. And yet, to go back for a moment to Athens under Pericles, how far wider a range has the sovereignty of our Demos now than that which Aristophanes³ represents him as wielding when sitting in state on the Acropolis. Far more complicated problems meet the politician of the present day than were ever dreamt of in the philosophy of the great thinkers of old. Indeed, the spirit of modern democracy is alien to much that was formerly connoted by the word. For it is often the direct opposite of liberty. It no longer takes as its watchword⁴ the unconstrained freedom of individual action, but, paradoxical as it may seem, among the essentials of its creed are rather restriction and coercive regulation. It has penetrated everywhere. It has tinged parliamentary life and language. It has raised its voice in secluded rural villages

¹ Compare a similar thought in i. p. lxxi.

² The incomparable letter of Cuthbert, who was an eyewitness of Bede's death, is printed in its entirety, and translated by Mr. Plummer (i. pp. lxxii–viii, clx–lxiv), but he has not attempted to collate the various MSS. of it, which exhibit considerable divergence from each other (i. p. lxxii, note 1).

³ *Knights*, 1326.

⁴ It is to this that Nicias appeals before the battle in the great harbour of Syracuse: Παριδος τε τῆς ελευθερωτάτης ὑπομνήσκων καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀνεπιτακτοῦ πᾶσιν ἐς τὴν διαίταν ἐξουσίας (Thucydides, vii. 69).

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with a population just above the limit of three hundred, that entitles them to a parish council of their own. It is threatening France with financial danger in the form of immensely increased expenditure and national debt. It is threatening the United States with a grave deterioration of the higher intellectual life, and with other evil results of the levelling down, which it encourages quite as much as levelling up. Nor is democracy without influence upon the Church. At least there are indications, strange as at first sight it may appear, that Catholicism will in the future tend more and more to ally itself with this tendency of the times.

Demos is crowned. And there is very little likelihood of his being discrowned. Voltaire¹ maintained that anyone who attempted to predict the future was either an impostor or a madman. But, however great the difficulty of prognosticating events, especially where, as in the region of politics, there is the peculiar uncertainty attaching to questions that involve decisions of the human will, and still more so when statesmen of the modern type are too apt to cast to the winds the lessons of the past, on which alone political prescience must rest, this much may at least be safely asserted—that the tide will continue in our day to flow in its present direction.

As Mr. Lecky says in the opening of his third chapter—

'I do not think that anyone who seriously considers the force and universality of the movement of our generation in the direction of democracy can doubt that this conception of government will necessarily, at least for a considerable time, dominate in all civilized countries, and the real question for politicians is the form it is likely to take and the means by which its characteristic evils can be best mitigated' (i. 212).

Mr. Lecky's monumental work naturally suggests some comparison with the masterly volume of the late Dr. Pearson, *National Life and Character: a Forecast*, the publication of which three years ago at once attracted all thoughtful minds. The scope of the two books is very different, but there is a certain amount of overlapping in their subjects. The one enters more deeply and exhaustively into political problems; the other, especially in its concluding chapters on the Decline of the Family and the Decay of Character, ranges over social questions untouched by the author of *Democracy and Liberty*. Both of them have much to say about the growing tendency to State interference and State control. Mr. Lecky has a

¹ 'La saine raison nous apprend que quiconque prédit l'avenir est un fourbe ou un insensé' (Voltaire, *Essai sur les Mœurs*, p. 46.)

profound distrust in the competence of the State to undertake *all* kinds of tasks, and is at a loss to know on what ground, either of experience or reasoning, it is based. He suggests practical remedies and limitations to counteract the too rapid development of democratic ideas, and is not afraid of extreme socialistic measures prevailing, at any rate in our own race. In Dr. Pearson's view, on the other hand, State paternalism will more and more stretch its iron hand over every region of life, and nothing is to be seen in the horizon of the future but a dead-level of material prosperity and a monotonous drill, paralysing all individual exertion. Mr. Lecky faces the question of this decay of national character, particularly in the matter of governing qualities. He refuses to believe, with Carlyle, that England has lost her high pre-eminence in this respect. He points to the administration of India under a succession of great men, with which 'no achievement of secular government since the Roman Empire can compare in its magnitude and splendour' (i. 206). Representative institutions may be overlaid and crushed by multitudes of ignorant voters, but England herself is not decadent.

'If we measure our age by the aggregate of its vitality, by the broad sweep of its energies and achievements, the England of our century can hardly fail to rank very high. In art, in science, in literature, in the enlargement of the bounds of knowledge, in the popularisation of acquired knowledge, in inventions and discoveries, and in most of the forms of enterprise and philanthropy, it has assuredly done much. It has produced in Darwin a man who has effected a greater revolution in the opinions of mankind than any one—at least since Newton—and whose name is likely to live with honour as long as the human race moves upon the planet; while in Gordon it has produced a type of simple, self-sacrificing, religious heroism which is in its own kind as perfect as anything, even in the legends of chivalry. A country which has produced such men and such works does not seem to be in a condition of general decadence, though its Constitution is plainly worn out, though the balance of power within it has been destroyed, and though diseases of a serious character are fast growing in its political life. The future only can tell whether the energy of the English people can be sufficiently roused to check these evils, and to do so before they have led to some great catastrophe' (i. 210).

Another point of contrast between these two writers is that while Pearson's treatment of his subject is far more rigid, and he carries out his inferences relentlessly to their strictly logical results, Lecky, on the other hand, allows more room for friction in the political machine. Undoubtedly, if all things in the social and political world moved on with undeviating

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regularity, the Pearsonian conclusions would inevitably follow. Where, however, human nature is concerned, the movement of the machinery is rarely found to be equally maintained in all its parts at the same rate. It seldom happens that political causes operate freely without checks and obstacles, which form a disturbing element in our calculations.

On the whole, Mr. Lecky's outlook, as the above quotation sufficiently proves, is far more encouraging than that presented to us in the sombre, depressing, and pessimistic pages of Dr. Pearson.

It would be wrong, however, to suppose that there are not many conclusions arrived at in these volumes which are far from cheering. Still, wherever Mr. Lecky ventures on a forecast of the future, it is eminently a guarded one, and expressed in very cautious and sober language. We proceed to select a few examples of such qualified predictions, which will serve at the same time to illustrate his convictions upon some of the most important of the diverse themes comprised in the series of elaborate essays of which this work is composed.

I. In his third chapter he discusses at some length the subject of Taxation in Europe, analyses the causes of its growth, and weighs carefully the advantages and disadvantages of a graduated taxation.

'It is obvious,' he says, 'that a graduated tax is a direct penalty imposed on saving and industry, a direct premium offered to idleness and extravagance. It discourages the very habits and qualities which it is most in the interest of the State to foster, and it is certain to operate forcibly where fortunes approach the limits at which a higher scale of taxation begins. It is a strong inducement at that period either to cease to work or to cease to save. It is at the same time perfectly arbitrary. . . . No fixed line or amount of graduation can be maintained upon principle, or with any chance of finality. The whole matter will depend upon the interests and wishes of the electors; upon party politicians seeking for a cry and competing for the votes of very poor and very ignorant men. Under such a system all large properties may easily be made unsafe, and an insecurity may arise which will be fatal to all great financial undertakings. The most serious restraint on parliamentary extravagance will, at the same time, be taken away, and majorities will be invested with the easiest and most powerful instrument of oppression. Highly graduated taxation realises most completely the supreme danger of democracy, creating a state of things in which one class imposes on another burdens which it is not asked to share, and impels the State into vast schemes of extravagance, under the belief that the whole cost will be thrown upon others' (i. 286, 287).

At the same time, so careful is our author not to overstate

the case that he adds: 'It would be pressing these arguments too far to maintain that a graduated scale of taxation is always and necessarily an evil. In this, as in most political questions, much will depend upon circumstances and degrees.' One thing, however, is plain, which is that 'graduated taxation will be contagious, and it is certain not to rest within the limits that its originators desired.' It becomes, therefore, highly important to consider its consequences. But even granting that it leads, as no doubt it will, to the dissolution of the old system of large landed proprietors, the change will not, in Mr. Lecky's opinion, be wholly evil. If the scale of expenditure in English country life is less luxurious than at present, this will be in some respects a gain. Smaller estates and a more equal division of property among the members of a family will be beneficial, and if the present owners lose territorial influence, they will not be impoverished. 'They will have to pass through a trying period of transition, but they will probably soon adapt themselves to their new circumstances.'

It must be confessed, however, that here Mr. Lecky in the judicial summing up of his third chapter rather fails to satisfy us. The prospect is sufficiently melancholy. 'The old historic houses will no doubt remain, but they will remain, like the French castles along the Loire, memories of a state of society that has passed away.' He is forced to admit the certainty of other results which will fall at least as heavily on the poor as on the rich, and we fail to recognize the counterbalancing advantages which he implies, but does not prove, will be the outcome of this altered state of society.

II. We turn to another instance of these qualified predictions as to the effect of democracy. Is there a danger in the future from priestly ascendancy? The whole subject of religious liberty in its relation to the democratic development is treated with great fulness in the sixth chapter, occupying the last fifty pages of the first and the 'first eighty pages of the second volume. The investigation is somewhat complicated and discursive, as, perhaps, was inevitable from its magnitude, branching out into collateral topics, such as missionary enterprise in India, and the history of Mormonism in the United States; but the broad answer to the question stated above is arrived at by drawing a distinction between the widely different conceptions of religious liberty, and of the permissible range of opinions and toleration of practice in different lands.

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'In my own opinion,' Mr. Lecky says, 'the danger of priestly ascendancy is very serious in particular countries and provinces, but is not serious in the world at large. No one who takes a wide and impartial survey of the broad current of human affairs can fail to see that it is not running in the direction of priestly power. It is surely a significant fact that the whole aggregate political force of Catholicism in the world has not been sufficient to maintain the small temporal dominion of the Pope, although Popes who were pronounced to be infallible had declared with the utmost emphasis and authority that the maintenance of this dominion was of vital importance to the Catholic Church. In countries where almost the whole population had been baptized into the Catholic faith, the once terrible weapon of excommunication has proved absolutely idle' (ii. 25).

This conclusion seems at first to conflict with the opening paragraphs of Mr. Lecky's second volume. But it does not really do so. He there mentions, as one of the strongest instances of a prediction falsified by events, the belief so confidently entertained by the eighteenth-century thinkers, that all danger of antagonism between Catholicism and the civil power was past. That danger still remains wherever, as in Ireland, the priests dictate politics to an ignorant congregation, and such cases 'cannot be dismissed with mere commonplaces about religious toleration.' The aggressive spirit of Catholicism will continue to occupy the attention of future democracies. The causes of the growth of Ultramontanism can here be only indicated. We need not dwell upon the series of blunders which, in England, at the time of the Emancipation Act of 1829 played into the hands of the priestly party. On the Continent other reasons have worked in the same direction: the reaction in favour of religion after the excesses of the French Revolution and the Commune; the spread of scepticism, which, by detaching the moderates from the Church, has thrown more independence and more organization into the priests' hands; and lastly, the confiscations which have reduced the priest to being nothing but a priest, and therefore more rabid and intractable. Again, the growth of Catholic enthusiasm, as shown in the revival of pilgrimages, and in the network of confraternities and *cercles* spread over France, is an unmistakable fact. Under Pius IX. Catholicism became greatly centralized, the triumph of the Ultramontane theory culminating in the definition in 1854 of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, and the definition in 1870 of the Infallibility of the Pope. All this, as Mr. Lecky subtly remarks, 'has greatly increased its power of acting on vast ignorant democracies. A cause

which is embodied in a single man is, with such democracies, far more popular than a cause which rests upon any abstract principles or any governing class.' The Encyclical issued by the present Pope, 'On the Condition of the Working Man,' has further accentuated the movement which is giving social questions a foremost place in Catholic politics, and there are signs in other quarters which strengthen the probability of 'the prediction of Count Cavour, that sooner or later Ultramontanism and Socialism would be allied' (ii. 79).

The outlines of the celebrated conflict between Catholicism and the State in Prussia are sketched in a concise but graphic manner, the subject occupying several pages of Mr. Lecky's sixth chapter. We may here illustrate the drastic nature of the legislation of 1872, and of the Falk Laws of the following year, from a narrative¹ not widely known, perhaps, in this country, but which passed through nine editions—45,000 copies—in three months, and was repeatedly confiscated in Germany, only to reappear in France. After due allowance is made for the fact that the writer seems from his own account to have been a somewhat aggravating offender against the civil power, it must be admitted that he was treated with needless and excessive cruelty. Being convicted of having contravened the law of May 11, 1873, and having both church and school closed against him, he was arrested and imprisoned for five months and a-half at Trier, in one of the cells assigned to the lowest criminals. After coming out of prison more hardened than ever in his resistance to the State authorities, he was banished from the district of Trier, the sentence being carried out with circumstances of extreme severity. Disguised, however, as a commercial traveller he returned not only to Trier, but to his own church, and performed the service there. From Luxembourg, where he was on safe soil, he again made a secret night journey to his parish, and said the Mass there, and also at other villages. Discovered and seized, he was banished from Germany, after a month's imprisonment, with all the sickening accompaniments of a common house of correction. Even then, before finally going into exile, he relates how he made his way through the snow on Christmas Eve to celebrate the Mass once more with his parishioners:—

'I have no country,' he says, 'or home, or resting-place. My parishioners are orphans. They have no sermon, no religious instruction; no one to administer the Sacraments, to comfort the sick, to

¹ *A Victim of the Falk Laws.* The Adventures of a German Priest in Prison and in Exile, told by the Victim. (London: Bentley, 1879.)

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carry to the dying the Bread of Life. These, then, are the fruits and manifestations of the Kulturkampf. Similar scenes are renewed daily, and in every direction. The whole country is in tears, and the priests are in prison, proscribed, and wanderers like myself. But the State cannot come out of the struggle victorious' (p. 171).

The Cardinal Archbishop of Posen was under arrest for more than two years, and a bishop of Trier died in prison. At last the resistance became too formidable. The Old Catholic movement, which had been encouraged by the Government, experienced the fate of most half-measures, and faded away. The persecution began to wane. On the accession of Leo XIII., in 1878, a spirit of moderation set in, and the diplomatic relations between Berlin and the Vatican, which had been broken off since 1874, were renewed. Then followed one of the most remarkable counter-revolutions that our age has witnessed. Dr. Falk was set aside, and his laws were eventually repealed. This was the price that Bismarck had to pay for Catholic interference, which he much needed, in his favour. He was forced to retrace his steps and surrender to the inevitable. He played off one party against another, and finally purchased support from the Catholics in order to carry out the military septennate, the Pope persuading the Catholics to vote for the Government in return for relaxations granted to them. This is a signal instance of the way in which the Papacy waits for its opportunity, and by doing so comes victorious out of the conflict.

In different countries the history of Catholicism in its attitude to the State naturally assumes, as has been already said, different phases. It is in Ireland that antagonism between the ecclesiastical and civil powers has reached its acme. Mr. Lecky concludes his admirable sixth chapter with the following words of warning, vehement, indeed, but not too vehement for the evil he is denouncing :—

'It is true, indeed, that elections may be and have been invalidated on the ground of religious intimidation, but this remedy is a very insufficient one. The most crushing intimidation is the most successful, for it scares the witness from the witness-box. The men who are really guilty are altogether unpunished ; and even when the election is pronounced void, they usually succeed at the next election in returning their candidates. As long as it remains possible to turn the chapel into an electioneering agency, and to blend politics with religious rites ; as long as priests are allowed to overawe the electors at the polling-places, to stand by the ballot-boxes, and take a leading part as personation agents or agents in counting votes, so long clerical intimidation will continue. Two laws, at least, are imperatively needed to meet the evil. The one is a law making the intro-

duction of politics into the chapels, and the actual or threatened deprivation of religious rites on account of a political vote, a criminal offence punishable by severe penalties. The other is a law putting an end to all personal interference or participation of priests at elections, except as simple voters' (ii. 79, 80).

III. We may ask, in the next place, What is the general character of Mr. Lecky's forecast on the question of *national education*, one that is closely connected with the one just considered on the growth of Catholicism? Here also a distinction has to be drawn between the circumstances and conditions of different nationalities. And here, too, Mr. Lecky deals with the problem in no *doctrinaire* spirit, but in a practical and sensible manner. To us in England the question is naturally one of peculiar interest at the present moment, the abandonment of their Educational Bill having somewhat damaged the position of the Government, from whom a final settlement of this vexed question for many years to come had been expected. Mr. Lecky's reflections on secular primary education in the abstract, and the line of action adopted in our own island in particular, are inserted in the midst of a long disquisition on Continental schools, and they rather break the continuity of his history of the battle of the educationalists as fought in France. The conclusions at which he arrives from our experience in the past are briefly these: A purely secular State education is not *per se* either irrational or irreligious. Religion, while it is certainly the most important, is not the only influence in the formation of character. The difficulty of teaching it at special hours is practically infinitesimal, as is plain to all who are acquainted with public schools. The double system has worked well on the whole with us, though in Catholic countries, where the simple reading of the Bible is regarded as an evil, the compromise we have made is impossible. But when we ask whether this compromise is likely to be permanent, Mr. Lecky is very doubtful. We must here let the author speak for himself:—

The establishment of free education by the State, and the constant tendency to raise the standard, and therefore the cost, of State education, are profoundly altering the conditions of the problem. The ever-increasing burden thrown on the ratepayer for educational purposes is becoming very serious, and is felt as a great grievance by those classes who derive no benefit from it. It is probable that one of its results will be that, sooner or later, a much larger proportion of the wealthier taxpayers will send their children to the free schools, as the corresponding classes appear to do in the

United States almost inevitably. They continue to do so, and on the whole they can permanently supported with conditions are closed, and But in the future desire definitely demand for become irre opinion with general aban so salutary least equally purely deno recently dim endow the t was so powe was the gre endowment, place in the policy has forces oppos is peculiarly that can be the object of the various consideration which shou opinion of t true questio children to the results'

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United States and in Victoria. Another consequence which appears almost inevitable is the gradual decay of the Voluntary schools, if they continue to depend as largely as at present on private contributions and on children's fees. It is scarcely possible that such schools can permanently resist the competition of high-class free schools supported wholly from the rates. . . . Sooner or later, if the conditions are not altered, great numbers of Church schools will be closed, and the children obliged to resort to the Board schools. But in the face of the vast multitude of ratepayers who incontestably desire definite dogmatic religious teaching for their children, the demand for a modification of the existing system is likely then to become irresistible. It does not seem to me probable that English opinion will approve of a purely secular education, or that it will in general abandon the unsectarian religious teaching which has proved so salutary and so popular. A very few years ago it appeared at least equally improbable that it would ever consent to endow largely purely denominational schools, but this improbability seems to have recently diminished. The belief that it is criminal for the State to endow the teaching of error, which in the recollection of many of us was so powerful in great portions of the English people, and which was the great obstacle to any system of impartial denominational endowment, has manifestly waned; and the division that has taken place in the Liberal party, and the discredit which the Home Rule policy has cast upon its larger section, have greatly weakened the forces opposed to sectarian education. English legislation, however, is peculiarly fertile in compromises. . . . Probably the only safe rule that can be laid down in dealing with questions of this kind is, that the object of the legislators should be to satisfy, as far as possible, the various phases of national opinion and wishes. One important consideration, however, should not be forgotten. The public opinion which should be really decisive on educational questions is the opinion of the parents, and not that of external bodies. . . . The true question to be asked is, whether parents readily send their children to the existing schools, and whether they are satisfied with the results' (ii. 61-63).

Our space will not allow us to do more than sketch in the merest outline the history and the prospects of education in France, of which Mr. Lecky gives a very full and most interesting account, tracing the various changes that have taken place since the Consulate and early days of the Empire of the First Napoleon. The chief landmarks are the growing influence of the ecclesiastical order after the Restoration, 1821-1828, the vehement advocacy of religion by Guizot in 1833, and the success of the Jesuits in getting a large part of popular education into their hands after the enfranchisement of education was completed by the law of 1850, which broke down the monopoly of the University over secondary education. This state of things was followed by a cry raised

against priestly education, and a strong wave of anti-Catholic reaction set in, Veuillot being the chief exponent of Secularism. It ended in the prohibition of the Jesuits to teach at all in either public or private schools. By the decrees of M. Ferry in 1880 a further step was taken: the religious corporations which were still authorised to give instruction were broken up, and from 1882 there dates a period of far more decided and bitter hostility to religion.

In Mr. Lecky's words, 'It was a deliberate attempt on the part of the Government of a country to de-christianize the nation, to substitute for religion devotion to a particular form of government, to teach the children of the poor to despise and repudiate what they learnt in the church' (ii. 67).

The state of things which he describes as the *proselytizing type of atheism*, under Paul Bert, Minister for Public Worship (!) is truly appalling. Among addresses delivered in the presence of children, we read that the following words were uttered: 'It is said that we have expelled God from schools. It is an error. One can only expel that which exists, and God does not exist.' The severe repression of all religion; the melancholy condition of the curé with his miserable pittance—with the mayor, the municipality, the national schoolmaster, the village doctor, all commonly hostile to him; the impediments thrown in the way of all ministrations, even in the hospitals—all this forms a ghastly picture. It is some relief to be told that more recently this violence has defeated its object; that many Frenchmen, though themselves sceptics, do wish their children to be taught some religion; and that in the field of education at the present moment the tension of conflict has been so far relaxed that, although there is still much aggressive atheism in France, it does not appear, as far as a stranger can judge, to be positively encouraged in the public schools.

Before leaving the subject of education we cannot forbear from quoting some words that Mr. Lecky uses in another aspect of the subject and in another portion of his work, words that deserve to be weighed and borne in mind by legislators in our own country, and by all who are interested in the democratic movement of our age. It is where he says:—

'One of the great divisions of politics in our day is coming to be whether, at the last resort, the world should be governed by its ignorance or by its intelligence. According to the one party, the preponderating power should be with education and property. According to the other, the ultimate source of power, the supreme right of appeal and of control, belongs legitimately to the majority of the nation told by the head—or, in other words, to the poorest, the most

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ignorant, the most incapable, who are necessarily the most numerous. . . . It is curious how often in modern England extreme enthusiasm for education is combined with an utter disregard for the opinions of the more educated classes' (i. 21, 25).

IV. We may next ask What, in the opinion of our author, are the probabilities of the growth of Socialism? What prospect in the future is there for Labour? What are the industries that the State can and cannot manage with success? What causes, other than political, affect the condition of the poor in our day, and what signs of any coming amelioration do the times afford? These, it will be admitted, are sufficiently grave topics, and they are among the chief ones comprised in the eighth and ninth Chapters of this work. Everyone must desire to know the opinions formed on them by a thinker like Mr. Lecky, and his discussion of them, as might be expected, abounds in words of wisdom, and rests on the assumption that no forecast can be of any worth that is not based on the lessons of the past, and has not carefully sifted its experiences. We can but skim the surface—'longæ Ambages, sed summa sequar fastigia rerum.'

The word Socialism is a word of French origin, of which Reybaud claims the invention, and it was employed by him first in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, in 1836, but it was not till 1848 that it came into general use. It does not (in Mr. Lecky's opinion) admit of any perfectly precise and exhaustive definition in positive terms, because of its flexibility, comprising as it does a great variety of sects, and being applied to many gradations of opinion. But, negatively (by seeing of what it is the antithesis), its popular meaning is clearly enough defined. 'It represents the tendency in the fields of industry and property to displace individual ownership, unrestricted competition, and the liberty of independent action, by State ownership and State regulation, continually contracting the sphere of the individual, continually enlarging the sphere and increasing the pressure of the community or the State' (ii. 225).

The literature of the Utopias of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries need not detain us; but it is singular how persistent has been the attempt to revive the ideals of the past. As Mr. Lecky remarks, 'this tendency, in the midst of the many and violent agitations of modern life, to revert to archaic types of thought and custom will hereafter be considered one of the most remarkable characteristics of the nineteenth century' (ii. 188). Among these, the idea of remodelling society upon a communistic basis constantly

figured. But it is important to remember that it was *not* this view that played any considerable part in the French Revolution.

'There is a distinction to be drawn between the confiscation of great masses of property and the establishment of principles essentially inconsistent with the existence of property. . . . The Revolution multiplied a class who clung with extreme tenacity to the idea of private property in land. At the same time, in the spheres of industry its great work was the abolition of the monopolies, privileges, and restrictions which still existed in the mediæval system of corporations. Before the Revolution free competition was unknown. Every man who desired to practise a trade or an industry was obliged to enter as an apprentice into one of these corporations, to pass through its grades, to submit to its rules. It is a form of industry curiously like that which would again exist if the supremacy of trade unions became complete' (ii. 200, 201).

Such a tendency has history to repeat itself, and in such unexpected ways. To do away with these close corporations had long been the object of the reformers. They were abolished by Turgot, but a few months later revived on his fall. His words became famous :—

"The right to labour is the property of every man, and this property is the first, the most sacred, the most inalienable of all." The Constitution of 1791 asserted it in the clearest terms, sweeping away the whole system of "jurandes" and "maîtrises," apprenticeships, and industrial corporations. . . . No portion of the work of the French Revolution has been more lasting or more widely followed than this emancipation of industry' (p. 203).

Mr. Lecky devotes nearly ten pages to the now almost forgotten Saint-Simon,¹ who died in 1825, and whose watchword was, 'Everything by industry—everything for industry.' His followers, the Saint-Simonian Church, recognized the right of private property and the inherent inequality of men. What they declared war against was *hereditary* property. A more important name is that of Robert Owen, who has been called the Founder of Socialism in England, and whose long life extended from 1771 to 1858. He became justly celebrated for his philanthropic care for the workpeople at the cotton mills at New Lanark. In his theory of wealth he anticipated later Socialists, but differed from them in that he relied not on spoliation, but on voluntary contributions and associations. Owen's best title to fame is his having originated the

¹ The vanity of the man is sufficiently shown by the words with which he says he ordered his servant to wake him when he was seventeen : 'Get up, Monsieur le Comte ; you have great things to do !'

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sound and fruitful idea of co-operation, the germ of what became so successful in the hands of the Rochdale Pioneers and their successors.

It was in France, and chiefly in the declamatory writings of Lamennais and Louis Blanc, that Socialism was fermenting during the forties. The word, as we have already seen, and the thing came into use at this period, and the Revolution of 1848 at once took up a socialistic character. Its history up to the establishment of Louis Napoleon on the Imperial throne forms an apt illustration of the ninth book of Plato's *Republic*, the extravagant love of liberty by a natural reaction paving the way for despotism. 'The *Coup d'État* of December 2, 1851, could never have succeeded had it not been for Socialism and the dread which it inspired.' The futile attempt of the Government to dismiss part of the workmen from the *ateliers nationaux*, which had proved far worse than useless, and had shown the utter hollowness of the doctrine of the right of every workman to labour, followed by the ferocious four days of fighting in the streets of Paris (June 23-27, 1848), during which 16,000 men were killed, and among them Archbishop Affre, was the strongest object-lesson that modern times have seen upon the natural outcome of revolutionary and socialistic ideas. One might have thought that it would have acted once and for ever in that country as a salutary check, did we not remember the sanguinary scenes of the Communist rising in 1871, involving the death of yet another archbishop, and how passionately the Socialists of Paris threw themselves into that movement. It is true, however, that a reaction set in after 1848, and Socialism in France was for a time much thrown back from that date. At the Congress of 'The International' at Basle in 1869, only four out of the fifteen delegates from Paris voted in favour of the resolution that it was necessary 'that the soil should be made collective property.' About the year 1876 French Socialism revived, though only partially. The programme of the *Collectivists* (the name which came into vogue about the end of the sixties to denote the State assumption of all means of production, land, machinery, capital) was rejected by a working-men's congress at Lyons in 1878 by a large majority. One great safeguard to France exists in its economical condition. Its peasant-proprietors will always oppose to their utmost any scheme which threatens private property. But even these the principal recent preacher of Collectivism, M. Gabriel Deville, the translator of Marx, does not despair of eventually capturing. At the period

when most of the European nations were struggling for freedom, Germany had remained inert. Its subdivision into petty States, and the terror inspired by its two great military despotisms, with the support of Russia in the background, had contributed to check the expression of national feeling. But after the *Coup d'État* of 1851 'the storm-centre of Socialism passed from France to Germany, where it chiefly gathered round two men—Lassalle and Marx.' Of them and their doctrines we have a very full account, which is one of the most interesting portions of Mr. Lecky's work. Ferdinand Lassalle's career was cut short in 1864 by a duel, when he was at the age of thirty-nine. The life of Karl Marx, who was born in 1818, extended to 1883, and it was not till near its close that he wrote his elaborate treatise on *Capital*. The journals which he edited in Prussia were more than once suppressed, and besides having to leave his native land, he was expelled from Paris and from Brussels. Finally he settled in London, where he became the correspondent of the *New York Tribune*, and made many disciples. Both of these men were of Jewish extraction. Both had inherited a moderate competence, and the leading ideas of both were directed against capital and private property, though in their characters the two men differed widely; for whereas Lassalle was vain, impulsive, and passionate, Marx was cold and self-concentrated, not aiming at popular applause, but working rather through the press and by conspiracy. In one important respect their views diverged:—

'Lassalle desired a purely German movement, and he was passionately devoted to the idea of a united Germany. It was the great object of Marx to denationalise the working classes, obliterating all feelings of distinctive patriotism, and uniting them by the bond of common interests, common aspirations, and common sympathies in a great league for the overthrow of the capitalist and middle class. According to his view of history, the labouring class had in all ages been plundered or "exploited" by the possessors of property. This tyranny took at one time the form of slavery, at another of serfdom, at another of *corvées* and other burdens of feudalism. In modern times it takes the form of the wage system, by which the labourer is compelled to work for the benefit of the rich. But democracy has come, and the most numerous class will soon become the most powerful, if they unite in all countries, and discard the sentiments and the divisions of local patriotism' (ii. 239).

The above passage represents in a condensed form the position reached by Socialism at the time we have been considering. In 1869 and 1870 it advanced rapidly, aided by the strikes in France and Belgium, and by the latitude of the

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French press at the close of the Empire. The programme of the Congress of Gotha, in 1875, which is regarded as the most authentic expression of continental Socialism, embraces among some highly revolutionary measures others, regulative and sanitary, to which no exception can be taken. But when we inquire into the means proposed for carrying them out, they seem to resolve themselves ultimately into force, in spite of the flimsy disguise which on the surface separates the Anarchist party from the so-called Moderates under Bebel, the most important of the later disciples of Marx. The organs of these two parties were respectively the *Freiheit* and the *Sozial-Demokrat*, a Zurich paper, but it is well to note that they both welcomed with enthusiasm the assassination of the Czar Alexander II., March 13, 1881. How far the opinions of the *Sozial-Demokrat* deserve the name of *moderate* may be seen by the following extracts:—

'Sooner or later will come a famine, or an epidemic, or a great European war. In that day the cry of anguish of the poor, which has been so long unheeded, will turn into a cry of vengeance that will blanch the cheeks of the great and of the powerful. Then will sound the hour of judgment, the hour of deliverance.' 'Christianity is the greatest enemy of Socialism.' 'When God is expelled from human brains, what is called the Divine Grace will at the same time be banished; and when the heaven above appears nothing more than an immense falsehood, men will seek to create for themselves a heaven below.'¹

A selection of a few out of the many fallacies of Marx, with their refutation by Mr. Lecky, is all that can be attempted here. Capital is Marx's deadly foe. No quarter is to be allowed to it. No prescription is recognised. It is the confiscator of labour and its fruits. The 'exchange value' of anything, as distinguished from its 'use value,' is created by labour, and by labour alone. Circulation, or the exchange of commodities, begets no value. Commerce, therefore, can never produce a surplus value, or, in other words, increase wealth. And what is true of money devoted to commerce is true also of the money-lender's capital: it is naturally barren. Here Marx, confusing usury with interest, invokes the authority of Aristotle, and quotes the well-known passage on *tókos* in the *Politics*.² In what way, then, is capital formed? It is simply the unpaid and confiscated labour of the labourer. He is not paid out of capital, but entirely out of his own earnings. The capitalist has no right to derive profit from the use of his own machinery. He has no right even to ask

¹ Quoted by Lecky, ii. 55.

² I iii. *sub fin.*

rent of the man who lives in his house ! The modern system has aggravated the servitude of antiquity, by introducing the use of machinery. The workman now, besides selling his own labour-power, sells his wife and child.

Solid fact is the best demolisher of the ideal worlds that the German mind is so prone to construct out of its inner consciousness. The realities of a manufacturing country are not easily obscured. Mr. Lecky shows how the estimates given by Marx of the growth of wealth, and its effects on the progress of the working-classes, are riddled through and through by the statistics of such authorities as Sir Robert Giffen for the years 1833-1883 in England, and of M. Leroy-Beaulieu for the corresponding period in France. The one fact that emerges is not greater disparity, but greater equality, the proportionately slow growth of the millionaire, the steady rise in the position of the labourer, the multiplication of small and moderate fortunes. 'When an industry is flourishing and growing, all classes connected with it will more or less benefit by its prosperity. When an industry is failing and dwindling, all classes connected with it will suffer.' The question of *accumulation* is really the question to the working-man. 'With a progressive industry and abundant employment, questions of wages and profits will easily adjust themselves. With a declining industry and a stationary or increasing population no possible change of distribution will prevent all classes from suffering' (ii. 267). All this is undreamt of or wilfully put out of sight in the Marxian philosophy. The great discovery that the labourer is not paid out of capital, but out of his own earnings, because he produces the equivalent, or more than the equivalent, of his wages before he receives them, is obviously untrue of most employments. If capital is not there to pay him, his labour will never be required. And even if mining or factory labour rests on a somewhat different basis, still the mine or the factory would never be opened without capital. And, further, how can commodities produce any wages till they are sold ? Besides the manufacturer and the labourer 'a third party—the consumer—must come upon the scene, and wages, profits, and employment will alike fluctuate according to his demand.'

Two other elements are systematically ignored by these dangerous theorists. One is the risks incurred in all industrial enterprises ; the other is the creative faculty, the directing mind, without which the manual labour, the importance of which is so greatly exaggerated, would be in vain. The

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fallacies connected with this subject have often been exposed. As Mr. Mallock more than ten years ago wrote :—

'To judge from the language of Mr. Hyndman, one would think that the laws of electricity had been discovered by a mob in Trafalgar Square, and been enunciated by acclamation. But what has really been the case? We have no hesitation in saying that the industrial progress of the modern world, and that rapid growth of wealth which Mr. Hyndman justly says is so astonishing, has been the creation, not of the labour of many, but of the intellect, the ingenuity, and the perseverance of the few.'¹

Or as the Duke of Argyll, quoted by Mr. Lecky, expresses it, 'the single brain of James Watt was, and still is, the biggest wage-fund that has ever arisen in the world.'²

The remainder of Mr. Lecky's long chapter on this subject is devoted to the prospects of Socialism in Belgium and in the United States, as represented by Mr. Henry George and Mr. Bellamy. It must, however, be in justice admitted that the former writer differs in one most important respect from the European Socialists, in the absence of aggressive atheism, and of attacks on marriage. The sophistries that are peculiarly his own are chiefly connected with the subject of land. The soil, being common property, should be taken by the community without compensation to the present owners. All the profits of production of every kind must ultimately centre in the possessors of land, who must therefore be reaping the most enormous wealth. 'All the advantages gained by the march of progress go to the owners of land, and wages do not increase. Wages cannot increase.' 'Wherever land is cheap, wages will be high, and wherever land is dear, wages will be low.' On this Mr. Lecky, with quiet sarcasm, remarks : 'It is obvious that, according to this law, wages must be far lower in London, in the great provincial towns, and in the country that surrounds them, than in Dorsetshire or Connemara ; far lower in England and in France than in Hungary, or Poland, or Spain !' (ii. 296). Other gross fallacies of this dangerous, because popular, writer he easily meets with very acute and unanswerable arguments. Unpopular as Mr. George's doctrines are, and are likely to remain, in a country where crushing national debt has been honourably accepted, and where the whole fabric of property and contract is opposed to spoliation, yet grave labour troubles may be in store for America, the signs of which are pointed out in a powerful passage in these pages, too long to be here quoted

¹ *Property and Progress*, p. 157.

² *Unseen Foundations of Society*, p. 455.

(ii. 298-299). Mr. Bellamy is, perhaps, a foeman hardly worthy of Mr. Lecky's steel, but his impossible Utopia gives opportunity for enforcing some lessons too apt to be forgotten: *e.g.*, that if production flags, comfort and wealth must swiftly perish; that the problem of the pressure of population on the resources of a Socialist community cannot be evaded, and that the isolation necessary for its realization is opposed to all free trade and international commerce.

Apart from Mr. Lecky's refutation of particular fallacies, we may look at the Socialist propaganda as a whole, and ask whether, after all, it may have a basis on reason. To judge it calmly and with minds free from all prejudice and crude or hastily adopted notions, let us take the latest and most authoritative exposition of it given by Dr. A. Schäffle,¹ which is not mentioned by Mr. Lecky. His motto is, 'Truth before all things.' He resents such imputations against the Socialist's creed as that it holds all property to be robbery and would dispense with all capital. No! It holds that the system is bad objectively, but the respectable capitalist subjectively is free from blame. It can make allowance for wealth already accumulated, but for the future it cannot permit it to flourish. The Rothschilds are to be compensated for their hundreds of millions by receiving in the course of from thirty to fifty years the estimated value of an annuity in the form of provisions, clothing, furniture, luxuries and amusement! It is only *private ownership* in the instruments of production that is to be abolished. Socialism does *not* ignore capital. On the contrary, a collective trade capital is its first aim. Private and competing capitals are to disappear. Again, it does not forbid the right of inheritance absolutely (as it has been falsely accused of doing), but only as the means of carrying on trade. Nor is freedom of demand, we are told, to be annulled. 'If Socialism did deny this, it would be the enemy of freedom, of civilization, and of all material and intellectual welfare.' This, together with free migration and free choice of occupation, elsewhere we read, may *perhaps* be maintained in force. When we come to production and exchange, we find that the State would collect, warehouse, and transport all products, and finally distribute them to individuals in proportion to their registered amount of social labour.

It is when we ask how these arrangements are to be carried out that the difficulties begin to thicken. How are

¹ *The Quintessence of Socialism*, by Dr. A. Schäffle, translated from the eighth German edition by Bernard Bosanquet. (London, 1894.)

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commodities to be exchanged without money? For a metallic coinage would have to disappear, together with national debts, private debts, leases, hiring of shops and warehouses, the whole institution of the Stock Exchange, and some things, we may add, such as speculative advertisements, which could well be spared. Labour-money certificates would take the place of a coinage. But a standard of value cannot be dispensed with. What will this be? The answer is, that the value of products will be estimated by the average labour-day, and the unit of value will consist in a fraction of the social labour-time. This is the corner-stone of Marx's system. The other points mentioned above are its most prominent features, and have taken deep root in Socialist thought. Without indulging in a sweeping criticism, or wondering 'that such views can be propounded anywhere but in a robbers' den or a lunatic asylum,' we rise from the perusal of Dr. Schäffle's volume with a profound sense of the utter unreality of the collective principle. The scheme is full of gaps and *lacunæ*. It bristles with serious admissions. To mention but a few of these: 1. There is the acknowledged difficulty of the transition to the new conditions. 2. The long space of time required *ex hypothesi* for even the initial steps—and who shall calculate the many checks that may retard its realization in the remote future? 3. The fact that the social services, *e.g.* those of the physician or the artist, *are* to be left to the competition of private payment by means of transferable labour-cheques. 4. The unavoidable retention and limitation of incidents affecting value in the present market, such as the local and temporary rise and fall in wages. 5. The task of coping with the enormous socialistic book-keeping, and the correct estimate of heterogeneous labour. After trying to picture the new world thus fashioned forth, we feel that the fabric eludes our grasp, the vision melts into thin air. To the German, elaborating Utopias in his study, these speculations may seem to herald to mankind the dawn of a grand regeneration. To the Englishman, who believes that past social and economic history has not been a total failure, and that its warnings, its experiences, and its fruits, are still of value, however dispassionately he regards them, they must seem retrograde, incoherent, and in the highest degree impracticable.

Nevertheless, it cannot be a matter of indifference to either statesmen or Churchmen that this programme has been accepted in France and Germany by many hundreds of thousands of voters; while in Belgium, the gigantic strike in

1893, which brought about universal suffrage, resulted in the election of a powerful Socialist minority in the Chamber of Deputies. In our own country the same doctrines have been widely popularized under the patronage of Mr. Henry George, very little of whose writings is really original. Our Socialism, like so many other of our imports, is 'made in Germany.' And no doubt fresh varieties from the same seed-plot will continue to be introduced from time to time. The predatory use of the taxing power, referred to in the earlier part of this paper, is a strong instance. Things are moving on; and the inevitable progress of democratic government involves a movement towards greater equality in the distribution of wealth. Many peculiar features of English life—our adoption of Free Trade, the tendency of recent legislation, the aggressive policy of the new trade unionism, with its strange antagonism to profit-sharing and to the now familiar principle of co-operative industrial partnerships, to thrift, and even to provident insurance for sickness and old age—favour the growth of Socialism. Fortunately, there are also many deep-rooted and permanent qualities in the English character to resist and counterbalance its acuter forms. The industrial world is in a condition of unstable equilibrium, and, with the many factors and side-issues involved, no wise man will venture to predict how equilibrium will be ultimately if at all attained. But the democracy is getting to know its own mind better, and is becoming better organized.

'If its leaders be wise they will guide the current into a less perilous channel, and will direct their efforts, not so much to reconstructing "society," which is an abstract conception, as to raising the character and capacities of men, women, and children, which are concrete realities.'¹

Some economist may arise who, with the objects of the Socialist at his heart, may lay down a theory not open to such objections as those of Marx, and more in keeping with the ordinary sense of justice and the fundamental laws and elements of human nature. If so, the movement will be constitutional, but no less sweeping on that account. All we know prepares us for change, and change, too, that may upset more than was intended. More and more State intervention is the one thing that seems certain. But all such intervention is not meddlesome interference with the liberty of the individual. Mr. Lecky more than once speaks in the highest terms of the municipal government of our provincial towns. He points out the class of industries which the State can

¹ *Nineteenth Century*, April 1884: 'Democracy and Socialism.'

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efficiently manage, *e.g.* the post office, the telegraph service, the means of public transport, the supply of a few great articles of public necessity, such as water and gas.¹ At the same time he deprecates dangerous experiments in this direction, showing how the London County Council, by fixing a minimum rate of wages irrespective of the work performed, has really been resuscitating the principle, long ago exploded, of a 'rate in aid of wages.' So strangely retrogressive are some features of our vaunted progress! Not that all reverting to the past is to be condemned as retrograde, for some of the latest departures of modern democracy (*e.g.* the parish council) remind us of the earliest Teutonic local assemblies, where every freeman had his place, and 'while they seem to be leading us to new things, are in truth only leading us back to our oldest heritage of all.'²

With the exception of a passing allusion to the growing importance of Christian Socialism in Germany and Belgium, Mr. Lecky is silent on the relation of Christianity to Collectivism. And yet the subject is one of deepest interest; for Christianity seems to be certainly on the side of Collectivism, while it by no means teaches that men can escape from individual responsibility. We are to say 'Our Father,' but we have to seek for forgiveness of *personal* shortcomings; and perhaps the greatest of our personal shortcomings are those in which we have injured our neighbour. The career of Jay Gould, who passed away amid the curses of the English-speaking world, accentuates the difference between the Individualist and the Collectivist. No man ought to live to himself, as he cannot die to himself. The organism of all humanity together is an entity, as much as the individual is an entity; and the development of this organism can only be attained when the units which compose it work together: a truth which underlies the language of St. Paul (Eph. iv. 13): 'until we [*i.e.* this organism] all come unto the unity of the faith, unto perfect manhood, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ.'

We have left ourselves no space for the numerous other important topics discussed in these interesting volumes. We can but refer to some few among them, such as the Charac-

¹ Mr. Courtney, in his paper recently read before the British Association, pointed out the difficulties to be faced when local authorities undertake productive industries not in the nature of monopolies. Competition must come in; and 'any industrial system must, if it is to be a living social organism, be constantly responsive to the ever-changing conditions of growth.'

² Freeman's *Norman Conquest*, vol. v. chap. xxv. p. 596.

teristics of the American Constitution, the History of the House of Lords, the Sale of Intoxicating Drinks, Gambling, the Sunday Question and the Opening of Museums on that day. On the last of these subjects recent legislation has already carried out Mr. Lecky's anticipations. The work concludes with a very temperate essay on Woman Questions. The arguments for and against a female parliamentary suffrage are carefully weighed, and the probability of the ultimate triumph of the demand for it is estimated. There is no general summary: perhaps the wide scope of the book scarcely admitted of any being given. These two volumes form a rich quarry, whence future students of political and social problems will, no doubt, largely draw their materials. It is lucid in style, as might be expected, and although its general tone cannot be called optimistic, the hopeful elements of the outlook for England's future are never ignored. Every topic is treated fairly and judicially, and no aspect of it is left out. Wherever Mr. Lecky suggests practical remedies and improvements in our political institutions—for instance, in the case of parliamentary representation, or the reform of the Upper House, or the adoption of the Swiss Referendum, provided it be restricted to grave constitutional questions, as a security against hasty innovations in legislation—he always does so in a large and liberal spirit. Where there is such a wealth of matter, and where every subject is so copiously discussed, it may seem ungracious to notice one or two omissions. Darwin is mentioned twice incidentally, but it has been remarked that Mr. Lecky is silent on the connection of scientific ideas with the growth of democracy. And yet the great discovery of our times in the physical world cannot be regarded as wholly alien to the march of events in the political. Is the monotonous dead-level of uniformity and equality to which Dr. Pearson's forecast points to prevail in the future? Or are the inequalities of capacity in human beings, to which Socialism shuts its eyes, and which evolution postulates, to have free play and sufficient scope in the coming ages? Some light on this question from Mr. Lecky would have been welcomed. Again, with the exception of a sentence or two on the development of the provincial press, the influence of modern journalism, English and continental, and of the periodical literature of our day, is entirely passed over. But who can overestimate the influence of what constitutes the sole reading of a large portion of the community? There is reason to fear that the systematic dissemination of gross fallacies and falsehoods in politics and in religion, in order to

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prejudice the minds and influence the passions of the labouring classes, is carried on far more widely than is generally imagined. In his recent Visitation Charge the Bishop of Oxford speaks of the circulation of infidel tracts, which he constantly receives, such as attacks on the doctrine of the Incarnation, or on the Resurrection, at Christmas or at Easter; and adds, that to his knowledge writings of the same sort are constantly sent about in towns and villages, carefully to be kept out of sight of the clergy, that the heaven may work without contradiction. And on such subjects as land, property, and wages, equally poisonous doctrines are being daily and weekly diffused. Can no antidote be supplied co-extensive in its circulation? Is it utopian to hope that something of the kind may be developed by journalistic enterprise in the coming century? The propagation of sound economical, political, and religious opinions by such an organ would be one of the greatest safeguards against the extremes of Socialism, hostility to the Church, and that hasty legislation and surprise which Mr. Bright long ago declared to be the greatest danger to which our present system of government could be exposed.

ART. VII.—THE DUKE OF ARGYLL'S 'PHILOSOPHY OF BELIEF'

The Philosophy of Belief. By the DUKE OF ARGYLL, K.G.,
K.T. (London, 1896.)

THIS book is the third in a trilogy. *The Reign of Law* was published in 1866, *The Unity of Nature* in 1884, and 'the reasonings and conclusions reached in them are now applied to an examination of the relation in which the great conception of Natural Law, when properly understood, stands to religion in general, and to Christian theology in particular' (Preface, p. vi).

The present work is divided into four sections. The first is entitled Intuitive Theology, and lays the foundation for that comparison between its principles and those of Revealed Religion and Ethics which occupies the greater part of the volume. There is an essay on Prayer in the light of the same principles, and the whole concludes with an interesting summary of the historical and actual relations between Christian Belief and Philosophy.

The value of a constructive argument depends primarily

on the security of its first principles, and those of our readers who are not already familiar with the Duke of Argyll's position will perhaps find the following summary useful :—

An intuition is a direct perception of fact. Such a direct perception we have of intelligence, design, purpose, Mind, immanent in Nature. From it we derive a complete confidence in the trustworthiness of our faculties of knowledge. We are able also to recognize their natural limitations, to regard them as fitted rather to apprehend than to discover all truth. The single certainty in Nature that we can by our natural faculties determine is the Rule of Mind, and this certainty leaves all the difficulties of Natural Theology unsolved.

'Design and the argument from Design are two very different things. Such arguments all lie in the region of inference, not in the region of pure and simple fact' (p. 147).

'A purpose or intention may be the most certain and visible of all facts, while He who purposes or intends may be otherwise absolutely unknown. Unknown to us may be the rank or place in the general system of things which is really occupied by all the carefully prepared contrivances and apparatuses which we see around us. Unknown to us may be the extent of the Contriving Power, *whether limited or unlimited*. Unknown to us above all may the Contriver be in his *relations to those moral qualities*, which are the highest in our minds' (p. 148).

We draw the reader's attention particularly to this passage, because of the important part it plays in the subsequent development. The italics are ours. The kind of certainty as to this solitary fact is well indicated in the interesting autobiographical preface. The author's father was a practical mechanic; he was also deeply devoted to the study of animal mechanism, especially as exhibited in the flight of birds. The son entered eagerly into the father's pursuits. His friends and teachers were impregnated with the Doctrine of Design in its oldest form.

'I was accustomed to hear this great triumph of purpose traced and explained through the finest mechanisms, until the great doctrine of the Intelligibility of Nature . . . was borne in upon my convictions with even more power than it is imbedded in the universal instincts and language of mankind. Indeed, it was with me not so much a doctrine as a Presence. It never appeared to me any mere inference, or the result of any argument of any kind, however linked and strong. It was an integral part of the observed phenomena, and a direct object of perception' (pp. xiv-xv).

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one who sees in Nature not the marks and characters of Mind, but Mind itself Immanent ; not the evidences of Design, but Design indwelling. The habitual inference has been gathered into Intuition. If the truth of the Intuition be denied, the only cure is to exhibit again and again the facts. If you are still blind, it remains but to prove that other men are not, and that those who think they are see in truth what they do not acknowledge. The Intuition is Universal and Necessary. Its universality is proved by the automatic evidence of natural language ; its necessity, by the impossibility of adequately describing the phenomena of Nature in terms that exclude the action of mind.

'It is a pure matter of fact that the human mind, looking into Nature, sees in all the phenomena of the world *a great deal which is obviously of its own kind and quality*. The most striking proof of this is to be found in the automatic action of the mind, whether popular or scientific, as recorded in the growth, the significance, and the use of human speech' (p. 5).

'Words are the most faithful records accessible to our intelligence of some of the most important of all facts ; and this they are because they have not been made by artifice (conscious human design), but have grown up by Nature' (p. 47). 'Born out of the contact of the Universal Mind that is in man with the Universal Mind that is in Nature, they are the stamped impressions made by the greatest of all energies on the most sensitively true of all adapted surfaces' (p. 48). 'They contain revelations as to existence which cannot otherwise be seen' (p. 49). 'The imagery and the metaphors they contain are the direct record of the immediate perception of the unities of Nature, which is not only most vivid, but is most true when it is simple and untainted by any conscious self-analysis' (p. 51).

The italics again are ours. The argument, as we shall see, requires more than the perception of 'a great deal.'

The second chapter in the volume, on Recognitions in the Structure of Language, is devoted to the enforcement and illustration of this doctrine. Words such as Life, structure, function, plan, homology, are discussed with the intent to show that they embody a doctrine of Mind, and are inevitable for the true description of facts. An exhaustive criticism of Cuvier's definition of Life is the field in which the great idea of Design is adequately defined and richly illustrated.

The same subject is pursued still further in the following chapter, under the name of Recognitions in descriptive Science and Philosophy. The force of these recognitions is that the writers who make them would 'avoid them if they could' (p. 113). They show the Necessity of the Intuition.

Thus, *e.g.*, in Professor Huxley's *Comparative Anatomy*: 'There is a constant use and repetition of teleological words, phrases, and grammatical constructions' (p. 114); 'Words such as apparatus and plan, which have no meaning at all except as applied to an arrangement of matter or of conduct preconceived to some definite aim or purpose' (p. 115). Even if the use of such words is painfully evaded, the doctrine shines through the syntax. 'The use of the prepositions "to" and "for" is perpetual among biological writers in describing the destination of incipient organic structure' (p. 125). 'An apparatus is always made "for" doing a certain work' (p. 127).

On the other hand, attempts to 'interpret all phenomena in terms of matter, motion, and force,' as, *e.g.*, those of Mr. Herbert Spencer, break down. His account of life as 'The definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external co-existences and sequences,' is probably to most living men utterly meaningless. But so far as by mental effort it can be understood, it is equally applicable to innumerable inorganic processes, as, *e.g.*, to that through which an organism is dissolved or decays; and Mr. Spencer, like Professor Huxley, is driven when he would accurately explain facts into teleological grammar and language (p. 139).

'So when men set themselves to the task of wiping out any old and ingrained impressions, they have to use the only tools and weapons which exist for the use of human thought, and these have been fashioned and moulded on perceptions which make their presence felt in spite of every effort to keep it out' (p. 141).

We have already pointed out that the Duke of Argyll, in these preliminary discussions, limits our certainty to the one fact of Mind of some kind or quality immanent in Nature. The difficulties of Natural Religion arise when we attempt to determine the extent and meaning of this fact, or to reconcile it with others, or to construct a system. It is in this area, he says, that the imagination of man has revelled among false religions or philosophies, and in the rejection of these the rejection of the fact of Mind has seemed to be implied. Nature, it is said, has been set up as a mindless force, in opposition to all gods, false and true alike. But our author is confident that in the classical philosophies Nature is nothing of the kind. 'She is an universal agency, lying behind and above all phenomena, to whom mental characteristics and all the elements that constitute personality are

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ascribed' (p. 2). These philosophies¹ are thus brought in as witnesses to the universality and necessity of the Intuition, although, perhaps, all that they testify is the capacity of the human mind for drawing distinctions which words do not exactly express. However, Lucretius himself is enlisted to prove that man is compelled to confess what he would fain deny, and acknowledge God while propounding materialism, and we owe to this occasion a most masterly and attractive analysis of the great Epicurean's great poem.

'Lucretius denied, not indeed mind, but any supreme power of mind, in the beings whom he called the gods, but only to erect an agency supreme over them as over all other beings, to which he gave the name of Nature, and to this agency he habitually refers in the terms of personality, and as possessing every attribute which can go to make up one supreme Divinity. Nature is endowed not only with commanding mind and Intellect, but the highest moral feelings and desires, craving happiness for men, and wanting no greater solace than the taking away of pain' (pp. 158-159).

The atoms which Lucretius conceives of as eternal, and having in themselves the germs of all that is, he calls *primordia*, i.e. first ordered and adjusted elements, over whose development Nature presides; he compares her infinitely subtle adjustments to those by which individual words are worked up into a poem (p. 164).

But 'that the system of Nature should present itself irresistibly to that most sceptical intellect as best imaged in the structure, origin, and import of man's highest speech to man is a striking testimony to its true character' (p. 165).

Lucretius was without the advantages which we possess through the extension of physical knowledge. He saw, as it were, the face of phenomena. We have penetrated into their depths. But the development of Purpose follows us in all our paths. Thus, for instance, Professor Osborne finds in the history of Mammalia 'an absolute, definite, and lawful progression; the infinite number of contemporary, developing, and degenerating characters, preclude the possibility of Fortuity.'²

But Fortuity means 'the occurrence of phenomena, not without physical causation, *for that is inconceivable*, but where physical causation is under no intelligent guidance, which

¹ Mr. Strong (*Bampton Lectures*, 1895) asserts that a conviction of the irrationality of all things is the prevailing character of all Greek literature. Fate and Envy are its two dominant conceptions. He thus traverses directly the Duke of Argyll's contention.

² Address to American Association of Science, Aug. 17, 1893. Quoted p. 172.

regards the future and provides for it' (p. 170). All theories of development, evolution by Natural Selection, and the like, are simply theories of the means used by the Providential Mind to explain the How of Purpose, not to substitute Fate or Fortuity for it. It is true that while in special structures the purpose is definite, clear, and certain, in long-continued developments of plan the connexions may be less obvious, shrouded in mystery, and waiting for the extension of knowledge. Nevertheless, it is a mere confusion of thought to infer that because we do not know all we can know nothing (or, the Duke of Argyll might have added, to extend our affirmations beyond the evidence in either direction). 'In the machinery of Nature, the parts are the product of an infinite past, and also links with an inexhaustible future' (p. 177), 'and to trace the working of Design through the whole is beyond our opportunities, if not our powers'; but this 'ought not to shake our confidence in the relation between means and ends when clearly seen' (p. 178), as is absolutely the case in every structure with a function, *i.e.* in all the organic world at least.

Nor, again, is the recognition of Mind in Nature a barren and unfruitful truth because it is one truth alone. Every truth is linked with others, to which it leads. For example, 'we know that our bodies are as full of mechanical and chemical purposiveness as the bodies of the lower animals' (p. 184). We are therefore adapted for knowledge by the Universal mind, and as such are brought into immediate relations with the Mind that adapted us.¹

A *prima facie* confidence is established, and we infer directly the existence of other relations between our Maker and ourselves. Even if these are uncertain in kind or extent, they become a legitimate field of inquiry; they exist; they are not a dream, a delusion, a phantasy; the search for them is justified; they are there to be found. Confidence, again, is established in our other intuitive perceptions. Their limitations do not affect their truthfulness, and the deep-seated relations between them, as they emerge into the light of recognition, build up a structure of mutual support and corroboration. And a 'theology which corresponds to them, which illumines them, and fits in with all

¹ These sentences contain practically the philosophy of Belief. The steps are: Design of some sort seen; design ubiquitous inferred; the mechanism of our brain is for a function; this function must be knowledge; and the knowledge must be knowledge of the mind that made us.

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that we can conceive or discover of the co-ordinated laws prevailing in ourselves and in the world around us, shines by its own light' (p. 203), and becomes an authority for truths we could never have discovered, but for which we have powers of recognition.

It is at this point that the Duke of Argyll accordingly proceeds, by an analysis of Hebrew and Christian theology, to show their correspondence with the principles of his philosophy. We have preferred to indicate his line of thought as much as possible in his own words, without criticism. But the line of thought is certainly open to criticism. Thus, for example, it is clear that the value of the argument from universality and the automatic growth of words and language implies some theory of the origin of man. If man is being evolved from a state of barbarism or savagery, the strata of language contain a trustworthy record of delusions from which he is gradually being freed. This is the ordinary modern view from the time of Hume.

'The question is, whether the earliest men were savages, or partially civilized—in other words, whether civilization has consisted in a certain uniform progression from a state little above that of brutes, or whether a savage is not a being who has degenerated.'¹

The ambiguity of the word civilization perplexes the problem; but when that is removed, the Duke of Argyll has in the *Unity of Nature* given forcible reasons for believing degeneration to be the fact; scientific ethnologists are against him; theology, until theology began to pose as an appendix of science, for him; but in any case, even on the degeneration hypothesis, language would contain a mixed record. Whatever be its origin, human speech is as fully charged with the recognition of Fate, Fortuity, accident, chance, or the envy and caprice of a multitude of minds, as with that of Purpose, and a true theory of Nature, that takes language for the evidence of direct perceptions, must reflect the one with the other.

The necessity of using teleological language again in the description of natural phenomena has other explanations than the existence of design in the phenomena themselves. It may but, e.g., reflect the mental attitude of the investigator to the object of his search; the final effect being known marks the line of exploration through its causes; the investigator identifies himself with a hypothetical designer, and translates the nexus of causes into a chain of means. Words,

¹ Cf. Morley's *Voltaire*, p. 261.

moreover, insensibly lose their connotation. 'Purpose' itself has so degenerated, and things, like words, are used for purposes never intended. In syntax few languages have perfectly discriminated final from consecutive clauses, and those that have done so have not always been able to abide by the distinction they have drawn. In English itself, 'in order to' is continually used where the phenomenon to be investigated is admittedly accidental, as 'To have shot himself on that side he must have been holding the gun in his left hand.'

We believe, therefore, that the evidence of language requires a far more critical and scientific analysis than the Duke of Argyll has given it. It testifies to a commonly spread belief in Design, but it testifies also to a belief in Design being conditioned by Fortuity, that wars with it. It may war with it ultimately in vain, but it wars with it as a fact; and the two facts alike call for recognition; any statement that excludes either is but half true; and the exclusion manifests itself in a want of proportion in the philosophy founded on it, and in a mutilation of any true theology with which the philosophy is compared.

We have indicated here a possibility of there being a rift within the lute, because the long and reiterated argument from language suggests it. Whether it is of any or of no importance can only appear from a more systematic review of principles, and a systematic review of principles is somewhat difficult. The Duke of Argyll has lived and published this trilogy in a long age of transition, and perhaps he himself has unconsciously shifted his position. Thus, he has been above all men a prophet of Special Design; but at times he appears content with 'something of that kind or quality being generally perceptible'; at one time he appears to be building his philosophy on the intuition of a single truth, at another time to be combining with and reading into it other perceptions, and resting his philosophy on the whole. Sometimes our differences with him appear simply verbal, at others a gulf of real divergence and opposition seems to open.

We believe that in the Definition he gives of Nature, and in its consequences, this last is the case. The word Nature, according to him, 'has no meaning at all, except as a name for the sum of all existences, visible and invisible' (p. 3). He fortifies this Definition by the approval of Huxley and J. S. Mill, and continually inveighs against the needless and ignorant distinction that men draw between the natural and the supernatural. Nature includes both God and Man, and it is only

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occasionally that he falls into speaking of the Creator as the God of Nature, after the manner of ordinary men.

Now Philosophy has so busied herself with this word Nature that almost any definition of it may claim some sort of authority ; but Scripture at least gives this one no support. A clear line is drawn therein between Creator and Creation, and there is no one name—except, doubtfully, the Pleroma—which will include them both. The whole system of things WAS created indeed IN the Word, and has been created THROUGH Him, and UNTO Him, and it CONSISTS in Him, so that in Him it finds its unity, principle of cohesion, lawgiver, preserver and controller, He bearing along the whole with the word of His power, but it is the very alienation of the whole system that is the motive of the Incarnation ; our Lord came to reconcile it ; as a result of the reconciliation it will be included in Him, and the original purpose of creation realized. Nor is the word Nature ever used in this context, or ever applied to Creation, or to the Creative Power, or to the Creative Process ; but wherever it is used as implying any principle in the creature, it is as often seen to be antagonistic to God, in rebellion against Him, as an indwelling Law of His giving. There is a Divine Nature, of which we are made partakers by grace, and man has a nature, and what would be, humanly speaking, natural for God, would be supernatural to man ; and, similarly, all animals, &c., have each its own nature.

As for man, the Nature derived through Adam is incapable of redemption by natural means ; it is begotten again from above ; the natural man cannot see God, or attain heaven, or reach the true wisdom ; the gift of the Spirit from above lifts him whither flesh and blood cannot come. Man thus Scripturally stands out of Nature by the design of his being ; he is immersed in Nature by the Fall, and begotten again in the Redemption. This way of conceiving Him cannot be neglected. That the facts of life support it may be gathered from its correspondence in effect with the ultimate view of Professor Huxley. Rationalism ordinarily ignores it, but it must be the foundation of every Christian treatment of our natural faculties. In popular use, again, 'Nature' is the name for the totality of created existences other than Man, their principles and powers, or, if they have any one inherent and dominant principle, for it. This use is heathen in its origin, but it is truly applied. Nature is a coming to birth, a growing, a becoming, and no philosophy or religion which affirms of God that He alone truly *is* (*ens verum*), that He

only has true Being, could include the two in any one concept, even as a protest against fencing them off from one another by impenetrable barriers. The language of the Epistle to the Ephesians is technically to be followed: 'God our Father, who is *over* all things, and *through* all things, but *in* you all'—*i.e.* in the hearts of the redeemed. God is not absolute, or unconditioned, or unknowable; His agency is not excluded from Nature, but his immanence in Nature, even if the expression be allowed, depends on His transcendence of it. To include God in Nature is an ambiguity full of peril. The Scylla of Neoplatonism is not more deadly than the Charybdis of Pantheism. The Duke of Argyll is no Pantheist; but the optimism with which he regards Nature, and which could alone justify his language, is not far removed from it. The Creed calls God Almighty—*i.e.* the Pantocrator, or Controller with the strong hand, of all things; but our author affirms of Matter and Force, not only that they obey Him, and are subject to a general control, but that they obey Him with an absolute, passive, and unconditioned obedience; though matter be eternal and indestructible,¹ yet there are in it no alien elements which defeat or hinder His Purpose; everything in the Universe, just as it is, was in the Idea from the Beginning, even to the teeth of the carnivorous animals, designed to destroy by biting often, or to death, designed for the good of the species.

Not only does God work directly by all the Forces in Nature, so that all they do He does, but we find no recognition in this volume that He can or does work without them. All the forces are Cosmic. But the miracle that transcends Nature is prominent in Hebrew and Christian theology. When it is omitted, no comparison is possible between theology and philosophy. And the omission is the more remarkable that the Reign of Law does not require it. The Reign of Law is satisfied so that it explains the End. Given a purpose running through, it is all one whether Elijah be fed by ravens or human charity, whether God causes the winds to do His work or drive back the Red Sea waters with the energy of Pure Will. Even though the purpose were but to deliver man from identifying the natural with the rational, the cosmic with the Divine, that were purpose enough.

Moreover, the philosophy with the theology recognises one great sphere in which God rules and controls and designs, yet does none of these things unconditionally. Man is

¹ Cf. C. Q. R. p. 132. Matter and Force in the Duke of Argyll's system are eternal, Space and Time real existences and infinite.

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free ; within a certain area he is at liberty to do as he likes ; sin, which is rebellion, ensues ; and the broken Law is met by a Law which is its consequence, and is, like the first, a corollary from the Eternal Laws of God's own Being. The Laws of retribution, satisfaction, meet the new state of things that disobedience sets up. Yet the Divine control is never escaped. Sin hardens Pharaoh according to the Law of Sin, and so it is written, God, who gave the Law, hardened him. He raised up Pharaoh as He created Leviathan, as He created the destroyer to destroy. We may accumulate testimony from Scripture of the supremacy of God over Nature ; we shall accumulate none stronger than that which asserts the same supremacy over man. Predestination is a hard saying in either case. Yet man is free, and Judas Iscariot is as much and no more of the Divine making 'as the monsters of the slime,' who also unceasingly cry, '*Culpa mea*,' fulfilling His Word.

The Duke of Argyll repeats the tradition that man is the great exception ; 'every other creature lives truly by its instincts ; man has disregarded his' (*cf.* p. 256)—a tradition which always had little evidence, and which can scarcely survive the results of recent observations of Instinct ;¹ a tradition which does not recognize other dividing-lines laid down by science. One of the great miracles of this Cosmos is the presence in it of a number of forces, correlated with one another, and yet distinct. Such forces are, *e.g.*, Life, Sensation, Intelligence, Will, Goodness, or, at the other end of the scale, the forces that rule in inorganic matter. They enter the Cosmos in an order successive in time. Preparation is made for each new-comer, but each new-comer deals with the material provided in a manner all its own, assimilating it to itself. No chemical combinations or molecular arrangements of matter are Life, no nervous mechanism constructed by Life is Sensation, no combinations of sensation are Intelligence, no knowledge constructed by Intelligence is Will, and no combinations of rational utilities are Goodness. Impassable gulfs divide, yet networks of complex reciprocities combine, and all are held together in a system of mutual service. It is this character of the Cosmos that, among others, irresistibly forces on many minds belief in a ruling Intelligence, all powerful and all good. To some, 'abstract conceptions, such as Law and Force, express the energies at work in Nature, and that which can be expressed in terms of mind must itself be Mind' ; to others 'the infinite complexity of adaptations'

¹ Cf. Dr. Wallace, *On Natural Selection*, chap. iv.

carries the conviction of mental agency with a rush; the intellect of others is constrained by 'the immutably connected order' of objects and events to recognise its kind, for every synthesis of a manifold, any orderly Totality, is possible only through a category of the Understanding, and implies mind as its maker. In the face of all these arguments we might waver to and fro, fearing to jump and not to jump 'off our shadow.'¹ It is the combination presented in precisely this Cosmos that is decisive, in which new forces appearing one after another in a time sequence, after due preparation for each, effectively constitute a new world, in preparation for another force that, in harmony with the old, shall again create a new heaven and a new earth. And not even yet is the conviction at its strongest; each new force in its turn, in the fulness of time, comes in 'from above,' the home of them all, and Mind in its plenitude is the greatest and last of the sisters, including all ethical and rational elements in a threefold cord that cannot be broken.

Dr. Weissmann² reasonably admits that spontaneous generation of life is a logical necessity for believers in the purely cosmic origin of all existence. Living organisms, he says, cannot be eternal, for they can be resolved into inorganic matter; it remains that they must be evolved out of matter, which they are not, or come in 'from above,' when the postulate and shibboleth of Cosmicality would be blasphemed.

Mr. G. Romanes³ at one time seems to have abandoned the argument from the character of the Cosmos to Mind through not seeing this. 'If we are the products of Matter and Force, our intelligence is such a product also, and in its concept of order merely reflects relations inherent in the elements.' This is a variety of the Kantian dilemma; but just as the Kantian system was not complete in itself, but depended on data and characters given 'from without,' so is it here. We are not such products. *Omne vivum ex vivo* is an established fact; there is no Abiogenesis, and Materialism sits waiting, not for one, but for many missing links, not to be found by any digging. There is no evolution without interference up to man, and then a new creation; the sections run lengthwise, even though at man they cut right across as well.

Thus animals in various degrees, some rudimentary enough, possess not only sensation, but intelligence, will, and even goodness. Man is divided from them by a difference in

¹ Cf. Romanes' *Thoughts on Religion*, pp. 16, 48, 94.

² *Heredity*, i. 34, 35.

³ *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 17.

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degree amounting to a difference in kind, and this very difference arises from the introduction of a new force, to wit, the life of the Spirit, which is the Knowledge and Hope and Love of God, man's proper and immediate synthetic intuition.

Man is the great exception by this possession. He alone can rebel, he alone can sin, for rebellion implies the knowledge of law, the knowledge of God; and he alone is free, for the Intuition of God alone is a 'motive' to the will that can overcome the manifold determinations hither and thither that arise from the Cosmic Nature, and while it overcomes them is Motive, 'obligation arising from Idea,' not physical determinant. But this very freedom implies a freedom, a potentiality of going, within an area, many ways in Nature. Man is a spirit, and the office of the spirit is to bring the body to God, to lead it 'in one way' (*ἀπλῶς*), and this office implies in its very concept the possibility of movement in many directions (*παντοδαπῶς*) inherent in Cosmic Nature. Wherein the freedom of Nature consists we cannot determine; the multiplicity and endless variety of combinations possible with a few simple elements, the fertility of organisms, and the endless variations in likeness of their offspring, the struggle of each new force with the material which it comes in from above to possess, the ascending scale in which the freedom exhibited approaches continually to the pattern of the freedom of man, so that for animals and man the arguments for automatism or liberty cover so much the same ground—all these are but signs, into the actual import of which we have no clear vision. But the fact remains. The whole aspect of the Cosmos as a Reign of Law presents the phenomena of Law given and broken, met by Law, of Design thwarted, and the thwarting overruled, of a freedom within an area that can yet never escape control. And it is to Hebrew and Christian theology we owe the clear statement of these facts in a broad spiritual light. Both alike treat 'Creation' as 'solid' with Man, implicated in the Fall, sharing in the hope of Redemption. 'All creation groaneth and travaileth,' and is 'subjected to vanity in hope' [the Duke of Argyll interprets this of man only, without warrant], and the impressive statement of Divine Control, 'All things work together for good for them that love God,' implies no absolute, passive, and unconditional obedience in Nature, but the hand of the Pantocrator 'over all, and through all.' And without entering on any of the mystical (Platonist, Jewish, and Christian) explanations of the Scriptural language, we may at least point out that if the last new force in analysis is the first in synthesis, designed to fashion and control and

make the whole into its ideal, then the shattering of the Intuition of God by rebellion did indeed deprive the creature of its proper lord, and the new heaven and the new earth fitly begin with the regeneration of the spirit of man.

So far, then, as the argument from the character of the Cosmos as a whole is concerned we are by no means involved by the Recognition of Mind in the optimism with which the Duke of Argyll regards Nature, an optimism which provokes the pessimist reaction, and really lays upon the heart and mind an intolerable burden. It will have appeared, however, that the whole force of this argument depends in a manner on our previous faiths. Apart, that is, from the spiritual impulse, and the power of spiritual recognition, there would be nothing to determine decision; it would be an intellectual problem in which probabilities were on one side, but on which it would not be unreasonable to hold a suspended judgment. Dr. Weissmann's faith, *e.g.*, that a cause in the Cosmos may be found for every event in the Cosmos decides him to wait. Is the matter altered when we turn to special Design, which is a direct corollary, indeed, of the Duke of Argyll's view of general Design, but which is also his immediate and peculiar perception?

The proof of special Design, so far from resting on a direct perception, is, in fact, an argument from analogy in which the evidence is most obscure. From the mechanisms contrived by man, *e.g.* a watch, an inference is drawn to mechanisms in Nature, *e.g.* the eye. Human design is not, however, limited to manufactured mechanisms. Man in various degrees co-operates with Nature; he does so in every case; but in many he uses his knowledge of the laws of growth to make Nature work with him or for him. He is hidden behind, and there may be no signs of his handiwork, or signs hard to trace. Art always imitates Nature, and the highest Art is *celare Artem*; while Nature, on the other hand, as often imitates Art, and produces effects which we should call designed but for knowledge that they are not. The automatic impulse of language has distinguished the natural from the designed. There are, again, many human structures, as languages, constitutions, states, nations, empires, which have on them all the characters of design, but which we know to have grown 'by Nature.' Even the history of manufactured mechanisms themselves is by no means that of an Idea formed and realized by means, but of Nature imitated bit by bit, discovery by accident, and the use for one purpose of structures intended for another.

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The inference of Design depends largely on evidence, in which the knowledge that men do design, and the signs of human handiwork, play a great part. The law infers intention from acts by a knowledge of human nature, but with proof to the contrary allows its general to be overruled by its special knowledge.

The evidence of design becomes more and more obscure the more the designer is hidden, the more, that is, he utilizes the laws of growth. But in Nature the Designer is completely hidden *ex hypothesi*, and the whole argument is to prove his existence; and He always works by 'growth,' and not by manufacture. So that the whole evidence of special Design seems to turn on a previous faith that a Designer exists, in which case we have marvellous material for wonder and worship in His works. God always, says the Duke of Argyll, creates by development from germ; nay, this is the distinction between creating and making (to which we do not now stay to demur), and the common element in Human and Divine Design is the Idea (or Logos) of the whole, which guides the execution. There must have been, therefore, for special Design an Idea in the Divine mind of every organism in Nature, particularly and singly. But each particular is included in a whole, as, *e.g.*, reptiles and vertebrates, and these wholes in larger ones, and this extensively, both in time and place. The Plan must have been of infinite adaptability, so that structures useless in one organism might be developed in it for use in another hereafter in the ages to come, and structures that served one purpose in one organism might serve quite another in its neighbour, and the horse should not be created immediately from a germ or idea of its own, but developed through endless æons in very undomestic forms for the rider who was to come. Now, a plan of this kind provokes awe and wonder, and even worship, so long as we know that it is a plan; but by its very nature it escapes every test that the human mind can conceive to prove it one. Given the knowledge of God and all would be clear, but our philosophy will not give us that. Moreover, the steps in the realization of this plan are determined, so far as our observation goes, by a chain of physical causes, so that each organism is apparently the product of its own inherited nature, with its inherent variability, and the environment. These physical causes are embodied indeed in Laws; the development of no organism can escape Law, but within the Law there is every appearance, humanly speaking, of accident in the particular determinations.

We cannot so much as understand where any opening for inference to Design on the bare facts can be found. The Duke of Argyll comes to our aid. He has two infallible criteria: 'The subserviency of structure to function, and the priority in time of structure-growth to the actual or possible discharge of structural function' (p. 8). These are complicated by many other signs hard to read, as, *e.g.*, that structures in the course of growth serve incidental purposes all along the line; and the most that we could infer from them seems to be that the fact of Nature being Nature, *i.e.* a process of 'growth' running to structure, is a sign of Intelligence in general working through the whole.

For the undoubted facts of direct perception are that Physical Life creates organisms with these characters by growth, and that human intelligence creates mechanisms with the same characters not by growth. Physical Life came in 'from above,' and so also did Intelligence; yet, while the analogies between their products, and the identity of their mode of appearance, and the complex connexions of their essences and energies, may convince us of the Unity of their origin; and while all organisms, so far as they are microcosms, are by that very fact witnesses to the same truth as the order of the Cosmos as a whole, yet neither of these considerations warrants our affirming any special structure to have been specially designed, or other than a creation of God by the method and according to the liberty of Natural Law.¹ The structures that appear may be the product of Design, to use the old language of Realism, in their essence, but undesigned in their accidents.

The moral judgment is here, as elsewhere, an indispensable Index of truth. But to special design on the grounds of goodness there is a moral repulsion which nothing but demonstration could overcome. We may exaggerate or minimise this. We are bound to take it into account. And, *a priori*, it is improbable that the evidence of Goodness in the Cosmos should be less clear and decisive than that of Intelligence; it is against the probabilities to expect this to be decisive, and that to be confused.

The Moral Repulsion may be met, indeed, by Faith in the Eternal Wisdom and Goodness, by the humility of a pure and genuine Agnosticism, though these should lead us to question more closely our reading of the evidence which

¹ If, that is, it warrants belief in any such creation at all as a logical conclusion. The leap of the heart to assent is one thing, the bridge building of the brain another.

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strains them ; or it may be met by consideration of the place of suffering and conflict in the Divine economy, and in the Light thrown on Nature from the Cross. It is true that suffering and conflict are, even in the animal world, conditions of strength and beauty ; that if creation be anthropocentric, we can conceive no world better suited for 'discipline and probation' ; that if we regard the Incarnation and the Eternal Counsel, the glory and the joy of the End deprive the pains of all unreasonableness and sting ; and that the Son of God in sharing the anguish may convince us of its inevitableness and justice. We may overrate, again, the suffering other than human in Nature, and its 'end' may be the conviction of sin through the knowledge of a vicarious retribution borne for us. But, in the first place, none of these considerations could occur to one seeking God through Design ; they are the consolations of those who bring God with them to Nature. In the second place, they scarcely touch the horrible and revolting forms, the analogues of all human vice, the trivial, the base, the degrading in Nature ; and, lastly, they reach for Christians even only to the general aspects, and not to the details. Therefore it is that Christianity speaks of all these things as 'permitted, endured, overruled,' arising from a liberty the granting of which, and the retribution of which, were alike necessary, not as specially designed or contemplated in deliberate Idea ; and the distinction is real ; it alleviates the burden ; and it is true to the Intuition of God. God (we speak as a fool) could not sin that grace might abound, nor justify means by ends.

The Duke of Argyll does not seem to think such considerations relevant to his philosophy. Yet they have been decisive with many of the best seekers after truth in his generation. He is no Rational Deist, but what Mr. Morley calls 'the complacent optimism' of the Deist clings about him ; nor has he listened to the Ode on Lisbon, the Deist's dirge. That mode of regarding things which we call Darwinism had the merit of removing in great measure the moral and intellectual burden which Deism imposed. It is no mere theory of means ; it establishes a liberty of self-adjustment in Nature within a definite area, determined by law. Nature may vary within limits from a type, and the very variation comes under Law ; the abnormal development that ought never to have been has its normal development, its normal Law of Death, but no abnormal monstrosities were ever in the Logos or Idea of God.

There are still two cognate objections to the Inference of

a Universal Mind ruling on the throne of Nature. The first we may state in the words of Mr. G. Romanes:—

'When we allow that the character of the Cosmos—which but for the effects of overweening familiarity could scarcely fail to be intellectually overwhelming—does betoken mental agency in Nature, we immediately find it impossible to determine the probable character of such a mind, if it exists. We cannot conceive of it as presenting any one of the qualities which essentially characterize what we know as mind in ourselves, and therefore the word Mind as applied to the supposed agency stands for a blank.'¹

We begin with an 'anthropopsychic' expectation and Idea, and the purgatorial inquiry clears out of it all human elements. This objection is met, of course, in Revelation—the 'human element' in God corresponds to the divine element in man; or it may be met in philosophy by connecting the Intuition of Design with other cognate intuitions; but it is fatal to procedure, through the proof of Intelligence, to the discovery of God. What reason discovers is not God but a blank.

The second objection is stated by the Duke of Argyll himself:—

'Some minds feel as if it were an unworthy notion of any supposed Divine power that it should be likened to some great artificer making things on the same principle on which we are compelled to make them in order to effect our purpose [working, that is, by natural means to an end]. . . . Such suggestions are not unnatural, but our recognition of mind must be determined by its recognizable qualities known to us. . . . It is a certain fact that in Nature all things are done by the use of means, and by the subordination of material structures to work and function. . . . By that fact we must abide, and not soar into regions with no atmosphere of knowledge to sustain our minds' (pp. 10, 11).

But the objection may be partially removed by the recollection that God uses the method of growth, while the vastness of the means, and the glory of the end, remove the handiwork in Nature from any taint of human littleness (p. 12).

Throughout this volume we find, significantly, no recognition of God the Creator in the ultimate sense of the word creation. God we are told creates by development. Was, then, the first original creation by development? Was Life developed, or intelligence, or the spirit of man? Is matter indestructible and eternal? But it is in the very class of facts here indicated that the correction of the one-sided inference from the other facts must lie. On the face of Nature, the use of means to ends occupies a subordinate and relative

¹ *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 87.

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position. Design visible in Nature as a system of means to ends is inadequate to the idea of God that even Nature suggests, but in the Duke of Argyll's system it has swallowed up all other rods. The creation of existences that appear, the communication to them of properties, lie under and behind all the mechanical features, and in a measure explain them.

Our author may urge that all these considerations are irrelevant in the face of the express limitations he has laid down on p. 148. One fact alone is certain. Design of some kind and quality is apparent. But he abandons those limitations. [*Cf., e.g.* (p. 364), 'We have seen how the facts of Nature are the authority by direct perception for the primary truth of a personal God,' on which fact he suspends the authority of the Christian apostles, the prophets, and Christ Himself.] And the argument of his philosophy requires that he should abandon them. For he argues directly from Design to the trustworthiness of our other perceptions. But if the Designer be limited in power, or malevolent, or the end of the whole unknown, no such inference can be drawn. We may be, so far as the intuition of design goes, incapable of knowledge through the designer's weakness, filled with delusions through the designer's malevolence, or inspired with the notions of goodness for some ulterior non-moral end.

All the attributes of God have to be read into the Intuition before it is of any argumentative value, and when they are read into it they correct and determine it. Nor is a confidence in our faculties based on our being mechanisms constructed for knowledge even by an all-wise, all-powerful, and all-good Mind, in every respect satisfactory; for it would be necessary to determine by an analysis of the structure for what kind of knowledge it was adapted, a necessity which is no way imposed by the trust we derive from the faith in our creation by One who is our Father. The faculties of knowledge that are evidently correlated with the mechanism plainly do not reach to the knowledge of God. Not sensation, nor the analytic brainwork, certainly, which belong to the Natural Man. Spirit is correlated with Nature, indeed, through the mechanism; but, on the other side, directly with God. Our confidence that we are His children is not the result of any analytic argument; flesh and blood hath not revealed it to us, but our Father which is in heaven.

An intuitive theology that starts with one of many subordinate Intuitions is as quixotic as a chessplayer who should rest his attack or defence on a single piece. The final

proof of any fact, and therefore of any such Intuition, is that it takes its place in an order. The Intuitions support and lean on one another, and the angles of their right inclination are only found by habitually using them together. We look askance even at the claims of ethics to supersede or correct theology.

But the Intuition of God is far other: it is the synthetic whole which gathers into itself all lesser intuitions, and is self-luminous by its own internal harmony; it is by its essential character prior and clearer and more certain than any into which it can be analysed, and is our proper heritage. The analysis of it is not for the creation of Faith—we believe before we understand.

And this true order is, as a matter of fact, the order which the Duke of Argyll has followed; he draws the outline of a Rational Theism, but never attained to Faith that way himself, and cannot help confusing his hypothetic rationalism with assumptions that it should reject. All the faith and piety, all the clear insight into and firm grasp of eternal truth that adorns these pages, are the product of an original Belief in God, not of an Intuition of Design.

We have before referred to the preface. We quote with pleasure again a few sentences from its delightful and instructive pages:—

'My father, though he had a very reverent mind, was not a theologian, and such religious instruction as I received was altogether simple and uncontroversial. . . . In the Shorter Catechism I had a very partial drilling. Only the first question and answer remained in my memory at call.¹ Plain Bible-reading, the ordinary collections of sacred poetry, the usual Sunday services in the church, were the whole of my earliest training in theology' (p. vii).

The parish of his home became the centre of a theological controversy:—

'The young minister with an acute and discriminating intellect combined a nature full of love to men, an absorbing devotion to the honour and credit of Christian truth, and all the attractions of a most saintly character' (p. viii).

His teaching was condemned as heretical after six years of controversy, but

'the battle never entered the doors and walls of the household in which I lived. The kinswoman who kept my father's house was an earnest disciple of the reforming minister, without, however, any

¹ 'Question: What is the End of Man? Answer: The end of man is to glorify God and enjoy Him for ever.'

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tendency to disputation on the subject. But the human mind has a strange property of receiving and keeping vague general impressions of which it is quite unconscious at the time. . . . Very early indeed the notion of ideas in themselves irrational, and still more of others which violate the moral sense, being insisted on as parts of religious faith was to me both painful and distressing' (p. xi).

We do not think it would be possible to indicate more clearly the origin of the Idea of God in the human mind, or, more precisely, that our author brought Faith with him to the analysis of Nature.

We have Intuition of God. So thought Voltaire, but he meant by Intuition a quick and immediate inference universally made to a First Personal cause, the capacity for drawing which with the analytic understanding it is impossible to predicate of intellectual childhood. So thought Lord Herbert of Cherbury, and he meant by Intuition a complex Intellectual Notion, self-evident to the natural man; but an Intuition is a vision of an object presented, and the Intuition of God implies from the very beginning a revelation, teaching, communication. It goes from spirit to spirit. The loss of it begins with disobedience. It is disintegrated, and the disintegration leads again through vain imaginations to worse moral corruption. There remains, even in the corruption, what the Duke of Argyll quaintly calls 'an apparatus for testing and recognizing truth' (cf. p. 370); but the Recognition depends on the Power of the Truth presented whole, as, *e.g.*, in Christ Jesus. It is the Recognition of God when presented that is assumed in the Scriptures and expected of man. The Gospel, it is needless to say, was such a Proclamation with Power. This is well remarked on in the chapter of this volume that deals with Philosophy.

'Christianity could well afford to maintain towards the old schools of paganism its own lofty attitude of compassionate reserve. Only a few words of not disrespectful reference escape its lips. "*The world by wisdom knew not God*"' (p. 519).

The turn which the Duke of Argyll gives to the thought of the Scripture from which he quotes is characteristic:—

'The Christian apostles do not seem to have disputed with them at all, but to have passed them by with a glance of compassionate indulgence, and simply proclaimed a *new philosophy* instead. From the first moment this *philosophy* was dynamic. . . : It captured minds of every calibre; it marched from victory to victory. The reaction under Julian the Apostate was in vain. The *new solution* which had been presented of the enigmas of life, the *new explanation*

given of the constitution of the Universe, so completely commended themselves to the interests and hearts of men that the old conceptions were rejected as false and irrational' (pp. 511, 512, 513).

The italics are ours. They mark what we had almost called the monomania of the Duke of Argyll. The words are true enough in their way, but compare them with what St. Paul actually said in 1 Cor. i. :—

'It pleased God by the foolishness of preaching [the thing preached] to save them that believe. For the Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling-block, unto the Greeks foolishness, but unto them that are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ, the Power of God and the Wisdom of God. . . . Christ sent me to preach the Gospel, not with wisdom of words, lest the Cross of Christ should be made of none effect ;'

or with the whole of that wonderful chapter that asserts the distinction between the faculties of the natural and spiritual man. Its 'reasonableness' was one element only in the triumph of the Gospel. The Cross of Christ shattered all philosophies, as it shattered much else, because it was a unity into which were concentrated all truth, all healing, and all power ; it went as such to the very root and centre of the Lie in every form, and germinated with a living energy in every direction. An Intuition analyzed is an Intuition lost. God is a Unity, whole in Himself, and His Gospel is preached whole as He gave it, the express image of Himself.

The review of Hebrew and Christian theology in this volume is full of interest, and full of an atmosphere of faith and Christian feeling which makes it a gift of inestimable value to the 'Christian brotherhood.' It is a treasury of rich suggestion and profound thoughts. It ranges over wide fields, and everywhere indicates pleasant and happy paths. But the Scriptures apparently have mainly been searched for confirmations of the author's dominant ideas ; there are striking omissions, and the analysis as it stands is in very incomplete connexion with the philosophy that precedes it. The Hebrew Theology has two chapters, one on the Character of the Godhead, the other on the Nature of Man ; the purport of them is to show that the Hebrew conceptions correspond with the principles of the Reign of Law.

'God is not the Unconditioned nor the Absolute, nor any other inconceivable and irrational contradiction.' 'The Divine Being works ALWAYS, whether we see it or not, through the employment of those methods or agencies which we call Natural Laws' (p. 207). 'The Hebrew takes the system of Nature as he sees it. He sits at

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the feet of fact' (p. 208). 'The Divine Being operates through what we know as causes, not by arbitrary or capricious exercises of irresistible power.'

That the Duke is a past-master of question-begging epithets already appears. To continue, however. As the great instance of God using means to ends, preparation in time, &c., of course the selection of Abraham and the whole history of the Chosen People is insisted on.

'The existence of a Living and personal God, who is the Author of Nature and the Father of men, who can and does speak to them in audible voices of command—this was a belief worth while to organize in the continuous tenure of . . . a growing tribe . . . for the sake of the whole race of man' (p. 211). 'The employment and adaptation of means to ends . . . is of the very essence of the history' (p. 213).

The phraseology of structure and function has become automatic in the Duke of Argyll; it runs unceasingly from his lips, he translates the Bible into it, and if the Bible has momentarily forgotten it, he is there to play prompter; even in miracles, where natural means are not expressly asserted to have been used, they probably were. The drying up of Jordan, for instance, was a natural fact, and had nothing to do with Elijah's mantle (p. 215).

Again, the Jew not only, like our author, believed in the Reign of Law, he also, which is still stranger, believed it to be 'intelligible'; the non-intelligible is godless. So a rational spirit ran through the prophets, as, for example, in their treatment of animal sacrifice, the mystery of whose enactment was not in the least allowed to obscure its essential and evident unreasonableness.

'The habit . . . of appealing to the human reason, as a power having the very highest functions to discharge in the sphere of religious belief, is a habit persistent in the great teachers of the Jewish Church' (p. 223).

The Jew is no disciple of Kant, no sensationalist with any spurious Agnosticism. He sits at the feet of fact in quite another sense, and lives in his inevitable beliefs.

'Our powers and our aspirations have a real, a substantial, and an organic connexion with the whole system of things, so that the knowledge we desire to possess is attainable by the appropriate means.' There is a sense in which Isaiah could truly say, 'Verily Thou art a God that hidest Thyself,' but 'our actual and inevitable ignorance is never allowed to cast the smallest doubt on the certainties which are clearly knowable, and are actually known, and even difficulties are held to be all soluble in the light of Revelation' (p. 237).

One of the most interesting discussions is that on Inspiration. Inspiration is cognate to Instinct, Intuition, to the whole series of adjustments or adaptations for seeing and recognizing self-evident truth.

'All these are part of the creative work done in us, and for us, and handed over to us for use. They are all Inspiration, in their own measure and degree, and capable of Infinite extension.' The prophets 'claim no more than lifted eyelids, and a seeing of that which is invisible to minds that are either idle, or corrupt, or both' (p. 244). 'When proclaimed the secrets can be recognised as truth by all who exercise their faculties with an open heart.'

Prophecy is the result of the reign of Law, which binds all phenomena, past, present, and future, together in an immutably connected order.

'It is a high and far-reaching power of interpretation over social phenomena, and over coming political events' (p. 265). 'The mention by name of Cyrus is against the analogy of prophecy, and its habitual and natural avoidance of detail' (p. 281.)

In the face of all this, many pages, including an analysis of all the prophets, are given to the Messianic predictions, which we gather to be the precipitate of an 'inspired' observation of the Reign of Law, determining both the character of the Hope, its necessary Incarnation in a Person, and the necessity of suffering as an essential part of the adjustments suitable to the end in view.

We confess that we have no great liking for this new wine; we are provoked to desire an antidote, a philosophy, *e.g.*, exclusively based on the irrational elements in Hebrew and Christian theology; we long for the *Religio Medici*, and even Professor Huxley's travesties would be as a breath of fresh air. The witch of Endor and the swine of Gadara are not in the Scriptures without Design, even though they be only for stones of stumbling.

We are thankful indeed to hear nothing in these pages of 'the development of the Idea of God from simple Elohim,' or of 'a progressive morality' that has its excuses to make both for God and Abraham. But the purveyors of these wares have as little reason to be satisfied as ourselves.

The Duke of Argyll justly says (p. 326): 'The Jews believed in the existence of a spiritual world underlying all visible things, and they expected it to make itself felt and seen in many ways.' Therefore they never felt the difficulty that he feels with miracles and prophecies inexplicable by a rational analysis of means. He limits God to the Cosmic Laws; they did not.

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The treatment of the fundamental conceptions of Christian theology and ethics runs on the same lines. For instance, the reasonableness of the Incarnation from the human side is exhibited in a forcible paraphrase of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the persuasiveness of the Epistle traced to the same source. 'On the full Divinity which he claimed for Jesus of Nazareth, however, it is remarkable that the author of Hebrews does not rest on any appeal to reason' (p. 340). 'For this it rests on authority, and on that wise and true Agnosticism which is conscious that on the possibility of a Divine Incarnation we can have nothing else than authority to stand upon' (p. 341). Nevertheless, we are told the conception was made easier by the actual sonship of men to God. As they have in themselves something of the Divine nature, they can understand a Messiah both Divine and Human. If we are the 'sons of God,' there is no immediate unreasonableness in Christ being the Son of God. We shall shortly see that *the authority* on which the Mystery is accepted is itself rational.

The author expressly disclaims any attempt to include controversial points of doctrine in his analysis, but, *e.g.*, in his doctrine of sacrifice (p. 347), he enunciates principles which would effectually, if pressed, overthrow the sacramental system, if not the Atonement, room for which, however, he immediately recovers by the mystery of Unknown Laws governing the Divine operations and requirements. Regeneration he apparently identifies with Conversion, and ascribes it to the natural power of Truth; we are begotten again by the Word, through the natural affinities between it and our responsive faculties. The New Birth is a quickening and exaltation of natural powers.

The treatment of Faith in the chapters on Theology and Ethics will not fail to attract the reader's attention, both by the stately eloquence of its language and the clearness of its thought. We select as bearing most immediately on our purpose those passages which refer more especially to Faith in the Christian mysteries, as, *e.g.*, in the Persons of the God-head.

'It is quite true,' the author says, 'that among the conceptions of Christian belief, there are some which we are expected to accept on authority alone, and not on any internal light which our mental powers are capable of recognizing as belonging to the sphere of natural or necessary truth. But there are two observations to make as regards those conceptions—one respecting their own nature, and the other respecting the nature of what is called authority in general' (p. 362).

The conceptions are transcendental, above reason, not contradicting it, and exactly on a par with the 'ultimate inexplicables' which we find in the physical world. They lie in 'the region of that true and legitimate Agnosticism, which rests upon a most rational humility' (p. 363).

'But the discrimination between true and false authorities may be the most important work which our reason is ever called upon to discharge. In the so-called physical sciences . . . the authority on which we accept numberless most difficult and obscure conceptions is simply the *authority of ascertained facts*. . . And a similar basis exists for authority in religion. We have seen how the facts of Nature are the authority, by direct perception, for the primary truth of a Personal God. The existence of some necessary relations with our own personality follows as a necessary consequence, whilst the self-revealing truths taught by the Hebrew and Christian theologies indicate with clearness how close those relations were in the case, above all, of Jesus Christ himself—of the Jewish prophets and of the Christian Apostles, and their obvious knowledge of spiritual things is a reasonable guarantee for their authority' (p. 364).

Here is a philosophy of Belief indeed, which makes to its first stepping-stone a great leap from the Limited Perception of Design in Nature as stated on p. 148, and which ignores afterwards the most important testimonies appealed to by the authorities themselves.

By what a thread is the whole suspended! Where is the justification even for crediting the Scriptures with primarily deriving the knowledge of God from the contemplation of Nature? Where is the justification for asserting that, even in that contemplation, Design or Wisdom was the sole or even the prominent feature recalled? There is, indeed, in the Scripture a famous apostolic appeal to Nature, but it is the Eternal Power and Godhead of Him whom the idolaters blasphemed to which the visible creation is called as a reminding witness.

In a fine paraphrase of the famous passage of St. Peter the Duke of Argyll sums up the triple witness: the testimony of eye-witnesses, the testimony of prophecy, and the testimony of the Spirit. The last is the great and final one.

'What men call the heart, in the instinctive analysis of their own mental powers, is that organ of vision which, in the affections, is conversant with spiritual light. It is there that the dawn of ethical recognition rises. It is there that the 'grammar of assent' reaches that kind of conviction which, beginning in intuitive perception and in personal experience, is established as personal love' (p. 419).

But while as to the conclusion we are at one with the Duke of Argyll, we read somewhat differently the Scripture.

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The testimony of eye-witnesses, of the Apostles, cannot be discarded for 'intuitive perceptions' of Design, or prophecy for 'personal experience.' And to what is the testimony? The Apostles 'were eye-witnesses of the majesty of Christ when He received from the Father glory and honour in the Voice that made the proclamation, "This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased."' This voice they heard from heaven when they were with Him in the mount; and so St. John: 'We saw His glory, full of grace and truth.' It is He to whom they testify, the substance of the Gospel, the Preaching, that is the starting-point; the authority of the Apostles enters into Belief as paramount in details, but it sinks out of sight in the Proclamation of the Central Truth, to which God testifies Himself. With this we have the prophetic word made more sure (*ἔχομεν βεβαιώτερον τὸν προφητικὸν λόγον*). He is the Truth that illumines all the evidences prophetic of the Lord, that are as a lamp shining in a desert land, mere clues and threads in the labyrinth of hopelessness and doubts, till the splendour of the day do dawn.

That Faith has a moral element, and that this moral element can only exist because Faith is towards a Person, that there can be no ethical element in our convictions about things, that Faith towards a Person is alone of obligation, a duty—all this is well set forth, but perhaps not always borne in mind; *e.g.*:—

'All that Christian theology assumes in its teaching on this subject is, that there do exist in the spiritual as well as in the material world a body of absolute and objective truths, on which all moral judgments depend. . . . It asserts that these truths are self-revealing—that they are luminous with an internal light visible to the moral sense. . . . It ascribes the rejection of this light largely, but not entirely, to an alienated will' (p. 415).

These truths may have ultimate reference to a Person, but the language used involves a confusion. Our obligation to believe the articles of Faith or the principles of morals is at bottom an obligation to believe God, a Faith which covers other than self-luminous propositions.

Chapter x., on Christian Belief in its relation to Philosophy, propounds the same question as the Bampton Lectures for 1895. Why did Philosophy fail where Christianity succeeded? The Lectures treat the question more from the point of view of Ethics. The failure as a moral guide is the immediate subject. The Duke of Argyll brings to the front the character of each as giving an intelligible account of the Universe. He contrasts Philosophy with Philosophy in the

stricter sense. The Lectures find the root of the contrast in the New Life; the Duke of Argyll in the 'well-compacted system of thought: larger, wider, more definite, more consistent than any other the world had known' (p. 491). The one appears to undervalue, the other to overvalue, knowledge as such. However that may be, Christianity, our author holds, has absorbed everything of solid value in the old guesses, intuitions, and reasonings (p. 492). He enumerates Innate Ideas, Experience as the test of Truth, the identification of the Beautiful with the good and true, of the Good with the useful, of virtue with happiness, and the Stoic doctrine of living according to Nature, as thoughts in their measure true on which Christianity has set her seal. It is strange, therefore, that neither the Jew nor the Christian in the first ages took any pains to meet philosophy on its own ground of abstract argument.

'It had few deep roots even in the intellect; and it had none whatever in the affections. It gave to men little that they could live by, and nothing for which they could care to die. Substitution therefore, not confutation, was the plan of the Apostles' (p. 497).

Polemic was likewise avoided, because philosophy was much concerned with the explanation of physical phenomena in their causal relations to each other, and the Apostles had an instinctive and inspired confidence that in this direction nothing new could be discovered—nothing, *i.e.*, that could shake the primary conceptions. 'They were confident that it could only fill in and fill up here and there some bits of the all-embracing outline of their own vast conception' (p. 503).

On the other hand, the most prevalent form of Philosophy in the Apostolic age—that of the Stoics—did cover, with many resemblances and deeper differences, the same ground as the doctrine of Christianity. The Apostles appear to have ignored them in a kind of compassionate contempt (p. 511). The Duke of Argyll then sketches the triumph of the New Philosophy as it captured minds of every calibre. The causes are to be found in the failure of philosophy to build up any real consistent system: it 'attempted to combine conceptions which are in a measure true with other conceptions which are immeasurably false' (p. 516). Thus Stoicism had an Ethics without obligation, and a Theology without God. 'Christianity did exactly what these schools had attempted and failed to do. It really was a philosophy and they were none' (p. 518). Of this the Apostles were conscious, and it gave them their imperial tone (p. 520); the atmosphere of authority and majesty in which they dwelt is largely traceable

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to their having grasped the principles of the Reign of Law (p. 520). 'All the precepts and principles of Life and Conduct are referred to known and intelligible Laws' (p. 534). Christianity thus displaced its old rivals; it has no new ones. There is nothing to take its place either in philosophy or religion (p. 537); 'no other name by which we may be saved' from universal scepticism.

Modern philosophy has created no 'intelligible' system. The 'Hitherto in vain' of Kant included Descartes, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Butler, Hume. The same verdict must now be passed on Kant himself (p. 538). The best thing the metaphysicians have done is to confute one another; far from satisfying the affections or the spiritual desires of men, they have done nothing to satisfy the intellect. The more recent philosophies have been even content with the title of Agnostic, and dubbed themselves Ignoramus. The chapter concludes with an eloquent peroration on the inexhaustibility of the Christian Gospel. It sets before its disciples the hope of knowing even as they are known. Its thoroughly intelligible and rational assurance is that 'eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him.'

This Montaignesque attitude to Philosophy appears to us a little inconsistent in the Duke of Argyll at the close of a constructive philosophy of Belief, nor do we think it on the whole either true or wholesome. Both the Apostles and the Church have treated philosophies with some discrimination. Compassionate neglect or calm reserve are the last terms we should apply to their treatment either of the Epicureans and Stoics, or of the systems connected directly or indirectly with Platonism. The preaching of the Gospel traversed the first two in all their essential principles and circumstances. A philosophy that, starting with Pleasure or Self-Righteousness, constructed a Materialist atheism or Pantheism to justify its choice could not but be met, as it was met, with uncompromising and bitter hostility. It was godless in inception and result, as it was godless in its byways. It mocked at the Crucifixion, it ridiculed the Resurrection, while it encumbered itself with infinite immoralities and legions of devils.

But Platonism was of another kind. It had inspiration in a measure; it might become the parody or the rival of Christianity; but it could become also a vehicle for the ideas of Christianity herself. As Judaism, so it was the occasion for giving to the Gospel a more philosophical character than

at first belonged to it. The doctrines of Incarnation and grace were developed to meet it. The Gospel of St. John or the Epistle to the Colossians are philosophy, if philosophy mean system.

But here, again, the actually pernicious elements are met with uncompromising hostility. The first of the rational attempts to make something of Jesus by emptying Him of Divinity was branded with the condemnation which is proper to them all; and the vain imaginations, unrestrained by reason, fact, or reverence, of mystic God-making provoked as stern a wrath as the devils and wickedness with which they also were encumbered.

If such characters are essential to philosophy, *cadit quæstio*; and if philosophy must always be an attempt by the natural faculties to discover and define God, again *cadit quæstio*. The apostle has declared it not possible. But neither apostle nor Scripture has declared it impossible or immoral

- (1) with the natural faculties to co-ordinate and bring to a Unity natural knowledge, or settle the limits within which they avail;
- (2) with the aid of the Holy Spirit to co-ordinate and bring to a Unity natural knowledge with truths revealed;
- (3) to unfold in ever fuller and fuller expansion the Truths that the Gospel contains in germ.

In all of these directions, if not in many more, philosophy is both legitimate, possible, and even of obligation.

On the other hand, in no direction is philosophy complete. The Gospel is not a philosophy because it contains facts crucial for every philosophy; it started on the process of becoming one when it came in conflict with error, and the word finality does not belong to its *ἐπιγνώσις*. The philosophy of natural knowledge is as little complete—its work is a work of laborious discovery and analysis—but through errors and failures it progresses, and for it, too, the future is practically infinite. It is not old but young.

Nor is it the office of such philosophy to fill up here and there; a great part of its work is the determination and elaboration of method: a solid and essential contribution to all future philosophy, whether Christian or natural. Aristotle is but one of many who has forged tools indispensable for both, and whose gift to the Church it were folly to call 'drift-material.' Again, another great part of its work is to sound the foundations of all knowledge, and so to determine what is necessarily of Faith and what belongs to Sight. And it is

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here that the Duke of Argyll seems utterly unable to appreciate his own position. Kant's Real Idealism may be an imperfect solution of a problem, but it is at least an attempt to solve one that must be solved if a philosophy of Belief is ever to be constructed. The Duke of Argyll cannot turn an inference into a vision by saying that it is one, nor convert a Spiritual Faith into a rational proof by reiterated assertions. Common sense is very well in its way, but when it takes to philosophizing it is apt to leave us with indestructible matters, infinite spaces, *et hoc genus omne*, even if we take no account of the pseudo-rationalism which always dogs its steps. So far as the Duke of Argyll intends only to insist on the impotence and wickedness of philosophy as a substitute or rival of our true religion, it is well. But the philosophies he passes by and condemns have not all at least set themselves up to be that, nor have they altogether failed in their time; while as for the future it were of evil omen if there were any appearance of a tendency to establish Faith by shutting the eyes. We build our hopes, indeed, on the Gospel, but we look in the wisdom of God to see philosophy in the future as in the past making smooth the highway, for philosophy itself rests on the Faith of an ultimate reasonableness in all things, and on the conviction of the harmonies of Truth.

If we sum up the impression we have received, we cannot say that it is one of any solid contribution to the Philosophy of Belief. Everything in the author's argument depends upon the direct perception of Design in Nature; in the face of criticism he is compelled to confess that this is not necessarily the perception of God. But he proceeds as though it were, and having assumed at once, as a consequence, the trustworthiness of all our faculties, might at once construct a common-sense Rational Theology. From this he refrains, but, taking the great revealed Theologies, endeavours to show in them a harmony with common-sense—common-sense by this time including a number of intuitive perceptions which he has scarcely examined, and which are not vouched for by the principle he has. Meanwhile there are in both these theologies many elements which his view of God and Nature either altogether excludes or makes unpalatable. These he either ignores or omits, to the great injury of the Faith he is defending, or he acknowledges, to the great injury of his embryo philosophy. The strain of Rationalism becomes less and less marked the nearer he draws to the central Christian truths; his faith is more and more divorced from his first principles, and the

book passes into a clearer atmosphere. It leaves us with the pleasant duty of acknowledging a substantial service to the Church at large. Never with more dignity, with more eloquence, with more quick recollection, with more pertinence against hostile criticism, and, above all, with a more luminous and impressive sincerity of Faith, has the essential reasonableness of the Christian religion been exhibited to any generation; even though a philosophy of faith be not constructed, some of its essential conditions are established, and a body of materials collected indispensable for the builder to come.

It is no brilliant piece of dialectic, carrying successful warfare beyond the borders, and preparing peace for an age that shall come after, but we walk in it as at home in the house of God. Faith that is not confirmed by the argument is communicated by the Spirit, and we feel the touch of the reverent mind, 'in whom the Dayspring has arisen,' and the authority of the high intellect that scans the Universe to bow before its Maker.

ART. VIII.—SANCTUARY AND SACRIFICE:

A REPLY TO WELLHAUSEN.

Sanctuary and Sacrifice: a Reply to Wellhausen. By the Rev. W. L. BAXTER, M.A., D.D., Minister of Cameron.

DR. W. L. BAXTER in his recent book thus entitled examines the pretensions of Wellhausen as set forth in the *Prolegomena to the History of Israel*, a work which is commonly regarded as the resultant of certain forces which have been at work during the century; a circumstance which of itself would give the book notoriety apart from its selection by the editor of the last edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* to supply the article 'Israel.'

In the *Prolegomena* we are given to understand that the history of Judaism has throughout the ages been entirely misunderstood; that what has been familiarly known as the 'Law of Moses' from the time of the Prophets to the present day was not only unknown to Israel when they crossed the Jordan, but continued to be unknown to them for centuries. Wellhausen tells us that there were in reality three sets of laws, the date of the first of which (commonly called the *Jehovistic Code*) he assigns to '(say) the first centuries of the divided kingdom.' The second of the three codes, known as

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the *Deuteronomic* Code, which unenlightened people have taken to be 'the words which Moses spake unto all Israel on this side Jordan in the wilderness' (Deut. i. 1), was never heard of till centuries after Israel had gone over Jordan, and was not the code of Moses, but of a person or persons in the time of Josiah. The third of the three codes, commonly called the *Levitical* or the *Priestly* Code, comprising *Exodus*, chapters 25-32 and 32-34, *Leviticus*, and much of *Numbers*, is placed about two centuries later than the second code—that is to say, after the Exile, with the proviso that the section of *Leviticus* comprising chapters 17-26 is the earlier and a separate part of the third code. This last-mentioned section has been called *the Law of Holiness*.

To this extent, and nothing short of this, has the world misread Jewish history. The Jews themselves have been under an eternal delusion not only as to their law but as to their actual life under it. We are now told that the law was an intolerable slavery, petrifying body and soul, whereas we had been foolish enough to be satisfied with the testimony of twenty-five centuries, the testimony of philosophers, poets, lawyers, casuists, to say nothing of plain men and women, who have all helped to swell the chorus of Psalm cxix. as to the bliss of living and dying under its provisions; the testimony of persons who were not theorists, it may be, but of men who living under its *régime* might be expected to know something of its character.

Dr. Baxter's elaborate treatise of more than five hundred pages forms vol. iv. of the *Bible Student's Library*, issued under the auspices of Messrs. Eyre and Spottiswoode. He does not treat of the whole contents of the *Prolegomena*, which in its English translation is an amalgam of three books, but principally with the early chapters which Wellhausen pronounces to cover his whole position.

Dr. Baxter's aim is to give the Bible student a lucid and conclusive test whether the dismemberment of the Mosaic legislation into three different codes harmonizes with the contents of the codes themselves, or with the glimpses which the sacred historians and the Prophets afford of Israel's worship.

Wellhausen, in his *Prolegomena*, begins with a chapter entitled 'The Place of Worship,' and declares, 'My whole position is contained in my first chapter.' Here we find a strenuous effort to prove that the idea of 'one God, one Sanctuary' was never heard of till Josiah's reign, and never really took root till the return from the Exile. Wellhausen

promises to be guided solely by the contents of the historical and legal documents of the Old Testament. He proposes to demonstrate from the *History* three clearly marked stages of development in the views of Israel regarding centralization of worship; then he will take the laws, and show that they consist of three codes of diverse authorship and widely sundered dates; and, further, that these three codes contain regulations as to the *place of worship* coincident with the three stages of the nation's practice as already historically fixed.

Nothing could seem fairer than the method proposed. But Dr. Baxter complains that, instead of appealing to the history as we find it, Wellhausen first adjusts the sources of history by critical processes wherein he assumes the very thing to be proved, denying the validity of every item of history that controverts it.

Wellhausen is not singular in this circular method of argument. It is employed by Kuenen and the critical school generally. After arbitrarily declaring the priestly laws to be post-Exilic, Kuenen calmly tells us that, this being so, we must assign the priestly histories to the same period also. Wellhausen simply inverts the order of argument.

But neither Wellhausen nor Kuenen is original. They have both borrowed from Graf who, having made up his mind that Deuteronomy was not a book of Moses but an invention of the time of Josiah, in whose reign the book was both composed and published, proceeded to determine which of the laws and narratives of the early books are assumed by the Deuteronomist to be already existing, and which of them may be accounted as subsequent. The result of this inquiry led him to the conclusion that the ritual laws were post-Deuteronomic. But here a difficulty arose. It was felt by Kuenen and others that to sever the historical sections from the laws was impossible. Either the laws must stand with the narratives, or the narratives must fall with the laws. Which alternative was to be adopted? The golden opportunity for a revolution of traditional ideas must not be surrendered. Every link of tradition must be severed. Old Testament history must be rewritten. Not only do the writing Prophets chronologically precede the priestly legislation, but their representations of the genesis of the theocracy precede the priestly historiography.

This is the point at which Wellhausen strikes in with his *Prolegomena*. He assumes—and herein lies half the absurdity of his work—that the Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua constitute one whole; that the Book of Deuteronomy, a part of

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this *Hexateuch*, yet essentially independent, was composed in the time of Josiah, about a generation before the destruction of Jerusalem; whilst the Pentateuch proper is made up of a history-book JE (its Jehovistic part J, and the Elohist E) and a vast portion RQ, by which he means a 'main stock,' including the Book of the Four Covenants Q (Quatuor), the Priestly Code and editorial revision (R). He assumes further that, 'with regard to the Jehovistic document, all are happily agreed that, substantially at all events, in language, horizon, and other features, it dates from the golden age of Hebrew literature, to which the finest parts of Judges, Samuel, and Kings, and the oldest extant prophetic writings, also belong,' the period preceding the dissolution of the kingdoms.

It is to be noted that, although all this is supposed to be taken for granted as *results* of the higher criticism, Wellhausen in each case offers proofs, not full proofs, to be sure, nor intended to be such, but such a selection presumably as appeared to him most cogent. If Wellhausen had simply stated his assumptions, and built thereon his 'crowning edifice,' Dr. Baxter would doubtless have reviewed his author accordingly; but inasmuch as the former submits a recapitulation of proof, Dr. Baxter is justified, *pace* some of his critics, in appraising the worth of Wellhausen's argument by the cogency or otherwise of such proofs as are epitomized.

Dr. Baxter is indignant with Wellhausen's declaration that a central sanctuary was unthought of in Israel till the days of Josiah. Such a view he regards as diametrically opposed to the evidence of the witnesses on whom he promises to rely. He points to the 'threefold embodiment of a central sanctuary which cannot, without the most signal violence, be eradicated' from the historical and prophetic books—namely, the Temple of Zion, the house of God in Shiloh, and the Tabernacle erected in the wilderness.

The division of his 'threefold embodiment' is ambiguous, being calculated to produce the impression that the Tabernacle in the wilderness was differentiated from the house at Shiloh as the latter was from the Temple. But this is not his meaning, for he afterwards (32) speaks of 'the Tabernacle as first built by Moses, and as still known and honoured by David and Solomon.'

(1) THE TEMPLE.—Dr. Baxter urges in proof of the ample historicity of the Temple the testimony of the historical books from which Wellhausen educes his theory. The levy for the Temple's erection is from all Israel (1 K. 5¹³); to them all is the promise of the abiding presence made (1 K. 6^{12, 13});

all Israel's magnates attended (1 K. 8^{1st}). But Wellhausen regards this representation of the author of the *Kings* as unhistorical, as an importing to the purpose of the Temple's erection a significance which it had acquired long centuries afterwards, in proof of which he urges the absence of what he thinks ought to have followed such an historic event in the subsequent history.

Wellhausen sees three groups of statements made by the author of 1 Kings.

(I^a.) That Solomon did not remove the high places.

(I^b.) Nor were the high places removed by his successors till the time of Josiah.

(II.) That Josiah not only attempted but accomplished this feat.

(III.) That Solomon built a temple 'in its nature unique,' with the design from the outset to 'set aside all other holy places,' and solemnly dedicated it.

These statements he considers irreconcilable. He regards the attestations of the author of *Kings*, that the high places were not removed, as incompatible with Solomon's avowed object in building the Temple; and so he declares the view to be unhistorical. In other words the author of *Kings* is good evidence for (I.) and (II.), but to be discredited for (III.). And so, having discounted group (III.), and with it the dedication prayer of Solomon (1 Kings viii.), he has the audacity to say (p. 21), 'Never once did Solomon's successors make the attempt (which certainly would have been in their interest) to concentrate all public worship within their own temple.'

To this Dr. Baxter pleasantly replies that the author of *Kings* might be allowed sufficient intellectual capacity to discover the irreconcilableness of his own three positions. As he was falsifying, he might have carried the falsification a little further to maintain his consistency, and have said that the high places were taken away. There was scarcely occasion for a forger to leave on record self-exposures that Wellhausen might one day detect, especially (as Dr. Baxter might have added) when we remember (with Wellhausen) that the past is recast in conformity with the ideal.

Are we to accept the Book of *Kings* as evidence on Wellhausen's selection therefrom, as may suit his theory? In this case there is nothing but his *ipse dixit* for the tremendous imputation of historical falsification. The narrative in *Kings* is not contradicted by any other part of the Old Testament, nor is any heathen author forthcoming to accredit Solomon with another version of his doings.

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Dr. Baxter makes two further points in defence of the thorough historicity of the Temple and its purport. (1) Wellhausen had practically said, 'If such be the facts, and the centralization of worship really intended by the Temple, where were its fruits during the centuries between its erection and the time of Josiah?' Dr. Baxter in effect replies, 'The Reformation under Josiah was a reality; where were its fruits?' In a few years, as Wellhausen confesses, Jeremiah had to complain that there were as many altars as towns in Judah. Josiah's Reformation bore no permanent fruit. (2) His second point is made by hoisting Wellhausen with his own petard. The latter had remarked that no king after Solomon is left uncensured for having tolerated the high places. What can these recurring censures mean, asks Dr. Baxter, unless they point to a centralization at Jerusalem as initiated by Solomon?

Yet, apparent as is the inference, Wellhausen is unmoved. He is aware that the writer of Kings regards the Temple as designed to set aside all other places of worship, but 'the view is unhistorical.' What is his proof that it is unhistorical? The proof is that the writer of Kings, whose view is unhistorical, regularly informs us that 'the high places were not removed' (W., 21). So, then, we are to regard the solemnities of the consecration of the Temple and the unrivalled prayer of Solomon upon the occasion as the untrustworthy invention of the author of the Book of Kings, because the same author in a moment of veracity confesses that the high places were not removed: an admission which, in the opinion of Wellhausen, precludes Jerusalem from being at any time the place which Jehovah had chosen. With a writer who thus recklessly regards as unhistorical the only authorities with reliance upon which he set out, Dr. Baxter might fairly decline further argument; though he might have challenged a proof that any other sanctuary than the Temple was sanctioned; he might have urged the number of reformations attempted in the kingdom before the time of Josiah, to wit, those of Abijah, Asa, Jehoshaphat, Joash, Amaziah, Azariah, and Hezekiah, noting the circumstance (as admitted by Kuenen) that Hezekiah did abolish the high places. He might have pointed out that, upon Wellhausen's own showing (*Prolegomena*, 47), for a century and more before Josiah's time the early writing prophets, to say nothing of the succession of unnamed prophets, had been exclaiming against high places; whilst after the time of Josiah, though there were as many altars as towns, not one of the kings is recorded to have made

the faintest attempt to abolish them. He might have confronted Wellhausen with his conflicting statements (p. 25) that Hezekiah is said to have made an attempt to abolish the high places; nay, more (p. 46), that the man from whom Hezekiah must have received the impulse to his reformatory movement was the prophet Isaiah, with his contradictory statement (p. 21), 'Never once did Solomon's successors make the attempt.' He might have urged the more glaring self-contradiction of Wellhausen (p. 25), 'It is certain that the prophet Isaiah did not labour for the removal of the Bamoth,' compared with what the same writer says (p. 47), 'It was Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah who introduced the movement against the old popular worship of the high places.' He might have strenuously maintained that in the dedication prayer of Solomon the law of the central sanctuary underlies every utterance from first to last; that it is a statement of fact, not a 'view,' and in this respect stands on exactly the same footing as the statement of the same author of Kings that 'the high places were not removed.'

It would have been easy for Dr. Baxter to have shown how both statements were perfectly compatible. He might have dwelt on the counter-forces at work, ever tending to decentralization, the people working against the King, tribal separation and jealousies, the lack of religious literature (2 Chr. 17⁹); a point of real importance, for the chronicler gives the gratuitous information that in the reformatory movement under Jehoshaphat the priests and Levites deputed to traverse the country with the princes had to take with them from Jerusalem the book of the law, evidently because of the scarcity of copies in the country districts. These were some of the circumstances which frustrated every effort made by the well-intentioned kings, creating in the main the historical position 'Howbeit the high places were not taken away.'

(2) THE TABERNACLE.—The stress which Dr. Baxter lays upon the historicity of the Tabernacle is more than justified by its dependent issues. Wellhausen had declared (Intr. 7) that the Priestly Code relates substantially to the worship of the Tabernacle and cognate matters; and as he had also asserted (p. 39) that the Tabernacle is proved to rest on a historical fiction (a matter which has much to do with the date of the composition of the code), Dr. Baxter very properly subjects this astounding assertion to the only available test, the documents of the Old Testament as we find them. There can be no confusion here as to the point at

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issue. In Wellhausen's own words (p. 39), 'The question before us has reference exclusively to the particular tent which, according to Exod. 25 *sq.*, was erected at the command of God as the basis of the theocracy, the pre-Solomonic central sanctuary, which also in its outward details was the prototype of the Temple.'

Indeed, Wellhausen's whole position stands or falls with the historic truth of the Tabernacle. If it be historical he has no *locus standi* whatsoever, and he would have been ready to admit as much. Thus on p. 24 he says:

'The Tabernacle is not narrative merely, but law as well; it expresses the legal unity of the worship as an historical fact which, from the very beginning, ever since the Exodus, has held good in Israel. One God, one sanctuary, that is the idea. With the ordinances of the tabernacle, which form the sum of the divine revelation on Sinai, the theocracy was founded; where the one is, there is the other. The description of it therefore stands at the head of the Priestly Code. . . . It is the basis and indispensable foundation, without which all else would merely float in the air. . . . Is it supposed that the tabernacle tolerates other sanctuaries besides itself? Why then the encampment of the twelve tribes around it, which has no military, but a purely religious significance, and derives its whole meaning from its sacred centre? Whence this concentration of all Israel into one great congregation (קהל ישראֵל), without its like anywhere else in the Old Testament? On the contrary, there is no other place besides this at which God dwells and suffers Himself to be seen; no place but this alone where man can draw near to Him and seek His face with offerings and gifts.'

And again (p. 50): 'There underlies this creation the very real idea of unity of worship.'

Clearly so. And the dilemma is inevitable. If the Tabernacle be historical the assignment of the law of the central sanctuary and of the composition of Deuteronomy to the time of Josiah is an absurdity. If the Tabernacle be not historical, then the Code, which is mainly occupied in its description and surroundings, is a deliberate fraud, for its every detail, as well as its archaic setting, are given to induce the belief that it is an original and genuine production of the Mosaic age. No middle ground is possible. Well may Delitzsch have observed: 'We hold it as absolutely inconceivable that the Elohist portions concerning the Tabernacle and its furniture should be a historical fiction of the post-Exilic age.'¹

Wellhausen, after felling at one blow the Priestly Code, which is the main testimony to the Tabernacle and its ritual,

¹ Preface to Curtiss *Levitical Priests*.

proceeds to annihilate the subsidiary evidence—namely, that of the Prophets and historical books. After throwing *a priori* doubts upon the possibility of such a structure by reason of the contrast of the magnificence of its material with the desert simplicity of its lodgment, he declares (p. 39) that 'Hebrew tradition, even from the time of the Judges and the first Kings, knows nothing at all about it.' And again (p. 41): 'The Books of Judges and Samuel make mention, indeed, of many sanctuaries, but never among them of the tabernacle.'

It strikes one as suspicious that Wellhausen does not seek for early Hebrew tradition in the times of Joshua. It is convenient to speak of *Hexateuch* instead of *Pentateuch* and *Joshua*, and thus deprive Hebrew tradition of the Book of Joshua as independent authority. Still Dr. Baxter (p. 19) will not surrender 'the unambiguous testimony of the only recognised history of Israel' for that period, and adduces Joshua 18¹ in proof of the identity of the Shiloh Tabernacle and the wilderness tent of meeting. But he might have made a better case than quoting a passage which the critics assign to the Priestly writer, and regard as equivocal as any other narrative of P.¹ He might have tabulated the four references of *Joshua* to the Tabernacle, thus:—

Joshua 18 ¹ . (Attributed to P.)	Joshua 18 ¹⁰ . (Attributed to JE.)	Joshua 19 ⁵¹ . (Attributed to P.)	Joshua 22 ²⁹ . (Attributed to 'a distinct writer.')
'And the whole congregation of the children of Israel assembled together at Shiloh, and set up the Tabernacle of the congregation there.'	'And Joshua cast lots for them in Shiloh before the Lord.'	'These are the inheritances which Eleazar the priest and Joshua . . . divided for an inheritance by lot in Shiloh before the Lord, at the door of the Tabernacle of the congregation.'	'To build an altar for burnt-offerings, for meat-offerings, or for sacrifices, beside the altar of the Lord our God that is before his Tabernacle.'

On the face of it there appears such an undesigned solidarity about these four representations as to leave no doubt of the unity of authorship and the underlying truth. But if we have here, as the critics maintain, a triple tradition, then surely in the mouth of two or three witnesses the fallacious P. is convicted of veracity, and the truth is established.

But Wellhausen finds no allusion to the Tabernacle in

¹ The assignment by the critics of special clauses to P. is simply arbitrary. Notice their treatment of Numbers 14¹⁰. The whole paragraph 14⁸⁻²⁵ is assigned to the more or less historic JE, *except v. 10*, 'And the glory of the Lord appeared in the Tabernacle of the congregation before all the children of Israel.' This verse, because of its witness to the Tabernacle, is relegated to the unhistoric P. Such methods of treating any other author would be set aside as ridiculous.

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the Book of Judges, although two notices are 'witness of the most undesigned but conclusive kind'—namely, Judges 18³¹, 'All the time the house of God was in Shiloh'; and 21¹⁹, 'There is a feast of the Lord from year to year in Shiloh.' This last quotation compared with 1 Sam. 1^{3, 21}, 2¹⁹, which record the yearly visit of Elkanah and his family 'to offer unto the Lord the yearly sacrifice and his vow,' point unmistakably to the Deuteronomic law of yearly presentation of tithes and firstlings as the occasion intended.

Still more absurd is Wellhausen in denying allusion to the Tabernacle in *Samuel*. Dr. Baxter calls attention to such repeated expressions as 'mine altar,' 'the temple of the Lord,' 'my habitation,' 'the house of the Lord,' all of which are synonymous for the recognized place of worship, 'the tabernacle of the congregation' (1 Sam. 2²²) (p. 17).

Very properly does Dr. Baxter affirm this last synonym, 'the tabernacle of the congregation,' as 'an express historic affirmation of the existence' of the Mosaic Tabernacle. 'It is badly attested,' says Wellhausen. Of course it is if it utterly destroys his theory, which it does. But how does he try to discount the existence of the passage in the original? By the fact of its omission in the Septuagint. Are, then, all passages that are not attested by the LXX. discredited? The context of this passage affords obvious reasons why the seventy translators may have omitted it.

To this positive testimony it may be added that never once during the period of Judges and Samuel are the godly among the Israelites recorded as having worshipped at high places.

1 Kings 8⁴ is terribly unfriendly to Wellhausen's position that Hebrew tradition knows nothing at all about the Mosaic Tabernacle. There it is said, 'They brought up the ark of the Lord and the tent of meeting, and all the holy vessels that were in the tent, even these did the priests and Levites bring up.' It happens that there are two other references to *the tent* in the early chapters of 1 Kings. 'Zadok took the horn of oil out of the tent,' 1³⁹; 'Joab fled into the tent of the Lord, and caught hold on the horns of the altar,' 2²⁸.

Wellhausen declares that *the tent* must be the same in the three passages, and must therefore refer to David's temporary structure on Mount Zion. But if the three passages do not refer to the same tent, and the tent of 8⁴ be, after all, intended to imply the Mosaic Tabernacle, then, says Wellhausen, it must be discarded as an interpolation. This is accounted argument! The long and short of it is

simply this, that any and every passage which runs a tilt against Wellhausen's theory is to be got rid of at any price. However, on this occasion 'the tent' and 'the tent of the Lord' are the Mosaic Tabernacle; for who ever heard of the holy oil being stored in Zion's shelter-tent, or of the transference thereto of the central altar? On Wellhausen's own premisses, then, as the three tents must be identical, the tent of 8⁴ must be the Mosaic Tabernacle.

But at this point, however remarkable it may appear, the Book of Chronicles is pressed in as *evidence* to prove that the tabernacle is unhistorical. The Chronicler, whose aim was 'the completely altering the ancient history,' is adduced as testimony! Did he not represent Jehovah as saying, 'I have gone from tent to tent'? This determines for Wellhausen that there must have been a multiplicity of tents. And this, despite the parallel in Kings, 'from the day that I brought up the children of Israel out of Egypt, even to this day, I have walked in a tent.' What other language could the Chronicler have used of the Mosaic tabernacle which could cover, first the temporary tent of Moses before the tabernacle was made, then the countless takings down and putting up of the tabernacle in the wilderness, then the setting up at Shiloh, and its subsequent establishment at Gideon? We have three references by the Chronicler—(1) 'Zadok the priest is said to be deputed to act 'before the tabernacle of the Lord in the high place that was at Gibeon,' 1 Chron. 16³⁹; (2) the tabernacle of the Lord, which Moses made in the wilderness, and the altar of burnt-offering were at that time in the high place at Gibeon, 1 Chron. 21²⁹; (3) 'Gibeon, for there was the tent of meeting of God which Moses the servant of the Lord had made in the wilderness,' 2 Chron. 1³.

Where is the contradiction, asks Dr. Baxter (p. 33), between this last quotation and 1 Kings 3², of which Wellhausen makes so much? The author of Kings tells that the people sacrificed in the high places, because there was no house built for the name of the Lord until those days. He tells, further, that Solomon went to Gibeon to sacrifice there, for that was the great high place. But the Tabernacle was not the high place, it was situate at it. There was something which especially magnified the *bamah* of Gideon, and on account of which Solomon chose it for his great inaugural gatherings. The Chronicler states the reason which the writer of Kings implies; the statement is supplementary; *there* was the Mosaic Tabernacle with the altar of burnt-offering beside it, the tabernacle which had long been located on the high place of Gideon.

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All here is in harmony ; contradiction is out of the question. To accuse his opponents of manufacturing a history of the tabernacle is an impertinence. The history is in the documents, not often in systematised form, but constantly derivable from remarks which are on the face of them undesigned.

Dr. Baxter naturally throws in the unequivocal witness of the Psalms and Jeremiah. And in noticing Ps. 68⁶⁰, 'He forsook the tabernacle of Shiloh, the tent which he placed among men,' he could have strengthened his argument by observing that no other tent than the Mosaic did God so place, and that this tent was superseded by the Zion sanctuary, implying its continuance in its sacred capacity till that event. In his comment on Jerem. 7¹²⁻¹⁴, 'My place which was in Shiloh, where I caused my name to dwell at the first,' truly does Dr. Baxter say that if this passage had favoured the views of Wellhausen, he would have called on us either to blot out history altogether, or to accept this straightforward witness.

The dating of the three codes is properly ridiculed by Dr. Baxter. The first code (comprising Exod. 20²²⁻²³ 33) Wellhausen assigns to the first centuries of the divided kingdom, a sufficiently wide range of time, hazarding this date on the strength of his canon that each code must correspond with the praxis of the period of its promulgation. Naturally we look to the post-Rehoboam period to discover the outlines of the cult and praxis of that period in order that we may thereby discern such correspondence with the code as inevitably to determine the date of the latter. It is curious to find Wellhausen noting of this period that 'for reasons easily explained it is seldom that an occasion arises to describe the ritual' (*Prolegomena*, 55), and this is indeed true. But Wellhausen finds that the recorded praxis of the Patriarchs (who lived, one supposed, eight centuries previously), who went about building altars in Palestine, demonstrates this first Jehovistic code of Exodus, which was written by the same author as the narrator of patriarchal worship, to have been drawn up in one of the early post-Rehoboam centuries. The stories of patriarchal worship are, notwithstanding, fictitious ; they were invented as a glorification of the arrangements of the cult as we find them in the early years of the divided kingdom ; invented, in short, 'to glorify the origin of the sanctuaries to which they are attached, and to surround them with the nimbus of a venerable consecration' (*Prolegomena*, 31).

The notion that the *second* code—the Deuteronomic—originated in the time of Josiah meets with righteous reprobation on the grounds of the utter inconsequence of Wellhausen's argument as well as the inherent absurdity of the paradox. The book Deuteronomy is unanswerable witness to its own historical situation. 'Ye are not as yet come to the rest.' 'When ye go over Jordan . . . then it shall come to pass.' No sophistry can set aside such declarations. If such expressions, and they are constant, are inserted by the author of Deuteronomy for the purpose of deceiving the reader, then nothing in the book can be adduced in counter-evidence, as the author may be falsifying throughout. It is absurd then to found, or try to found, any argument from the passage, 'Ye shall not do after all the things that we do here this day, every man whatsoever is right in his own eyes.' How do we know that the people so acted? How do we know that anyone ever charged them with so acting? We have only the authority of the mendacious writer who said the Israelites had not crossed the Jordan when hundreds of years had elapsed since the event.

And, supposing that the people did take the bit between their teeth, was that an unprecedented epidemic of Josiah's age? Is it a proof that the Bible is of nineteenth-century authorship that it inveighs against contemporary vice? Granted that the historical situation suited the Josian period, did it not befit as well, and better, the moment of entrance into Canaan with its fresh and most alluring temptations? It is just this marvellous power of covering periods, all periods, with their new dangers, difficulties, and responsibilities that makes the Bible what it is to the present as to the past.

It is doubtless an admitted fact that Deuteronomy has a 'literary dependence' on the Jehovistic Code; but this fact is 'at least as explicable on the view that the Jehovistic Code was promulgated at Sinai, and Deuteronomy forty years after in the plains of Moab, and both by the same author' (p. 75).

Wellhausen assigns a post-Exilic origin to the *third* of the Codes, called by him the *Priestly Code*. This code, however, includes in some sort the 'Law of Holiness,' Lev. 17-16, which occupies, according to his idea, a position of priority to the rest. Dr. Baxter urges that such a notion embodies the anachronism that 'the tent of meeting is described (Lev. 17⁴, 5, 9) as standing, and as universally honoured, before the command for its construction was ever delivered' (p. 57).

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The Priestly Code must of course be relegated to a date many centuries after its apparent delivery for most cogent reasons. Such a revolution of the belief of all the ages of Jews and Christians must surely rest upon proof irrefragable. What, then, is the proof so confidently offered by Wellhausen? Why must the Priestly Code be certainly post-Deuteronomic? The proof is that whereas Deuteronomy enforces the central sanctuary in opposition to existing usage, the Priestly Code finds the people's practice in complete accord with its requirements.

Dr. Baxter puts the vaunted demonstration in the form of syllogism. (1) A Jewish law could only be delivered when the proprieties of the said law were duly observed. (2) The law was never duly observed till after the Exile. (3) Therefore the Priestly Code, which is based on the hallowing of the central sanctuary, must be post-Exilic (p. 58).

What a begging of the question does the major premiss contain? Who ever heard of a law presupposing universal compliance with its terms at the time of its delivery? Upon such terms could the Decalogue ever have been delivered? If the requirements of the Priestly Code were in operation, what need of the Code? The principle upon which Deuteronomy was assigned its date was its opposition to current praxis; that which guides the datings of the Priestly Code is its sanction of contemporary practice.

The second part of Dr. Baxter's work is occupied with an examination of Wellhausen's views on sacrifice. He again admits that Wellhausen's proposed method is unimpeachable, but complains that he departs from it at every step. 'He opens by telling the jury that he will try the evidence fully before them, and he straightway ignores, twists, and contradicts the evidence beyond all recognition.'

In his second chapter Dr. Baxter exposes the hollowness of Wellhausen's notions of sacrifice as a development. He ridicules the notion, as disproved by the only materials for forming a judgment, that Israel in regard to sacrifice were precisely on a par with other nations, the only differentiation consisting in the *being to whom* the sacrifice is offered, and the variation in sacrifices from age to age being dependent on advancing culture not on Divine command. He urges that Wellhausen's suggested germ for Israel's praxis is purely subjective as to date and matter; that whereas the Bible teaches that it was not till after Israel's emancipation through Moses that a divinely conceived and sanctioned ritual was

enjoined on Abraham's seed, that then for the first time their previous sacrificial knowledge and practice were gathered up, enlarged, and stereotyped; Wellhausen regards Israel as merely borne along the general stream of sacrificial development which had been flowing through all nations from the beginning. Dr. Baxter criticizes the creation of pure fancy that early religion consisted in the celebration of vintage or joyous festivals, to which the incentive was gratitude for good bestowed with the smallest reference to sin and the need of pardon; that, in short, evolution was wrought out from freedom to bondage, from joy to monotony, from life to death (p. 103).

Wellhausen never tires of dwelling on the irreconcilable contradictions between the codes, the utter variance between the Book of the Covenant and Deuteronomy on the one hand and the Priest's Code on the other. This contradiction is to him especially significant in their respective views of the origin of Israelitish sacrifice and the sanction of the same in the whole period from Moses to Ezra. He imagines that the P.C. represents sacrifice as unprescribed and virtually unknown until Moses, whereas the other codes represent it as a universal instinct. He reads the history of Israel in a light which displays the impossibility of reconciling it with the notions that such a code as the Levitical had ever been heard of. Indeed, such a notion is inconsistent with reason.

And yet, observes Dr. Baxter, if there was any Divine choice of Israel at all, if Moses was in any sense the establisher for Israel of a long-standing covenant-relationship with Jehovah, and if, in Wellhausen's own words, sacrifice is 'a natural and universally current expression of religious homage,' was it not most natural that their manner of Divine service, especially their sacrificial, should be under regulation, and should bear lasting testimony to their high privilege? (p. 109).

But, further, Wellhausen represents the authors of the Priest's Code as teaching that Moses was the first promulgator of sacrifice, whereas it was 'a very ancient and quite universal method of honouring the Deity.' Were then the Exilic forgers ignorant of all this? And if not, were they likely thus to stultify themselves?

But the facts are widely different. Never does the P.C. affirm that Moses was the originator of sacrifice, nor that the generations preceding him were ignorant of it. The P.C. ever presupposes on the part of all concerned an amount of

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familiar acquaintance with the details of sacrifice. Thus (Lev. 1^{1, 2, 3}) 'The Lord called unto Moses . . . out of the tabernacle of the congregation, saying, . . . if his offerings be a burnt-sacrifice of the herd,' &c. How did they know what a burnt-sacrifice meant, or how to present it? So, too, 'when any will offer a meat offering to the Lord' (2¹), and 'if his oblation be a sacrifice of peace-offerings' (3¹). It is only intelligible on the supposition that these offerings were immemorially presented, and were now being specially adapted to the fresh destiny of the people.

But all this receives confirmation from a singular change of method in the priestly writer in Levit. 4 and 5, which Dr. Baxter handles with much skill. Levit. 4 and 5 deal with sin-offerings and trespass-offerings. These were certainly not so formally recognized before as after Moses. Whether or not their essence was included in sacrifice from the first, 'one of the special sacrificial adaptations by Moses seems to have been to bring sin and trespass offerings into increased prominence . . . and it is observable that a good deal of discrimination occurs as to the different persons by whom these offerings are to be brought, and as to the varying changes which shall render them needful. May not this indicate that what is comparatively new from the lips of Moses requires minuter handling and prescription from him than other parts of his ritual which have been all along in great measure self-evident and familiar?' (p. 114). Certainly there is nothing in the P.C. which is inconsistent with the antiquity of sacrifice.

But Wellhausen further urges that this antiquity is negatived by the Priestly history. It will be remembered that Wellhausen regards vast portions of Genesis as of post-Exilic invention, and written in the interest of the Priestly school, and that having *excerpted* such passages as treat of sacrifice or have even a sacrificial reference, he calmly remarks that 'it is well known that the P.C. makes mention of no sacrificial act prior to the time of Moses.'

But, suppose that we were not to separate off and assign to the P.C. the sacrificial examples of Cain and Abel, of Noah, of the patriarchs; or suppose that we should postulate for the redactor enough common sense to avoid repeating in the same revision what had been said in the same complete work by a collaborateur, are we to infer, therefore, that sacrifice was non-existent?

But this so definite a sacrificial ritual can have arisen, we are told by Wellhausen, only as a consequence of the centralization of the cultus at Jerusalem. The argument is

very much on a par with his Josian date for Deuteronomy. But what, asks Dr. Baxter, 'is to hinder a definite ritual from being the cause as well as the consequence of centralization of worship?' (p. 126). The cause of it, and not the consequence, it was; and if Wellhausen had not read into the code what he could never read out of it, he would not have made such shipwreck.

The Jehovistic and Deuteronomic Codes are alleged by Wellhausen to agree in repudiating any Divine interposition through Moses or anyone else in the regulation of sacrifice. Dr. Baxter naturally points to Exodus 20^{24, 25} 'an altar of earth shalt thou make me . . . and if thou make me an altar of stone, thou shalt not build it of hewn stones. Neither shalt thou go up by steps unto mine altar.' Jehovah cannot be unconcerned with ritual, he urges, when he determines the very material of the altar and the mode of its approach (p. 133). And the announcement of Jehovah, 'In every place where I cause my name to be remembered I will come unto thee, and will bless thee' absolutely conditions the locality of worship, and renders nugatory Wellhausen's declaration that 'Israel's sacrifice is distinguished, not by the manner in which, but by the Being to whom it is offered' (*Prolegomena*, 54). With this the Deuteronomic phrase coincides in intent: 'At the place which the Lord your God shall choose.' More than this, the *kind* of animal that can alone be accepted as a firstling is carefully prescribed, and the periods at which united festival is to be kept unto Jehovah, whilst there we have also careful details as to the *how* of sacrificial requirements (Ex. 23¹⁸, 34²⁵).

Dr. Baxter insists with much force that there are passages of such a nature that the codes from which they are taken necessitate the simultaneous existence of such a code as Leviticus in order to acquit Jehovah of injustice.

E.g. Deut. 20¹⁸: 'That they teach you not to do after all their abominations which they have done unto their gods; so should ye sin against the Lord your God.' He urges that the 'abominations' would not be changed by merely speaking over them Jehovah's name. The 'how' of the sacrifice is the point here; so, too, notably in Deut. 12^{30, 31}: 'Take heed that thou inquire not after their gods, saying, How do these nations serve their gods? even so will I do likewise.' The caution could not have been stronger had the Deuteronomist foreseen that in the far future a Wellhausen would arise to declare that the 'to whom' of sacrifice was the all in all. Ritual left to man's devising would only issue

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in 'abomination.' The codes without the Priestly Code were certainly no exhaustive guide to legitimate ritual.

The codes then failing, does the history support the new theory as to the origin or regulation of Israelitish sacrifice? The history, according to Wellhausen, represents the cultus and sacrifice on all occasions as occupying a large place in the life of the nation and individual. Here Wellhausen contradicts himself, for he had told us that in pre-Exilic time the notion of *national* worship was foreign to Hebrew antiquity. This by the way; but what of the minute divine interest in sacrificial detail to be found in the Jehovistic narrative Ex. 12²²⁻²⁵? The blood put in the basin, the dipping of the hyssop, the striking the lintel, the annual ordinance, these surely are priestly requirements in an unpriestly document. And minutiae even more rigorous are laid down in Exod. 13³⁻¹⁶.

But what is the teaching of the more strictly historical books? In the Book of Judges we have no attempt at a detailed outline of sacrificial ritual. The occasions for it do not arise; how then can appeal to this transitional and abnormal period with any fairness be made? Yet the narrator unquestionably presupposes a code similar to the priestly. It is a gratuitous evasion to slur all the passages which deal with breach of law as sin, or to assign them to some late editor who from his own point of view, or for his own ends, pragmatized in such expressions as 'turning aside quickly out of the way wherein their fathers walked, obeying the commandments of the Lord.' Where were these commandments to be found save in Levitical ordinance? Where but in the Priestly Code is the Nazarite vow described? Why should the priest stand before the ark? Why the inquiring of the Lord whose method is so well known? How is it that the regulations of burnt-offerings and meat-offerings and peace-offerings are so familiar? Even the peculiarities of the abnormal in such instances as Gideon and Jonathan postulate the normal.

But, to the 'where' as well as to the 'how' of sacrifice Wellhausen denies Divine command. And here the book of Kings is utterly destructive of the theory. With the author of Kings the cultus outside Jerusalem is accounted heretical. The righteousness or unrighteousness of the kings of Judah is absolutely gauged by their attitude to the 'high places.' Did they destroy them or did they not? Upon the reply to this question the king stands or falls in the Divine estimate. How does Wellhausen dispose of this crucial evidence?

These notes are inserted, he tells us, by a redactor of Exilic date. How does he know? Had the redactor, asks Dr. Baxter, seen the Book of Kings before the late redactor operated upon the book? And this is the kind of stuff whereby a 'profound impression has been produced on the scholarship of Europe' (*Prolegomena*, Preface).

Are the historians supported by the early writing prophets? Here Wellhausen departs from his practice of dealing in generalities and scraps of quotations; he offers chapter and verse. Is it then inconceivable, as he supposes, in the estimation of the prophets that God could have delivered regulations concerning sacrifice? Do the prophets leave it to be inferred that God's law 'deals in no sense with ritual'? Is it the use or the abuse of sacrifice that they anathematize? Does not Wellhausen inadvertently himself answer the question when, speaking of the nation's cultus, he remarks that it was in their superstitious ever-estimate of it that lay their sin and their ruin?

Wellhausen appeals to Amos. The prophet had written (4⁴): 'Come to Bethel and transgress; at Gilgal multiply transgression; and bring your sacrifices every morning, and your tithes after three years; and offer a sacrifice of thanksgiving with leaven . . . for so ye like, ye children of Israel.' The prophet in this context denounces the people's sin, and indicates that while they so sin Temple services will not avert God's judgments. But where is the inference that such services would be rejected if they altered their habits? Dr. Baxter shows up the falseness of Wellhausen in emphasizing 'ye' in the clause 'for so ye like,' as though their cult were will-worship, not an ordinance of Jehovah. The 'ye' is not in the original (p. 185).

Wellhausen ventures to press in two passages in Hosea as evidence. (1) The prophet's complaint (4^{6ff}) that the priests cultivate sacrifice instead of Torah. (2⁸): 'Ephraim hath built for himself many altars to sin. How many soever my instructions may be,' &c. As to the first supposed reference, Dr. Baxter reminds him that sacrifice is not mentioned, that the censure is addressed to lives of immorality which no sacrifices can render acceptable. As to the second, Wellhausen mistranslates and suppresses the main point, observing that 'all that be drawn from the contrast, "instead of following my instructions they offer sacrifice," is that the prophet had never once dreamed of the possibility of cultus being made the subject of Jehovah's directions.' What an inference! The passage really reads, 'though I write for him

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the manifold injunctions of my laws (or 'my law in ten thousand precepts'). Why does Wellhausen suppress the important verb 'write'? Where were these thousands of laws but in a code which Israel possessed? What code but the Levitical could this be? The context forbids any other. It was 'the sacrifices of Jehovah's offerings' that were rejected because of the people's iniquity (p. 188).

Dr. Baxter shows how Wellhausen misinterprets Isa. i ^{10, 20} in the same way. The prophet's indignation is pointed at moral delinquency. 'Let the sacrifices be never so appropriate, such externalities can never be acceptable so long as the whole heart and the whole life are full of unrighteousness.' And then he brings another charge of suppression: 'Had he gone on and quoted *vv.* 13-14, he would have shown the passage to be so saturated with Levitical phraseology' as to determine Isaiah's reference to the Priestly Code. 'Incense, new moons, convocations, set feasts, solemn assembly,' demonstrate Isaiah's knowledge of the code (p. 190).

In dealing with this part of Wellhausen's theory, Dr. Baxter might have urged two considerations: (1) Wellhausen parries all argument drawn from the prophetic reference to God's Torah by limiting such to prophetic 'instruction.' But there are cases where this cannot apply. In Isaiah 24⁵ Torah is parallel with the 'everlasting covenant' and with 'ordinance.' It deals with the past. Cf. Amos 2⁴, Hos. 8¹. From Hosea 4⁶ we learn that a priestly law had not only been disobeyed but forgotten; yet its knowledge and interpretation were a priestly inheritance. Since the law is employed as one with 'the covenant' and the conditions it imposes, the idea must date back to a definite historic event—namely, the legislation of Sinai.

(2) Jeremiah (7 ²¹⁻²³) seems to deny that at the Exodus Jehovah had given any commands concerning sacrifice. The meaning is clear: Ritual worship was not the foundation of God's covenant, but rather obedience. If this were neglected externals were hateful. But the point to be observed is this. Jeremiah unquestionably referred, and often, to the legislation of the Deuteronomist as Mosaic. Deuteronomy, however, contains numerous injunctions as to sacrifices. It is impossible, therefore, to take Jeremiah's words in their bare literal sense, irrespective of context or circumstance, as the Wellhausen argument requires. The words of the prophet can no more preclude the sacrificial injunction of the Levitical than of the Deuteronomic Code. The prominence of sacrificial legislation in the Priestly Code has nothing to do with

it. The 'how' of sacrifice in the Priestly Code must have occupied more space and greater detail than could be expected in Deuteronomy. But no higher position is allotted to them in one book than in the other.

Dr. Baxter, after remarking that 'I will have mercy and not sacrifice' was uttered by one who lived under the code and observed its feasts, with much pertinence takes us to the post-Exilic prophets, and bids us examine whether they who, as admitted by all, had the Priestly Code before them, use different language and adopt another attitude to it than the earlier prophets who, on the hypothesis of the critics, possessed it not. Does Zechariah, for example, bid the people observe a newly established ritual? Not so. The language of the older prophets is still heard: 'Speak ye every man truth . . . let none of you imagine evil in your hearts against his neighbour.' Morality is here, as before, God's great requirement. Why is Haggai, the prophet of the rebuilding of the house, silent about the supposed revolution in ritual? He was employing all his powers in stirring up a waning enthusiasm. On one occasion he refers (2¹²) to some Levitical injunctions, obviously as immemorial; and how does he follow up the reference? 'That which they offer is unclean.' Why does not Wellhausen say *here*, as of a parallel passage in Isaiah, 'Certainly the prophet could not possibly have uttered such language if the sacrificial worship had, according to any tradition whatever, passed for being specifically Mosaic'? Lastly, Malachi (1¹⁰) re-echoes the sentiments of all his pre-Exilic predecessors.

Ezekiel, according to Wellhausen, is the prophet of a State-ordered formalism. 'The Temple was in ruins, the cultus at an end, its *personnel* out of employment.' An exiled priest, he fancies, paints the sacred praxis as he carried it in his memory and published it as a programme for the future restoration of the theocracy.

Imagine Ezekiel carrying in his memory the Priestly Code with its endless detail of tabernacle construction and sacrificial injunction! But what does he mean? He views the prophet's efforts at one moment as a recast of the past, at another as a making all things new. To put the most liberal construction on his words so that they may convey a coherent meaning, he may intend to convey that Ezekiel is a connecting link between an unauthorized and an authorized cult; that henceforth begins a new departure in sacrificial legislation.

But, as Dr. Baxter urges (p. 229), he never himself hints that

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a new era has dawned, that a new responsibility attaches. He never speaks of himself as the abrogator of the old, the pioneer of the new; nor do his successors ever so regard him. The newly returned captives under Zerubbabel and Joshua never glorify Ezekiel or make mention of his new revelations, or a sacrificial programme for the first time legalized through him. They 'build the altar of the God of Israel,' they offer 'the daily burnt-offerings by number according to the ordinance,' they keep 'the feast of tabernacles as it is written in the law of Moses, the man of God (Ezek. 3). A century later, when the Temple is completed, without any reference at all to Ezekiel, the command is, 'Bring the book of the law of Moses which the Lord had commanded to Israel' (Neh. 8).

The post-Exilic prophets are entirely at one with the post-Exilic historians. There is no notice there of any new priestly revelation to Ezekiel. 'Haggai bids the people remember "the word which I covenanted with you when ye came out of Egypt." . . . The prophet Malachi is still more definite, "Remember the law of Moses my servant which I commanded unto him in Horeb for all Israel."

But more than all this, Ezekiel joins the post-Exilic writers in 'enforcing, as having ever existed in Israel, a definite recognized code of Divine commandments and statutes' from which sacrificial enactments cannot be eliminated (Ezek. 5^{6, 9}) (p. 234). What is the meaning of such constant expressions as 'my sanctuary,' 'mine holy things,' 'my Sabbaths,' 'my law'? Were these all unauthorized? Why then does Jehovah appropriate them with the significant 'my'? Is it moral obliquity that Jehovah here stigmatizes? What then means Ezek. 22^{8, 20}? 'Her priests have done violence to my law, and have profaned my holy things; they have put no difference between the holy and the common, neither have they caused men to discern between the unclean and clean.'

Is not this Divine prescription of cultus?

And, as with sacrificial cult, so with the law of the central sanctuary. Words have no meaning if Ezekiel does not recognize this as an ancient law of paramount importance which Israel had transgressed. 'The mountains of Israel' are specially prophesied against as having been illegally made the rivals of Jehovah's sanctuary (6¹³). Nothing could be clearer in its reference than 20^{27, f} to bamoth aberration, dating from their entrance into the land: 'when I had brought them into the land . . . then they saw every high hill . . . and they offered there their sacrifices, and *there* they presented the provocation of their offering; there also they made their sweet

savour, and they poured out there their drink-offerings.' And, even more striking still, the Oholah and Aholibah of Ezek. 23: on the one hand, the sanctuary in Samaria, the unauthorized tent; on the other, the Temple on Zion, 'My tent in her.'

But, not only from the earlier divisions of Ezekiel's prophecy is no support forthcoming for Wellhausen's fancies, the latter portion is equally unavailable. It is absurd to seek here for an embodiment of the real. Indeed, had the returned exiles looked for it, they would have found it incapable of realization. All is dark. The site undefined, the dimensions of the city irreconcilable with possibility, the holy oblation impracticable, no portion of the vision capable of literal execution. On what rational principle of exegesis can the sacrifices be regarded as less ideal than the mountain, the city, the inheritance, and the prince with which they are associated?

On the other hand, on the supposition that the vision were the groundwork of a new programme, how can it possibly be accounted for that Wellhausen's most influential functionary of post-Exilic time, the high priest, is not alluded to, nor that day of days 'the Day of Atonement,' nor the Feast of Pentecost, to say nothing of others of the laws of Judaism?

And yet Ezekiel knows all about the ordinances of Leviticus, 'all the appointed feasts of the house of Israel,' 'the set feasts of the Lord, even holy convocations,' and therefore he is able in his vision to embody selected rites from the well-known ritual. But, with Wellhausen, in the Priestly Code the Tabernacle, the High Priest, the Day of Atonement, are the house, the functionary, and the day *par excellence*. If then Ezekiel was the first to draw up a sacrificial ritual for the restored of Judah, not only is it a ritual which neither historian nor prophet ever deign to notice, but it is also a ritual which is lamentably imperfect regarding matters so vital as to involve 'the copestone of the sacred structure,' 'the culmination of the whole service,' 'the holiest ceremonies of all the year,' and 'the basis at once of life and of religion.'

Dr. Baxter further objects that the Ezekielian theory is opposed to common sense. Is there an instance on record, he asks (p. 263), where laws have remained uncoded till nationality is effaced? And what possible object could Ezekiel have had in so doing? Would these laws ever be needed? Were they for the guidance of Israel's praxis after Babylonian exile was an accomplished fact? How could he foresee this? To foresee it would be a piece of that *wretched supernaturalism* which Wellhausen is ever ridiculing. Yet the troubles of

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the people were multiplying; not a sign was there of hope. How could he know that the grasp of Babylon would relax, that the city 'Jehovah is there' would replace Jerusalem? The foresight of a restored temple would not be a whit less extraordinary than the announcement to Eli of the future priesthood of Zadok, or to Jeroboam of a King Josiah who in long subsequent time would annihilate his heretical cult, or the prophetic announcement of Cyrus, all of which are dismissed as 'the most unblushing example of historical worthlessness' (*Prolegomena*, 285). It is utterly absurd to say that Wellhausen's post-dating of 1 Sam. 2²⁷ involves no reference to the incredibility of the supernatural as such. Not a prediction in the Old Testament is post-dated without a motive, and that motive is determined by one *a priori* assumption; and Dr. Baxter is fully justified in saying that Wellhausen would have treated such 'anticipation' on the part of Ezekiel with scorn, had it not been that his 'programme' necessarily embraces it.

But again, if it had not been necessary to codify for nearly a thousand years, why should it be necessary in Ezekiel's time? If Ezekiel knew of the return, which he did, he knew also of the appointed time, for it had been proclaimed. If memory had served so well before, why not now? The Captivity was running its course, and common sense would dictate that which actually occurred—namely, that the older men among them would remember the glory of the first house and its cult. Why then codify?

For, this new Ezekielian programme was a gathering up for the guidance of restored Israel either of the ideal or of the actual. Wellhausen precludes himself from the former alternative. For him there was 'no pattern shown in the mount.' It must then have been a retrospect of the actual. But what an actual to codify! 'They have defiled my sanctuary with all their detestable things.' 'Her priests have done violence to my law, and have profaned my holy things.' Was this the programme for the future restoration of the theocracy?

Again, if Ezekiel stereotyped pre-Exilic practice, was not he 'a surer witness to pre-Exilic laws than those who lived a century later and who had never seen a pre-Exilic sacrifice? What right had these latter . . . to alter the regulations of such a distinguished priest and prophet as Ezekiel' (p. 278)?

The origin of sacrifice is discovered by Wellhausen in the aping of earthly courts, the primary notion being the offering of a present by way of homage. Dr. Baxter does not find

the 'literary sources' to which Wellhausen appeals lending support to such a notion. They 'represent sacrifice as existing in the days of Cain and Abel, before kings were ever heard of.' Wellhausen represents the pre-Exilic *material* of sacrifice as in itself indifferent, if the thing offered only have value of some sort, and is 'the property of the offerer.' But the 'literary sources' are again polemical, for Cain's offering failed to secure Divine respect. Abraham's ram was not the property of the offerer. Moses insisted that a certain sacrifice *must* be from 'our cattle' (p. 291).

A writer of the critical school has exclaimed against Dr. Baxter's employment of passages from any source but J in evidence of early customs. But what nonsense! The critics create a source, they call it P: they say it is a late (and unhistoric) source, and then would forbid the employment of it in evidence. Very pretty! Suppose it be replied that P, as they term him, it, or them, is not contradictory of J. How does the exclusion of animal food before the deluge contradict J with his story of Abel's sacrifice? There is not one word about the eating of any portion of the sacrifice, by Abel or his successors, till the Mosaic law gave the command. The so-called contradiction is purely a critical manufacture. Two can play at the 'pair of tongs and an open window.'

And Wellhausen himself can use P as evidence when it suits him, for we read, p. 54: 'Noah . . . built the first altar after the flood, and long before him Cain and Abel sacrificed *in the same way* as was usual in Palestine thousands of years afterwards.' How does Wellhausen obtain from the 'literary sources' his information that the shew-bread was among the 'most primitive' offerings? Only from his post-Exilic P. How does he know that *hiktir* is the most usual term for the conveyance of an ancient sacrifice? He learns it almost exclusively from the 'unhistoric' P (p. 295).

That there was an absolute equality of old between bloodless and bloody offerings is another of Wellhausen's doctrines. He refers us to Micah 6 in proof that oil and rams were equally efficacious. Yet, just before, he had adduced this passage in proof that all the sacrifices therein named were equally valueless.

Wellhausen proclaims that a historical evolution is observable in the *materials* of sacrifice: *e.g.* in the earlier period he says that 'ordinary flour' (*kemach*) was the material invariably used, but that in the later (Priestly) literature 'fine flour' (*soleth*) takes its place, and that this is a mark of ad-

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vancement. To this Dr. Baxter replies (p. 300) that the oblation which the Priestly Code (Numb. 5¹⁵) represents the man as bringing to the priest for his wife is not *soleth* but *kemach*; whilst Ezekiel, in describing the evil practices of Israel after the Exodus, declares that the sacrificial meal which they then employed was not *kemach* but *soleth* (Ezek. 16¹⁹). With equal emphasis does Dr. Baxter disprove Wellhausen's conceit (1) as to any evolution in the order of *preparation* of sacrificial meal, pointing out that P never indicates any preference for meal in the 'raw' condition; on the contrary, it proclaims the oven, the flat plate, and the frying-pan as legal instruments for preparing meal for the altar. (2) He points out that the supposed priestly development from *boiled* flesh to *raw* is absolutely unwarrantable.

The lateness of the Priest's Code is supposed to be especially evidenced by its glorification of *incense* as a detail of sacrifice. Wellhausen finds no references to incense in the older literature, none indeed till the times of 'Jeremiah and Zephaniah.' Let it be noted that two distinct substances are equally rendered *incense* in E.V. (1) *Lebhonah*, pure frankincense, a substance of itself, is named six times in the Priestly Code, and is never presented as a separate offering, but as an adjunct: as, for instance, to meal-offerings, and is always to be burnt on the altar of burnt-offering outside the Tabernacle. (2) *K'toreth* is a composite substance made of such ingredients as stacte, galbanum, and *lebhonah*. It is differentiated from *lebhonah* in that it never reaches the altar of burnt-offering outside the Tabernacle, and that it has a golden altar entirely to itself inside the Tabernacle, where it was presented twice every day by the high priest as 'a perpetual incense before the Lord.' It was this *K'toreth* which he took with him once a year into the Holy of Holies to be burnt before the mercy seat.

Now, from Wellhausen's words, we should expect that this *K'toreth* is for the first time borne witness to by Jeremiah and Zephaniah, but by neither of them is the term once mentioned. True, Jeremiah uses a word derived from the same root, but his use of it shows that, instead of being a new invention, it was in prevalent use long before his day. He represents their 'fathers, kings, and princes, through long periods of rebellion, as having provoked the Almighty' by the misdirection of incense to the queen of heaven (Jer. 44), which was a contravention of the law of God. And not only were they breaking the statute as to the *to whom*, but as to the *where*, by offering it elsewhere than on the golden

altar, and as to the *by whom*, for it was being offered by ordinary worshippers instead of by the priesthood.

The Books of Kings are a constant witness to the antiquity of incense. The kings are being constantly charged with burning incense (*mekatterim*) on the high places. This is the incense-offering, most certainly carried back to the days of Solomon.

But this incense theory is absolutely disproved by Ezekiel. 'My *k'toreth* and mine oil' refer to the squandering on idols, in *past ages*, of what should have been scrupulously reserved for Jehovah. And what can Wellhausen think of Ezekiel's *silence* about this incense in his closing vision? And what of the silence of Nehemiah when he is enumerating the sacrificial requisites stored in the Temple? Indeed, not a single historical statement is there of the *actual offering* of *k'toreth* in the whole of the post-exilic literature.

And yet in the face of all evidence, Wellhausen suggests that the use of incense must have crept in about the Josian period as 'an innovation from a more luxuriously developed foreign cultus.' Unfortunate this, for Josiah happened to be the king who banished foreign cultus. And, of course, no preceding period could boast of luxury at home. Solomon was a pauper!

As there was no incense used of old, there could, of course, be no 'golden altar for incense'; it 'is foreign, even, to the *kernel* of the Priestly Code itself' (*Prolegomena*, 65). Its appearance in Exod. 30 is to be regarded as an 'appendix,' and 'there is no historical corroboration of its existence.' The author of 1 Kings 6 must have been napping, then, when he stated of Solomon that 'the whole altar that belonged to the oracle he overlaid with gold'; and when he wrote (1 Kings 7⁴⁸⁻⁵⁰) 'and Solomon made all the vessels that were in the house of the Lord; the golden altar, and the table whereupon the shewbread was, of gold.'

Wellhausen insists that the altar of incense, if commanded at all, *must* have been commanded in Exod. 25. He thinks that all the other contents of Ch. 30 figure naturally there as an *Appendix*, the altar of incense being the most important utensil of the sanctuary, and that its omission in Ch. 25 is more than significant. But there is no *must* in the matter, for there is no uniform principle attaching to the enumerations; and Dr. Baxter might have told him that the Samaritan text transfers Exod. 30¹⁻¹⁰, not to Ch. 25, but to 26³⁵. Moreover, it is in its appropriate place as connected with the daily ministrings of the priests.

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The most closely reasoned chapter in the book is Chapter IX., in which Dr. Baxter completely turns Wellhausen's position that in pre-Exilic time the *olah* or burnt-offering occupied a subordinate, whilst the *shelamim* or peace-offerings occupied the prominent position. Dr. Baxter appeals to the facts that only one kind of offering, the *olah*, was presented by Noah; that the same was commanded to Abraham; the same offered only by Balaam ('the Aramean who understands as well as any Israelite how to offer sacrifices to Jehovah,' Wellhausen, 54); the same *olah* by Jephthah, Manoah, Elijah, Samuel at Mizpah, Solomon at Gibeon. And yet we are told that *olah* was never prominent in Israel till after the Exile. Wellhausen offers in proof of this assertion what has already been falsified, that the '*olah* seldom occurs alone.' He points to twenty-seven passages, and Dr. Baxter finds that in *none* of these passages does *shelamim* occur alone, whereas in eleven of them the *olah* does occur alone (p. 379). This surely points to the prominence of the *olah*; and yet let us hear Wellhausen (70, 71):—

'It must be borne in mind that, as a rule, it is only great sacrificial feasts that the historical books take occasion to mention, and that, consequently, the burnt-offering, notwithstanding what has been said, comes before us with greater prominence than can have been the average case in ordinary life. Customarily, it is certain, none but thankofferings were offered.'

That is to say, that Israel at its great gatherings elevated to honour and prominence an offering which was usually treated with contempt! This is not argument. We find the *olah* either alone or coupled with *shelamim*, and this constantly; if these were not the ordinary sacrifices we have no means of determining what were.

Wellhausen teaches that in pre-Exilic time a sacrifice was not so much an altar offering as a social meal, but that all this was altered by the Priestly Code; sacrificial meals and sociality become henceforth a thing of the past. Dr. Baxter emphatically denies this statement, urging that the early chapters of Leviticus not only allow but ordain the materials for the people's meals, with their duration, and further prescribe who shall participate thereof, Lev. 7^{15, 16, 17, 19, 20}. It is manifest, moreover, from Lev. 17¹⁻⁷ that the *flesh* of the victims is intended to be distributed between priests and worshippers in the proportions laid down previously in the book. Lev. 19 ordains that a sacrifice of *shelamim* shall be eaten the same day as it was offered. So, too, with the sacrifice of thanksgiving (*todhah*), Lev. 2^{20f}. All *shelamim*, in

short, had by the code to be accompanied by meals. As to the relative predominance of burnt and peace offerings, we have a guide in the description of the offerings of the twelve princes of Israel at the dedication of the altar, Numb. 7. The animals for the burnt-offerings number thirty-six, for peace-offerings two hundred and four, and all these connected with a meal. And yet we are told that the burnt-offering is *everywhere* in the foreground!

Dr. Baxter is particularly acute in unearthing the countless self-contradictions of his foe, of which his exposure of Wellhausen's treatment of *misbach ha olah* is a good sample. On p. 66 of the *Prolegomena* the only use of the 'altar of burnt-offering' was to gild a forgery. The Priestly Code would have none of it. On p. 72, however, the same expression has become quite right and proper: it vouches for an important sacrificial evolution. What on the former page was an absurd misnomer tacked on to a forged piece of furniture, never *once* occurring in the true code, is on the latter page one of the best indications of the code's provisions!

Wellhausen further argues that the use of the name 'the altar of burnt-offering' as a standing name for the altar in the Priest's Code indicates how this offering had in later times risen into prominence. Dr. Baxter replies that never throughout the code does the name once occur except when the construction or use of the two altars (burnt and incense) has to be recorded *side by side*. 'The altar' is the ordinary name. Lastly, the later writers know nothing which could corroborate the theory. Ezra, Nehemiah, and the post-Exilic prophets hallow the ancient term 'the altar' without once adopting 'the altar of burnt-offering' as their *usus*.

Nowhere, then, does the Code assert for the burnt-offering the exclusive prominence which is claimed; ever does it recognize and enact a multitude of sacrificial meals. The pre-Exilic history affords no presumption whatever against the Mosaic origin of the Priestly Code.

In Chapter X. Dr. Baxter severely criticizes Wellhausen's assertion that the sin and trespass offerings were unknown before the Exile. The former (*chattath*) was certainly known to the writer of Lev. 23¹⁹, and the trespass-offering (*asham*) to the writer of Lev. 19²¹. The suggestion of a late insertion is wholly gratuitous. Wellhausen further says that the burnt-offering is significantly discriminated from other offerings by the fact that the Priestly Code requires it to be slain 'at the north side of the altar,' as 'always expressly stated.' This is

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not true. In only one of the three statements of the ritual of the burnt-offering does the code insist on this ; and it is also expressly prescribed for the sin and trespass offerings. The notion that these last were simply at first mulcts payable to the priests is absurd. The assignment of flesh to the priest is altogether a subordinate and supplementary regulation.

Very pungent is Dr. Baxter's handling of Wellhausen's *silence* argument to prove that the sin-offering first comes to be known in Ezekiel's days (p. 461). 'Has not Wellhausen suggested in another connexion that if it is seldom that an *occasion* arises to describe the ritual, the absence of details of the ritual need not surprise us?' But there is not silence here. Both *chattath* and *asham* are mentioned in the historical books ; of course Wellhausen will expect to find abundant trace of these in *post-Exilic* writers ; but 'they are barely equal to the pre-Exilic references.'

Nor do the Prophets come to his aid. There is 'strong inferential proof that sin-offerings were known to Micah' ; whilst there is 'not the slightest specification of either *chattath* or *asham* on the pages of any post-Exilic prophet'!

If these offerings come to light in Ezekiel's time, how comes Jeremiah, his contemporary, who as a priest was bound to know the *chattath*, never to mention it? And does not Ezekiel take for granted that his every reader will understand its meaning and ritual as they understand that of *olah* and *shelamin*? Why does he not make a distinction between old and new? Till he comes to his ideal vision he never mentions it. Was it part of the programme of a future theocracy? Strange that no subsequent prophet notes the innovation.

Chapter XI. is busied with convicting Wellhausen of a series of misrepresentations of the Priestly Code.

Dr. Baxter's book has defects of tone and of style, but for all that it is not too much to say that he demolishes Wellhausen's theory. The book must be read to understand its force ; the new theory is destroyed not by merely disproving accidental items, but by proving the very foundations upon which Wellhausen rests it to be simply hallucinations ; assertions that what is the reverse of fact is fact, and that what is given as fact is interpolated, or untrue. Dr. Baxter has been abused, he has not been answered, and that simply because he is unanswerable.

ART. IX.—STRONG'S 'CHRISTIAN ETHICS.'

Christian Ethics. Eight Lectures preached before the University of Oxford in the year 1895, on the foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton. By THOMAS B. STRONG, M.A., Student of Christ Church, Examining Chaplain to the Lord Bishop of Durham. (London, New York, and Bombay, 1896.)

CHRISTIAN ethics present a subject so valuable that no treatise either on theology or evidence can have much importance save so far as it both aids and appeals to ethics. Influence upon character is the highest result of truth, and the power to affect character forms a test of truth which appeals to all who take any interest in goodness, either for themselves or for society. Moreover, the subject is so large that ample room exists in it for renewed treatment even of views which, as Mr. Strong says of his own, are not very novel; and the serious reader of his work will find little reason to complain of any want of freshness. The chief criticism we have to make is on the form of the work, and is anticipated by the author when he admits how difficult he has found it to place his matter in the right order and place. The idea of a volume of *Bampton Lectures* seems not impossible to state. The argument should be one capable of being set forth in eight sermons with such clearness and interest as shall enable intelligent minds to follow it in the hearing and in the reading. As for the notes, they have in many successful cases consisted almost wholly of extracts from authorities in support or illustration of the lectures; but they may also be well permitted to assume the form of special dissertations which experts might value while ordinary readers could dispense with them, by way of expanding points which could not have been treated at large in the pulpit without spoiling the proportions of the sermons. But if the notes consist of a renewal or even a repetition of the discussion in the text, we feel that the arrangement into lectures presents itself as a defect for purposes of publication, and that the plan which Mr. Strong suggests as an alternative would have been best—namely, to work up the material into a continuous whole, making in the delivery whatever omissions the exigencies of time required. We cannot deny that a considerable degree of this defect offers itself in parts of Mr. Strong's volume, especially in the relation of Lectures III. and IV. to the long and excellent note appended to them. After

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all, however, this is but a defect of arrangement, and detracts nothing from the great value of the thought and learning which is set before us.

The special character of Christian ethics which Mr. Strong desires to present is thus described by himself :

'The position maintained in these lectures is briefly this : that the Christian theory of moral life is not merely a new formulation of the old experience ; nor is it merely a restatement of old truths with certain new virtues added ; but it is a view of life based upon a radically different experience of facts. The reconciliation of the finite and the Infinite—of man and God—which the Incarnation achieved, was at most a dream of the most enlightened Greek philosophers and a hope of the most enlightened Jews. When it happened, man was admitted, in proportion to the certainty of his faith in it, into a clear and decisive knowledge of the spiritual Divine order' (p. xi).

Perhaps it is hardly enough to say that the reconciliation of finite and infinite was but a dream to the Greeks. They knew not, indeed, how to state it. They resembled the excellent people among ourselves who desire to believe in a real reception of Christ in the Eucharist, yet dare not assert the Real Presence. But that some spiritual facts behind the visible life were necessary as a basis for morals as we know them, or desire to see them in humanity, was as certain to them in one form or other as the existence of a planet as yet undiscovered has been to the astronomer, because of the motions of bodies which he has observed.

It is to the consciousness of the necessity of facts on which to found moral demands, combined with the difficulty of defining the facts, that we owe the strange difficulty which meets us in moral treatises of all ages, of knowing whether they teach a science or an art. Are they observing as a branch of natural history the means by which man's moral experiences arise and are fostered, or are they teaching him the best methods of strengthening his conscience and exhorting him to use them for the production of results which are as yet quite future and contingent? In the early ages of Greek thought, physical theories of the nature of things came first and moral inquiries were connected with these. Now the systems of evolution return to the same connexion. Mr. Herbert Spencer gives us a theory of the universe in which the evolution of morality in man follows in uninterrupted course from the beginning of material existence, and is to be improved into perfection by the operation of the original forces. We do not marvel that this great writer confesses

that in his ethical discussions he has not derived the assistance he had expected from the results of his previous inquiries into evolution. And we quite understand the necessity which drives Von Hartmann to ask of us a spiritual sympathy which we are quite unable to feel, with the Unknowable Power which his system has deprived of every intelligible quality that could deserve sympathy. Socrates dismissed the physical systems of previous philosophers as mere encumbrances in his moral investigations, and physical systems are still equally worthless for ethical inquiry.

But though physical laws be thus useless and inapplicable to ethical argument, yet ethics never have ceased to be founded on supposed facts and laws of the universe and of human life. No philosopher ever laid down a system without desiring to influence men to adopt it, nor did any of them ever hope to influence men except by assuring them that the facts of life and the plan of life which is founded on its facts prove his system to be true. Philosophies are not needed to induce men to follow their impulses like the beasts; ethics imply restraint and guidance, were it only in the choice of pleasures. No teacher can claim to exercise restraint and guidance except on the ground that he knows a plan of life more conformable to the real wants of his pupils than they would be able to discover for themselves. The very notion of a philosophy implies, therefore, the knowledge of some facts which lie below the surface—something regarding human life which is unrealized but ought to be realized. However material a philosophy may be, it cannot be itself a material thing. It is a thought, a conception—that is to say, something mental, yet something which possesses reality, and could not without the support of real facts claim the attention of men or the guidance of their lives. Every great philosophy was a preparation for the true ethical basis which is found in the Incarnation.

Mr. Strong excellently illustrates the operation of the principle alluded to when he describes the part which the ideal man holds in Greek philosophy:

'As there was a disposition to treat human life from the point of view of the external observer, so, as a true artistic impulse rises out of accurate observation, it was inevitable that speculative ethics should express itself in the construction of ideal figures. Assuming man in relation to certain forces, it would seem to confirm and illustrate any definition of virtue or of the end of life that might be attained if an ideal man, in an ideal relation to those forces, could be contrived by the imagination. Speculation would then seem to become intelligible' (p. 7).

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But the ideal man is only one instance of the unreality of the presuppositions of Greek ethics in those very points where genuine facts were most required. The Platonic idea, the divine law of the Stoic, were essential to the noble systems which bear those names, yet they rested upon no genuine facts. 'The conception of the world,' says a writer of the highest competence, 'as organized and fitted by divine thought, was common in some form to all the philosophies that looked back to Socrates as their founder—the Megarians even maintaining that this thought was the sole reality.'¹ Yet how shadowy, how distant from human life, were God and God's thoughts to the Greek. We may truly say that the impossibility of establishing a system of ethics upon a purely secular or material basis was far better recognized by Greek philosophy than by many teachers of our own day. The essential need of spiritual facts and spiritual laws for effective ethical instruction was well known; yet they could only be imagined or taken for granted.

When we consider the wondrous results of Greek thought in the ethical sphere, we cannot but acknowledge that, if they sought after wisdom, they found much of what they sought. That Greek thought should form a combination with Hebrew faith seems so appropriate, so good for the world's peace and righteousness, that we are ready to wonder that it did not take place earlier and more completely. In these cosmopolitan days we find it hard to comprehend the difficulty which one race experiences in receiving the intellectual and spiritual inheritance of another or in communicating its own. Were it as easy to learn the ideas of another people as to learn its language, we should have thought it strange that a nation possessed of God and revelation and a religious history, but not of any profound applications of moral principles to human life, and another nation which had stored up treasures of ethical thought, yet no clear knowledge of the spiritual facts which they knew to be required behind it, should not have come to share their common stock. It was not political rivalry, nor distance of dwelling-place, nor ignorance of each other's tongues that prevented the amalgamation. Never has any nation so extensively learnt the language of another as the Jew learnt that of the Greek, and of all the peoples with whom the Jew has mingled, he has never mingled with any so closely as with the Greek. Mutual influence there was, and that even in spiritual things. But the mental habits of nations are more jealously protected than their trade. The Greek

¹ Sidgwick, *Hist. of Ethics*, 1886, p. 76.

might want the Jewish religion to be the foundation of his ethic, and the Jew might want the Greek ethic to be the application of his religion. But the exchange was never made. The history of Philo, as Mr. Strong well depicts it, is a history of failure. The Jewish faith remained too severe and intractable for ethical use; Greek ethics remained, in spite of their power over many noble lives, a speculation and an unreality on their spiritual side.

Greek philosophy was kindly received by the Christian Church. It was, indeed, no longer in its best days when the Church came into existence, and the argumentative nature of the Greek, his scepticism and his jealousy set up many a contest between his philosophy and the Christian religion. Yet the enmity was not implacable. Greek thought was capable of rendering valuable services to the Church, but they were small in comparison to those which the Church could render to it. She was a reality and a power in the world of action—she had a basis of truth, an object in life, to set before her children, a divine Ruler to love and obey, an ideal life to receive into union with their own. Every requisite of fact in the spiritual world and in history, the need of which had been so well discerned by the philosophers yet never supplied by them, was here provided. The Church was able and willing to take charge of the ethical wealth of the schools of Greece, and to use it as its original producers had never been able to do—nay, to preserve it when its natural heirs had long failed, and when but for her it would have been a mere recollection of the past.

Mr. Strong states, with perfect correctness, the meaning of the claim which he makes for Christianity when he bases it on the Incarnation. The claim is that the spiritual truth which Greek philosophy so nobly grasped at is offered to men's faith by Christ as genuine and literal fact. It is spiritual fact proposed to faith. The fact which differentiates Christian ethics from philosophic is not that of spiritual assistances given to men to enable them to accept and follow Christ. Such helps there are, by God's mercy; but the truth of the Incarnation might be conceived to exist without them; and even if the gift of the Spirit and the institution of the Sacraments were no part of the Christian creed, still the Incarnation alone would place a world-wide difference between the heathen and Christian systems. The Greek moral teachings proposed to human minds had large effects by their inherent reason, although the spiritual conceptions, without which they could not clear their moral vision, were unproved.

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And if the divine connexion with man could produce such effects when dimly supposed as a necessity of the moral nature, what would have been the effect of the life of Christ and the doctrine of His person had the Stoic or the Academic been able to put them forth?

The facts on which we rest the essential nature of Christian morality cannot be tested by earthly results. They are accepted by faith, and the only effects which can be expected from them in the world are displayed in the minds which have received them in faith. The philosophies never would have submitted to be tested by their results in the general society of Greece, but by their effects upon their faithful adherents; and in this respect Christianity takes a similar position. By it man, as Mr. Strong truly states, is admitted to a knowledge of the divine order *in proportion to the certainty of his faith*. That even so great a gift as the Incarnation should be so little believed in or enjoyed is, indeed, a terrible problem in the divine government, corresponding to the appearance of waste which, as Butler reminds us, is found in so many departments of life. But it is not a special problem of Christianity, which nowhere pledges itself to any particular diffusion of its morality among men.

The relation of Christianity to the systems of ethics theological and intellectual previously existing, is one of harmony and friendship rather than of opposition, of confirmation and extension rather than of destruction. An element of contrast there must indeed be, but it is such as has place between the stages of progress and completion. The method of St. Paul, who became all things to all men that he might gain them for Christ, was the method of the Church, which not only dealt gently with the prejudices of Jew and Greek to make their transition to the faith more easy, but bade them bring in all their knowledge and found a place for it in her own system. The Psalter is her book of devotion to this day: Greek thought gives the form of her creeds.

The second of the lectures before us passes to the direct consideration of the Christian ethic. The moral atmosphere of the Gospels is admirably contrasted with that of philosophy and legalism, for in them the imaginary ideal is exchanged for an historical ideal full of life and energy. Human life is endowed with permanence and its temporary character acquires eternal significance, by its relation to the Eternal Father. The life of Incarnation passes by a natural necessity into the life of Resurrection, and the position of teacher and helper is developed by the gift of the Holy Ghost into

that of the ever-present and all-powerful Saviour, making His faithful ones partakers of the divine nature. If we were to offer a criticism on what is so excellent, we should crave a little more emphasis upon the connexion between the Christ of the Gospels and the Old Testament, and between the Christ of the Epistles and the Christ of the Gospels. In the analysis which stands prefixed to the lectures and gives us a most useful help in tracing the progress of the argument, we find the statement that the distinctive character of the ideal man of the Gospels lies not in the mere fact that it historically existed, but in the relation of Jesus Christ to the Father, 'which also explains the difference between the moral tone of the Gospels and, for instance, that of the Psalms' (p. xvii).

And no doubt this is true. The fact which distinguishes the Gospel ethics is not the earthly and historical fact that the life of Jesus was once lived, but the truth which lies behind—namely, that He came forth from the Father and that His morality is originated by the Father and rendered back to Him by the Son. But while this great truth must ever mark the life of Christ as distinct from all others, we must remember how fixed is the determination of the Lord Himself and of His Evangelists to connect all the events of His life and all His thoughts and principles with those of the Psalms. We cannot find in Mr. Strong's lecture any reference to the contrast of the New Testament and Psalms which is stated in the analysis. From the Lord's cradle to His grave the Psalms follow Him with their prophetic utterances as freely applied by the Gospels to Him as if there were a general licence to find His life and thoughts everywhere in the Psalter. The prophetic words seem often to apply only to what is external, as the descent into Egypt, and the words fall far below the greatness which they dimly discern. But still we find no contrast, but great unity of view, and a constant tendency in the Evangelists to point it out.

A similar or still stronger continuity exists between the Christ of the Gospels and the Christ of the Epistles. No doubt it is perfectly true that the Jesus Christ who is of God made unto us wisdom and righteousness, and sanctification and redemption, is not the mere remembrance of Jesus as He lived in Judæa, but the living, risen Saviour. But if the truth of the Resurrection had been in anywise supposed to relegate the Gospel record to a previous stage of revelation, how comes it that the Church, though founded on the Resurrection and inspired by the Spirit from on high, yet diligently preserved the record of the earthly life and gathered up the fragments of

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it which remained when the departure of the witnesses was threatening her with its total loss?

It may well be that the Sermon on the Mount as it was listened to by those in whom the germ of faith in Christ had not yet arisen belonged rather to the law than the Gospel. At that time the spiritual traits of the Lord's character and teaching seemed admirable, but unattainable without helps which its hearers did not possess. They were a still more impossible law than the law of Moses. But the Sermon on the Mount as treasured up and studied by the Church long after the Resurrection and the mission of the Comforter, presented no such legal aspect. It belonged, with all the rest of Christ's earthly life, to the divine morality preached by the Lord from heaven, which the Holy Ghost enables us in union with our Saviour to make our own.

It is very true that the records of the Lord's life and words are extremely small, and can only be regarded as specimens of His method given to those who had other means besides these of knowing what He would have them do. And when we ask what the other sources are by which men can discover what Christ would have them do, we find our answer in the letters of the Apostles, in the records of saintly life in the Church, and in the discoveries of moral truth and righteousness which those who are trying to follow Him make for themselves in the varied experience of life. 'I write to you,' said St. John, 'not because ye know not the truth, but because ye know it.' 'Ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things.' The highest that we find in ourselves Christ sanctions and commands.

When Jew and Greek were made one in Christ Jesus, we might have expected that the philosophical genius of the Greek mind would begin to exercise itself at once in that sphere of human experience which had been its favourite field. And the Greek genius did find its work to do in the Christian Church—but not in the field of ethics. It is a striking testimony to the predominant place which the revelation of God in Christ holds in Christianity that Greek thought should have been in the Church forcibly transferred from its familiar work upon human nature to work upon the nature of God Incarnate. The controversies of the Church gave it plenty to do in that direction, and their history and result showed that it had lost none of its acuteness or power of analysis. But in Christian ethics as a philosophy the Greek mind had nothing to say. What was to be done in framing a system of Christian philosophy on the Greek model

was not to be done by Greeks, but by Latins. St. Augustine began the work, but it was not completed until—twelve centuries after Christ—St. Thomas Aquinas carried it out when Greek language and life had long been dead.

The contributions of the Greek Church to Christian ethical philosophy are small indeed. That Mr. Strong should not have been able to find more in the Greek Fathers to enlarge his account of ethical thought in the Church is so remarkable a thing that at first sight we are ready to suppose that if search were made on some broader principle more of moral discussion might be found in that quarter. But even if it could, the truth would still remain that heathen Greek thought is extremely human, and Christian Greek thought extremely theological. Our author finds, therefore, that in describing the beginnings of Christian ethics the Greek analysis of virtue must for the present be put aside, though at a later stage of the history it will be revived with excellent effect. To analyse the Apostolic ethics Mr. Strong uses the triad of Christian virtues—Faith, Hope, and Charity—which occur so repeatedly in the New Testament as to show that a certain completeness of Christian moral demand was felt to be denoted by the words. Yet it is not a theoretic completeness. Philosophical theories belong to a later age. The Apostolic writings are in such immediate contact with life that they belong to that class of record from which later thinkers construct theories rather than to that which suggests or involves theories already framed.

Mr. Strong makes an observation of great truth and use when he shows that, in elevating hope and love to such a position of duty and of honour, 'Christianity has brought into line the unruly elements of passion with which Greek philosophers found it so difficult to deal' (p. 99). The emotions are despised by the wise man of Greece, but they become instruments of knowledge and lessons of duty to the Christian. This gives a great enlargement to the subject of ethics, and imposes on the Christian moral teacher a formidable increase of work from which his Greek predecessor considered himself free. But it obtains access for Christian ethics to the common life of man, of which emotion forms so important a part.

We do not feel at all sure that Mr. Strong is right in excluding feeling from any part in the nature and genesis even of faith itself. We may grant that faith has 'in large measure an intellectual character.' But when he says that 'the impulse which enables the intellect pure and simple to recognize the facts and their interpretation comes from the

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moral sense,' we remember many incidents in the Bible in which we know not how to separate such recognition of the facts and their interpretation from the exercise of healthy feeling. St. Peter on the shore of Gennesaret; the grateful leper; the sinful woman at the feast: no doubt there was a true moral impulse in them all, but the moral impulse was expressed and vivified by the emotions of gratitude and affection, and these feelings continued even in the very bosom of faith itself. It worked by love.

Professor Sidgwick, in his admirable *History of Ethics*, presents to us in its due place his view of Christian morality,¹ which it is highly interesting to compare with that of the lectures. The first difference which he notices between the ethic of the Church and that of the philosophers is that the former early assumes a character resembling that of jurists interpreting a code, while the heathen moralist treated the question as one of intellectual interest. And this, no doubt, is so far true, that a morality which is the will of a divine person really existing must ever be something imperious to which obedience is due. But Professor Sidgwick himself remarks that the tendency to develop and make prominent a scheme of external duties has always been balanced and counteracted in Christianity by the ineffaceable remembrance of the founder's opposition to Jewish legalism. The fundamental differences, however, between pagan and Christian ethics depend on

'different views of the essential form or conditions of inward rightness. In neither case is it presented purely and simply as moral rectitude. By the pagan philosophers it was always conceived under the form of Knowledge or Wisdom. . . . By Christian Evangelists and teachers, on the other hand, the inner springs of good conduct were generally conceived as Faith and Love.'

Faith seems to Professor Sidgwick to blend several elements differently prominent in different minds. First, there is the contrast between faith and sight, out of which grew in later times a contrast between faith and reason. But in early Christianity this antithesis is not yet developed; faith means simply

'force in clinging to moral and religious convictions, whatever their precise rational grounds may be; this force in the Christian consciousness being inseparably bound up with loyalty and trust towards Christ, the leader in the battle with evil that is being fought, the ruler of the kingdom to be realized. So far, however, there is no ethical difference between Christian faith and that of Judaism, or its

¹ *History of Ethics*, pp. 109, sq.

later imitation, Mahometanism; except that the personal affection of loyal trust is peculiarly stirred by the blending of human and divine natures in Christ, and the rule of duty impressively taught by the manifestation of His perfect life.' The 'more distinctively Christian and more deeply moral significance is given to the notion in the antithesis of faith and works. Here faith means more than loyal acceptance of the divine law and reverent trust in the Lawgiver; it implies a consciousness at once continually present and continually transcended of the radical imperfection of all human obedience. . . . Christianity, while maintaining the ideal severity of Stoic morality in the moral standard with an emotional consciousness of what is involved in it quite unlike that of the Stoic, at the same time overcomes its practical exclusiveness through faith.'

This analysis bespeaks the skilled hand of a master of ethical science, and the sympathy of an earnest student in the ways of winning men to goodness. It agrees well with the general view of the lectures, but it will be seen that in more than one point emotion forms, in Professor Sidgwick's view, a constituent of faith. Indeed, it would seem that all our great inward experiences include complex movements of heart, mind, and soul. Love itself, as the Catechism teaches, is an exercise of the mind and soul, as well as the heart. And the three great Christian qualities have a certain likeness, nay even an identity, among themselves; distinguished from one another as the apprehension of God in a progressive series. Faith rests upon God as He has been known in the past; hope as He is to be in the future; while love keeps close to Him in the living present. Professor Sidgwick makes a serious omission when he spoils the Apostolic triad of virtues, and neglects to recognize hope as a powerful agency of Christian morals, as unknown to other systems as either faith or love.

And with all his fairness and goodwill Professor Sidgwick does not apparently perceive the whole importance of the Incarnation in a sphere of morality where Christianity has gained many a hard-won victory, while heathen ethics hardly sought one—that of bodily purity.

'The profound horror with which the Christian's conception of a suffering as well as an avenging divinity tended to make him regard all condemnable acts, was tinged with a sentiment which we may perhaps describe as a ceremonial aversion moralized—the aversion, that is, to foulness and impurity.'

The aversion to impurity which is characteristic of the New Testament is distinctly that which results from a sense not merely of discipleship or brotherhood but of actual bodily union with the human nature of the Lord of Holiness: 'Shall

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I take the members of Christ and make them the members of an harlot?'

In truth, the more we study the records of primitive holiness in the Christian Church, the more convinced we feel of the correctness of the lecturer's contention. The Incarnation of the Lord, and the history of contest and victory which is the development of the Incarnation, was the genuine source of it all. When Gibbon and his followers seek for natural causes of the growth and spread of the Church, they are on the wrong scent. They assume that all human minds must be as averse to the supernatural as their own is. On the contrary, it was the great supernatural fact that God was manifest in the flesh which seized the faith of men, which at once humbled and exalted them, and gave them a life from without, in virtue of which they became worthless in their own sight before Christ, and yet of infinite value in Him.

We suspect that it was the perception that this astounding theology was the distinctive mark of Christianity which caused that strange shyness in noticing it on the part of heathen writers which Mr. Lecky has well described :

'The dissolution of old beliefs, the decomposition of the entire social and moral system that had arisen under the republic, engaged in the very highest degree the attention of the literary classes, and they displayed the most commendable diligence in tracing its stages. It is very curious and instructive to contrast the ample information they have furnished us concerning the growth of Roman luxury with their almost absolute silence concerning the growth of Christianity. The moral importance of the former movement they clearly recognized, and they have accordingly preserved so full a record of all the changes in dress, banquets, buildings, and spectacles that it would be possible to write with the most minute detail the whole history of Roman luxury, from the day when a censor deprived an elector of his vote because his garden was negligently cultivated, to the orgies of Nero or Heliogabalus. The moral importance of the other movement they altogether overlooked, and their oversight leaves a chasm in history which can never be filled up.'¹

But they would not have made this omission if the character which Christianity bore had been of an equally earthly and visible nature with that of Roman luxury. If the goodness, the charity, the self-denial of Christians had been the salient features of the Church, we should have heard of it. But writers of position and repute do not often take notice of the tenets of religious sects which repel them by their contradiction to received principles of belief. Christianity was an

¹ *History of European Morals*, i. 359, 8vo ed.

exitiabilis superstitio; the very virtues of those who held it seemed tainted with madness. Why should it be described? Many great writers of our own day avoid as sedulously all allusion to the supernatural as do the classical historians who say nothing of Christ. The value which the doctrine of the Incarnation imparts to human life, the extension which it gives to every moral idea by introducing that which was before a thing of very brief time into companionship with eternity, form the distinctive character of the morality of the Church. This once established, the question is, How is the subject to be proceeded with? First, is it to be treated as a science or as an art? for the effects of the Incarnation admit of either sense. They might announce a treatise on Moral Theology like those which abound in the Roman Church and have their place among Protestants. An excellent work of the kind was produced by the illustrious theologian, De Wette, who states his standpoint in terms which Mr. Strong would approve:

'The distinctive character of my standpoint consists in the manner in which I unite the human and the divine in Christianity with one another, recognizing neither as separate from the other, but both in mutual interaction according to the true sense of the Church doctrine of the two natures and the one person in Christ.'¹

A new *Ductor Dubitantium* adapted to the times would indeed be a welcome and valuable present to the Church.

But though Mr. Strong writes with a very practical purpose, and gives us in the course of his discussions many passages of direct practical application, yet it is of the formal statement of ethical principles in the Christian Church that he treats, and this in the historical aspect. Yet it could not escape an author so competent as Mr. Strong that the absence of formality constitutes a mark of Christian ethics, especially in the hands of the Lord and His apostles. What they imparted was the possession of an inward power of faith in the Incarnate Lord, capable of being turned upon any moral question, and providing an inward spring of righteousness for all emergencies. But in ethics, as in theology, the course of time obliged the Church to formulate her principles, and gather from the utterances of the New Testament (all of which bore absolute authority, but all of which were drawn out by occasional circumstances) some universal laws applicable to all cases, and displaying to us the inner reason of ethical rules.

¹ *Christliche Sittenlehre*, von Dr. W. M. L. de Wette (Berlin, 1819), Vorrede.

It serves well to show the depth and thoroughness of the analysis of virtuous human action which the Greek philosophers had offered that the first essays in formal ethics which the Church produced should have adopted their divisions and their nomenclature, yet filling alike Temperance, Fortitude, Justice, and Prudence with an infusion of Christian thought which wholly changed the conception of the virtues which in pagan ethics bore those names.

'Thus this earliest treatise on Christian ethics [St. Ambrose *De Officiis*] adopts with some slight modification an older theory of life. There are signs in it that the time has come when a new spirit is to be poured into the ancient doctrine and new application made of ancient principles. This is especially prominent in the passage where St. Ambrose reviews these virtues in the light of clerical life. But it is in the writings of his great pupil, St. Augustine, that the step is taken which separates the new theory most completely from the old. The names of these virtues are continually appearing in St. Augustine's writings, from the earliest period after his conversion onwards. He asserts their prominence in all current ethical teaching, and in one place expresses a wish that they were as prevalent in practice as they are in theory. But, what is still more important, he gives them a new definition. He connects them closely with the true end of man's existence—viz. the vision and the love of God—and he makes love the point of contact between them' (p. 139).

The restriction of the subject to formulated ethical statements makes it possible for Mr. Strong to deal with it in the bounds to which he is confined; taken in its widest meaning, Christian ethics would be too large a theme. Even as it is, the necessary connexion of Christian ethics with theology forces him, in dealing with scholasticism, to discuss subjects which, however interesting in themselves and however ably treated, are but indirectly concerned with moral systems. And the break-up of scholasticism at the Reformation launches him into a condition of things in which formal ethics have little place. The modern contests of the faith and the world bring us back to the primitive times of the Christian Church, when the tactics of her warfare were known in use more than theory. Contemplating this variety of ethical treatment into which the author is forcibly carried by the sheer compulsion of his sympathy with successive ages, we are tempted to question the statement that 'the Church passed into the possession of a consciously elaborated moral theory by slow and gradual movements.'

Did the Church ever pass into the possession of a consciously elaborated moral theory? We know that she did become possessed of a consciously elaborated theological theory. But

where is the statement which takes in ethics a position corresponding to that of the creeds in theology? Various ages have produced ethical treatises more or less elaborated, and a few of them are read with permanent profit by select members of the Church, and used as historic records by scholars like Mr. Strong. But were they anything more than episodes in the Church's endeavour to follow Christ; systematic and elaborate because there was room for such treatment in the ages when they were composed, but leaving each future century to throw the old unchangeable lesson of life in Christ into the forms which present needs require?

In Lecture V. Mr. Strong returns from 'the progress of ethical thought within the Christian Church' (p. 205) which occupies the two previous lectures and the copious appended notes, and treats of the great question of the nature of sin, 'the most decisive test,' as he truly says, 'of the character and value of any ethical system' (p. 207). But it is a test which cannot be applied to those ethical systems which are mere classifications of facts externally regarded. These cannot stand the test; for they attach no meaning to the word 'sin.' Sin bears a personal meaning, and, like some other words (for instance, 'love'), has no application except in the relations of a person to a person. The Christian conception of sin, says Mr. Strong, is 'ruled by three chief ideas—the notion of man's true relation to God, the sense that he is free and responsible, and the notion of the true social relations of mankind' (p. 213). Of these three it seems to us that the first is by far the most important; the others, so far as they are essential to the conception of sin, might be deduced from the first, while it never could be deduced from them. Mr. Strong admirably expresses the distinctive morality of the Old Testament as 'the sense that the holiness of God is in some way a law to men, and that they fall short of their ideal.' That is a sense which was embodied in the observances of the law and the records of Jewish history, and breathed in the words of the Prophets and the Psalms. It may indeed be questioned 'whether we do not carry back into our interpretation of the Prophets and Psalms some of the fuller knowledge of man and his possibilities and his perils which is derived from the teaching of St. Peter and St. Paul.' But St. Peter and St. Paul themselves certainly believed that they were drawing out of the Old Testament spiritual meanings which were truly contained in it. However, the Cross of Christ was to lend to man's estimate of sin a greater reality than the Old Testament could furnish;

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we know not that it can be said to lend to it 'a shade of blacker gloom.' Mr. Strong himself well says that

'to contrast the furious hatred of evil which breathes in some psalms and in some of the writings of Isaiah with the almost matter-of-fact way in which St. Peter in his early speeches describes the message he had to deliver might seem to justify the most light-hearted methods of explaining away sin. . . . But this impression does not remain. The whole treatment of sin in the New Testament is cooler, but it is no less severe than that in the Old. It is cooler because it is more certain of itself. There is less of the tone of panic in it. . . . In the light of the Life and Death of Christ the true spiritual meaning of moral life is revealed. It is seen what God thinks of sin, and what He is prepared to do to overcome it' (pp. 216, 217).

This is to add an awful seriousness to sin, but hardly a blacker gloom.

The metaphysical difficulties respecting free will do not seem to Mr. Strong to concern us. They are not discussed, nor is there any sign of a consciousness of their existence, in the New Testament. We have no doubt that he is quite right in this opinion, save that we might maintain that St. Paul seems conscious of their existence, and puts them aside as out of his sphere, when he writes, 'Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?'

But St. Paul's own words have been worked into metaphysical systems which have asserted that the ethical dependence on divine help which the Apostle inculcates cannot be maintained without the metaphysical system of predestination and election. Once the great disservice to the Church of attaching her spiritual teaching to a metaphysical system which its first authors never dreamt of has been done, it is very difficult to move the previous question, and decline to assume an attitude of scientific argument. The definition of Transubstantiation is an instance in point, and so is the definition of Predestination. Perhaps even the term free will carries us into the metaphysical region; and St. Paul, in his simple consciousness of personality in man working and resting in the personality of God, might have felt himself carried beyond the proper limit of the creature's thought by pronouncing that the will is free as much as by pronouncing that it is bound.

In defence of Butler's argument, that if crime be done under necessity the same may be said of punishment, it must be remembered that his chapter 'Of the Opinion of Necessity' is not offered as a general answer to the Necessi-

tarians. It proceeds upon their own principles, which, however, are in the first place pronounced absurd ; and Butler declares that, in his opinion, the fact that we are as if we were free proves that we are free, though at the same time he confutes any practical application of the doctrine of necessity, without assuming freedom. And his principles would seem to us amply to provide for all that terrible significance of sin as a revolt of the soul which Mr. Strong describes with such power and truth.

The third head in the analysis of sin is the principle of the solidarity of mankind. This truth, it is justly observed, 'belongs essentially to the mode in which the Sacrifice and Death of Christ are presented to us.' Nothing can be more true ; but the extreme doctrine of the substitution of the Saviour for the sinner has tended greatly to obscure it. That doctrine deliberately singles out the individual, and considers his sins as separate quantities which can be weighed and measured and an equivalent paid. But Christ suffered and died as the Head of the race, and summed up mankind as a unity in Himself.

From this faith flows out, as the lecturer truly shows, the discipline of the Church. She is one with her Saviour, and every sin that one of her members commits is an offence not only against Him, but against her. Hence the penitential rules of the Church. And here, we may also remark, is the explanation of the terms of the Lord's commission to His Apostles : 'Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them ; and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained.' The plain meaning of these words is this, that where the Church forgives sin as against herself, God forgives it too as against Him. A mother does not hesitate to give her child forgiveness even of a sin which has no special reference to herself, knowing that her absolution will fully comfort his heart and leave no more room for any fears. For she has the faith that in giving the child into her hands God gave her the power to forgive him, and that God's absolution will not be wanting where hers has been given with due sense of her responsibility to God for his religious training. And thus the Church has felt and acted ever since those great words of Christ were spoken ; she assumes no prerogatives of God, but forgives offences of her children against herself ; God giving this promise : that where she absolves in her sphere He accompanies her act with His heavenly clearance.

Many will probably feel on a first reading of Lecture VI. that its connexion with the subject is not immediate, and that

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it is difficult to master. The impression will be removed on a second perusal. The connexion of morality and reason binds together that goodness which conscience bids us seek, and that truth the search for which is a necessity of our intellect, and one which is better recognized in the present than in previous ages. The note appended upon the scholastic philosophy is highly instructive. The questions with which the great minds of the middle ages grappled were the deepest that can occupy man. And so far is the popular opinion which regards them as triflers from being true, that the freedom with which they move in regions of thought which we regard as inaccessible seems often audacious.

And yet we know they were not free; and the absolute submission to authority which bound them sets an essential separation between the modern mind and theirs. Mr. Strong expresses excellently what we mean:

'It is sometimes said that the schoolmen did wrong in attempting a philosophical construction, on the basis of pure thought, of the whole world of nature and religion. They doubtless made many errors of judgment and of fact. But their real danger was much more that they criticised their creed too little than that they felt too much confidence in reason. There were two very strong dispositions prevalent at the time: one was the desire for a completely systematised account of things, and the other the desire for orthodox belief. It was not that there were no sceptics; there were sceptical thinkers enough, and the influence of Arabic speculation was sceptical, but the faith had an antecedent right to acceptance which would not generally be accorded to it now, and this more than anything else seems to have been the difference in atmosphere between the present and the scholastic ages' (p. 304).

But it was not in all respects an advantage to the faith to be placed beyond dispute; placed beyond dispute, it is placed also beyond the free choice of an unfettered mind. Again Mr. Strong expresses our meaning:

'If the thought of God's mere commands, backed up by habit and the pressure of society, helps us to continue in the path of right, even if some never care to press for a further solution, it still is not true that this is a final position for the mind of man. The time must come when he will demand, and be right in demanding some hint or suggestion, at the very least, of a more rational and satisfying explanation. Mere authority exists and is justified only as preparing for reason' (p. 285).

Reason in its best sense is truth in the highest meaning of that word. It is that kind of truth to which we assent not merely as something which is, but as something which must

be and ought to be. The satisfaction of reason is identical with the search for truth. Only we must remember that we may be long searching for truth before we know it well enough to see reason in it; yet that the vanity and the contention which so often mar our search for truth are forbidden by the laws of reason from the first. And reason leaves room for authority. When we consider the higher and more spiritual parts of the faith, we must recognize the need of teaching them with authority while yet the mind is immature and unpractised in divine things; for so alone can they have their fair chance of recognition and acceptance by those who cannot value them for themselves. But authority in the middle ages (as in certain parts of the Church to this day) stretched its powers far beyond the transcendental truths which, like a mother with a little child, it has a right to impose on its own word, and far beyond the period of tutelage in its children. It demanded submission from all and forbade free opinion on science and fact, even to those who knew more of science and fact than anyone else in the world. There it had no right to command, and reason ought to have been allowed free action as the only means of securing truth.

To this assertion of authority, everywhere demanding assent even to incredibilities on pain of the guilt of heresy, we must needs ascribe that fear of the use of reason which caused the omission of falsehood from the mediæval list of the principal vices. For how should men stigmatise falsehood of all sorts, if religion demanded that something to which none of the recognized tests of truth could be applied should be set up as matter of necessary faith or pious belief? Mr. Strong rightly condemns this omission: 'It is strange to find that luxury and gluttony are classed as co-ordinate vices, and at the same time untruthfulness has no place in the list at all' (p. 229).

We venture to suggest that he might very usefully have supplied this defect in the moral systems which he criticises by a long and careful note upon truthfulness as a virtue in Christian ethics. Even the short extracts from his work which we have been able to give suffice to prove his power to treat the subject. He would know how to reprove those Protestants who in the name of free inquiry claim infallibility for themselves without any inquiry at all, and those Catholics who claim for their own selected opinions the authority of the universal Church. And to our minds it is the question of the right moral relation of private judgment to authority that should determine our opinion on the Reformation. The

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revolt against authority, the reassertion of the position of the individual in the Church and that of the State in the government of Christendom at large, were various forms of the relation of private judgment to authority, or of the species of authority which private judgment has established to those of alleged divine prescription. The influence of purely ethical principles in the Reformation was indirect, except so far as impatience of pretended authority is a moral duty. In the sphere of general morality the candid inquirer may well doubt whether more sin was caused by the abolition of the moral restraints which, as Mr. Strong truly contends, existed in the mediæval Church; or by the weakening of the individual conscience which the violent and unscrupulous efforts of the Church to maintain her supremacy encouraged. The records of crime on either side forbid us to determine the question by results. But an impartial historian thus estimates the moral change:

'The notion of a mighty institution founded by Christ and endowed with His gifts, which watched over the individual from the cradle to the grave, and by its observances disciplined him into saintliness—this splendid ideal of mediæval Christendom dropped entirely away from Luther.¹

The splendid ideal, however, had already failed, and failed by claiming more power for guidance than it had proved able to furnish. The time had arrived when the way into every region of thought must be left open to the individual. Pity it was that the time-honoured institutions which could no longer exist as an absolute government could not have been everywhere maintained as the framework of constitutional rule. Our own retention of the primitive Church order, hampered though it be in many directions, has been such a blessing for the past and such a spring of hope for the future as ought to enable us to feel for less favoured communities, and to labour earnestly for the improvement of our own goodly heritage.

The prescription which Mr. Strong offers for the restoration of the Church of Christ among us to its rightful dominion in the ethics of the Christian people is expressed by the one word, Discipline. But he is well aware that the mere sound of the word discipline will call up two hateful images to the mind of our people—that of sacerdotalism and that of casuistry, apparent enemies both to the true morality of the Gospel, as Englishmen understand it now and to all ap-

¹ Bishop of Peterborough, *History of the Papacy*, v. 153.

pearance ever will. But sacerdotalism, as he truly urges, vanishes away when laymen take their own part in the Church's work, and regard their lay priesthood not merely as a convenient argument against the sacerdotal claims of the clergy, but as a real consecration of their own lives to God in His Church. Laymen who take their own place do not often complain of their clergy for claiming to be priests. If they do, the probability is that their clergy have been taking too much upon them.

Casuistry has some right to plead that its books are only meant to be used in the cure of sinful souls, and that it is unfair to treat them as directions for the guidance of the life. It may be alleged with much truth that when the treatment of sins after they have been committed comes to be considered by Protestants, the same distinctions and allowances which are objected to when printed in Jesuit books, come very readily into practical use. And so they do. But it is probably more wholesome, both for the individual and the society, not to provide beforehand for infringement of its rules. The communion of saints comes before the forgiveness of sins—that is to say, God's first call is to holiness, and we are to respond to it. When we fail in holiness, then it is time enough to think of forgiveness and its conditions. And therefore the instinct which has repelled the English mind from the study of casuistry may rest on true moral principles; and while it loses something of skill in dealing with morbid states, may gain more in expecting and demanding moral health as the normal condition of the Christian.

Discipline, then, Mr. Strong contends, may exist without either sacerdotalism or casuistry; and though it is perhaps a strain upon the word to conceive it separated from the exercise of chastisement, it is no doubt perfectly true that definite judgments of the Christian Church upon moral questions might as conceivably be left for their execution to the conscience of her children as to any external tribunal. The judgments of God Himself are largely left to this method of execution. And no doubt discipline of this sort is the only one that can be supposed possible in our time and among our race. But Mr. Strong, while he clearly diagnoses our wants, does not suggest any practical means by which the moral judgments of society may be better imbued with Christianity, and the decisions of the Church in matters ethical be more effectively delivered than they are.

What kind of Church do we want for moral purposes in these latter days? It must know its own mind and the mind

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of the universal Church, but it must not be bound by party or class traditions, nor leave it always possible to predict what course the Church will take, apart from the question of what is right. It must represent in action the highest self-denial of the time. It must include the best learning of the time upon all religious subjects, and in order that it may be learned it must be free, and be very cautious in its anathemas. It must be the most reasonable body of thinkers in the nation, never too ready either to forsake what is old or reject what is new. To sum up all, it must ever reflect and renew the spirit of Jesus Christ.

When we name these high qualities they do not absolutely compel us to despair of the Church of England. Imperfect as are the attainments of that Church, and far as her influence falls beneath her calling, yet there is no part of our description which is wholly untrue of her, and much of it is more true of her now than fifty years ago. To widen her sphere of influence must be the effect of her own hard work. No one will make room for her if she does not make it for herself. To create an atmosphere (as Mr. Strong well calls it) is not within the power of the few. If the world be strong enough to give the tone of expression to the ethics of the nation, the Church must adopt it until she succeeds in making her own language familiar. But we would fain hope that Mr. Strong somewhat underrates the amount of Christian belief which, directly or indirectly, enters into the moral judgments of the nation. In many a quarter where Christ is not named, or even where He is professedly rejected, the moral judgments which meet approval are due to Him and the work of His servants in the past.

The atmosphere, therefore, in which the Church of England seeks to exercise her discipline is charged with latent Christian influence. The conscience of the Christian world responds to Christian words and deeds, even if it does not originate them. And if every member of the Church in his vocation and ministry truly served his Master, the world would acknowledge more openly than it does that the ethics of Christ are divine.

Organization is what we want to make all the goodly powers that we possess available. We cannot but envy the Roman Church her seminaries for the supply of clergy, whereby she is provided with a disciplined army of men ready to carry her message wherever she bids them bear it. Yet we would not be like her. She is organized with a vengeance. She has garrisoned her fortress for defence against the world, not for the conquest of the world; and in

shutting the gates against her besiegers she has excluded multitudes of citizens whom Christ will acknowledge though she does not. Above all, let us have no infallibility. The Christian Church must speak like the Apostle of old, not as having dominion over faith, but as being a helper of the joy of her children. Her ethics and her theology are human as well as divine, and her methods are those of sympathy and brotherhood with men.

ART. X.—THE TEXT OF THE GOSPELS.

The Traditional Text of the Holy Gospels Vindicated and Established. By the late J. W. BURGON, B.D., Dean of Chichester. Arranged, completed, and edited by EDWARD MILLER, M.A. (London, 1896.)

THERE is something pathetic in the record of Dean Burgon's life. Essentially a fighter, and by temperament passionately attached to the opinions and practices in which he had grown up, it was his lot to be continually the champion of those 'lost causes and impossible loyalties' which have been declared to find their special home in the University of which he was a member. Whether the verdict of future ages shall declare him to have been right or wrong in his views, certain it is that he was consistently in opposition to the prevailing current of his own age; and in the sight of so much ability and so much energy, exerted to so little effect on its own generation, there is surely something that is pathetic. Or, to speak more accurately, it would be pathetic but for the joyous spirit of confidence in which the Dean fought his losing battles. Whether it was the Revised Lectionary or the Revised Version, the admission of Nonconformists to Oxford or of women to University studies, he never faltered in his belief in the truth of his own views, nor ceased to treat those who differed from him after the manner of the Irish juryman, who declared that he had never known eleven such obstinate persons as his fellow jurors.

It is not in the spirit of this last comparison that we should wish to speak of Dean Burgon's attitude towards the controversy in which he was mainly engaged during the later years of his life. The problem of the Gospel text is one to which a man may well devote his best powers, and in respect of which he will do right to adhere strenuously to the opinions which he has honestly formed, even though he may find

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himself in a minority. That Burgon honestly held his opinions on this point, in opposition to the prevailing school, no one will doubt who knew him; that he expressed them strenuously will be questioned by no one who has read *The Revision Revised*. That was avowedly a controversial volume, and very good controversy too, from the point of view of those who like to see a good fight, with stout strokes well laid on; but Burgon was anxious to follow this up by a formal treatise in which the whole question of the Gospel text should be treated constructively. Unfortunately he died while his work was still incomplete, and the task of setting his materials in order, and of bringing them into a shape fitted for publication, has fallen upon Mr. Miller. The volume now before us is the joint production of the Dean and his editor,¹ in which, broadly speaking, the former has contributed the introductory portion, laying down the general principles of the inquiry, while the latter deals with the details on the substantiation of which their joint theory must stand or fall. A second volume is to contain a disquisition on the causes of the corruption of the Traditional Text, almost entirely from the Dean's own hand; and we are also promised a revised text of the Gospels, exhibiting what the Dean supposed to be the true form of the Traditional Text, as distinct from the *Textus Receptus*.

The theory of the Dean and his coadjutor may be most compendiously described as the direct antithesis to that which was worked out by Dr. Hort in collaboration with Bishop Westcott, and which has been very generally adopted by the younger generation of textual students. To both the turning point in the history of the Gospel text is found in the fourth century; but whereas Hort holds that at that date the primitive text was obscured by a revision in which smoothness and comprehensiveness were more conspicuous than critical selection of the best attested readings, Burgon, on the other hand, maintains that the true text was then purified from the errors which had clung to it in the earliest days, and established in a position of supremacy which has lasted for fifteen hundred years. The issue is a direct one, and no one

¹ We are sorry to see that Mr. Miller often adheres to his habit (already noticed in the *Church Quarterly Review*, vol. xxxix. p. 153, in an article on Mr. Miller's edition of Scrivener's *Plain Introduction*) of interpolating his own additions to the work of the author whom he is editing, without any indication that he is doing so. The main authorship of the several chapters is stated, but it is often evident that Mr. Miller has made verbal alterations in Dean Burgon's words, which would have been better confined to foot notes.

can complain of its being raised. No formal answer has ever been made to Dean Burgon's assault upon the edition of Westcott and Hort, and in avoiding a wordy controversy, at a time when it would have engendered much heat, the Cambridge editors did well; but it is right that the substantial objections which can be brought against their theory should be fully and respectfully considered, even if we are not convinced by them.

Unfortunately we are bound to say that the tone of the volume before us does not always conduce to a temperate study of the great issues involved in it. Dean Burgon could never refrain from a rhetoric which often came perilously near to invective; and Mr. Miller, though without his leader's literary brilliance, exhibits, at least in print, the same intolerance of his opponents' views. In spite of the formal tribute paid to Dr. Hort's ability and character, his opinions are repeatedly spoken of as though they were lightly formed, ignorantly conceived, and maintained in a spirit of prejudice and *parti pris*—charges which are little less than ludicrous, and considerably less than just, in speaking of so careful, so laborious, and so sober a student as Dr. Hort. Phrases like 'audacity,' 'in order to prop up his contention,' 'tampering with historical facts in order to make them agree with his theory,'¹ 'the mention of Antioch is, *characteristically of the writer*, purely arbitrary,'² simply ought not to be used in such a matter. They are in the style of political controversy, not of scholarly study of a sacred subject; and as applied to Dr. Hort they are as unjust as they are inappropriate.

Apart from this defect of manner (which no doubt is unconscious, but is none the less unfortunate, since it prejudices the writer's own case in the eyes of a fair-minded reader) the problem is one eminently suited to discussion, and the substantial issues can, with a little thought, be disentangled from their controversial encumbrances. The main propositions laid down by Dean Burgon and Mr. Miller are, in outline, these: (1) the predominance of the traditional text from the fourth century to the nineteenth is itself a proof of its superiority, since it rests on the authority of the Catholic Church; (2) in point of fact the traditional text can be shown to have been also predominant even before the fourth century, from the earliest times of which we have evidence; (3) the traditional text, as embodied in the later uncials and the cursives, is intrinsically superior to that contained in the

¹ *The Traditional Text*, pp. 92, 93.

² *Ibid.* p. 14. The italics are ours.

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earliest uncials and a few other ancient authorities. Of these propositions the second and third would be simply denied by the adherents of Dr. Hort, while the first is declared to be irrelevant and misleading.

With regard to the first proposition, it is obvious that if it can be made good all further controversy is at an end. If the usage of the Church is decisive on textual matters, then it is clear that any text based (as, in the main, that of the Revised Version is) upon the principles of Westcott and Hort is condemned. What Dean Burgon calls the traditional text is what Dr. Hort calls the text of the Syrian revision; and it is agreed by both that this has been the standard text of the New Testament since the fourth century. It is true that what is known as the *Textus Receptus* (which is practically that printed by Stephanus in 1550) is not a perfect representation of the traditional text, and Dean Burgon himself, we are told, would make about 150 corrections in the Gospel of St. Matthew alone; but yet all the later manuscripts, and the texts used by the post-Nicene Fathers, are found to represent substantially the same type of text, as opposed to that which is contained in the earliest uncials, supported by a handful of later manuscripts and a few early Versions and Fathers. The contention of Dean Burgon and Mr. Miller is that, just as the principal doctrines of the Church were finally formulated in the fourth century, and the Canon of the New Testament was then practically fixed, so the text of the Scriptures was then purified from the corruptions of earlier ages, and the purified text ratified for all time by the tacit approval of the Church, from which there is no appeal.

This, it may be freely allowed, is an intelligible and, at first sight, even a plausible theory; but if it were admitted, much of Dean Burgon's work, and nearly all of Mr. Miller's, would be rendered quite superfluous. If the verdict of the Church is decisive, why argue about points of detail? Why discuss the characteristics of the Codices Sinaiticus and Vaticanus? Why trouble about the relative priority of the Peshitto and the Curetonian Syriac? But, in reality, the theory of the Church having guaranteed and preserved a true form of text will not square with the facts. Even on Dean Burgon's showing the text of the Gospels which has been current since the invention of printing is corrupt in some five or six hundred places. During the first three centuries too, we must suppose, texts far more corrupt might circulate without serious injury to the Church. Further, a slight acquaintance with manuscripts of the Latin Vulgate will

assure any student that during the greater part of the Middle Ages the prevalent texts of the Scriptures in Western Europe were exceedingly corrupt, often needing revision, and as often falling rapidly back into their former state of chaos.¹ Even more striking is the case of the Old Testament, where the divergencies between the Septuagint, which has been the Bible of the Eastern Church, and the Hebrew, which has been the Bible of the West, are far greater than anything that is found in the manuscripts of the New Testament. We might reasonably expect that the Holy Spirit would not allow the main truths of Christianity to disappear from the sacred books, or be seriously obscured; and that has been the case. They are present in every form of the Gospel text which has existed, except those deliberately garbled by heretics, such as Marcion or Basilides. But the great divergencies between different types of text, and the infinite verbal corruptions in the various copies representing each type, are sufficient to warn us against believing that the Holy Spirit has guaranteed any particular form of words, or has forbidden us to seek for the nearest possible approximation to the original autographs elsewhere than in the texts prevalent since the middle of the fourth century. The analogy with the formulation of doctrine in that age, and the practical determination of the Canon, is misleading. No Council authorized a revision of the Gospel text or gave its imprimatur to any one of the forms then current; and if the silence of history is an argument against the reality of such an unofficial revision as that to which Dr. Hort refers the origin of the 'Syrian' type of text, still more is it an argument against any formal action of the Church, of which no record has come down to us. On historical and *a priori* grounds alike we are forbidden to conclude that the usage of the mediæval Church confers any special ratification upon the 'traditional' text.

But if the controversy cannot be thus summarily closed, there remain the problems with which the textual critic is properly concerned, and to which the greater part of this volume is devoted. Is the traditional text, or that which modern critics have preferred to it, the one which approaches most nearly to the lost originals? If there is no special virtue in the usage of the mediæval Church, then the appeal must be to the ordinary principles of textual criticism. These are the principles which we apply to the text of Homer or Virgil, and there is no *a priori* reason why they should not

¹ See Berger, *Histoire de la Vulgate*, passim.

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hold good also in the case of the sacred Scriptures. And if they do, what is their verdict with regard to the New Testament text?

The modern view is that of which Dr. Hort was the main originator and the most conspicuous champion. Its outlines are well known. Dr. Hort held that the traditional text is the result of a revision¹ undertaken in or about Antioch in the latter part of the third century, in which the various types of text then extant were combined and harmonized and submitted to a process of literary polish. The earlier types of text were classified by him as (1) Western, in which the original text had been freely handled, and had suffered much interpolation and alteration; (2) Alexandrian, characterized chiefly by verbal modifications, affecting the style rather than the matter; and (3) Neutral, which was the nearest approach to the true text of the autographs themselves. The Syrian revision is represented by the vast majority of manuscripts, including nearly all the later uncials and the cursives, as well as by the later versions and the quotations in the post-Nicene Fathers in general; the Western text by the Old Latin Version, the Curetonian Syriac, the Codex Bezae and a few cursives, and the early Latin Fathers; the Alexandrian by some of the Egyptian Fathers, the Coptic Versions, and detached readings in a few manuscripts; the Neutral primarily by the two oldest manuscripts, the Vaticanus and the Sinaiticus, with the support of a very limited number of uncials and cursives, and by many readings in authorities which elsewhere diverge into Western or Alexandrian forms of variation.

The corner-stone of this theory, as Dr. Hort explicitly shows, is the evidence of the Fathers. Examination of manuscripts does, indeed, show the existence of these several groups of authorities, but the proof that one or other of them is the older rests solely on the testimony borne to it by the earliest Christian writers. Dr. Hort's statement is that no purely Syrian reading is found in the ante-Nicene Fathers; and if this can be disproved his theory breaks down. Hence the most important part of the present defence of the

¹ The possibility of such a revision having taken place, without having been referred to by any extant writer, has been much questioned, and many even of those who adopt Dr. Hort's view in general would prefer to regard this revision as a gradual process, due to the establishment of certain principles as to the method of dealing with passages where divergent readings were in existence. To this explanation Mr. Miller, at least, could not object, since he attributes the formation of the traditional text to just such a process of gradual revision (p. 198).

traditional text is that in which Mr. Miller undertakes to show that even the ante-Nicene Fathers give a preponderant testimony in its favour. Mr. Miller has examined the quotations from the Gospels in all extant works of writers who died before A.D. 400, and has tabulated his results. According to his figures (pp. 99-101) there are 2,630 quotations which support the traditional text, and only 1,753 in favour of that which he calls the 'Neologian' text. Nor is this majority obtained solely by a preponderance in the later writers. On the contrary, the earliest Fathers, from Clement of Rome to Irenæus, give a majority of 151 to 84 in favour of the traditional text. It is true that in the Western and the Alexandrian Fathers the figures are nearly equal, and that the copious quotations of Origen actually show a slight majority against the traditional text; but the general result is clear and decisive. Further, on taking a select list of thirty important passages in the four Gospels it is found that the Fathers give 530 testimonies in favour of the traditional text and only 170 on the other side.¹

Here, then, it would appear as if Mr. Miller had scored a decisive victory on a critical issue; for if these figures could be maintained Dr. Hort's theory would have to be abandoned. A scrutiny of the details, however, will show that Mr. Miller has fatally misunderstood the point at issue. In the first place, it is highly probable that a critical examination of the texts of all these Fathers would materially alter the figures which have just been given.² The manuscripts used in Migne's *Patrologia*, which Mr. Miller has mainly followed, are rarely the best which are now available; and there is no point in which error creeps into a text more readily than in respect of Biblical quotations, which the copyist naturally and easily altered into the form current in his own day. But Mr. Miller's fundamental error is that he has made no distinction between Western and Syrian readings. The traditional text, according to Dr. Hort, is made up out of Neutral, Western, and Alexandrian readings, with a large number of variations for which we have no earlier evidence than the Antiochian revisers themselves. There are many readings which do not appear in B or κ or the text of Westcott and Hort (Mr. Miller does not tell us which of these he takes as his standard for the 'Neologian' text), but which yet are shown to be early by being found

¹ *Traditional Text*, pp. 101-115.

² Some striking evidence to this effect is given in a review of Mr. Miller's book in the *Guardian* for May 26, 1896.

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in the Old Latin or Old Syriac versions; and these, wherever they were adopted in the Syrian revision, Mr. Miller has reckoned to the credit of the traditional text. It is impossible, within reasonable limits of time and space, to check all Mr. Miller's figures throughout the ante-Nicene writers; but, taking his thirty select passages, it will be found that in every single instance his 'traditional' text has Western attestation, and in some cases Neutral attestation as well. Thus in Matt. vii. 13 ἡ πύλη is supported by B L, four Old Latin MSS., the Curetonian Syriac (the Sinaitic is imperfect here), the Bohairic, and Sahidic; Matt. xviii. 11, though omitted by \aleph B L, the Coptic versions, the Sinaitic Syriac, and several Fathers,¹ is supported by D, the Old Latin, and the Curetonian Syriac; in Matt. xxiii. 38 ἔρημος is the reading of \aleph D, the Old Latin, and most MSS. of the Bohairic and Sahidic versions; the deeply interesting passage concerning the Agony in the Garden and the ministering Angel (Luke xxii. 43, 44) is attested by \aleph L, most MSS. of the Old Latin and the Bohairic, and the Curetonian (though not the Sinaitic) Syriac; the Word from the Cross in Luke xxiii. 34 is given by \aleph L, several Old Latin MSS., and the Curetonian (but again not the Sinaitic) Syriac; Luke xxiv. 40 is supported by \aleph B L and the Coptic versions; and, for a final instance, John xxi. 25 is accepted by all MSS., versions, and editors, except \aleph and Tischendorf. It is hard to see on what principle Mr. Miller has chosen this as a test passage between the 'traditional' and 'Neologian' texts.²

The general result of this examination, then, is that in all these passages, on which Mr. Miller especially relies, we could have known from the evidence of the manuscripts and versions alone that the 'traditional' reading existed in ante-Nicene times; and Mr. Miller's array of patristic quotations proves absolutely nothing as against Dr. Hort. Dr. Hort states, in effect, that the traditional text was composed in the fourth century out of old materials and later modifications; Mr. Miller picks out several of the old materials and points to them as evidence that the whole is old. It is a most unsatisfactory conclusion to come to; for it shows that the enormous labour which Mr. Miller has unquestionably

¹ Dr. Sanday refers to Origen, the Eusebian Canons, Hilary, and Jerome; Mr. Miller says he can find no patristic evidence on this side.

² Similarly on Matt. xxviii. 19 a long list of authorities is paraded in support of βαπτίζωτες, though this is actually the reading of *all* editors (Westcott and Hort only placing βαπτίζαυτες, the reading of B D, in the margin).

bestowed upon this part of his work is simply labour thrown away ; unless, indeed, his failure to produce early patristic evidence for any reading of which the manuscript testimony is purely Syrian is to be reckoned as a point in favour of his opponents. Certainly it does not advance his own cause, and much of his argument in the subsequent parts of the volume falls to pieces in consequence.

In face of this failure to demonstrate the antiquity of the characteristic features of the traditional text Dr. Hort's assertion of its relative lateness must be regarded as holding the field ; and the investigations and discoveries of the last fifteen years tend to confirm his view. It is, however, still open to Mr. Miller to maintain that the traditional text, whether we have earlier attestation of it or not, is yet intrinsically the best. It is perfectly true that the oldest manuscripts of an author are not always the best ; for instance, the recently discovered papyrus manuscripts of Homer, which range between 300 B.C. and 300 A.D., are inferior in quality to the Codex Venetus of the tenth century. It is also true that there is a very vast preponderance of manuscripts which support the traditional text ; and to this numerical majority the Dean, who spent his life-time in minorities, repeatedly appeals. *A priori* it is no doubt possible that the true text of the Gospels was obscured during the early ages of the Church, and only made its way to the front in the fourth century ; but if we accept this view we must be prepared to believe that the ordinary methods of textual criticism are not applicable to the Bible. We have shown above that there is no reason to suppose that an ideally perfect text has been maintained in the Church by the direct action of the Holy Spirit ; and we are therefore compelled to learn its history by the ordinary methods of literary criticism. Now this phenomenon, which so outrages the feelings of the Dean and his editor, of the earliest and best text being found in a comparatively small number of authorities, while a very large majority support a later and inferior text, is so common in the history of other books as to be the rule rather than the exception. No editor of Virgil thinks it necessary to attach weight to the mass of manuscripts written between the tenth and fifteenth centuries, if they differ from the handful of authorities of the third and fourth centuries. The best text of Lucretius, it is agreed by all scholars, is to be found in two manuscripts which, until about fifty years ago, had been so little used as to be practically unknown, all other extant copies being derived from

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a different archetype and being more corrupt than these two. The manuscripts of Isocrates fall into two classes, one being that of the received text, supported by nearly all the extant manuscripts, while the other rests mainly on a single copy. Yet scholars unanimously recognize the latter as being, in most respects, decidedly superior. To take but one more instance, the best text of Aristotle's *Politics* is derived from two principal manuscripts, forming a family, or sub-family, by themselves; while the remaining manuscripts contain texts which, though preserving some good readings, are on the whole decidedly inferior. The state of things with regard to the Gospels is precisely similar to that of these classical authors, though, owing to the fact that they were enormously more read than any other book, the numbers are on a much higher scale. It matters little, however, whether the later MSS. are numbered by tens or by hundreds; the point is that in the history of most books which have come down to us from classical antiquity the current text is a relatively late and relatively imperfect one, and that scholars are accustomed to leave this and prefer older testimony, even though the number of authorities of earlier date is exceedingly small. Except under special circumstances, such as those of the papyri mentioned above, which were probably private copies, not intended for general circulation or preservation in great libraries, greater age in a manuscript connotes superiority in text.

It is mainly on the same ground of preponderant acceptance in the Church that Dean Burgon and Mr. Miller uphold the claims of the Peshitto to be older than the Curetonian Syriac. 'Is it not surprising,' we are asked, 'that the petty Curetonian, with its single fragmentary manuscript, and at the best its short history, even with so discreditable an ally as the Lewis Codex, should try conclusions with what we may fairly term the colossal Peshitto?'¹ For the same reason, we suppose, the Authorized Version of the Bible in English, with its many thousands of extant copies, must be regarded as earlier than Tyndale's New Testament, which is represented only by two or three imperfect volumes. But if we put numbers aside, and look only for evidence of age, the testimony of the earliest Syriac literature to the existence of some version closely akin to the Curetonian is extremely striking. It was rightly held to be a strong confirmation of Dr. Hort's theory, when the Sinai palimpsest, discovered long after the publication of Westcott and Hort's Greek Tes-

¹ *Traditional Text*, p. 131.

tament, and therefore quite an independent witness, was found to contain no purely Syrian reading. Mr. Miller indeed denies this statement, and gives a list of passages from St. Matthew which he believes to prove the opposite; but his argument is again vitiated by his neglect to distinguish purely Syrian readings from those which the Syrian revision adopted from Western texts. Every one of the readings quoted by him has Western attestation; and it would be odd indeed if Western readings were not found in so characteristically Western an authority as this Syriac version.

The evidence of the priority of the Curetonian Syriac (or of some version closely akin to it) has indeed been much increased of late years. On the one hand the discovery of the text of the *Diatessaron* shows that Tatian must have used a text substantially of this character. On the other Professor Robinson has quite recently informed us¹ that the Armenian version of the Gospels, which was made from Syriac about the year 400, was evidently made from a text of the Curetonian-Sinaitic type, which could never have been the case if the Peshitto were then the standard version throughout Syria. Further, it appears that St. Ephrem, in his commentaries on the Acts and Epistles, used a Syriac text which was not the Peshitto, but which appears to be the counterpart of what the Curetonian-Sinaitic version is for the Gospels.² As against testimonies of this kind the mere placing side by side of passages from the Peshitto and Curetonian, with the view of thereby discovering their relative precedence, is of little weight, as depending too much on the 'personal equation' of the critic. With more confidence than ever is it now permissible to use the term 'Old Syriac' to denote the version which finds its manifestations in the Curetonian and Sinaitic manuscripts, the *Diatessaron*, and the quotations in St. Ephrem and Aphrahat.

Nor is Mr. Miller much more fortunate in dealing with the Old Latin version. His argument against the localization of one form of it in Africa, as is often done on the ground of supposed resemblances in style to the African writers of the time, is, indeed, very reasonable; for since there is practically no literary Latin extant during this period except that of African authors, we cannot safely argue that all their peculiarities are of local origin. At the same time if, as is maintained amid all the divergencies of individual manu-

¹ In 'Euthaliana' (*Cambridge Texts and Studies*, vo. iii. No. 3), pp. 72-82.

² *Ibid.* p. 83-91.

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scripts two distinct families may be discovered, of which one is found to be generally in agreement with the quotations in the African Fathers, while the other is not, there is at least a fair presumption that Africa was the home of the one type, and Europe of the other. The whole subject of the Old Latin version is, however, still in need of much research, and we do not lay stress on any difference of opinion with Mr. Miller on this topic. What is to the point, however, is to observe that this discussion does not in the least affect the general issue. If the pre-Vulgate Latin translations of the Gospels are conspicuous for supporting a text which is not the traditional one, but one akin to that of the Old Syriac, then, whether their origin be one or many, they are witnesses against the early predominance of the traditional text. Mr. Miller is unlucky in his contention that Augustine's 'Itala' is the standard text of the Old Latin,¹ and that it is to be found in manuscripts such as *f* and *g*, which are marked by greater conformity to the traditional text. The latter part of this view would have been generally accepted till within the last few months; but now comes Mr. Burkitt with some exceedingly plausible arguments to show that Augustine's 'Itala' is simply the Vulgate itself, pure and simple.² If this be so, Mr. Miller will be deprived of his reliance upon St. Augustine's words as conferring any predominance upon one particular type of the Old Latin MSS. Nor is it in accordance with ordinary literary criticism to maintain that the best MSS. of the Old Latin are those which are most in accordance with the traditional text. It is far more likely that an originally erratic text (such as that of all Western authorities is) should be gradually altered by comparison with Greek copies, than that divergencies (which are not merely copyists' errors, but imply a difference in the text translated) should be gradually introduced into a version which had (*ex hypothesi*) already attained a fair agreement with the current Greek text.

Putting aside the Versions, therefore, as giving no sound evidence in favour of the view maintained by Mr. Miller and the Dean, let us return to the Greek manuscripts. Here, in

¹ 'Evidently the "Itala" was the highest form of Latin Version—highest, that is, in the character and elegance of the Latin used in it, and consequently in the correctness of its rendering' (p. 143). Why 'consequently'? The purest Latin need not be the most correct translation; still less does it follow that it was translated from a pure and primitive type of Greek text.

² 'The Old Latin and the Itala' (*Cambridge Texts and Studies*, vol. iv. No. 3), pp. 55-65.

addition to the argument from numbers, it is contended that the text of the later uncials and cursives is superior in quality to that of the earliest uncials and that of their few followers. The argument, briefly, is to the effect that the oldest uncials, α and B, are corrupt and mutilated copies, owing their preservation to the very fact of their corruption, which led to their being but little used; while the later uncials and the cursives have derived their text from purer ancestors which have not been preserved. In support of this contention Mr. Miller introduces a new argument, which is so curious as to be worth quoting. After referring to the fact, now generally recognized, that the early copies of the New Testament must have been written on papyrus, the brittle nature of which will account for their disappearance, he proceeds thus:—

‘But beyond this conclusion, light is shed upon the subject by the fact now established beyond question, that cursive handwriting existed in the world some centuries before Christ. For square letters . . . we go to Palestine and Syria, and that may possibly be the reason why uncial Greek letters came out first, as far as the evidence of extant remains can guide us, in those countries. The change from uncial to cursive letters about the tenth century is most remarkable. Must it not to a great extent have arisen from the contemporary failure of papyrus, which has been explained, and from the cursive writers on papyrus now trying their hand on vellum, and introducing their more easy and rapid style of writing into that class of manuscripts? If so, the phenomenon shows itself, that by the very manner in which they are written, Cursives mutely declare that they are not solely the children of the Uncials. Speaking generally, they are the progeny of a marriage between the two, and the papyrus MSS. would appear to have been the better half.’¹

Mr. Miller has done quite rightly in attempting to utilize the information derivable from recent discoveries of papyri, but it is to be feared he has not fully made himself master of the subject. It is true that cursive Greek writing is now known to have been in common use so far back as the third century before Christ. We should be the more unwilling to contradict this statement since Mr. Miller refers to an article in the *Church Quarterly Review* in support of it. But it is also true that uncial Greek writing is known back to the same early date. Mr. Miller speaks as if all writing on papyrus were cursive; but though the border line between uncial and cursive is obscured by the existence of various types of more or less cursive uncials, the broad distinction remains, and some decidedly square uncials are extant from

¹ *Traditional Text*, pp. 157, 158.

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the two last centuries before Christ. It is purely fanciful to connect the uncials of the early vellum MSS. with the square Hebrew characters. Further, papyrus did not continue in use so late as the tenth century, except for Coptic manuscripts. The Arab conquest of Egypt in 640 soon put an end to Greek writing in Egypt, and also stopped the export of papyrus to the rest of the world. Hence there is a hiatus of some centuries between the end of Greek writing on papyrus and the rise of cursive writing upon vellum; and the latest cursive writing on papyrus is very unlike the earliest cursive writing upon vellum. Finally, even if the cursives were in some cases copied from papyrus MSS. it would make no difference to the value of their testimony. Papyrus manuscripts have no prerogative of superior accuracy to vellum MSS.; rather the reverse, so far as our present knowledge goes. It is not the material on which a text is written, nor yet the style of its writing, that matters, but whether the text itself is correctly copied from a good original.

The truth of the matter, from the palæographical point of view, would appear to be as follows:—From the earliest times at which we have any knowledge of Greek writing (which may be fixed as the fourth century B.C., since the numerous extant manuscripts of the first half of the third century enable us to draw inferences which would extend for some generations further back) uncial and cursive styles of writing have existed side by side. The former is normally the style used for copies of literary works, the latter for private and business documents. No doubt we possess several literary works written in cursive hands, but these are copies made by private individuals for their own use, not for sale or for preservation in public libraries. It is highly probable that, in the early days of Christianity, copies of the Scriptures were often made in these non-literary hands and by untrained copyists, and hence errors of transcription would easily creep in, but public and official copies would normally be written in uncials. About the third or fourth century vellum, the use of which had previously been confined in the main to note-books and small documents, became the favourite material for literary purposes, and since about the same time Christianity became the religion of the Empire, many handsome and well-written copies no doubt came into existence. It is to this period and to this impulse that the oldest extant manuscripts of the Greek Bible, the Vatican and Sinaitic codices, may be assigned; though, since there is no trace of their ever having been in Constantinople, it would not be safe

to regard them as forming part of the fifty copies which Constantine commissioned Eusebius to prepare for the use of his capital. From the fourth century to the ninth uncial writing upon vellum was the normal style of writing for literary works, just as uncial writing (of a somewhat easier and more flowing character) upon papyrus had previously been. Cursive writing no doubt continued to exist side by side with it; indeed, we have examples of it in Egypt up to the eighth century; but it was not employed for formal literary copies. It was only in the ninth century that a smaller style of writing was adopted in books, technically known as minuscules. These were more easily linked together by ligatures than the larger and stiffer uncial hands, and the tendency thus to link them became stronger and stronger. Hence it has been common to describe all minuscule manuscripts as cursives, a convenient but not altogether accurate phrase. But between the cursive writing on vellum and the earlier cursive writing on papyrus there is simply no direct connexion. Whether any of our existing cursives of the Gospels was copied from a papyrus manuscript we have no means of knowing, but even if we had it would tell us nothing as to the antiquity of the text copied. It is impossible to see how Mr. Miller thinks his case for the superiority of the cursives in any way strengthened by the discovery that cursive writing existed on papyrus long before it was used for literary works on vellum.

Considerations of space forbid us to follow Mr. Miller and the Dean through all their examination of the characters of the principal manuscripts which dissent from the traditional text—namely, α , B, and D. Very much depends upon the opinion of the individual critic, and here Dean Burgon's dislike of novelties in general inevitably weights the scales to the advantage of the traditional text. It is one of the merits of Dr. Hort's theory that it substitutes an appeal to historical facts for this subjective form of evidence, and consequently lends itself to proof or disproof by being confronted with whatever additional facts may from time to time be brought to light. A more fruitful topic is that of the *provenance* of B and α , to which Mr. Miller devotes some considerable space. Modern research is tending more and more to localize these two great manuscripts at Cæsarea, and to associate them with the library of Eusebius and Pamphilus in that place, and so ultimately with the textual traditions of Origen. Here Mr. Miller is, for once, in accord with such representatives of the Cambridge school as Mr. Rendel Harris and

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Professor Robinson; but it is hard to understand why he should consider these manuscripts as discredited just because the Father to whose influence they are ascribed had paid especial attention to textual criticism.¹ Another argument in this connexion is so peculiar as to be worth quoting:

'The probability that \aleph was thus at least in part copied from a manuscript executed by Pamphilus is established by the facts that a certain "Codex Marchalianus" is often mentioned which was due to Pamphilus and Eusebius; and that Origen's recension of the Old Testament, although he published no edition of the Text of the New, possessed a great reputation.'²

Why should the fact that the Codex Marchalianus, which is a well-known Hexaplar MS. of the Prophets, is 'often mentioned' (by whom?) prove anything as to the origin of the Codex Sinaiticus; and why should the fact that Origen's revision of the Septuagint possessed a great reputation establish the probability that the latter Codex was copied from a manuscript executed by Pamphilus?

These, however, are matters of detail, and do not affect the broad issue with which alone we have space here to deal. On this broad issue we feel bound to express our conviction that Mr. Miller and the Dean have failed to make good their case. We hold no brief for the Westcott and Hort theory. We do not say that its claims have been finally established; but we do say that the arguments brought against it in the present volume fail, in our opinion, to shake its position. As to the readings of particular passages, we may dissent from the views of the Cambridge editors, just as we may from those of Tischendorf or Tregelles, or the Revisers; but the general principle set forth in Dr. Hort's *Introduction* seems to us to hold the field successfully against its assailants, and also to promise the most fruitful results for the future.

In coming to this conclusion, however, we should wish to part amicably with Mr. Miller. We should be the last to disparage the labour which he has undertaken in dealing with the questions at issue. Rather are we grateful to him for a book which compels us to examine once again the theory which of late years has become the prevalent one, and to

¹ *Traditional Text*, p. 58: 'Origen, Clemens Alexandrinus, and Eusebius, though first-rate authors, were so much addicted to Textual Criticism themselves . . . that their testimony is that of indifferent witnesses or bad judges.' The words appear to be Dean Burgon's, but Mr. Miller expresses no dissent from them, and one is tempted to ask whether Dean Burgon and Mr. Miller are not themselves "addicted to Textual Criticism."

² *Ibid.* p. 164.

consider how far it has been confirmed or modified by researches and discoveries made since its first exposition by Dr. Hort. If, as the result of such consideration, we come to the conclusion that Dr. Hort's theory has gained additional strength, both by the discovery of new evidence in support of it and by the failure of hostile criticism seriously to shake it, our attitude towards Mr. Miller and those who share his views would fain be that of a friendly difference of opinion. We congratulate him cordially on the preferment which, by conferring on him a Wykehamical prebend in Chichester Cathedral, associates him alike with his old school and with the Dean whose opinion he shares and whose works he is so loyally editing. We recognize gladly the earnestness with which he has devoted himself to the study of the problems of textual criticism, and even where we do not agree with his results we profit by the antagonism. If subsequent discoveries should justify his contentions he will have the rewards and pleasures of success; but if the result should be otherwise, he has at least, by his presentation of the opposite case, contributed to the ascertainment of that truth which is the common aim and object of us all.

SHORT NOTICES.

The Dublin Review, July 1896. (London: Burns and Oates, Limited.)

IN our last number¹ we briefly referred to an article² in which Father Sydney Smith criticized Dr. Bright's recent work, *The Roman See in the Early Church*. The *Dublin Review* for July has continued the Roman attack in the shape of two articles, one by Dom Chapman, entitled 'A Regius Professor on the Truthfulness of Catholics,' the other 'A Regius Professor on the Roman See,' by Mr. Rivington. The point of both articles is that Dr. Bright has himself been guilty of the very offences against historical accuracy and fair dealing with which he charged Mr. Rivington; and the second article attempts to defend the position taken up by the last mentioned writer with regard to the Roman Episcopate of St. Peter and the events connected with the Nicene Council. These three articles have been followed by further controversy. Dr. Bright has written at some length on 'Roman Controversial Methods' in two numbers of the *Guardian*,³ with special reference to the articles by Father Smith and

¹ *Church Quarterly Review*, July 1896, pp. 343-4.

² *Month*, June 1896: article on 'Canon Bright and Father Rivington.'

³ *Guardian*, September 9 and 16, 1896.

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Mr. Rivington. Those two writers have both replied in the same paper.¹ A rejoinder from Dr. Bright to their replies has appeared.²

This controversy has covered a wide field. The chief points discussed in it have been the teaching of Holy Scripture with regard to the position of St. Peter, the Episcopate of St. Peter at Rome, the bearing of the history of the Arian controversy on the 'Roman Question,' and the relation of the Council of Chalcedon to St. Leo the Great. Running through it has been the consideration of Dr. Bright's contention that a distorted way of treating evidence is characteristic of specifically Roman theology, and is an indication of the general unsoundness of the Roman position.

To discuss the details of which the various papers to which we have referred are full would necessitate our passing altogether beyond the limits of a Short Notice, and writing a somewhat lengthy article, and we may be permitted here to state briefly what appears to us to have been the upshot of the controversy.

It is impossible to avoid a feeling that a much stronger grasp of the whole position is possessed by Dr. Bright than by his opponents. Father Smith's handling of questions suggests both wider knowledge and greater power in general than Mr. Rivington's treatment of his subject, but the impression left on the mind even by the former writer's work is, that he lacks the width and depth of learning and true appreciation of the significance of history which are characteristic of Dr. Bright.

But the point of importance is not anything personal about the writers so much as the outcome of the comparison of the evidence they respectively bring forward. Here, too, there is nothing which need make Anglicans fear to look closely into the controversy. We do not ourselves feel sure that Dr. Bright quite fully recognizes the prominence of the Roman See in the primitive Church; but the tendency of the series of papers under notice is to add clearness to the fact that there is no evidence forthcoming to show such a position of the Bishop of Rome in the early centuries as would supply a sufficient foundation for the claims of the later Popes.

It is a matter of some significance that Father Smith attempts to dissociate his view of the succession of power in the Roman See from any necessary occupancy of the See of Rome by St. Peter:

'Leo XIII.'s rights come,' he says, 'from the fact that he is the occupant of that See, and that these rights have been attached to it by competent authority. But, whether St. Peter was Bishop of Rome or not, his rights of jurisdiction did not come from any such occupancy. They were inherent in his person, to which they had been attached by our Lord, and it belonged to them that he should assign the channel through which they should be transmitted. It follows that, though St. Peter may have resided and worked for some time at Rome (but evidently not without intermission), his power of attaching his prerogatives to that See, and thereby communicating them to a race of successors, did not necessarily involve residence of any length—not even, for the matter of that, of the

¹ *Guardian*, September 23, 1896.

² *Ib.* September 30, 1896.

"few days" which Dr. Bright regards as the *reductio ad absurdum* of my contention.¹

Dr. Bright has some vigorous and weighty comments² on this argument. We may point out, further, that it appears to us to be a very significant sign of the extreme difficulty which there is, from an historical point of view, in connecting the 'privileges of Peter' with the 'primacy' of the Roman See. That St. Peter was martyred at Rome may be reckoned among the facts of history; that he exercised episcopal powers there is, to say the least, likely; that he filled such an office or conferred such powers there as would make, let us say, Victor I. in any exclusive sense his successor appears to us to be rendered unlikely by the whole weight of considerations about the early condition of the Church at Rome, of which Father Smith's 'contention' is apparently a partial recognition. Even if the Roman view of the position of St. Peter himself were established, it would fail to affirm the claims made for the Roman See.

It is an unpleasant task to take notice of methods of controversy which do not commend themselves to those who care for accurate scholarship and historical fairness. Yet we are constrained to say that we have carefully gone through the treatment of authorities in the *Primitive Church and the See of Peter*, and are, in consequence, led to agree with Dr. Bright's words:

'Mr. Rivington has been now for some years an accredited and an exceedingly confident champion of the Papal cause in England. It has seemed necessary in the interest, not only of the English Church, but of historical truth, to examine somewhat strictly his qualifications for his enterprise. The result may be stated in its practical aspect. Anglicans who "take pains" to compare his version of history with the authorities will be confirmed in their opposition to the claims and the systems of Rome.'³

1. *The Principles of Ecclesiastical Unity*. Four Lectures delivered in St. Asaph Cathedral on June 16, 17, 18, and 19. By ARTHUR JAMES MASON, D.D., Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Cambridge and Canon of Canterbury. (London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1896).

2. *The Road to Reunion*. Two Lectures in Reply to Rev. A. J. MASON, D.D., Canon of Canterbury, &c. By Rev. H. LUCAS, S.J., M.A. (Cardiff: St. Teilo's Catholic Historical Society of Wales, 1896.)

1. UNDER the title of the *Principles of Ecclesiastical Unity* Dr. Mason has published the Lectures which he delivered this year at the invitation of the Dean of St. Asaph. The Lectures, he tells us, 'were hastily written, and for the most part away from books' (Preface, p. v), and they do not attempt any very complete treatment

¹ *Guardian*, September 23, 1896, p. 1459, col. 2.

² *Ib.* September 30, 1896.

³ *Guardian*, September 30, 1896, p. 1500, col. 3. We observe that Mr. Rivington intends to resume the discussion in the November number of the *Month*.

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of the great subject with which they deal. But they contain much that, if 'hastily written,' is obviously the outcome of long thought, and they may well have been helpful to the audience to which they were addressed. The first Lecture, after some interesting comments on present lines of thought and the Pope's letter *Ad Anglos*, insists on the duty of unity as demanded by the oneness of the Christian Faith, the teaching involved in the laws of Jewish worship and expressed by the Prophets, and the words of our Lord Himself. The second Lecture, describing the internal principle of unity as agreement in the truth, lays down the acceptance of Holy Scripture and belief in the doctrine of the Person of Christ as means to such agreement. In the third Lecture the discussion of the external principle of unity leads the lecturer to declare—

'In order to corporate unity, not only must the laity be able to pass without anxiety from Church to Church, sure of finding everywhere, amidst all diversities of ritual, the same duly consecrated Bread. The presbyters themselves in each diocese must be united by canonical, *i.e.* constitutional, obedience to the supreme authority of the diocese; and the supreme authority of each diocese must enjoy the mutual recognition of the rest. There we reach the old Cyprianic formula of the Church. Unity as an outward thing consists in the mutual recognition and fellowship of the bishops. There is no necessary step beyond that. Various modes of grouping among the bishops have obtained at various times and in various countries. They may consent to pay special deference to the occupants of particular sees, or bind themselves to act in concert with their brethren of a particular province. But essentially they are equal and independent. They represent, under the altered circumstances of their day, the College of the Apostles. If, among the Apostles, one was the leader, and others followed, there is no reason to suppose that he had, or claimed, or dreamed that he might claim, any jurisdiction over them' (pp. 103-5).

The fourth Lecture applies to existing circumstances the principles of the preceding Lectures. In it Dr. Mason attempts to lay down, with regard both to Rome and to the Protestant sects, the outlines of conditions upon which reunion might take place. Perhaps the most important part of what he says on this subject is with regard to the dogma of Papal Infallibility.

'In any reunion, therefore, between Rome and us, it will indeed be necessary—as Leo XIII. said—to explain the Infallibility decree. It is not easy for great personages or for great bodies to unsay what they have publicly said; and we should be wrong to ask for abjurations, and carrying of fagots round the stake; but before we could enter into ecclesiastical communion with Rome, we should have to be fully assured that the Infallibility dogma (setting aside for the moment the unhistorical grounds on which the Pope claims the authority of Peter) involves no necessary submission to ordinary judgments of Rome, and that with regard to things future, as well as things past, the Church at large is to judge whether on any given occasion the Bishop of Rome has or has not spoken as her representative. If we did not require some such assurance, we should be unfaithful to true Catholicism; and though our sinful submission might bring a measure of peace between Rome and us, the reunion of Christendom would be at least as far off as ever; for

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our base example would not be followed by the Churches of the East, nor by the great Protestant bodies of the West' (pp. 117-8).

Among the most valuable passages in the Lectures we have noticed a statement on 'the attitude of the Church of England,' and a description of circumstances under which separation is not sin. The Church of England, says Dr. Mason,

'does not teach, nor suggest, nor sanction the idea that contradictory beliefs, except on a very small number of points, are equally correct, and that her ministers are equally right in inculcating opposite views. But she refuses to bind all her members down to the opinions of Calvin or of Arminius, to those of Zwingli or of Luther, not—let me repeat—as setting her approval on them all alike, nor as equally contemptuous of them all, nor yet as timidly afraid of pronouncing judgment where judgment could reasonably be pronounced—but for this one purpose, namely, to make the more of those few things on which her pronouncement is absolutely made; to show unmistakably that there are some truths which stand high above all others in their religious value, even above those which may legitimately be deduced from them' (p. 51).

Separation¹ is said to have been 'pardonable' and 'justified' in certain cases, and it is added—

'Where the local authorities of the Church exact the acceptance of terms which are positively sinful, before they will admit to communion—and this has sometimes been done—then a true Christian has no choice but to leave the visible communion, confident that he remains all the while in spiritual communion not only with Christ, but with Christ's Church also' (p. 75).

2. Dr. Mason's Lectures were speedily followed by those delivered in St. Asaph by Father Lucas, and since published under the title of *The Road to Reunion*. He defended expressions used by the Pope in the letter *Ad Anglos*, which Dr. Mason had criticized; argued, on the ground of Scripture and Patristic testimony, that agreement on 'fundamentals' is insufficient; maintained that intercommunion, if it is to be legitimate, presupposes unity of belief about the Eucharist; declared that 'probability approaching to certainty' stigmatizes Anglican Orders as invalid; objected to Dr. Mason's treatment of the dogma of Infallibility; and insisted that it is only the Roman Church which can decide what is a 'fundamental' and what is not, and that the only possible method of reunion is by the submission of Anglicans to all the claims of Rome. These Lectures are characterized by moderation of language and a friendly tone, and, uncompromising as they are, they may be welcomed as a serious attempt to conduct a theological controversy on Christian lines. A brief reply to them is contained in the preface which Dr. Mason has prefixed to his Lectures. Dr. Mason there adheres to his conten-

¹ We regret that Dr. Mason should use the word 'schisms' to describe separations which he regards as 'pardonable' and 'justified.' There is a difference between 'schism' and a justifiable separation. See, e.g., Bramhall, *A Replication to the Bishop of Chalcedon*, chap. ii. sect. 4 (*Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology: Bramhall's Works*, ii. 81).

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tion that the Pope's expression that 'England at the Reformation was "bereft of the Faith"' was 'most unfortunate,' on the ground that

'the Church of England retained at the Reformation the three great Creeds of Christendom in their integrity, and continued to use them in the very same sense in which they had always been used before' (pp. vi, vii).

He points out that the quotation from St. Irenæus by which Father Lucas had endeavoured to support his contention of the insufficiency of agreement in 'fundamentals' can 'hardly' be quoted 'to the advantage of the Roman Communion,' since, while St. Irenæus 'does indeed insist that all Catholic Christians are at one in their definition of the Faith,'

'he proceeds to state what that Faith is. That Faith, according to St. Irenæus, is precisely what I, in common with the whole English Church, affirm to be the fundamental and necessary Faith of Christendom' (pp. viii, ix).

With regard to the Eucharist, he denies that 'the Church of early days believed in Transubstantiation in the form in which it was inculcated by Innocent III.,' and asserts that, whatever differences of opinion there may be among Anglicans, they 'all believe that Christ is really present and that they actually receive Him into themselves in the Holy Communion' (pp. ix, x). On the subject of the authority of the Pope, he contends that the English appeal to 'the witness of Scripture and the Fathers' (p. xii) may be justified by the history of the Church.

There are two considerations we would add to what Dr. Mason has very effectively said. It is indeed sad that the Sacrament of Christ's love should ever have become a matter of controversy, and that divergent opinions should be held as to the nature of our Lord's Presence. But those who really weigh the meaning of history, and have a serious belief in the guidance of God, may discern the work of Providence in the fact that the undivided Church had not occasion by formal decree to exclude from communion any who should fail to grasp that Christ is in the consecrated elements by the presence of the very Body, now spiritual and glorious, which He took of the Virgin Mary. And when it is contended that only the Roman Church can, under existing circumstances, decide what is fundamental truth, and that submission to all the claims of Rome is the only 'road to reunion,' it must be pointed out that one who believes in Divine Providence should not ask what appears at the present time to be a practicable path so much as what is the verdict of Holy Scripture and the Christian tradition on the claims he is asked to accept. When this is recognized, and when it is further seen that those claims are not consistent with the Bible, or with Christian antiquity, or with the history of the Churches of the East, we are in a position to disallow the soundness both of the 'negative' 'argument' and also of the 'more positive consideration' that Father Lucas has urged (pp. 14-15).

Father Lucas speaks of the 'probability approaching to certainty' (p. 18) that Anglican orders are invalid. Since he wrote their absolute invalidity has been definitely declared by a Papal Bull. It is a fresh sign that among the most serious barriers to reunion between Rome and England we must continue to reckon the Roman refusal to fairly face the facts of history.

Lectures on Religion. By LEIGHTON PULLAN, M.A., Fellow of St. John Baptist College, Oxford, Lecturer in Theology at Oriel College and Queen's College. (London, New York, and Bombay : Longmans, Green, and Co., 1896.)

THE lectures which this book contains are evidently the work of a clear and well-balanced mind. They are marked by learning and theological grasp, and are given interest both by the vigorous language in which they are expressed and by the apt use of by-paths of knowledge with which the author shows his familiarity.

The first lecture, that on 'Christian and Pagan Ethics,' is in itself excellent and is well-timed. The distinctive value of Christianity as a practical religious system is strongly insisted on, and some useful remarks on the Italian Renaissance lend point to the condemnation of the folly and wickedness which would revive Paganism in our own day. The originality of Christianity is admirably treated in the second lecture. In the third lecture the orthodox presentation of the Divine Person of our Lord in view of many modern forms of misunderstanding and unbelief is combined with a keen and sensitive appreciation of the beauty of His human life, and Mr. Pullan notices how 'the evangelists'

'describe a personality which is nearer earth because so close to heaven. History has nothing equal to that quick, wide sympathy. He canonized distinctive friendship, for He drew nearest to Himself a man who had been headstrong but became the Apostle of the love of God. He knew the charm of a frank character unspotted from the world, and when He saw the young ruler who had kept the commandments from his youth He "loved him." There was one household where He was peculiarly at home, and "Jesus wept" when death had taken a member of that household to the grave. The weakness and lowliness of heart, which He only of those born on earth could attribute to Himself, was the counterpart of a tender, crystalline affection which for eighteen centuries has exercised a profound attraction on every one who has trusted that he is one of the children whom Jesus has gathered to His arms. It was a sympathy which regarded no company too mean and no place too poor. It consoled the outcasts of the world, and lifted them with the assurance that He was "come to save" with a salvation of which He showed no need Himself. Jesus dispensed this salvation, and did not merely exhort the shattered conscience to apply to God for forgiveness. He granted forgiveness. To the man crippled with palsy He says, "Son, thy sins are forgiven"; with radiant words He pardons the woman who bent at His feet—"Her sins, which are many, are forgiven, for she loved much." To the thief, who in his last hour recognizes the beauty of His holiness, He says, "This day shalt thou be with Me in Paradise"' (pp. 60-2).

The succeeding lectures are not less useful. Intended, appar-

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ently, to a considerable extent for the general public, the book is likely to be of value also to readers with some knowledge of Theology, and there is much which in depth and strength of treatment compares very favourably with more ambitious works. The whole of it is eminently fair, but the justice it exhibits does not prevent the author from exposing with scathing force the weakness of the arguments sometimes used to attack orthodox Christianity. The tenth lecture, entitled 'On some "Scientific Theology,"' affords a good instance of this power.

There are abundant signs that Mr. Pullan has studied the age in which he lives and knows its needs. A recognition of the real unity which, in spite of outward separation and many differences, exists in the different parts of the Church, leads him to say—

'The unity which is implied by the above facts far outweighs in moral consolation the sorrow caused to intelligent minds by the insularity of any particular Pope or Archbishop. It is quite sufficient to rescue us from the misguided patriotism which tries to convince itself that England or Italy is the land of Goshen, where alone the light of heaven descends in the midst of an Egyptian darkness. And it is equally sufficient to save us from those theories of union which, while making Christianity comprehensive, would also make it incomprehensible. Above all, it restrains us from a pagan regret for a bygone golden age, and encourages a Christian expectation of a city that "lieth foursquare," where "the nations of them which are saved shall walk in the light"' (pp. 275-6).

At the end of an excellent refutation of some false ideas about the Nazarenes and Ebionites he writes—

'The final disappearance of Ebionism is hidden in obscurity. One thing we know. Two hundred years after the time of St. Jerome, a young Arabian used to visit Syria to trade in the interests of a rich widow of his country. That young commercial traveller wrote a book which, next to the Bible, is the most famous in the world. In it Jesus is taught to be the sinless Messiah and the Word of God. Strange legends hang round His infancy, there is a wild travesty of the Eucharist, and He dies in appearance only, another form being substituted for His upon the Cross. His Divinity is passionately denied, and the repudiation of a Trinity is rendered complete by the identification of the Holy Spirit with the angel Gabriel. That Muhammad should have learnt these stories from Arabian Jews is hardly probable. But they may well be borrowed from the Essene or Unitarian Ebionites. And if it be so, the struggle between St. Paul and the preachers of "another Gospel" finds expression in the Crusades, in the disdain felt by a modern Moslem for the man whom he calls a "Nazarene," and in the Armenian massacres of 1895' (p. 301).

And the 'two reflections' with which he closes a 'brief history of worship in the Middle Ages' may be of service in helping to overthrow some common misconceptions of the present day.

'Firstly, with regard to mediæval simplicity. Just as it is a mistake to suppose that a period was always narrow-minded which tolerated alike the Thomist and the Scotist, the Nominalist and the Realist, so it is a mistake to suppose that this period was invariably given to a gorgeous worship. Some of the monastic orders, notably the Cistercians and the

Charterhouse monks, used a studied simplicity. . . . Secondly, it is often thought that at the close of the Middle Ages Jesus Christ was only remembered as the Child on Mary's knee, or as a threatening Judge. Most assuredly it was not so in Northern Europe. The smallest antiquarian knowledge would make this inconceivable. "*Passio Christi conforta me*" was then the cry of the sons of men. Here a shield borne by angel hands, as in the University Church at Oxford,—here a banner, as that preserved in the library at St. John's College,—there a stained window, as in Cologne Cathedral, give a witness which we know is true. It was the age that carved the scourge and the crown of thorns on the walls of the churches, that sang the Mass of the five wounds of Christ, that often thought of Mary as our Lady of Pity, sorrowing while she held the body of her Son on Calvary, the age that wrote the English "*Jesus Psalter*," with its hallowed affection and repentance' (pp. 333-4).

So false is the idea that the theology of the Middle Ages lost sight of the meaning of the Humanity of Christ.

The very few blemishes¹ which we have observed in this excellent book do not prevent us from most heartily welcoming the publication of it as the earnest of work of very high value which we may hope to receive in the future from its gifted author, and commending it both as delightful reading and as serviceable in defence of the Christian Faith.

The Commentary of Origen on St. John's Gospel. The text revised, with a critical Introduction and Indices. By A. E. BROOKE, Fellow and Dean of King's College. Vols. I. and II. (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1896.)

ORIGEN did not complete what must have been his very congenial work upon 'the spiritual Gospel' of St. John. If we may suppose that the completed plan would have treated all the parts of the Gospel at uniform length we may say that we have certainly not more than a quarter, and probably not more than a fifth, of the whole design. Nor are the 'books' which have come down to us continuous, or indeed as numerous as they were apparently in the days of Eusebius and of Jerome. Of perhaps forty-five or fifty books we have but Books I, II, VI, X, XIII, XIX, XX, XXVIII, XXXII, and some fragmentary pieces. It does not fall within our present purpose to enter into the troubles of Origen's history, which at least in part would explain why he was unable to complete his work. But yet—such is the genius of the man—even in its incompleteness the commentary stands in the honoured company of the

¹ *E.g.* the lecture on 'Faith,' good as it is, does not appear to us to emphasize sufficiently that in a Christian faith is an act of the human will utilizing the Divine gift bestowed in Baptism; the name 'Jesus' seems to be used too frequently without any mark of reverence attached to it; and the description of books of the New Testament as 'Romans' and 'Ephesians' strikes us as slipshod. The reference to the 'mandate' for Barlow's consecration on p. 240, note¹, appears to be due to a mistake, and calls for alteration in subsequent editions. And the questions recently raised about the 'mandate' and the 'royal assent' are too complicated for any reference to the subject apart from a detailed consideration of it to be satisfactory.

four principal ancient commentaries on St. John's Gospel, and deserves all the care which Mr. Brooke has bestowed upon the text of it. If Origen's work lacks, as it does, the eloquence of St. Chrysostom's homilies upon St. John, and some of that unique insight which enables the genius of St. Augustine to triumph over his ignorance of Greek in his lectures upon this Gospel, and still more the dogmatic concentration of the commentary of St. Cyril of Alexandria, at all events the commentary, which he began before his ordination in 228, stands as a fine early example of that new form of theological literature which is associated with his name. It possesses the faults, but also the excellencies, of Origen in full measure. It is, as Bishop Westcott frankly acknowledges, 'lengthy, discursive, fanciful, speculative,' but it abounds, as he justly adds, 'with noble thoughts and intuitions of the truth.'¹ In Mr. Brooke's edition the scholar will find an accurate and well-printed text, with references to Bible texts in the margin and an index of them at the end, and an index of words which illustrates Origen's vocabulary and supplies aid for the interpretation of the text (vol. i. p. xxvi). Mr. Brooke's account of the text is given in his critical introduction (vol. i. pp. ix-xxviii), and he has done well to print a diagram (p. xiii) to show the probable relation of the MSS. to each other. The diagram shows that the oldest existing MS. of Origen's commentary on St. John is Codex Monacensis (I) of the thirteenth century. We are wholly dependent upon it, for all other existing MSS. have derived their text from this. Mr. Brooke's description of it (p. ix) will prepare the reader for the uncertainties of its history and its readings which are deplored on p. xxi. The next century (the fourteenth) produced Codex Venetus (II), certainly derived from (I), and as Mr. Brooke, successfully as we think, maintains, derived without any secondary source (pp. xiii-xix). Two sixteenth-century MSS. were also directly derived from (I), while from (II) proceeded one MS. in the fifteenth century, two in the sixteenth, and one in the seventeenth. Some interesting details are mentioned in connexion with these MSS., of the copyists who transcribed them, and the students who have used them. The chief of these is a list of emendations by Bentley preserved in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge. They are among the materials which he collected for an edition of Origen's works, and are to be found in the copy of Huet's edition of the commentary in which Bentley collated Huet's text with the XVIIth MS. bound in three volumes in the Bodleian. Mr. Brooke has had a task of some difficulty in dealing with the fragments which are attributed to Origen, which he has not altogether bravely faced. He makes no pretence, indeed, of having made a complete or an authentic collection of the fragments. He has 'preferred to risk error on the side of inclusion,' and so has included some very doubtful fragments, and has only rejected those about which doubt was hardly possible. It will be seen at once from a mere glance at Mr. Brooke's remarks on p. xxv that much research

¹ Westcott's *St. John*, pp. xciv-v.

is still needed and might be undertaken with comparative ease, especially among the Catenæ of the tenth and eleventh centuries. Until this work has been done, the 110 passages which Mr. Brooke prints as 'fragments of Origen' (ii. 211-312) must be regarded as a very unsatisfactory collection. We cannot doubt that the main part of the work, which places Origen's comments on St. John before students in a very convenient form, will help to make Origen's qualities as a writer better known. It would not therefore be right to leave the subject without some allusion of distrust to Origen's spiritualism—of which his work upon St. John supplies abundant instances—so far as it may tend to abate the positive, historic, and dogmatic element in religion. This need not involve us in any of the acrimony which marked the feud between Jerome and the Origenists,¹ but it is supremely necessary to balance the 'Alexandrianism' of Origen, and we might add of Clement, by the equally 'Alexandrian' teaching of St. Athanasius, and to preserve the proportion of things by remembering that 'Augustinianism' emphasizes many precious aspects of truth, however much they may have been overshadowed by predestinarian gloom. Origen's greatness, his apologetic services, his brilliant genius, the story of his life and the circumstances of his death must not make us blind to the fact of the impetus which his writings gave to speculations of a dangerous kind, and which justly excluded him from the circle of the canonized doctors of the Church. He is, in fact, not a Catholic but a one-sided teacher, and it is always easier to be intense upon one point than to be just towards all. To look upon one side of the shield of the faith is not to declare the whole counsel of God with St. Paul, or to exhibit the majestic balance of St. Athanasius. We may readily acknowledge that Alexandrianism brings out, as St. John himself does, the moral character of faith, and that it corrects the undue hardness of Latin ways. But we must go to other teachers to be reminded of other matters of equal importance.² What Origen has, and what he has not, to teach us in the portion of his writings which Mr. Brooke now presents to us will frequently prove once more to his readers the thorough justice of the late Professor Blunt's remarks on Origen's true place as a theological writer. The weighty passage is too long for quotation, and we must content ourselves with a reference to it.³

Patriarchal Palestine. By Professor SAYCE. (London : Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1895.)

THE popular demand for first-hand information on Biblical archaeology from those who are best qualified to give it, is a gratifying proof

¹ Bright's *History of the Church*, pp. 215, 224.

² That it is possible to do full justice both to Alexandrianism and Augustinianism (so called) see Bright's *Waymarks*, pp. 198-201. Cf. *ibid.* p. 69 for the famous saying of Origen on the eternal generation of the Son. On the moral teaching of St. John, which would specially appeal to Origen, see the same writer's *Morality in Doctrine*, p. 39.

³ *The Church in the First Three Centuries*, pp. 301-3.

of the general infiltration of latter-day culture. When men of the eminence of Professor Sayce address themselves to the general public they are sure of a sympathetic audience. In *Patriarchal Palestine* the author seeks to describe the land and people of Palestine as the monuments reveal them during the days of the Old Testament patriarchs. So large a part have the Tel el-Amarna tablets in the foundation of this work that it might be almost said to be Patriarchal Palestine according to these relics of the library of the heretic Egyptian King Khu-n-aten. These give us a fairly accurate idea of the habits of the inhabitants of Palestine and the neighbouring countries when Abram went out from Ur of the Chaldees. The Rephaim, or giants, who were a terror to the Israelitish spies, take their place in monumental history side by side with the Amalekite, 'the untamable nomad of the southern desert,' with the yellow-skinned Hittite, who founded an empire that Rameses II. himself was powerless to crush, and with the Amorite, who gave Sargon so much difficulty when, 3,000 years before Christ, he carried his victorious arms to the Isles of the West. We can better understand the habits of thought of the Israelites when we know, as we now do know more thoroughly, the share that Assyria and Egypt respectively took in moulding them. The very existence of the tiny kingdoms of Israel and Judah between two such antagonists is presumptive proof of the Divine direction.

All this Professor Sayce is able to illustrate from the wealth of documents unearthed by the spade of the excavator in these latter days. There is no excuse now for any but the most illiterate if they do not know the circumstances under which the Jews took their rise. *Patriarchal Palestine* shows an old and vigorous Nature-worship flourishing on every side, and leaving ancient traces in the names of localities. Beth-lehem is the city dedicated to the Babylonian deity, Lakhmu. Jerusalem is not 'the Vision of Peace,' of which mediæval poets sang so sweetly; it is Uru-Salim, the city of Salem, another Babylonian god. Israel—at all events in its earlier signification—is connected with the Hebrew for *straight, upright*, rather than with *sar*, a prince. Sinai is the mountain sacred to the moon-god *Sin*. Some writers see a reference to Baal in the first half of Balaam's name, and Professor Sayce thinks that a god, *Ammi*, may lend his name for the second. All these facts, and a multitude like them given in this volume, may help us to understand somewhat better the genesis of the worship of Jehovah.

Professor Sayce has not always escaped the danger that besets the expert when he leaves his critical brethren to address himself *ex cathedrâ* to the intelligent but not always judicious public. He is apt to become too dogmatic where a guarded caution is required, to state probabilities for ascertained facts, and to erect a substantial building on the slenderest of foundations. In two instances he unhappily plays into the hands of the Higher Critics without in the least intending it. By a curious piece of dialectic he affirms that 'we must see' in the 'Great King' of Ebed-Tob—or Abdi-Kheba, as others prefer to call Khu-n-aten's Governor of Jerusalem—the 'Most High God' of Melchizedek. It is quite certain that Ebed-Tob

means the King of Egypt, and not any god at all, and it is passing strange that Professor Sayce should not at once recognize this. Again, he is inclined to put too much reliance on a precarious reading of a tablet recently brought to the front from the unnumbered treasures of the British Museum. It has been said that the three kings mentioned in Genesis xiv. 1 occur in this tablet, which, *therefore*, is a valuable support to the Bible narrative. This the tablet undoubtedly would be were it certain that those three names do occur there, or if the tablet were a document contemporary with the date of the writing of Genesis. But as it is likely that Tidal is the only one of the three whose name does appear on the tablet, and as the tablet itself—though Professor Sayce does not notice this fact—is not earlier than 1,000 years after the events recorded in Gen. xiv., it is obvious that not much can be built upon it as evidence. It is unfortunate indeed that Professor Sayce should give occasion to the Higher Critics to score a point, and to suggest that where one or two alleged discoveries are thus found to be nothing but mistakes, others relied on may be perhaps equally fallacious.

There is yet another point where the author seems to leave a joint in his armour exposed. He gives conclusive evidence for a knowledge of writing, and for the existence of libraries, and for an advanced state of art and Assyrian culture in Canaan in patriarchal times. And the implication is that the Hebrews were on a level with those who enjoyed this culture, that they took their full part in it, that they, too, conducted a more or less extensive epistolary correspondence with their neighbours, wrote their books and established their libraries. Of this latter proposition, however, he does not offer us the faintest shadow of a proof. We have no doubt that the Hebrews were not illiterate, that Abraham did not leave Ur with his mind a blank so far as learning and culture were concerned; but our belief in these statements does not rest on the monuments, for, so far as this volume is concerned, they are silent on the point. What, however, the author does succeed in showing conclusively is that there is no necessity for the Higher Critics to rely on the later intercourse of the Jews with Persia and Babylonia for such material as the Holy Spirit may have seen fit to utilize in the Sacred Scriptures, when such intimate relations had been established at the earlier period. It is now pretty well agreed that it is Babylonia and not Egypt that we must look to as the main external influence brought to bear on the Jews, and Professor Sayce has done yeoman's service in establishing this conclusion so firmly.

Sermon Sketches for the Christian Year. By W. FRANK SHAW, B.D., F.S.A., Vicar of St. Andrew's, Huddersfield, Author of *A Manual for Communicants' Classes*, *A Manual for Confirmation Classes*, *The Church in the New Testament*, *A Manual of Addresses to Communicants*, &c. (London: Skeffington and Son, 1896.)

This volume contains fifty-two sketches of sermons, thirty-three of which are for particular Sundays in the Church's year, from the First Sunday in Advent to the Third (omitting the Second) Sunday after

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Trinity,¹ the remainder being described as 'general.' Those which are assigned to particular Sundays are in many cases based upon some part of the service, and the other sermons are suitable for the Sundays after Trinity.

The general aim of the writer in publishing these *Sketches* is indicated in a passage in the preface, where he says :

'However impatient of systematic teaching some may be, I am, nevertheless, more and more firmly convinced that if we are to bring back the whole "Truth as it is in Jesus," "the Faith once for all delivered to the Saints," before our people, so that we keep back nothing that is profitable for them, we *must* regularly follow the course of teaching marked out for us by the Church in the Christian year. By so doing, patiently and persistently year after year, the instructions given will be full and complete, according to the proportion of the Faith; otherwise our teaching cannot fail to be one-sided, weak, and meagre—some truths exaggerated by oft repetition, and other equally necessary truths passed lightly by, or even omitted altogether' (Preface, p. vii).

We think Mr. Shaw's book will be of service to those preachers who will use it, as the author evidently intends it should be used, to suggest thoughts which they will first make their own, and then employ in their sermons.

Doctrine and Duty: Sundry Sermons. By ARUNDELL BLOUNT WM. WHATTON, M.A. (London : Skeffington and Son, 1896.)

THIS is a volume of sermons of more than ordinary thoughtfulness. The author pleads, in defence of their publication, that he has 'amused himself during' the 'weakness' of 'a long convalescence' by putting them together and seeing them through the press (Preface, p. vii). They might, we think, have been published without any apology, as being calculated to suggest many useful thoughts to readers. They include very various subjects, as, for instance, 'On Sermons, and Hearing them,' 'The Coming of Jesus Christ in the Flesh in Relation to Human Opinion' and 'Church Doctrine' and 'Personal Duty,' 'Christian Mysteries in themselves Divine,' and 'Pre-Raphaelism in Religion.'

As an illustration of the writer's style we may quote the following passage :

'Meditation, as opportunity permits, is an essential of right hearing. It is spiritual digestion. The example of the ever-blessed Virgin Mother is a familiar but neglected one : she kept the sayings in her heart, and pondered them. Who has not known, in communing with his own heart in solitude, some heavenly ray fall athwart his path, illuminating its darkest spots? Often the riddle which the public preaching of the congregation could only propound and never solve, when he has stolen back into the deserted church, unobserved but by the eye of the Father of Lights, and has knelt him upon his knees and waited with submission, has then

¹ In the classification of the sermons there is a discrepancy between the table of contents and the headings of the sermons themselves. In the table of contents the thirty-second and thirty-third sermons are described as 'general;' on pages 81, 83, they are headed 'First Sunday after Trinity,' 'Third Sunday after Trinity.'

been made clear, and the rough places plain. What faithful soul has not tasted of that dealing of the Lord with His disciples, that in the open ministry of the Word He spake not but by parable and enigma, but "when they were *alone* He expounded all things"? There is at least a half-truth in the motto of the Carthusian monks: "O beata solitudo! O sola beatitudo!" (p. 7).

And his general aim is indicated in the Preface:

'Of all guides of conduct, religious truth is the surest and strongest. We are safe in acting, or in abstaining from action, only when we have a good reason for the one or the other, and the best reasons are derived from Christian doctrines. Emotion, indeed, often, and often properly, controls conduct; but it is always untrustworthy unless evoked by those Divine facts of which doctrines are our human description and expression. Emotion may well add force, but fact should direct. Doctrine is the Christian cause of duty: duty is the proper consequence of doctrine. The laws of belief and of life are not really two, but the same and one' (Preface, pp. vii-viii).

We do not know that we should give the same answer as Mr. Whaddon to every question. We desire to commend his work as thoughtful sermons of earnest tone.

Fifty Years; or, Dead Leaves and Living Seeds. By the Rev. HARRY JONES, M.A., Prebendary of St. Paul's, Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen, and Minister of St. Philip's, Regent Street, London. (London: Smith, Elder, and Co., 1895.)

UNDER this romantic title Mr. Harry Jones has put together a most interesting memoir of his clerical experiences both in London and the country. The book is full of anecdotes, of reminiscences of well-known men, and of amusing episodes in parochial life. It has also its serious side, and contains many hints about pastoral work which the younger clergy would do well to take to heart. We do not always agree with the writer's view of ecclesiastical matters, but he has a wonderful knack of seeing the ludicrous side of things where others see only difficulties and hindrances. The writer is at his best when he lets his experience tell its own tale; for when he attempts to draw general inferences, as in the last chapter, in which he compares town and country parsons, he becomes too discursive to be really effective. We can endorse his 'plea for some variety of experience in addressing different congregations' (p. 6), for the clergy are apt to get into a groove of preaching, and it would do them good to have to speak occasionally out of doors, or in a workhouse, prison, or asylum. Much as we enjoy choral service, we should not like a setting of the Nicene Creed which lasted eleven minutes (p. 33), and we can admire the courage of a man who will say that Sunday Schools act as 'consecrated nurseries,' which enable the parents to absent themselves from morning church, because they have not to go there with their children (p. 45); and we also agree that church decorations are being greatly overdone, particularly at weddings, as when 'a palm tree filled the pulpit' (p. 49). We are glad too to have the common view of East London corrected in

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respect of overcrowding and poverty and the intelligence of the people (pp. 67-8); and we welcome Mr. Jones's remarks about charity organization (pp. 101-3), Salvation Army shelters (p. 115), clergy holidays (pp. 51-3), house-to-house visitation (p. 87), and the possible grouping of small country parishes under one incumbent with a staff of assistant curates (p. 218). But we feel bound to differ from the writer in his admiration for Board School religion (pp. 50, 69-71), and his objections to parochial missions to Jews (pp. 78, 79); and we think he overestimates the obstacles to parish work in the country (pp. 192-6). It is always pleasant to have reminiscences of such men as Maurice (pp. 29-30), Tait (pp. 56-7), Hansard (p. 61), Lowder (p. 62), Fraser (p. 67), Stanley and Carlyle (pp. 133-4); and this frequent reference to men who have made their mark in the Church and society is one of the pleasantest features of the book. From among the many excellent stories the following may be quoted as characteristic of the writer's manliness and sound common-sense; it may make our readers wish for more from the same source:—

'There was a pump in this eastern churchyard, at which, for all I could say, they insisted on filling their pails and jugs, till I hung a placard on it with this inscription, "DEAD MEN'S BROTH." Then I watched the arrival of disobedient souls, who paused to read my notice, and retired with empty buckets' (p. 25).

We have noticed an error on p. 131, where 'Bristol' should be substituted for 'Gloucester,' since Mr. Mann is precentor of the cathedral at the former, not the latter place.

The Ethics of the Old Testament. By W. S. BRUCE, M.A., Minister of Banff. (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1895.)

WE can heartily recommend this little volume to beginners in the study of Old Testament ethics. It is brief and concise, lucid and sound; it upholds the Biblical theory, accepts Moses as the lawgiver of Israel, and does not blindly endorse the conclusions of the 'Higher Criticism.' At the same time it has its blemishes, as we shall show directly, and not the least of these is its tendency to generalize, without giving the illustrative details and references to the Scriptures upon which the statements are grounded. But this is only here and there; as a rule the modern authorities which have been consulted are referred to in the footnotes, and certainly we know of no other book which gives the results of modern study in so compendious a form. In some places the English might be improved.

The arrangement of the book is as follows, viz.—An introductory chapter contrasts the ethics of the Old Testament with those of pagan antiquity, and explains their fundamental principles. After this the ethical character of the Old Testament revelation is discussed, and the general lines of the morality contained in the Law are set forth (chs. ii.-v.). Next, the Decalogue is minutely examined (chs. vi.-viii.), and the rest of the Mosaic legislation is reviewed (chs. ix., x.). Then follow three chapters upon the doctrine of a Future Life and the progress of morality in the Pentateuch, the Prophetical writings, the Wisdom literature, and the teaching of the post-Exilic period (chs.

xi.-xiii.). And the volume concludes with a discussion of the moral difficulties of the Old Testament (chs. xiv., xv.), which, to our thinking, is the best part of the book.

Some extracts will show the general character of the work :—

'The Ethics of the Old Testament is [*sic*] in its origin and method historical. In no sense of the word can it be called a speculative science. It springs from an historical revelation, and it must consistently pursue the historical method' (p. 9).

'The goal of Old Testament theology is Jesus Christ, the mystery hid from ages, but revealed in the fulness of time; the goal of ethics is the moral perfection of Israel, and, through Israel, the realisation of the world-wide kingdom of God. Hence it is that we must speak of Old Testament ethics as an [*sic*] ethics of hope' (pp. 10, 11).

'The starting-point is the infinitely holy God; and the end of it all is the perfection of man living in communion with that same Divine Father, and in a life of true moral freedom' (p. 16).

'The objective principle of Old Testament morality is just the will and the character of God, as revealed to man' (p. 23). 'The subjective principle . . . is a free, loving obedience to this holy will of God' (p. 25).

Mr. Bruce teaches, as against the German school of critics, that the religion of Jehovah 'was the result of direct revelation from heaven, and not a natural product of the people' (p. 34), and that 'it is the personal character of Jehovah that gives to the worship of Israel its feature of separateness' (p. 39). The teaching about Jehovah and the revealed religion of the Israelites is admirable, quite refreshing indeed in these days (chs. ii., iii.). He also believes that the Law was given *by* (i.e. through) Moses, and accepts the Scriptural account; but he brings out clearly that Moses 'was but a *προφήτης*, a spokesman for God,' 'not as a legislator like Solon or Justinian' (p. 73), and he extends this divine character to other laws besides the Decalogue. He appeals to the Tel-el-Amarna tablets in proof of the literary capacity of Moses' times (p. 90). In examining the Ten Commandments he prefers the division into two tables of five each—viz., *pietas* and *probitas*; and though there is nothing new in his interpretation of them, yet upon the second he remarks appropriately,

'the sin is clearly not that of worshipping other deities (which is forbidden by the first commandment), but that of worshipping any visible image of the true God who is a Spirit' (pp. 107, 108).

and upon the tenth his comment is specially good—viz. :

'The second table, containing the precepts of probity, is intended to define a man's duties to his neighbour, and in accordance with the Old Testament trilogy of hand, mouth, and heart, it proceeds from the outward to the inward. There is manifest in it an ethical progress, which, beginning in the prohibition of murder, advances through the laws that forbid illicit passion, theft, and slander, to this concluding command which enters the inward province of desire and motive. Thus it becomes clear that the Ten Commandments are not merely a criminal code for the purpose of protecting life and property. The criminal laws of a nation take cognizance only of overt actions. Covetousness is a motive within the breast, which could only be guessed at by the law; its

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precedence to an act of theft could hardly be proved in the witness-box. The tenth commandment is altogether outside the boundaries of civil jurisprudence. Its presence in the Decalogue is a manifest proof of the spiritual intention and ethical character of the Sinaitic code' (pp. 165, 166).

There is a good account of the conditions of slavery under the Mosaic Law (pp. 182-9); Mr. Bruce quotes with approval a phrase of Wuttke (*vide* footnote on p. 184), that it recognizes slavery as 'a service-relation'; and there is an excellent summary (too long for us to quote) of the ideal morality, as between man and man, exhibited by the Mosaic Law (p. 203). We were glad to find that Mr. Bruce, when speaking of the prophetic condemnation of the use of the sacrifices apart from the practice of moral duties, does not, like many modern writers, claim that the prophets would have had the sacrifices done away with as valueless; he points out that both Psalm li., and Hosea, and Isaiah, while denouncing the worthlessness of the *opus operatum*, yet contemplate the continuance of the sacrifices as the appointed means of worship (pp. 226-229).

But we must indicate a few places where we feel bound to differ from Mr. Bruce. For example, we do not like the separation of ethics from theology (pp. 9, 10), nor his assumption of the truth of evolution (chs. xii., xiv.); and we cannot accept his account of the Nethinims (p. 185), nor the reason that he gives (pp. 212, 213) for God's withholding from Israel the revelation of a future life—viz., that the false notion of it which had been exhibited in Egypt, had made the revelation of the doctrine dangerous. And we think that Mr. Bruce is unnecessarily severe upon the post-Exilic period when he says:

'The ethics of the period becomes [*sic*] utilitarian: evil is to be shunned because of its results, and good is to be done because it pays. The Messianic hope disappears. . . . Faith in God gives place to legality . . .' (p. 248).

This, we think, is to confound the whole period with the later Pharisaism; it is certainly not the impression that the Scriptures give of the restored Jewish Church.

The concluding chapters are, as we have said, the best in the book; they are largely based on Dr. Mozley's teaching, but they contain much that is original and suggestive; we specially commend the teaching of pages 250 and 251-2; it might ease many consciences.

1. *The Devotions of Bishop Andrewes (Grace et Latine)*. Edited by the Rev. HENRY VEALE, B.A. (London: Elliot Stock, 1895.)
2. *Lancelot Andrewes, and his Private Devotions*. By ALEXANDER WHYTE, D.D. (London and Edinburgh: Oliphant, Anderson, and Ferrier, 1896.)

MR. VEALE has given us a useful reprint of the old current text of Bishop Andrewes' Private Devotions, in Latin as well as Greek, which practically dates from Lamphire's edition of 1675. His 'primary end' in this reprint, as he tells us in his introduction, was to make 'this devout manual, so full of sound theology,' more 'acces-

sible and popular,' and that not to clergymen only, but also to 'young students and pious laymen.' It will answer this purpose admirably for such as may not be possessed of what he speaks of as 'the excellent edition, by the Rev. John Barrow,' which forms one of the volumes of the Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology. It is, however, necessary to remind the reader that the S.P.C.K. edition (1892, by Canon Medd) of Bishop Andrewes' original Greek Devotions, from the recently discovered autograph which, on his deathbed, he gave to Laud, then Bishop of Bath and Wells, has really superseded all previous editions in some very important particulars. For these do not follow the order of the autograph manuscript, but have arranged the Devotions in what their editors have thought a more convenient form for use; and they all omit, without notice of the omission, the intercession for the departed in all the places where the autograph has it. Mr. Veale has much to say on this latter point. He takes refuge in the theory that the first editors may have worked from some other, as yet undiscovered, original autograph, which did not contain these passages, and may have honestly given all they found. That, of course, is mere conjecture. The fact remains that, in the only autograph manuscript that is known, these passages are found. That fact is quite sufficient evidence as to 'the views and practice of Andrewes.' That the intercession for the faithful departed is primitive and Catholic, not merely Roman, and involves no theory as to Purgatory, is as well known to all competent and unprejudiced students of theology as the fact that the Church of England, in her synodical drafting of her Articles, advisedly abstained from condemning it. For all well-informed members of the Church of England this also is mere matter of well-ascertained fact, open to the observation of any one who will study Hardwick's *History of the Articles*.

Dr. Whyte's English version, with its preliminary 'Biography' and 'Interpretation,' is one of extreme interest and value, especially as coming from the minister of 'St. George's Free Church, Edinburgh.' True—though he had before him the S.P.C.K. text—Dr. Whyte has not given the Devotions in the author's own order, nor has he restored the author's intercession for the departed. So far—and undoubtedly it is a serious deduction—the 'Devotions' presented in this English form are not those of Bishop Andrewes. Fact is fact; and in matters of this kind accuracy is of importance. It is due to the great Bishop that those who profess to represent him in so vital and sacred a matter as his 'Devotions,' should give not only the truth, so far as they may think fit, but the whole truth, as he left it, and left it, one cannot doubt, sincerely and advisedly. We do not wish to represent Bishop Andrewes as infallible. That is not the question. We only contend that what is given as Bishop Andrewes should be Bishop Andrewes. The question of order and arrangement, too, though not so serious, is still of importance. Surely the object is not to produce a useful and edifying book, according to our own idea and point of view, but to give what Bishop Andrewes found edifying, leaving it to others who may use his work to adopt or omit, according to their own spiritual discernment and

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sense of what is true and helpful to themselves. Dr. Whyte estimates Andrewes much more highly in the closet, as the compiler and user of this 'entrancing book,' this 'priceless book,' than in his public action as a bishop, and gives a curiously unfavourable criticism of his Sermons. But as regards the *Devotions*, he has that love of his author, and of his work, which are among the most needful qualifications of a translator. We are not, therefore, surprised that his translation, though not as close to the original, nor as independent of previous translations, as it might be, is such as will be welcomed by all lovers of Bishop Andrewes, and will be unquestionably spiritually helpful to such merely English readers as will use it seriously and devoutly.

Some Principles and Practices of the Spiritual Life. By B. W. MATURIN, Mission Priest of the Society of St. John the Evangelist, Oxford. (London and New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1896.)

KNOWLEDGE and vigour are the marks stamped on Father Maturin's chapters. 'I know in whom I have believed,' and 'so fight I not as one that beateth the air' might stand as the double motto of his book. His knowledge is personal, and he has entered into close contact with the needs of his brother men. It follows from this that he understands that the spiritual life is a combat. If he knows something of the serenity of Thomas à Kempis, he also knows that it must be preceded by war and storm, by the struggle of St. Laurence Scupoli. Only a fatal torpor can persuade us that there is any discharge in that war, and Father Maturin is just the man to brace up the failing warrior. Be sure, he says, in effect, that your 'Christian aim' is high and worthy of your calling.

'What a difference there is in the whole character and religious bearing between one whose struggle consists merely in an effort not to give in to any sharp speech and uncharitableness, and one who with the same fault sets himself with all his might to gain the love of God, and of others in and for God' (pp. 7, 8).

The virtue of contrition is the first at which a sinner must aim. It is characterized by a patient readiness to endure all that comes, by a strong decision to put away, at least from the heart, occasions of sin, and by a tender longing after holiness (pp. 18, 28, 31, 34). Mortification is 'the necessary outcome and the guardian of contrition'; it is 'the putting away of things, that in themselves are lawful, because of past sin'; and it is necessary because we must 'keep ourselves loose from the creatures' if we would end in God (pp. 36, 39, 47). The motive of the warrior demands this, for it is 'to fulfil as perfectly as possible the purpose for which' he 'was created by God and placed here upon earth.' That is to say, the principle of vocation is a fundamental rule of human life. It teaches us to see God's will in little things, to keep our will free till God's will is known in matters of pleasure or uncertainty, to hold our will in reserve, and to remember the difference between wishing and willing (pp. 56, 63, 69-71). This means that we must act upon the

principle of self-oblation, to be practised with suffering on earth, and to be the delight of the soul in eternity (p. 77). This conformity to the will of God is to be learned by the difficult practice of prayer. 'We must not gauge our devotion by what we feel, but rather by what we are ready to endure' (p. 105). It is true that each person must learn to pray for himself, but we should be greatly surprised if a struggling, earnest man told us that he had gained no help from Father Maturin's eminently practical chapter on Prayer (p. 94). Prayer lifts us up into the presence of God, and our prayers at the Holy Eucharist help us to realize this (pp. 123, 136). It is the indwelling presence of our Lord which explains what is meant by the hidden life (p. 155), which is 'the secret of the saints' (p. 159). 'Coming to Christ and abiding in Christ' are the two acts which sum up the whole Christian life (p. 160). If we are to abide in Christ we must give up everything that hinders the union between Christ and us, we must increasingly cling to Him, and must realize that He for His part will not let us go (pp. 171, 178, 180). There remains perseverance (p. 188), under whose guardianship men can 'enrich their souls with many virtues that mature and ripen to perfection' (p. 208). Rarely does such a book on the spiritual life come in our way, and when we do meet with such a one we reflect that the responsibility of having read it is great in proportion to its merit. We hope that it may be read, and that it may not be read in vain, by many Church people. Its teaching is of Him 'quem nosse vivere, cui servire regnare est.'

The Mind of the Master. By JOHN WATSON, D.D. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1896.)

WE should have no hesitation, from a mere literary point of view, in acknowledging that Dr. Watson has composed these religious papers with the skill which may be expected from the author of *Beside the Bonnie Brier Bush*. But when we have said that, we have no other favourable word left for the book. The extraordinary vagueness and indefinite generalities which mark the modern fashionable undenominationalism are prevailing characteristics in Dr. Watson's papers. These appear even in the titles which he has chosen—Jesus, our Supreme Teacher, the Development of Truth, the Sovereignty of Character, Ageless Life, Sin an Act of Self-Will, the Culture of the Cross, Faith the Sixth Sense, the Law of Spiritual Gravitation, Devotion to a Person the Dynamic of Religion, Judgment according to Type, Optimism the Attitude of Faith, Fatherhood the Final Idea of God, the Foresight of Faith, the Continuity of Life, and the Kingdom of God (pp. vii, viii.). And when we read the sections themselves, we find that they are largely occupied in explaining away what we have always regarded as certain, pouring contempt on those who give definite teaching, and putting we know not what in its place. Our readers will not want much detailed illustration of this kind of thing. They know very well how the Church and Faith of nineteen centuries are usually treated by the undenominationalist who professes universal toleration. There is, of course, the contrast drawn between the Creeds and the Sermon on the Mount (p. 15), which utterly

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ignores the facts that the dogmas of the Creed are germs of moral power, that the Sermon on the Mount contains tremendous claims of judicial sovereignty on the part of the Speaker which demand the theological statements of the Creeds, and that the four Gospels assign even more importance to the significance of the Lord's death than to the utterances of His gracious lips. There is the full quantity of depreciatory allusion to the 'theologians' and their 'metaphysical subtleties,' to the 'accumulated dogmas' of the Councils and the Fathers of the Church—which again entirely ignores the fact that conciliar and patristic action has been defensive, and that the terms of technical theology have been found to be the only adequate protection for the truth as it is in Jesus against the onslaughts of heresy (pp. 8, 21, 25, 54, 93, 119, 152, 169, 193, 251, 321, and indeed *passim*). But Dr. Watson himself shews into what very serious errors a man will probably fall if he attempts to talk about the profound mysteries of the Faith without the guidance which technical terms supply. If he had not treated theological definitions with an air of such superior disdain, as mistaken as it is fashionable, he might have been protected by them from some of his worst statements, such as: 'Twice Jesus was *carried beyond Himself* by anger' (p. 91); 'the most brilliant inspiration of Jesus' (p. 186); 'it must be admitted Jesus had moods, and in one of them *He sometimes lost heart*' (p. 240). It is not the way of the Fathers and theologians, for whom Dr. Watson has so much contempt, to speak of our Lord as on a level with any of His creatures, as is done on p. 208, where Plato is called 'the greatest prophet that has spoken outside the Hebrew succession,' and our Lord 'the chief prophet of Jew and Gentile.' We have merely given one or two instances of undesirable methods of speech. It would be easy to multiply them to a very large extent. And if the unvarying witness of the Catholic Church for nineteen centuries has any weight against the graceful productions of Dr. Watson's pen we are driven to the conclusion that he has most lamentably failed to express 'the mind of the Master.'¹

The Theology of the Old Testament. By Professor W. H. BENNETT, M.A. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1896.)

ONLY a master could successfully compress Old Testament theology into a volume of Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton's half-crown Theological Educator Series. Controversies are raging round the vast subject, and although the table of contents and the two indices of subjects and of passages quoted show that Mr. Bennett has worked hard and honestly, the complexity and range of his materials have overpowered him. He has not judged correctly about the relative importance of the various parts of his subject; he is diffuse when he

¹ Dr. Watson's shallow objections to doctrinal definitions and conciliar action are in singular contrast with Mr. Balfour's keen perception of their value (*Foundations of Belief*, p. 279). He could not do better than study *The Doctrine of the Incarnation*, under the Rev. R. L. Ottley's guidance (especially i. 321-4; ii. 273), before he again attempts to soar into the atmosphere of religion.

might have been brief, and brief when he ought to have been full. Moreover, there are many unsatisfactory passages. The first division of the book is entitled 'Jehovah and Israel,' and 189 pages are devoted to it, while the second division, on 'God and the Universe,' is dismissed in ten pages. The relation of Jehovah to Israel is first of all considered historically (pp. 7-75), and then in connexion with the prophetic idea of the Messianic Kingdom (pp. 79-94). The materials of these two inquiries form a base for a formal statement of the Old Testament teaching on Jehovah as the God of Israel (p. 97), Israel as the people of Jehovah (p. 123), and personal religion (p. 171). Mr. Bennett prints a table (p. xi.) to show the difference between the two chief schools of Old Testament study in the matter of dates. Mr. Bennett, when he has to choose between conflicting opinions, follows the school which is associated with the name of Professor Cheyne and others. Too much space has been given to the historical matter in chapter ii. (p. 7), while the important doctrinal passages in Isaiah xl.-lxvi. (p. 59) are not sufficiently enlarged upon. Mr. Bennett has, in fact, interpreted his title-word 'theology' much too loosely. On the subjects of the Kingdom of God (p. 79), the theology and Messianic character of the Psalms (pp. 67-8, 88, 92, 153), the kingly, prophetic and priestly offices of the Messiah (p. 87), the anthropomorphism and the theophanies of the Old Testament (pp. 99, 105), Mr. Bennett is much too short to be practically useful. And in the second division of the book he is positively misleading, because he assumes that 'strictly speaking the Old Testament has no doctrine of man as man, but only as Israelite' (p. 195). When Mr. Bennett says that 'Old Testament' (he often uses Old Testament without the article when his English requires it) 'offers no explanation of the origin or existence of evil' (p. 196), he appears to us to ignore the fact that in Gen. iii. we have a revelation from God of the origin of evil in the human race, and that is of immensely more importance to us than to be told how we are to account for the existence of evil in 'the serpent.' Our impression is that Mr. Bennett is not deep enough as a theologian to be a theological educator by means of a small text-book. The type is slightly disturbed on p. 217.

The Modern Reader's Bible. A series of works from the Sacred Scriptures presented in modern literary form. Edited with Introductions and Notes by Professor R. G. MOULTON, M.A. (Camb.), Ph.D. (Penn.) (New York and London: Macmillan and Co., 1895-6.)

FOR our part we have no desire to be presented with a Bible 'in modern literary form' like any other book. We have no doubt that it will survive such treatment, but we are by no means so certain that the process is likely to have any practical good results. Professor Moulton, however, thinks otherwise. Without entering upon any questions of theology or historic criticism he believes in the advisability of issuing the books of the Bible as 'portions of world-literature,' 'stripped of the mediæval and anti-literary form in which

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our current Bibles allow them to be obscured ; more particularly of the pointless divisions into chapters, and monotonous numbering of verses, under which all literary structure lies buried.' In this way he puts forward the books of Proverbs, Job, Ecclesiastes and Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, and, apparently as an afterthought, Deuteronomy. There is some careful work in the introductions and notes to these little books ; the text of the Revised Version is used, and reference tables to the ordinary chapters and verses are given. But the central feature which, in Professor Moulton's eyes, is to commend the series is the new-fangled literary form of the whole production. We are to put aside for the time being all the deeper reasons for which we read the Bible ; we are to forego the reflexion so wisely emphasized in the Bishop of Oxford's second Charge, that 'no other book comes to us with a claim authorized by the Church of our Baptism as containing the Word of God ;'¹ we are to stand, not on our Christian ground, but on the platform of literary admirers, as, let us say, Li Hung Chang might stand ; and what is really to charm us into patronizing Holy Scripture is to read such a stage aside in the Book of Job, just after the passage, 'I know that My Redeemer liveth,' as 'He nearly faints. A pause' (p. 57). Professor Moulton is actuated by the best intentions, and we hope that he may allure some readers to go farther and fare better. But it does not seem to have occurred to him that many members of the Church—which after all is the keeper of Holy Writ—will be shocked at his method and regard it as impertinent. He might as well expect a man to bear with patience a proposal to dress his mother in any other woman's clothes.

Little Books on Religion. Edited by W. R. NICOLL, LL.D.
(London : Hodder and Stoughton, 1895.)

THE peculiar shape of this series of 'little books,' of which the measure is about 7 by 3½ inches, will not commend them to many a true book lover. Readers who have leisure and power to read the great books of the world will not descend to the very much lower region of their contents, and the old-fashioned piety which has not yet discarded the Bible for the newspaper, or the sober literature of the Church of England for the new and cheap devotional manuals, will not care to hunt through pages of insipid matter for an occasional reward. If we are asked for what class of readers Dr. Nicoll's *Little Books on Religion* may be supposed to be suitable, we cannot for the life of us say. By no stretch of imagination can we fit these books on to any mental position with which we are acquainted. They are the inferior and indefinite productions of men who have in many cases written something else much better. Everything which the late Dr. Dale wrote is worth reading, but he produced much better work than his little contribution on 'Christ and the Future Life.' Professor Marcus Dods gives some very thin studies in Zechariah with the title 'The Visions of a Prophet.' Dr. Nicoll's own theme is

¹ The Bishop of Oxford's Second Visitation Charge (Clarendon Press), p. 10. Compare *Church Quarterly Review*, No. 72, p. 493.

'The Seven Words from the Cross,' which has been so fully preached upon by the best men that commonplace addresses are not required. There is no pretence made to show any connexion between the volumes of the series, and so we pass from our Lord's Sayings from the Cross to Dr. Whyte's discourses on 'The Four Temperaments—Sanguine, Choleric, Phlegmatic, and Melancholy'—containing, it is true, a good story or two from Jeremy Taylor, but even thinner than the rest of the series in original matter. He does not vex us, after all, so much as the Rev. J. Watson, who talks about 'The Upper Room' in a graceful way, which is much more suitable for his delightful stories in the Scotch dialect than for such solemn themes. These five little books, as might be expected from the names of their writers, are not without some excellent passages. But the general impression which they make upon us is that they are in merit what they are in form—extremely small and not to be desired.

Woman under Monasticism. Chapters on Saint-lore and Convent Life between A.D. 500 and A.D. 1500. By LINA ECKENSTEIN. (Cambridge: at the University Press. 1896.)

MISTRESS ECKENSTEIN may be sure that her book will find a ready sale. She has endeavoured to 'make the subject attractive to the general reader' (pref. p. xi), and she has succeeded. She recognizes much good in monasticism, and such a recognition has come to be popular in days of easy toleration, when many, if not more charitable towards the opinions of others, are at all events less definite in defence of their own than their forefathers were. She makes a large bid for the approval of a very large modern circle of readers when she exhibits the monastic life of the thousand years with which the book deals as providing a sphere for the woman who imagined that the home circle afforded insufficient scope for her energies or imposed impossible restrictions upon her aspirations (see pref. p. x). She can honestly say, 'I have not stinted such powers of labour as are mine' (pref. p. xii), and the details which all parts of the work contain, while they make the book somewhat unwieldy, and interfere with its really clear arrangement, supply continual evidence of industry, which is always respected.

The subject is not pursued into the wide field which is indicated by the title. It is, indeed, confined to English and German women, and the authoress confesses that her aim has been not so much to give a consecutive history of monasticism as it affected women, as to show how numerous are the directions in which the history can be pursued (pref. p. xi). The reader will be able, however, to trace the record with sufficient certainty if he consults the chapters on Frankish (A.D. 550-650) and Anglo-Saxon (A.D. 630-730) convents, and then proceeds to the convents of Saxon lands between A.D. 800 and 1000, and the new monastic orders which were founded between the tenth and twelfth centuries, consulting lastly the chapters on convent life in England from 1250 to 1500, pre-Reformation monastic reforms, and the sad pillage of the dissolution (pp. 45, 79, 143, 184, 354, 398, 432). After this chronological survey, it will be well to see

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what influence has been exercised upon women who have lived in community by certain famous men. The book provides abundant material for this interesting study in the case of Wilfrid (p. 95), Boniface (p. 118), and Gilbert of Sempringham (p. 213). By looking out a few references in the index further details can be obtained concerning Ambrose, Anselm, Benedict, Bernard and Francis of Assisi, and a mass of information about the famous houses at Barking, Chelles, Coldingham, Ely, Godstow, Quedlinburg, Shaftesbury, Sheppey, and Whitby. To this we should add the chapter on the art industries in the nunnery (p. 222), the treatment of philanthropic work (p. 285), and, above all, the copious materials upon the literature of women saints. For many readers this will, we doubt not, be quite a new field of inquiry. They will explore for the first time the writings of the nun Hrotsvith (p. 160), who sang the praises of chastity in dramas which followed the mode of Terence, and find in the Abbess Herrad's *Garden of Delights* a wealth of information on the customs, manners, conceptions, and mode of life of the twelfth century (p. 239, cp. p. 485). They may peruse the substance of the writings of 'women who were interested in the problems of the day' in the twelfth century, like St. Hildegard of Bingen and St. Elizabeth of Schönau (p. 256), or the more exalted mystic literature composed for nuns (p. 305), or by them, as in the Benedictine convent of Helfta in Saxony (p. 328), or the account of stormy Lutheran days contained in the *Memoir of Charitas Pirckheimer* (p. 458). There are but few clerical errors when we consider the large mass of facts which the authoress has incorporated into her work. But to the list of errors printed on p. xvi must be added one, more serious than any which are there noted, which speaks of 'Waynfleet, Bishop of Worcester' (p. 406). Would that we had no more to say, and that we could take leave of the work under review with nothing but a word of praise. But we have unfortunately to speak of it in a way which would really strike at its very heart if it possessed such a thing. The charge which we are grieved to make against it is that it is a book without a heart and soul. The elegance of its exterior form and the graceful varieties of its drapery only prepare us for a deeper disappointment when we find a dead chill figure beneath instead of the warmth and beauty of a living thing. This is a vital point, and means more than an objection which might very fairly be made against the work—that the writer (see especially the introductory chapter) builds very large theories upon very flimsy bases, and institutes very precarious comparisons in the matter of what is called 'the mother-age'; that she is far too ready on numerous occasions to assume a connexion between pagan and Christian customs; and that, on a subject into which we will not enter in the pages of the *Church Quarterly Review*, her remarks well-nigh led us to wish that we might close the book without reading further (p. 4). What our objection really means is that the subject is approached coldly from outside, without any inward affinity of mind on the writer's part. If we can imagine a highly cultivated German scholar, brought up in total ignorance of all Christian

realities, introduced without any previous knowledge of the rite to a Confirmation service, we may suppose that his account of it would be as perfect in regard to the outward scene as it would be without recognition of the inward communication of spiritual power. And in this careful investigation about the monastic life of women there is no more evidence of inward sympathy with the subject than an observant fish would have with the life of a bird. We can speak the more frankly about the impression which the book has made on us because we know nothing personally of the writer; but, after our study of it, we can think of nothing which chimes in so well with our thoughts and our regrets as the text which tells us that 'the natural man' understandeth not the things of the Spirit, 'because they are spiritually discerned.'¹ We conclude that the writer of this work has vainly thought that she can stand outside the Catholic Church and yet be able to describe the glow of life within it.

Eden Lost and Won. By Sir J. WILLIAM DAWSON. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1895.)

THE volume under this allusive title is an attempt on the part of 'a student of Nature who is also a Christian' to bring to bear on the Bible narratives the evidence supplied by 'all natural facts or facts relating to natural things.' With this object he traces the earlier story of the Old Testament, and illustrates it by such facts as geology or archæology can supply. For example, he finds in the high civilization of Egypt under the nineteenth dynasty, proof presumptive that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch. 'Moses was intellectually a product of the refined civilization of Egypt, naturally a man of power and genius, and, may we not add, spiritually a man very near to God.' The way in which he appears in the Pentateuch is in favour of his authorship. 'There is no formal biography or laboured eulogy,' but instead a gradually developed character. The author, of course, does not suggest that these remarks are an answer to those who maintain that Moses did not write the Pentateuch. They are, however, an answer to those who affirm roundly that he could not. Sir J. W. Dawson holds that the two earlier portions of Genesis which deal respectively with cosmogony and the patriarchal age were compiled from earlier documents left untouched by Moses, or merely annotated or modernized by him, while the later part gives us the original work of Moses himself. He does good service in quoting from Professor Green of Princeton a remark that 'the difference of diction in different sections of the Pentateuch is largely to be accounted for by the diversity of theme, or of the character of the composition.' This is a consideration not always present to the mind of some Higher Critics when they are weighing particles, and counting the number of times an unusual term occurs.

The account of the Creation of Man is shown to be 'quite in accordance with historical fact.' For Genesis conveys to us the idea of man being 'produced on some recently elevated alluvial plain,'

¹ 1 Cor. ii. 14.

and science shows that 'it has usually been on the latest geological formations that man has by preference settled.' The story of the first woman, Eve, and of the murder of Abel, is treated as the original out of which 'the fancy of poets of the later ages, and the inventions of priests,' have evolved the stories of Ishtar mourning for her dead son Tammuz. The three antediluvian races of the Sethites, the Cainites, and the Nephilim, find their fossil representatives, according to Sir J. W. Dawson, in the three races of Truchere, of Canstadt, and the gigantic Cro-Magnon race, all of the Palæanthropic period. Nimrod is identified with the Chaldean hero-hunter, Gisdubar, on the authority of Professor Hommel. The passage of the Red Sea at the Exodus is explained as due to a strong north-east wind driving out the ebb-tide 'by a Divine arrangement in favour of the fugitives.'

In the latter part of the volume, where the author discusses the Fall and Restoration, he has many interesting remarks on the influence for good or evil exerted over nature by a rational and moral being 'introduced into the world with power to assume mastery over it, and with capacity for multiplication and extension.' He makes short work of the theory of evolution, which he regrets has carried so many naturalists off their feet, and lays stress on the want of harmony in nature as proof sufficient of a catastrophe.

We have said enough to indicate to our readers the standpoint of the author. His work is one of a class not so common now as it used to be, which takes the Bible narrative as its *datum*, and then inquires what light for its better understanding can be drawn from other documents, instead of assuming that absolute truth has been reached by human reason, and then proceeding to see how much of the Bible can be made to square with its preconceived theories and conclusions.

Sketches from Eastern History. By THEODOR NÖLDEKE; translated by JOHN SUTHERLAND BLACK. (London and Edinburgh: A. and C. Black, 1892.)

ANYTHING from the pen of the learned Professor of Oriental Languages in the University of Strasburg is sure to be full of good reading. Nor is the present volume any exception. Consisting as it does of collected papers, some written so far back as 1872, it is somewhat discursive and unequal. It contains nine essays on Some Characteristics of the Semite Race, The Koran, Islam, Caliph Mansur, A Servile War in the East, Yakub the Coppersmith and his Dynasty, Some Syrian Saints, Barhebræus, and King Theodore of Abyssinia. Of these the best is that on Islam and the thinnest that on Some Syrian Saints. The paper on the Koran is as exhaustive as the limits of space allow, and its general estimate of that extraordinary collection one that can claim justly to be sound and accurate. It is interesting to note that Professor Nöldeke remarks the same temptation in the case of commentators on the Koran as we sometimes have to lament in the case of critics of our Sacred Scriptures:

'In default of clear allusions to well-known events, or events whose date can be determined, we might indeed endeavour to trace the psychologi-

cal development of the Prophet by means of the Koran, and arrange its parts accordingly. But in such an undertaking one is always apt to take subjective assumptions or mere fancies for established data.

This witness is true. The late Professor Mozley's remark that Mohammed knew that his followers would do two things, transact religious forms and fight, is emphasized by Professor Nöldeke, so far as the former of these is concerned, in the sentence :

'It is to be regretted that this prayer [the Lord's Prayer of the Moslems] must lose its effect through too frequent use, for every Moslem who says his five prayers regularly—as most of them do—repeats it not less than twenty times a day.'

But while Professor Nöldeke appraises the religion of Mohammed at its true value, and that, compared with Christianity, not a very high one, he is not blind to its relative value when compared with the religions of Darkest Africa.

'In the Dark Continent,' he says, 'which offers no favourable soil for Christianity, the acceptance even of Islam means progress from the deepest savagery to a certain culture, however limited and limiting, and to association with peoples who in the Middle Ages were higher in civilization than the people of Europe.'

On the whole, this volume affords some useful insight into several of the most critical movements in the history of Mohammedanism, as well as into its innermost spirit. It has the characteristic excellencies and drawbacks of all German writing—a painful and accurate collection of hard facts scientifically exposed, almost like the objects in a museum, but not illuminated and made to live by any broad and co-ordinating principle. The translation is vigorous and idiomatic, two qualities not always easy to secure in the process of distilling English from German. But *repristination*, which is used several times, is pedantic; 'the constituents of our present Koran' is not an English phrase, nor is 'this feature in their *dogmatic*.' Otherwise Mr. Black is to be congratulated on the scholarship which has enabled him to give so exact a rendering of the original without losing its tone and spirit.

Alethea: At the Parting of the Ways. By 'CYRIL.' Two volumes. (London: Burns and Oates, Limited.)

THE age immediately succeeding that which saw the Imperial establishment of Christianity is one admirably fitted for the framework of an historical novel; and of all places Constantinople, or New Rome, could best provide the furniture for an imposing dramatic display. There East and West met in conflict, or contributed each its share for a *tertium quid*. The Old Empire was losing itself in the new ecclesiastical supremacy, while the New was trying to hold its own against the followers of Mahomet and its own internal dissensions. Great characters, such as Heraclius and Justinian, pass across the scene, and leave a deep mark on history. All the materials of a striking narrative are provided, and ask only for the *vates sacer*. The author of these two volumes is no such

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inspired bard. He has admirable intentions, but not the power of carrying them out. He tells the story of Photius and Ignatius; how the former schemed to depose the latter that he might rule as Patriarch in his place, secure in the support of the Cæsar; and how the iniquitous plot of Photius was frustrated by the refusal of the successor of Peter to sanction by his supreme authority the deposition of Ignatius. This, with a background of somewhat inane love-making, constitutes the whole plot of this *jejune* story. The motive of the author is clear enough. It is to exalt the prerogatives of the Roman See, and to hold up to odium the men who were responsible, by their selfishness and cupidity, for the separation of the East from the West. He gives no hint that mutual jealousy was at work, that the conversion of Bulgaria had embittered the rivalry between the Patriarchs of Old and New Rome, and that the pretensions of the former under Nicholas I. were somewhat more extensive than they had been under Pope Victor or Pope Stephen. The colours are all strong, and no shading is allowed. Photius and the Cæsar Bardas, and all their supporters come out in a good, deep black; while Ignatius, the Turmarch, Theophylact, the beautiful Alethea and their sympathizers are all angels of light, only inferior to their ecclesiastical superior, the Pope himself. 'C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre.' The characters have little individuality of their own. They talk mild philosophy or re-echo the author's pious opinions about ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but they do it all in the same key, like puppets which pretend to speak of their own accord while their manipulator is the real agent. As a work of art we must pronounce *Alethea* a failure. It is, moreover, unhistorical in the worst sense of that word. It does not, indeed, put fictions for facts, but it shapes and collocates them in such a way that they give a false picture of the life and beliefs of the age in which they appear. Pope Nicholas was not wholly the unworldly saint that 'Cyril' dreams of. Gibbon's estimate that he 'was one of the proudest and most aspiring of the Roman pontiffs' has very much more evidence in its favour than can be produced for the character depicted here. The Cæsar Bardas, also, is too harshly dealt with. Moreover, it is quite certain that no Eastern Emperor would have tolerated the familiarity with which 'Cyril's' characters are made to approach their sovereign. In addition to all the other faults of *Alethea*, it is marred by the fundamental vice of attempting to enforce a particular theory by means of a story of human passion and human suffering.

A Charge delivered by William Stubbs, D.D., Bishop of Oxford, at his Third Visitation, May and June, 1896. (Oxford, 1896.)

EVERYTHING that the Bishop of Oxford writes demands the serious attention of the Church. There is ever a grasp in the manner in which he deals with the subject he is handling that shows an amount of thought, and a careful examination of it in the light which experience derived from past history is capable of throwing upon it, that compels his readers to examine carefully the conclusions at which he arrives, and the arguments on which he rests them. This is pre

eminently the case in the Charges which he addresses to his Diocese ; and the Charge recently given to his clergy contains most valuable remarks on some of the most interesting questions of the day. We shall endeavour to place before our readers a few sample paragraphs which have especially excited our admiration.

‘When the great Bishop Butler, in his primary Charge to the clergy of Durham in 1751, felt himself obliged to begin with a lamentation over the general decay of religion in this nation, he no doubt had in his eye, not only the increasing influence of professed and ostentatious worldliness, but the working of the pretentious philosophy of his own day. Fifteen years before he had said plainly that it was being taken for granted that the falsehood of the Christian religion was an agreed point among all persons of discernment. It is not indeed now true that among people of discernment the falsehood of the Christian religion can be said to be an agreed point ; and I trust that it has ceased to be at all true, to any extent as Bishop Butler thought, that there is an active zeal prevalent amongst us against everything good and sacred. But it is true that there are regions of society in which such zeal is active, and in which that zeal takes the form of controversial virulence, the painful characteristics of which cannot be exaggerated. . . . It is possibly true that the poison brings its own antidote—sometimes it may ; the outrageous tone of blasphemy must shock those who have any remnant of affection or respect for the truths that they have learned ; but it is not a sufficient antidote when it falls into the hands of those who, having education enough to make them think it a fine thing to question and doubt, have neither teaching enough, nor interest sufficiently real, to make them follow up the doubts and questions to a solution, or to realize the practical consequences that acquiescence in the sceptical attitude eventually brings’ (p. 78).

‘It is not, on a second thought, at all strange that we find the questions of Butler’s time so like the questions of our own. We pass in our Charges quite naturally from the matters of theology to those of practical experimental work. We repeat the warnings of his time and our own to the speculation and adventuresomeness which thinks that it can fulfil its functions when consciously or unconsciously disregarding revealed truth. We warn our young clergy to take heed to the soundness of their belief and loyalty of their spirit before they begin to teach their people—and when they do begin, to treat their material constructively, not controversially ; to attend to affirmative not polemical preaching, and careful and edifying instruction, pointed as well as ready handling of religious matter in all conversations into which we must enter on such topics’ (p. 11).

The Bishop discusses this question at considerable length and with great ability, and then turns to the consideration of Unity, which has recently excited a good deal of attention. On one feature of the controversy he says :

‘We cannot accept invitations to exhibit Unity by casting away beliefs that are an integral part of the deposit on which we are trying to build ourselves up in the Word, and whose history and development at all events is an integral part of that training by which we have been brought, so far as we have been brought, in the way of realizing the growing truth. From the one side, and from the other, comes the cry, “Lo ! here is Christ, or lo ! there.” From the one side the invitation,

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Cast away the discipline, in which you have learned of Him as you have learned, and take up an ancient, imperious, authoritative assumption that the whole Unity of past, present, and future is in the rock of St. Peter, as it claims to be, forgetting that St. Peter's rock was Christ, and not less ours than theirs. We cannot follow. And on another side, Come, and we will build a tower that shall reach up to heaven; only cast away the dogmatic chains in which you have been trained, declare yourselves free from creeds and articles, and we shall present to the world a Unity that shall convince the world; a Unity, Heaven help us, which without one real conviction of its own can carry confusion only worse confounded, wherever it works. We cannot follow' (pp. 19-20).

He next examines the question of divorce, when he states that his own personal view was that neither the guilty nor the innocent party should marry again; but that with respect to the innocent party he would not urge his view in face of the contrary opinion held by persons whose opinions must carry weight.¹ He greatly regrets the continued agitation to legalize marriage with a deceased wife's sister, and he thus concludes his remarks on the subject:

'I can say nothing new about this. I will not suggest compromise. If the thing is to be done, it must involve an extension of the system of civil marriage, which is indeed a small part of the evil; it must involve the reconstruction of domestic relations of the closest character; and it means a store of ecclesiastical difficulties that I shudder to contemplate. As a minor matter, I must protest distinctly against the cogency of arguments derived from the practice of Churches and countries in which the sanctity of marriage is of less account than it is in England. The arguments are far-fetched, and singularly unreal in the mouths of men who, to their credit be it said, would be the last to admit the relevance of the analogy in other matters' (p. 31).

After paying a few words of deserved commendation to those who successfully resisted the attempt to disestablish the Church in Wales, he proceeds to examine certain proposals for reform in the Church. He approves the Bill on the subject before Parliament, but deprecates the agitation that is being raised by some assistant curates in the matter of patronage. Concerning it he says:

'The one point is to get the right man in the right place. The two prejudicial influences that I mentioned are, first, the idea that all pastoral work is very much alike, so that the place, wherever it may be, and whatever the sort of its inhabitants and traditions, may be satisfied with any man of ordinary or average competency; and second, the idea that all qualified clergymen are pretty much alike; their accomplishments, experience, and natural qualifications making little or no difference in relation to the work entrusted to them. Of course, so stated, the absurdity is patent. No two places are alike, no two men are equal—

¹ It is with great respect that we venture to record our surprise and regret at the Bishop's reluctance to press his own belief that marriage is absolutely indissoluble. It might be anticipated that the personal view of a theologian who possesses the Bishop of Oxford's profound historical knowledge and keen insight into human life would be a well grounded doctrine. And in this matter there are weighty reasons for believing that this the case.—ED.

but the idea is there ; and we are told practically that in selecting and accepting candidates for ordination, we are stamping them with a mark that qualifies them for any sort of pastoral work ' (p. 35).

The Bishop regards as equally absurd the claim that curates should have fixity of tenure, for 'it is of essential importance that in a parish where the assistance of a curate is required there should be entire working sympathy between curate and incumbent ' (p. 37). The Bishop then examines other proposals of Church Reform, and gives excellent advice to the younger clergy. He further emphasises what he had said in a previous Charge about the absolute duty of giving definite religious instruction in elementary schools, and he attributes the opposition to it to a mental revolt against the principle of authority. He concludes with a spirited defence of the principle of an Established Church ; and with thanks to the many clergy and churchwardens who attended his visitation, coupled with a few caustic words to the younger clergy who 'of course have less to learn than we older ones.'

We shall be glad if the extracts we have made should persuade our readers to study this valuable Charge for themselves, from which they cannot fail to derive instruction and profit.

The Churchman's History of England. By M. S. BAYLIS. (London : J. Masters and Co., 1895.)

WE can cordially recommend this little manual, as supplying a real want which every teacher of English history in Church schools must have felt. We have admirable little 'Primers' and 'Epochs' dealing with various periods of English history, and we have a good *Historical Reader* for elementary schools, by Miss C. M. Yonge, which has, it is needless to say, a good Church tone ; but a manual giving a general conspectus of English history from a Churchman's point of view, and adapted for a rather more advanced class than the children of our National schools, was a desideratum which is now, in many respects successfully, supplied by Mr. Baylis. Considering the vast amount of matter which he has had to pack within his 268 pages, he has made wonderfully few slips in details—though there are a few, which will be pointed out presently—and, as he has wisely taken for his guides the best authorities in each period, his general estimates are always the right ones. The title of his book is a little misleading, and our first glance at it led us to fear that the most embarrassing and unpleasant of all tasks was before us—the task of condemning a book which our principles would fain have led us to commend. *The Churchman's History of England!* Why should the Churchman have a different History of England from anybody else? Facts are stubborn things, and history is history, whether it be for a Churchman, or a dissenter, or an unbeliever. A fair field and no favour is all that the Churchman demands. The manipulation of history to suit the views of a particular party is, to our mind, as objectionable when made in favour of Churchmen as of any other people. Nay, much more so, for the appeal to history is the strongest ground which a Churchman can take ; and it is most provoking

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when he gives, quite unnecessarily, occasion to the enemy to blaspheme by claiming what he has no right to claim, and ignoring what he has no right to ignore. But Mr. Baylis has most agreeably disappointed us. In spite of its title, nothing is more conspicuous in his work than its fairness all round. 'The Churchman' will find no sentiment in it which he may not boldly assert in any company, and if it be an unprejudiced and well-informed company, he will not find himself contradicted. Indeed, Mr. Baylis might fairly have brought some Churchmen into a little more prominence. 'The Churchman' should hardly be left without knowing that Archbishop Plegmund had much to do with forming the character and directing the energies of the best of all English kings; but in the account of King Alfred's work, the name of Plegmund never once occurs. 'The Churchman' might with advantage have had more strongly impressed upon him the services rendered to his country by another great Churchman, Archbishop Lanfranc, who is dismissed with a very cursory notice. Archbishops Parker and Whitgift were too prominent figures in the glorious Elizabethan era for one to be noticed only casually, and the other to be ignored altogether; and another body of very excellent Churchmen, the nonjurors, are too slightly, not to say contemptuously, referred to. But the general impression left by Mr. Baylis's book is favourable—in other words, just—to that National Church which has been, beyond all comparison, the most important factor in moulding the national life. We have only met with one instance in which the most vehement anti-Churchman can with any show of justice accuse Mr. Baylis of claiming too much for his Church. It is rather too sweeping a statement to attribute the *whole* of the education of the poor in the early part of the nineteenth century to the work of the National Society. The British and Foreign School Society was a little earlier in date; and though it accomplished incomparably less than its slightly younger sister, yet it did do something.

If, as we sincerely trust it will, the manual reaches another edition, it would be well if Mr. Baylis paid some attention to the style. He is evidently not a practised writer, and his sentences are sometimes exceedingly involved and awkward. This drawback is enhanced by a strangely eccentric method of punctuation. He uses semicolons where most people would use brackets; commas appear in the most unexpected places, and are omitted where one would expect them, and so forth. The following instances, which might be multiplied *da capo*, will illustrate what is meant: 'Anselm, a man of great reputation, refused to accept the post, but at length, after great importunity; it is said that the archbishop's cross was forced into his hands; he consented' (p. 30). 'The latter, [Thomas Becket] was a great friend of the king's, and entered into all his plans, thus, on the death of the Primate, in 1162, Thomas was chosen as his successor' (p. 36). 'Next year both parties had wearied of the dispute, and disposed to make concessions were reconciled' (p. 38). 'Following the example of his grandfather, Henry I., in 1166 by the Assize or Edict of Clarendon, judges were sent' &c. (p. 40). 'The king had outlived the popularity of his earlier years, and for some

time seemed to have lost all energy, the country was in a discontented state, the Prince of Wales; now helping the King of Castile to retain his throne; was in delicate health, and matters generally were in an unsatisfactory condition' (p. 66). A few errors have crept in, as was inevitable, and we think Mr. Baylis will be glad to have them pointed out. The name of the famous Bishop of Sherborne is sometimes spelt Aldhelm, sometimes Ealdhelm, but never, so far as we are aware, 'Adhelm' (p. 15). It is not correct to say that Ethelred did not become Ethelred the Unready until after the death of Dunstan (p. 17); he never *would* listen to the counsel of Dunstan. Canute was not baptized after his accession (p. 18), but at least three years before it, though it is quite true that after his baptism he was practically a heathen until he became king. The Royal supremacy was not a new thing, but the title of 'Supreme Head' was, before Henry VIII. claimed it (p. 104). 'Well-meaning' (p. 111) is a singularly inappropriate epithet to give to the church robber and fratricide Somerset. The story of Pope Paul IV. and Elizabeth (p. 120) is of doubtful authority. It was not the 'unconstitutional' (p. 143), but anti-puritan nature of Dr. Montague's work that incensed the Commons against him. Walpole did not say 'Every man has his price' (p. 210), but 'all these men have their price,' pointing to a group of politicians, which was a very different matter.

It will be seen that none of these slips are of any great importance, and we can honestly congratulate Mr. Baylis on having done well a useful and by no means easy task.

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